Tony Blair: military intervention in rogue regimes 'more necessary than ever'
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Pastor Dale Morgan
Sep 1, 2010, 4:24:29 PM9/1/10
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Perilous Times
Tony Blair: military intervention in rogue regimes 'more necessary than ever'
Former PM defends foreign policy record, revealing that the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan has not diminished his commitment to taking on opponents
* Owen Bowcott
* guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 September 2010 13.08 BST
Tony Blair addresses British troops in Basra Tony Blair addresses British troops in Basra, southern Iraq, in 2003. Photograph: Reuters
Globalisation has made military intervention in rogue regimes overseas more necessary than ever, Tony Blair argues in his memoirs. Not toppling Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, is one regret voiced by the former prime minister.
His belief that Iran needs to be confronted in its nuclear ambitions and as a last resort prevented by force shines through. The experience of Iraq and Afghanistan has not diminished his commitment to taking on opponents.
His appetite for international affairs, he admits, has been sharpened by his role as a mediator in the Middle East. "Personally I have never felt a greater sense of frustration or indeed a greater urge to leadership," he writes in his postscript.
But it was the Balkans that formed the crucible for his new policy of liberal interventionism. "My awakening over foreign policy was ... abrupt," he explains. "It happened over Kosovo."
Distinctions between foreign and domestic policy are breaking down as consequence of globalisation, he maintains. Television news beams foreign crises into every living room. "The world [is] interconnected not just economically or in self-interest but emotionally, the heart as well as the head."
Looking back he admits he was surprised: "The 1997 campaign was fought almost exclusively on a domestic policy basis. If you had told me on that bright May morning as I first went blinking into Downing Street that during my time in office I would commit Britain to fight four wars, I would have been bewildered and horrified."
Foreign policy based on "narrow self-interest" is outdated, he asserts. "Global alliances [have to] be ... based on shared global values." That realisation has resulted in the undermining of the old political divisions of left and right.
"We ended up in the bizarre position where being in favour of the enforcement of liberal democracy was a 'neoconservative' view and non-interference in another nation's affairs was 'progressive'."
Kosovo was his first test. The "ethnic cleansing" and killings "completely changed my own attitude to foreign policy", he admits. While Europe stalled, in favour of pacification rather than resolution, Blair was "extraordinarily forward in advocating a military solution".
He persuaded Bill Clinton, the US president, he suggests, to take part in aerial bombardments even though there was no direct US interest in the region. "I saw it essentially as a moral issue. And that, in a sense, came to define my view on foreign and military intervention."
Clinton, he says, was "the most formidable politician I had ever encountered". He exults in their close political empathy, describing them on one occasion working US crowds "like two old music hall queens".
Many opposed Blair. He compresses their counter-arguments. "Beginning wars is relatively easy; it's ending them that's hard. Innocent people die; unintended consequences develop; bad situations can be made worse."
On the range of his military targets, he comments: "People often used to say to me: If you got rid of the gangsters in Sierra Leone, [Slobodan] Milošević, the Taliban and Saddam, why can't you get rid of Mugabe? The answer is I would have loved to, but it wasn't practical (since, in his case, and for reasons I never quite understood, the surrounding African nations maintained a lingering support for him and would have opposed any action strenuously)."
Over Kosovo, Blair recounts how he tried to "stoke up concern" with other European leaders. Kosovo became the template for his subsequent military interventions. His close relationship with and affection for his generals is a recurring theme.
"The leader has to decide whether the objective is worth the cost," he states. "What's more, he or she must do so unsure of what the exact cost might be or the exact price of failing to meet the objective. ... In this context, by the way, indecision is also decision ... Omission and commission both have consequences."
The expedition to restore democracy to Sierra Leone in 2000, Blair says, "is one of the least discussed episodes of my 10 years as prime minister, but it's one of the things of which I am most proud." His father used to teach at Freetown University in the African nation's capital.
The former prime minister's discussion of his early foreign adventures contain remarkably few references to United Nations resolutions or international law, considering he is a lawyer by training.
In one passage he comes curiously close to expressing a sneaking admiration for the bold action of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 rather than Kerensky's social democrat government.
Seeking to systematise his theory of foreign interventions in regimes that are "oppressive or dictatorial", he writes: "They may pose no outside or external threat; or it may be easily contained diplomatically. It may – as with Mugabe – be impractical to intervene."
A judgment has to be made. "If change will not come by evolution, should it be done by revolution? Should those who have the military power contemplate doing so?"
On Iraq, he insists that he never regarded those who opposed war in Iraq as "stupid or weak-minded".
About 9/11, he concedes that: "I misunderstood the depth of the challenge ... If I had known then that a decade later we would still be fighting in Afghanistan, I would have been profoundly disturbed. I hope I would have still taken the same decision, both there and in respect of Iraq."
Blair is uncompromising in the face of the dangers he perceives in Tehran, discussing them in the context of the growing danger that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons. "It is America that leads the challenge to Iran and its nuclear ambitions," he says. "But let us be frank: Iran is a far more immediate threat to its Arab neighbours than it is to America ... That's why Iran matters. Iran with a nuclear bomb would mean others in the region acquiring the same capability; it would dramatically alter the balance of power in the region, but also within Islam."
In his interview with the Guardian, he declared: "I wouldn't take the risk of Iran with a nuclear weapon."
Speaking to Andrew Marr in a BBC interview to be broadcast in full tonight, Blair says: "I think it is wholly unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability and I think we have got to be prepared to confront them, if necessary militarily. I think there is no alternative to that if they continue to develop nuclear weapons. They need to get that message loud and clear."
Tony Blair: military intervention in rogue regimes 'more necessary than ever'
Former PM defends foreign policy record, revealing that the experience of Iraq and Afghanistan has not diminished his commitment to taking on opponents
* Owen Bowcott
* guardian.co.uk, Wednesday 1 September 2010 13.08 BST
Tony Blair addresses British troops in Basra Tony Blair addresses British troops in Basra, southern Iraq, in 2003. Photograph: Reuters
Globalisation has made military intervention in rogue regimes overseas more necessary than ever, Tony Blair argues in his memoirs. Not toppling Robert Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, is one regret voiced by the former prime minister.
His belief that Iran needs to be confronted in its nuclear ambitions and as a last resort prevented by force shines through. The experience of Iraq and Afghanistan has not diminished his commitment to taking on opponents.
His appetite for international affairs, he admits, has been sharpened by his role as a mediator in the Middle East. "Personally I have never felt a greater sense of frustration or indeed a greater urge to leadership," he writes in his postscript.
But it was the Balkans that formed the crucible for his new policy of liberal interventionism. "My awakening over foreign policy was ... abrupt," he explains. "It happened over Kosovo."
Distinctions between foreign and domestic policy are breaking down as consequence of globalisation, he maintains. Television news beams foreign crises into every living room. "The world [is] interconnected not just economically or in self-interest but emotionally, the heart as well as the head."
Looking back he admits he was surprised: "The 1997 campaign was fought almost exclusively on a domestic policy basis. If you had told me on that bright May morning as I first went blinking into Downing Street that during my time in office I would commit Britain to fight four wars, I would have been bewildered and horrified."
Foreign policy based on "narrow self-interest" is outdated, he asserts. "Global alliances [have to] be ... based on shared global values." That realisation has resulted in the undermining of the old political divisions of left and right.
"We ended up in the bizarre position where being in favour of the enforcement of liberal democracy was a 'neoconservative' view and non-interference in another nation's affairs was 'progressive'."
Kosovo was his first test. The "ethnic cleansing" and killings "completely changed my own attitude to foreign policy", he admits. While Europe stalled, in favour of pacification rather than resolution, Blair was "extraordinarily forward in advocating a military solution".
He persuaded Bill Clinton, the US president, he suggests, to take part in aerial bombardments even though there was no direct US interest in the region. "I saw it essentially as a moral issue. And that, in a sense, came to define my view on foreign and military intervention."
Clinton, he says, was "the most formidable politician I had ever encountered". He exults in their close political empathy, describing them on one occasion working US crowds "like two old music hall queens".
Many opposed Blair. He compresses their counter-arguments. "Beginning wars is relatively easy; it's ending them that's hard. Innocent people die; unintended consequences develop; bad situations can be made worse."
On the range of his military targets, he comments: "People often used to say to me: If you got rid of the gangsters in Sierra Leone, [Slobodan] Milošević, the Taliban and Saddam, why can't you get rid of Mugabe? The answer is I would have loved to, but it wasn't practical (since, in his case, and for reasons I never quite understood, the surrounding African nations maintained a lingering support for him and would have opposed any action strenuously)."
Over Kosovo, Blair recounts how he tried to "stoke up concern" with other European leaders. Kosovo became the template for his subsequent military interventions. His close relationship with and affection for his generals is a recurring theme.
"The leader has to decide whether the objective is worth the cost," he states. "What's more, he or she must do so unsure of what the exact cost might be or the exact price of failing to meet the objective. ... In this context, by the way, indecision is also decision ... Omission and commission both have consequences."
The expedition to restore democracy to Sierra Leone in 2000, Blair says, "is one of the least discussed episodes of my 10 years as prime minister, but it's one of the things of which I am most proud." His father used to teach at Freetown University in the African nation's capital.
The former prime minister's discussion of his early foreign adventures contain remarkably few references to United Nations resolutions or international law, considering he is a lawyer by training.
In one passage he comes curiously close to expressing a sneaking admiration for the bold action of the Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 rather than Kerensky's social democrat government.
Seeking to systematise his theory of foreign interventions in regimes that are "oppressive or dictatorial", he writes: "They may pose no outside or external threat; or it may be easily contained diplomatically. It may – as with Mugabe – be impractical to intervene."
A judgment has to be made. "If change will not come by evolution, should it be done by revolution? Should those who have the military power contemplate doing so?"
On Iraq, he insists that he never regarded those who opposed war in Iraq as "stupid or weak-minded".
About 9/11, he concedes that: "I misunderstood the depth of the challenge ... If I had known then that a decade later we would still be fighting in Afghanistan, I would have been profoundly disturbed. I hope I would have still taken the same decision, both there and in respect of Iraq."
Blair is uncompromising in the face of the dangers he perceives in Tehran, discussing them in the context of the growing danger that terrorists will obtain nuclear weapons. "It is America that leads the challenge to Iran and its nuclear ambitions," he says. "But let us be frank: Iran is a far more immediate threat to its Arab neighbours than it is to America ... That's why Iran matters. Iran with a nuclear bomb would mean others in the region acquiring the same capability; it would dramatically alter the balance of power in the region, but also within Islam."
In his interview with the Guardian, he declared: "I wouldn't take the risk of Iran with a nuclear weapon."
Speaking to Andrew Marr in a BBC interview to be broadcast in full tonight, Blair says: "I think it is wholly unacceptable for Iran to have a nuclear weapons capability and I think we have got to be prepared to confront them, if necessary militarily. I think there is no alternative to that if they continue to develop nuclear weapons. They need to get that message loud and clear."
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