Anthropology Free Lectures
Sherry Galeazzi
Rather than treating ethics as an object or as an isolable domain in moral theory, the authors are interested in grasping how the ethical and the moral emerge from social actions and interactions, how they are related to historical contexts and cultural settings, how they are transformed through their confrontation with the political, and how they are, ultimately, an integral part of life. Contrasting in their perspectives and methods, but developing a lively conversation, this masterclass provides four distinct voices to compose what will be an essential guide for an anthropology of the ethical and the moral in the twenty-first century.
The James R. Bindon Endowed Lecture Series on Biocultural Anthropology and Health features guest scholars who can speak to interdisciplinary questions that make biocultural anthropology such a vibrant area for research and study. This series, and the endowment establishing it, are named in honor of our retired colleague, Jim Bindon.
The ALLELE series is hosted by a steering committee at The University of Alabama called the Evolution Working Group (EVOWOG). EVOWOG participation is open to any UA faculty or affiliated educators or scholars whose teaching or research interests are evolution-oriented. Department of Anthropology faculty serving on this committee include Keith Jacobi, and Chris Lynn.
The Skomp Distinguished Lecture Series in Anthropology is made possible by an endowment provided to the Indiana University Anthropology department in 1983 by David Skomp (A.B. 1962; M.S. 1965). Mr. Skomp studied under the direction of Dr. George Neumann. He left the remainder of this estate for the use of the department. The Skomp Endowment currently provides support for anthropology students in the form of first-year fellowships, summer field research grants, dissertation-year fellowships, and distinguished lectures.
Now that there are Cambridge Critical Guides for Kant's major works, Cambridge University Press is adding lesser-known works, such as Kant's Lectures on Anthropology, to the series. In her introduction, the editor Alix Cohen admits that these lectures have long been ignored and "deemed a peculiar collection of more or less pointless remarks on a variety of random topics vaguely related to human beings" (2), and that they are criticized for their "stereotyping, prejudice and bigotry" (2). Yet, the last twenty years have seen a revival of scholarly interest in them. Cohen's volume is part of the ongoing rediscovery of Kant's empirical (or impure) philosophy. This rediscovery has helped to correct or mitigate some long-standing misunderstandings, for instance the notion that Kant is only interested in abstract, transcendental matters and that he pays no attention to the social and historical embeddedness of human existence.
According to Cohen's introduction, there are three main reasons why attention to the Lectures on Anthropology can enrich current debates. Firstly, as the course of lectures most frequently taught by Kant over the span of thirty years (from 1772/3 to 1795/6), they help us follow and understand transformations in Kant's thought. Secondly, they afford insight into how Kant's anthropological thought is integrated with his transcendental philosophy and his other writings. Thirdly, they help us flesh out the empirical dimensions of Kant's philosophy.
I propose to add a fourth reason: Kant's anthropology is pragmatic. Pragmatic anthropology differs from science (such as empirical anthropology and empirical psychology) in its standards, methods and goals. As Cohen rightly states, Kant intends his lectures on anthropology as a way to help students "make their knowledge relevant, applicable and useful" (1) and to convey material to his young students that would be useful for many aspects of their lives. The lecture notes on anthropology therefore also help us to understand what Kant thought the responsibilities of academics (himself included) towards the public are, and how philosophers can and should engage and educate the public. I will discuss this theme first, and then the essays that do not develop this point.
Gary Hatfield argues that in the Lectures on Anthropology Kant's pragmatic aim with regard to the senses is to explain to his students the nature of illusions and the workings of their senses. For this purpose Kant starts from the "everyday phenomenology of sensory experience" (39) of his audience. He makes use of scientific, psychological theory for a deeper explanation of this phenomenology and to facilitate his pragmatic purpose. Kant aims to distinguish his pragmatic anthropology both from empirical psychology and from physiology, which is the study of human beings according to nature or as part of nature, not as what they make of themselves. Hatfield's essay, in addition to containing useful material about Kant's notion of sense, is also an exemplary study of the pragmatic aim of Kant's anthropology and of how and to what end Kant draws on scientific theory in order to facilitate this aim.
Alix Cohen's contribution is a rich discussion of the anthropological dimension of Kant's account of cognition. She argues that Kant "not only acknowledges the empirical, contingent and messy features of our cognition," but that his account "also helps us become better, more efficient knowers" (76). Cognitive differences between different human beings and the diversity of human talents are nature's means to secure the two natural purposes of humanity: cognitive survival and progress of the species. Natural and cognitive differences result in antagonism and disagreement. For the resolution of disagreement we need to develop our cognitive capacities. Furthermore, we need to institute laws or procedures to regulate disagreement and antagonism. Cohen then criticizes Kant. His Lectures on Anthropology are supposed to "provide the empirical knowledge we need to succeed and reach our vocation" (85). The problem is that Kant seems to think that our faculty and process of cognition are not in our control and we therefore cannot improve them (Cohen cites XXV:488 for this). Cohen argues against Kant that an agent has sufficient control over cognitive matters. We have control over what to investigate, and it is up to us to withhold judgment. Most importantly, we have control over our epistemic principles or our way of thinking. Pragmatic anthropology therefore can be of assistance for Kant's audience and readers.
G. Felicitas Munzel's essay is about the relation between morality, education and anthropology in the Friedlnder notes. In order to show what education can achieve on Kant's framework, Munzel provides an overview of the rational capacities and possible deficiencies of rational agents. Against these deficiencies four levels of constraint are imposed on rational agents: civil order, propriety, moral order, and conscience (in other writings, these four are respectively called discipline, cultivation, civilization, and moralization). These constraints establish conditions under which morality can develop. The philosopher can facilitate this development by educating the educators who in turn educate the broader public. The moral formation of the human being is made possible by nature, but is only realized by education. Munzel's stimulating contribution shows the potential of Cohen's volume at its best: our understanding of an important and puzzling issue, the role of education in Kant, is illuminated via material from the Lectures on Anthropology. My only complaint is that Munzel's discussion of the intricate question of how agents can make a transition from pre-moral rational capacities to morality on pages 187-88 is far too short, and the answer simply does not become clear. The reader will wonder as much as before how society and education can facilitate the first steps to moral agency.
John Zammito closes the volume with another fine example of how Kant's Lectures on Anthropology are pragmatic. He notices that despite changes in Kant's philosophy and in the anthropological knowledge of the time, Kant's conceptions of the characteristics in his lectures, encompassing a discussion of temperament, personal character, national characters, the sexes, races, and the species as a whole, remains largely unchanged over thirty years. Zammito argues that this is the case since the living circumstances of Kant's pupils did not change considerably. Kant therefore thought no changes necessary in order to fulfill anthropology's pragmatic goal. His aim was to teach his young hearers something useful for their lives without overburdening them with theory, and he thought the characteristics can help students make sense of and deal with people and that they are generally accessible. Zammito emphasizes that, even though Kant claims that his teachings concerning the characteristics are systematic and empirical, or grounded in observation, they are a "practical guide" (235) and not science.
Kant believes that philosophers can and should philosophize about a great range of subjects and can engage the public with useful lessons from all areas of philosophy. If philosophers start from everyday phenomenology or ordinary elements of human existence and articulate these elements clearly and in a systematic manner, the audience can benefit from this with regard to a great variety of subjects (the senses, cognition, psychology, etc.). Kant's method and goals in his anthropology lectures show surprising similarities to his ethics, which, according to the Groundwork, starts from "common moral rational cognition" (IV:393.3), systematizes and vindicates this cognition and, finally, is supposed to serve moral educators as a guideline for improving the public (IV:391.34-392.2, V:163). I believe it would be interesting to discuss in what sense this is a general structure of Kant's philosophy and pertains also, for instance, to his political philosophy, theoretical philosophy and his aesthetics. The essays in Cohen's volume that I just summarized make a valuable contribution towards this.
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