Subjective truth

[Rami Rustom]

I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
without explaining what it is. So I said:

What is a subjective truth?

Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than
vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.

Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better
than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there
are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.

So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are
objective truths (or falsehoods).

Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be
subjective truths?


So he replied:

Start quote.

> Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact. It may be objectively true an individual holds a certain opinion, but it is an objective statement about something inherently subjective.
>
> When I say value-based statements, I mean values which will determine what is good or bad or what motivates us as people. There is an important distinction between objective and subjective values: Objective values only make empirical measurements which can be objectively falsified, and subjective values indicate what is important to humans and cannot be falsified — at best, you may determine what opinions are most collectively held or most popular, even if you may be able to in principle falsify whether or not they truly hold those opinions with some advanced brainwave-reading lie detector.
>
> Objectivity holds no opinions. It does not know a flavor is good or bad. No such values are objective.
>
> Now, you may believe objectivity may be superior to subjectivity, but this is a bit of a mistake. When it comes to discovering scientific truths, yes, objectivity is best… but not for enriching our lives, or even for our own survival — individually or collectively. That is, unless objectivity is used in a way subordinate to subjectively determined goals, in which case you may use objective metrics to determine whether or not something is conducive toward your goal.
>
> Objectively, there is no reason to value your life or the human race — there is only a biological self-preservation mechanism, and built-in mechanisms to ensure we will be distressed if other human beings are being hurt. My amygdala will emotionally stir me if I witness a murder. But it is a mistake to confuse this objective cause with truth. All thoughts, all opinions, and all of consciousness arises from objective events in our brains, and yet that does not make our beliefs true. Even demonstrably false beliefs held by humans can only be held in the first place because our brains. Prey animals will want to cling to life at all costs, and predators will want to catch them and end their lives at all costs, yet both are programmed by nature to value their own lives, even when these desires are in conflict.
>
> If one values only objective truth, this inevitably leads us down the path of nihilism. Objectivity has nothing to say about our lives, our species. It has no opinions. Yet, at the same time, there is objectively no reason to not value our lives — it is indifferent, objectivity will not protest. Objectivity and subjectivity are like water and oil; they will not blend together. But both are components of our experience as humans, thus becomes a gestalt in the full picture of conscious experience.
>
> As I will behold this vantage point throughout my entire life as a human being, it behooves me to value both major components of the human experience. I value objectivity and subjectivity. And when you think about it, if I choose to value objectivity, I am still making a subjective determination about the value of objectivity, as objectivity cannot value itself — the subjective factor simply is; it is for you to decide if it is good or bad.
>
> This is an ineluctable truth: Everything which motivates us sprouts from a subjective axiom. These subjective axioms have an objective cause, yet as everything in the purview of the objective realm has no subjective value coloration, this neither validates nor invalidates the opinions. It is neither objectively good nor bad we hold these subjective beliefs, and indeed to say anything is objectively good or bad is oxymoronic. Objectively, all of this simply is. Subjectively, it is our prerogative as individuals to decide; our beliefs and opinons can only be self-vindicated, or shared by others.
>
> My choice is that both personal and collective values are vitally important in my experience as a human.

End quote.


What do you think?

-- Rami Rustom
http://ramirustom.blogspot.com

[Brett Hall]

On 25/01/2013, at 5:15, "Rami Rustom" <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
> without explaining what it is. So I said:
>
> What is a subjective truth?

In epistemology there is subjective (meaning biased, poorly reasoned, just a matter of opinion, so forth) and objective (carefully controlled, not merely a matter of taste, so forth. So for example, aspects of aesthetics are objective, not only subjective). Subjectivity in this sense is often thought of as be derogatory.

The part of philosophy called "Ontology" is about what exists. If you think that you don't have any internal experience of the world, if you have no mind or subjectivity, then you can reject this distinction I am about to make. If you think other people are (philosophical) zombies, without an internal experience of the world that they interpret, this will make no sense. If you *actually are* a zombie, this likewise will make no sense to you. the philosopher Daniel Dennet does not believe in consciousness and that people have an internal experience of the world. at least he has an argument he says he believes for that view. He is a zombie (I take him seriously). But I know he is wrong because I know consciousness exists. I am experiencing it now and my best explanation of the world entails its first person existence. Objectivity in this sense is about objects outside your mind, outside your interpretations of them. Apples and tables exist out there but we only have interpretations of them, not direct access. Subjectivity *is* "your set of interpretations" or, another way this is usually put, "how things *seem* to you". The apple or table seems a certain way. You don't have direct access to the object. But those things really exist.

A subjective truth of the ontological kind then is something about the personal contents of your own mind, that you have knowledge of, which you are unable to capture in language, and communicate with another person. How things "seem" to you constitute objective truth. So, a description of qualia.

>
> Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than
> vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.
>
> Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better
> than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there
> are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.
>
> So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are
> objective truths (or falsehoods).
>
> Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be
> subjective truths?
>
>
> So he replied:
>
> Start quote.
>
>> Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact. It may be objectively true an individual holds a certain opinion, but it is an objective statement about something inherently subjective.

I think that is wrong. A subjective fact about how things seem to you (of the ontological kind, which is just which ice-cream flavor you prefer is actually objectively true in the epistemic sense. You are not lying. It *really is* the case you prefer chocolate (say) over vanilla.)

So a subjective fact about you that no one else can *experience* as you do just the way you do, can be an objective fact about what is really out there.

Say you prefer chocolate and I prefer strawberry. I just can't experience liking chocolate ice cream better than strawberry. I just can't, I don't know what that would be like. I don't know what it is like to be you. But you do. And only you do. How it feels to be you, how things seem to be, to you, these are truths you know. But I don't. Sure we can try to communicate and you can try to use language to explain *that* chocolate tastes better than strawberry by saying so, but at no point can these words have me have your experience. Yet you objectively (epistemically) are having some subjective (ontologically) experience.

Your experiences really are happening. You know this from a first person perspective. But from over here, in me, I only know that objectively in the epistemic sense, if you are not lying to me and I am not otherwise mistaken. I'm not you. Subjectively I can only experience being me.

For now.

Brett

[Elliot Temple]

On Jan 24, 2013, at 10:14 AM, Rami Rustom <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
> without explaining what it is. So I said:
>
> What is a subjective truth?

A contradiction.

>
> Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than
> vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.
>
> Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better
> than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there
> are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.
>
> So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are
> objective truths (or falsehoods).
>
> Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be
> subjective truths?
>
>
> So he replied:
>
> Start quote.
>
>> Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact.

It is a fact that "best flavor" is ill-defined and this comment about it is a bit silly.

It's a fact that you made that comment and think that (in the hypothetical).

It's also a fact that this comment can express some ideas you have, and that you really have those ideas.

And so on.

One of the common issues with subjectivists is they don't notice all the objective facts that make up the situation they are talking about. Instead they simply notice one thing isn't an objective fact (or any kind of fact at all) and then call it a "subjective fact" or "subjective truth" in order to communicate ... something vague.

-- Elliot Temple
http://curi.us/

[Elliot Temple]

On Jan 24, 2013, at 11:34 AM, Brett Hall <brha...@hotmail.com> wrote:

> On 25/01/2013, at 5:15, "Rami Rustom" <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
>> without explaining what it is. So I said:
>>
>> What is a subjective truth?
>
> In epistemology there is subjective (meaning biased, poorly reasoned, just a matter of opinion, so forth) and objective (carefully controlled, not merely a matter of taste, so forth. So for example, aspects of aesthetics are objective, not only subjective). Subjectivity in this sense is often thought of as be derogatory.
>
> The part of philosophy called "Ontology" is about what exists. If you think that you don't have any internal experience of the world, if you have no mind or subjectivity, then you can reject this distinction I am about to make. If you think other people are (philosophical) zombies, without an internal experience of the world that they interpret, this will make no sense. If you *actually are* a zombie, this likewise will make no sense to you. the philosopher Daniel Dennet does not believe in consciousness and that people have an internal experience of the world. at least he has an argument he says he believes for that view. He is a zombie (I take him seriously). But I know he is wrong because I know consciousness exists. I am experiencing it now and my best explanation of the world entails its first person existence. Objectivity in this sense is about objects outside your mind, outside your interpretations of them. Apples and tables exist out there but we only have interpretations of them, not direct access. Subjectivity *is* "your set of interpretations" or, another way this is usually put, "how things *seem* to you". The apple or table seems a certain way. You don't have direct access to the object. But those things really exist.

You claim to experience consciousness but let's slow down.

What is the evidence? State each observation you made which you think requires you to be experiencing consciousness.

I won't be able to test whether you really observed that. But that's OK. Maybe I could take your word for it but still question and criticize in other ways (e.g. your interpretations of those observations).

> A subjective truth of the ontological kind then is something about the personal contents of your own mind, that you have knowledge of, which you are unable to capture in language, and communicate with another person. How things "seem" to you constitute objective truth. So, a description of qualia.
>
>>
>> Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than
>> vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.
>>
>> Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better
>> than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there
>> are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.
>>
>> So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are
>> objective truths (or falsehoods).
>>
>> Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be
>> subjective truths?
>>
>>
>> So he replied:
>>
>> Start quote.
>>
>>> Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact. It may be objectively true an individual holds a certain opinion, but it is an objective statement about something inherently subjective.
>
> I think that is wrong. A subjective fact about how things seem to you (of the ontological kind, which is just which ice-cream flavor you prefer is actually objectively true in the epistemic sense. You are not lying. It *really is* the case you prefer chocolate (say) over vanilla.)
>
> So a subjective fact about you that no one else can *experience* as you do just the way you do, can be an objective fact about what is really out there.
>
> Say you prefer chocolate and I prefer strawberry. I just can't experience liking chocolate ice cream better than strawberry. I just can't, I don't know what that would be like. I don't know what it is like to be you. But you do. And only you do. How it feels to be you, how things seem to be, to you, these are truths you know. But I don't. Sure we can try to communicate and you can try to use language to explain *that* chocolate tastes better than strawberry by saying so, but at no point can these words have me have your experience. Yet you objectively (epistemically) are having some subjective (ontologically) experience.
>
> Your experiences really are happening. You know this from a first person perspective. But from over here, in me, I only know that objectively in the epistemic sense, if you are not lying to me and I am not otherwise mistaken. I'm not you. Subjectively I can only experience being me.

If you have a particular experience which no one shares or fully observes or even perhaps understands, it is objectively true that you had that experience, that you experienced that. It's still an objective matter.


-- Elliot Temple
http://fallibleideas.com/

[Rami Rustom]

On Thu, Jan 24, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Rami Rustom <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:
> I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
> without explaining what it is. So I said:
>
> What is a subjective truth?
>
> Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than
> vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.
>
> Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better
> than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there
> are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.
>
> So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are
> objective truths (or falsehoods).
>
> Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be
> subjective truths?
>
>
> So he replied:
>
> Start quote.
>
>> Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact.

[So, with the help of your ideas, I said:]

It is an objective fact that "best flavor" is ill-defined.

It's an objective fact that you made that comment and think that (in
the hypothetical).

It's also an objective fact that this comment can express some ideas

you have, and that you really have those ideas.

Notice that the versions that I stated, are either objective fact or
objective falsehood, and none are subjective truths. I'll list them
again with slight variation to mimic your version:

- "I like chocolate ice cream more than vanilla ice cream." This is an
objective fact.

- "Chocolate ice cream is the best-tasting ice cream." This is an
objective falsehood because it implies that it applies to all people,
and of course there is at least one person that likes vanilla over
chocolate thus successfully criticizing the idea, thereby rendering it
false.

The criticism I used above applies to your idea that you've labeled as
a "subjective truth". Do you agree? If not, can you explain why its
anything other than an objective falsehood?

Also, can you point out another idea which you consider to be a
subjective truth?

[Brett Hall]

On 25/01/2013, at 10:06, "Elliot Temple" <cu...@curi.us> wrote:

On Jan 24, 2013, at 11:34 AM, Brett Hall <brha...@hotmail.com> wrote:

On 25/01/2013, at 5:15, "Rami Rustom" <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:

I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"

without explaining what it is. So I said:

What is a subjective truth?

In epistemology there is subjective (meaning biased, poorly reasoned, just a matter of opinion, so forth) and objective (carefully controlled, not merely a matter of taste, so forth. So for example, aspects of aesthetics are objective, not only subjective). Subjectivity in this sense is often thought of as be derogatory.

The part of philosophy called "Ontology" is about what exists. If you think that you don't have any internal experience of the world, if you have no mind or subjectivity, then you can reject this distinction I am about to make. If you think other people are (philosophical) zombies, without an internal experience of the world that they interpret, this will make no sense. If you *actually are* a zombie, this likewise will make no sense to you. the philosopher Daniel Dennet does not believe in consciousness and that people have an internal experience of the world. at least he has an argument he says he believes for that view. He is a zombie (I take him seriously). But I know he is wrong because I know consciousness exists. I am experiencing it now and my best explanation of the world entails its first person existence. Objectivity in this sense is about objects outside your mind, outside your interpretations of them. Apples and tables exist out there but we only have interpretations of them, not direct access. Subjectivity *is* "your set of interpretations" or, another way this is usually put, "how things *seem* to you". The apple or table seems a certain way. You don't have direct access to the object. But those things really exist.

You claim to experience consciousness but let's slow down.

What is the evidence?

There is none.

State each observation you made which you think requires you to be experiencing consciousness.

I can only *say* I am having *an* experience. I cannot describe an observation of consciousness that I am having. That is the problem. 

From http://www.samharris.org/blog/item/the-mystery-of-consciousness

"The only thing in this universe that attests to the existence of consciousness is consciousness itself...Were we not already brimming with consciousness ourselves, we would find no evidence of it in the physical universe - nor would we have any notion of the many experiential states it gives rise to. The painfulness of pain, for instance, puts in an appearance only in consciousness."

End quote.

Elliot wrote:

I won't be able to test whether you really observed that.

Right.

But that's OK. Maybe I could take your word for it but still question and criticize in other ways (e.g. your interpretations of those observations).

You could criticise other stuff...like the interpretations, namely the words I try to use to capture some aspect in my consciousness or whatever. Yeah. But that doesn't help me to communicate what it is like to be conscious. I can only give you, in imperfect language, the stuff I am conscious *of* not consciousness itself.

A subjective truth of the ontological kind then is something about the personal contents of your own mind, that you have knowledge of, which you are unable to capture in language, and communicate with another person. How things "seem" to you constitute objective truth. So, a description of qualia.

Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than

vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.

Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better

than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there

are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.

So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are

objective truths (or falsehoods).

Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be

subjective truths?

So he replied:

Start quote.

Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact. It may be objectively true an individual holds a certain opinion, but it is an objective statement about something inherently subjective.

I think that is wrong. A subjective fact about how things seem to you (of the ontological kind, which is just which ice-cream flavor you prefer is actually objectively true in the epistemic sense. You are not lying. It *really is* the case you prefer chocolate (say) over vanilla.)

So a subjective fact about you that no one else can *experience* as you do just the way you do, can be an objective fact about what is really out there.

Say you prefer chocolate and I prefer strawberry. I just can't experience liking chocolate ice cream better than strawberry. I just can't, I don't know what that would be like. I don't know what it is like to be you. But you do. And only you do. How it feels to be you, how things seem to be, to you, these are truths you know. But I don't. Sure we can try to communicate and you can try to use language to explain *that* chocolate tastes better than strawberry by saying so, but at no point can these words have me have your experience. Yet you objectively (epistemically) are having some subjective (ontologically) experience.

Your experiences really are happening. You know this from a first person perspective. But from over here, in me, I only know that objectively in the epistemic sense, if you are not lying to me and I am not otherwise mistaken. I'm not you. Subjectively I can only experience being me.

If you have a particular experience which no one shares or fully observes or even perhaps understands, it is objectively true that you had that experience, that you experienced that. It's still an objective matter.

Yes. I agree. But all experiences are matters of subjectivity. To *have* an experience is to admit to being conscious. Unconscious things, like tables (we guess) do not have experiences. Do they? Tables do not have an "inner life" of thoughts or perceptions. Only subjectivity (or consciousness - I am using the words interchangeably here) allows any *experience* at all. 

It is true that objectively, experiences happen or not. But what *has* them and where in the world is the experience located? The experience might be said to be located in the mind, but then "mind" becomes a weak synonym for consciousness. I say weak, because when I see attempts to define "mind" I don't see that it really captures what I mean by consciousness. For example, many definitions include consciousness as just a *component* of the mind along with other stuff like "...the element of a person that gives them the capacity to think...". It gets circular if you try to define mind or consciousness with respect to one another.

There is much to say on this topic. That is a start. I will finish by observing that: I am not my thoughts. I am not a single thought, a stream of thoughts or all my thoughts. Instead I notice that I *have* thoughts. I can stand apart from them. I can notice "Hmmmm...an interesting thought" as something passes through my mind. 

I am not identical to my thoughts, or my perceptions. I *have* them. I *have* a mind. Indeed I can be aware and *be unthinking*. I do not see that as a contradiction. I know this as a matter of introspection. My mind can be blank. But yet I exist. I am conscious. What is that?

So if I am not my thoughts, but rather I have thoughts, what am I? What I am, is consciousness. But what is that?

Brett.

[Elliot Temple]

On Jan 25, 2013, at 4:31 AM, Brett Hall <brha...@hotmail.com> wrote:

> On 25/01/2013, at 10:06, "Elliot Temple" <cu...@curi.us> wrote:
>
>>
>> On Jan 24, 2013, at 11:34 AM, Brett Hall <brha...@hotmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> On 25/01/2013, at 5:15, "Rami Rustom" <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>>
>>>> I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
>>>> without explaining what it is. So I said:
>>>>
>>>> What is a subjective truth?
>>>
>>> In epistemology there is subjective (meaning biased, poorly reasoned, just a matter of opinion, so forth) and objective (carefully controlled, not merely a matter of taste, so forth. So for example, aspects of aesthetics are objective, not only subjective). Subjectivity in this sense is often thought of as be derogatory.
>>>
>>> The part of philosophy called "Ontology" is about what exists. If you think that you don't have any internal experience of the world, if you have no mind or subjectivity, then you can reject this distinction I am about to make. If you think other people are (philosophical) zombies, without an internal experience of the world that they interpret, this will make no sense. If you *actually are* a zombie, this likewise will make no sense to you. the philosopher Daniel Dennet does not believe in consciousness and that people have an internal experience of the world. at least he has an argument he says he believes for that view. He is a zombie (I take him seriously). But I know he is wrong because I know consciousness exists. I am experiencing it now and my best explanation of the world entails its first person existence. Objectivity in this sense is about objects outside your mind, outside your interpretations of them. Apples and tables exist out there but we only have interpretations of them, not direct access. Subjectivity *is* "your set of interpretations" or, another way this is usually put, "how things *seem* to you". The apple or table seems a certain way. You don't have direct access to the object. But those things really exist.
>>
>> You claim to experience consciousness but let's slow down.
>>
>> What is the evidence?
>
> There is none.
>
>> State each observation you made which you think requires you to be experiencing consciousness.
>
> I can only *say* I am having *an* experience. I cannot describe an observation of consciousness that I am having. That is the problem.

So you're saying you *do* have evidence. But no way to describe it in English?

Or your internal process of deciding you're conscious does not ever use observation or evidence even internally? If so, what methods did you use? Are they epistemologically good methods?


But I don't think that's true that you can't describe any of this. People have written descriptions of their thinking before, e.g. about having an inner voice. Couldn't you at least describe part of it?

Or do you think all the parts you know how to describe are unpersuasive?

Can you explain or define "subjectivity" as you're using it here?

You seem to be using it in such a way that a matter can be both objective and subjective at the same time, rather than those being contradictory. Is that right? You consider those compatible?

> To *have* an experience is to admit to being conscious. Unconscious things, like tables (we guess) do not have experiences. Do they? Tables do not have an "inner life" of thoughts or perceptions. Only subjectivity (or consciousness - I am using the words interchangeably here) allows any *experience* at all.

The word "subjective" has established meanings. Why are you trying to use it interchangeably with a different non-synonym word?

It is an objective fact of reality that you are different than a chair in many ways. "have experiences" is vague but something along those lines is an *objective* difference.

[Brett Hall]

I have written about this on BoI before (aside, meta, apologies: is there a better way to reference posts on the BoI list than this?)

In a discussion titled "Free Will" on 4/3/12:

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/beginning-of-infinity/subjective$20objective$20Brett/beginning-of-infinity/njNQL6tTLZg/Un4hzqoVHVcJ

in a discussion titled "Objectivity vs Subjectivity" on 4/7/12

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/beginning-of-infinity/subjective$20objective$20Brett/beginning-of-infinity/9_k1bwv3X0I/k1Y9hTxtk04J

In a discussion titled "Subjectivity (was: What is an idea?)" on 7/3/12

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/beginning-of-infinity/subjective$20objective$20Brett/beginning-of-infinity/5nAJLzb_g-w/kyfn5PK76VcJ

And in a discussion titled "Unfalsifiable" on 15/1/12

https://groups.google.com/forum/#!searchin/beginning-of-infinity/subjective$20objective$20Brett/beginning-of-infinity/tz82W6iAcl4/wXIJ2PYjHPIJ

But that's only me.

Here is another source

http://instruct.westvalley.edu/lafave/subjective_objective.html

The author there writes (I think this is reasonably uncontroversial for the most part)

We should distinguish two kinds of objectivity:

1. metaphysical objectivity, and
2. epistemological objectivity.

We also should distinguish two kinds of subjectivity:

1. metaphysical subjectivity, and
2. epistemological subjectivity.

Remember the distinction between metaphysics and epistemology?

Metaphysics consists of arguments and counterarguments about what we should call "real" or what we should say "is" or "has being". "Is free will real?" is a metaphysical question. In metaphysics, something exists objectively if its existence does not depend on its being experienced. For example, Antarctica and the Eiffel Tower exist objectively. They exist whether or not anyone has experienced them. Many realities are real in this way.

Something exists metaphysically subjectively, by contrast, if its existence depends on its being experienced — like a headache, or how Bourbon tastes to you. A particular headache ceases to exist if the person experiencing the headache stops feeling it. Many realities are real in this way, too — a different way.

She writes heaps there. That's just a snippet of a long article if anyone is interested, though I don't recommend it as there are errors in the wider epistemology she seems to endorse. That doesn't affect the accuracy of what she says above, however.

So, I'm not alone in this. It *is* established if not as widely known as it should be and so that leads to confusion. The word "knowledge" has just such a quality. An established word, not properly understood. Well here we have two words, and the differences between them not properly understood. It's only a problem in discussion like this. 

 With "subjective" there are two distinct, although related meanings. Both work really well in their own domains, but one has to be careful. Here, specifically when we are talking about consciousness is one of those times to be careful. I want to distinguish between "the world of objects" and that other thing that I have *experience of* that is not a world of objects. What's the opposite to a "world of objects"? Well let's just be really simple and say "not-a world of objects". Now some people want to stop there and say: so a world that *does not exist*. But no, for by my own experience, I refute that. The "not" operator here  in "not-a world of objects" works in such a way not to negate "world" but rather operates on "objects". So what is the negation of object? Subject.

So to distinguish between the world of objects, I like to talk about a world of not-objects. What's a not-object? It's a subject. I am a subject. The study of a subject-world is subjectivity. It exists, because I experience it now. Myself. Apart from objects in the world. I am literally "apart" from them. I am not them. I am me. I am not my brain. (We agree on *that* I presume).

Here is where I *guess* I part company with you now: I say I am not my mind, either. At least I am not *only* my mind. I consider my mind to be my "domain of thoughts" for want of another phrase. But when I'm not thinking (literally) I think it is right to be called "mindless". You're mindlessly doing this or that. It sounds derogative. It need not be. Sometimes it should be. We should be "mindful" especially when we *must* think. Thinking is important. The most important thing people do. Well equally most important. We should keep breathing too, I suppose, until we can escape these bodies!

So, mindless. Mindless means "without thought". I think *that* has an established meaning. But notice what it does not mean. Mindless does not mean "without existence". A person can be mindless. That's not trivial.

That means a person can *be* a person without having a mind.

How is that possible? Only if there is something else to a person that is not their mind. And this all comports with exactly what I experience as a matter of fact, right now, sitting here. I hear no criticism of this idea. I can be thoughtless, in the most literal sense, but still a person. I can be conscious without thoughts.

Thoughts, intentions, perceptions: these are the *contents of* consciousness. Not consciousness itself. I changed my mind on this about 5 years ago. Before that I agreed with David Hume who suggested "I am my perceptions". That is to say *identical to* the thought or feeling. But then it became clear: what about if there is no thought or feeling? Yet there is still *something*. I would have a thought right after an experience of just blank awareness and think: okay, I notice now that just then: no thoughts. Maybe laying in bed, in silence. But now I notice even awake and surrounded by stuff. I am not identical to the thoughts that arise in my head that pop in and out. I am there watching. I can choose to decide on something, or not. I can be a witness to the contents of my mind.

So ontological subjectivity is what I mean by consciousness. In that sense that I am describing, *my* subjectivity is my consciousness and they are synonyms. Maybe someone who rejects the reality of consciousness can be convinced by the ontological distinction to be made between subjects and objects. If I can convince them there, then I need only make one more move: that subjectivity is consciousness.

Do you have criticisms of the idea that "Consciousness exists"?

Brett.

[Elliot Temple]

The only quote you've provided -- on using subjective and conscious interchangeably -- does not mention "consciousness".

Could you provide a relevant quote?

> Do you have criticisms of the idea that "Consciousness exists"?

Yes: it's vague.


-- Elliot Temple
http://elliottemple.com/

[Brett Hall]

> Subject: Re: [BoI] Subjective truth
> From: cu...@curi.us
> Date: Fri, 25 Jan 2013 12:01:50 -0800
> To: beginning-...@googlegroups.com

From http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2011/jun/09/mystery-consciousness-continues/?pagination=false

(This stuff is from a review of a book by John Searle)

We have: "...consciousness consists of qualitative, subjective states of feeling or sentience or awareness."

And "Because of this qualitative character all conscious states are essentially subjective in the sense that they exist only as experienced by a subject—human or animal. The problem of consciousness can now be stated somewhat more precisely: How does the brain produce qualitative subjectivity? "

And "In another sense, the objective/subjective distinction is about modes of existence. I call this the ontological sense. An entity has an objective ontology if its existence does not depend on being experienced by a human or animal subject; otherwise it is subjective. For example, mountains, molecules, and tectonic plates are ontologically objective. Their existence does not depend on being experienced by anybody. But pains, tickles, and itches only exist when experienced by a human or animal subject. They are ontologically subjective."

And crucially:

"I emphasize these two senses of the distinction because a common mistake is to suppose that because science is objective and consciousness is subjective, there cannot be a science of consciousness. Science is indeed epistemically objective, because scientific claims are supposed to be verifiable independently of anybody’s feelings and attitudes. But the ontological subjectivity of the domain of consciousness does not preclude an objective science of that domain. You can have an (epistemically) objective science of an (ontologically) subjective consciousness. Much confusion has been created by the failure to see this point."

And:

"Damasio’s two crucial notions are consciousness and the self.

(1) Consciousness. In actual practice I think his idea of consciousness is essentially the one stated above. Its essence is qualitative subjectivity." 

And:

"We have to keep reminding ourselves that any type of qualitative subjectivity is a form of consciousness."

So although he is not saying "Yes, you should use the words as synonyms" he is doing so. He is saying one of them (consciousness) *is* the other (subjectivity). It's common. Sam Harris does the same. I didn't provide quotes from him that help my case, but can. I thought Searle was enough.

Brett.

[Elliot Temple]

In this sentence, the author indicates he does NOT use consciousness and subjectivity as synonyms.

You provide zero explanation of how you think this sentence helps your case.

The reason is indicates he does NOT agree with you is because, in your terminology, the sentence can be rewritten equivalently:

> "...consciousness consists of qualitative, conscious states of feeling or sentience or awareness."

which is silly and circular (at least the relevant part where it's now saying "consciousness consists of ... conscious states ...").

> And "Because of this qualitative character all conscious states are essentially subjective

This is of the form, "Because of X, all Y are Z". This does not say or mean that Y and Z are the same word.

If Y and Z were the same thing, it would read "Because of X, all Y are Y". Which would be dumb.

Again your quote does not make your case -- it actually disagrees with you -- and you've provided no explanation of what you're seeing in this.

> "We have to keep reminding ourselves that any type of qualitative subjectivity is a form of consciousness."

"All X is a form of Y" does not mean "X and Y are synonyms". Consider, for example: "All light blue is a form of blue".

If they were interchangeable, then you would have "All X is a form of X" or "All blue is a form of blue" or "All light blue is a form of light blue" -- all of which would be dumb. So the quote again indicates they are not interchangeable.


Just because someone says two words are related or connected in some way -- even if it's a universal link -- does not mean he is saying they are interchangeable.

[Brett Hall]

Agreed. I can accept that "subjectivity" and "consciousness" both label different, although related, real things.

Brett.

[Elliot Temple]

On Jan 24, 2013, at 6:18 PM, Rami Rustom <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:

> On Thu, Jan 24, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Rami Rustom <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:
>> I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
>> without explaining what it is. So I said:
>>
>> What is a subjective truth?
>>
>> Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than
>> vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.
>>
>> Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better
>> than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there
>> are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.
>>
>> So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are
>> objective truths (or falsehoods).
>>
>> Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be
>> subjective truths?
>>
>>
>> So he replied:
>>
>> Start quote.
>>
>>> Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact.
>
> [So, with the help of your ideas, I said:]

Who is "your"? You do not quote anyone else with attribution (you do have a "start quote" but no attribution other than to "he". presumably "he" and "your" are not the same person but it's rather hard to tell). It's important when using words which refer to other things (like "he", "that", "your") that the other thing is in the email and not too hard or ambiguous to find.

>
> It is an objective fact that "best flavor" is ill-defined.
>
> It's an objective fact that you made that comment and think that (in
> the hypothetical).
>
> It's also an objective fact that this comment can express some ideas
> you have, and that you really have those ideas.
>
>
> Notice that the versions that I stated, are either objective fact or
> objective falsehood, and none are subjective truths. I'll list them
> again with slight variation to mimic your version:
>
> - "I like chocolate ice cream more than vanilla ice cream." This is an
> objective fact.
>
> - "Chocolate ice cream is the best-tasting ice cream." This is an
> objective falsehood because it implies that it applies to all people,
> and of course there is at least one person that likes vanilla over
> chocolate thus successfully criticizing the idea, thereby rendering it
> false.
>
> The criticism I used above applies to your idea

What is "your idea"? This is again a reference with no referent.

> that you've labeled as
> a "subjective truth". Do you agree?

who is "you"? you did not quote anyone. you aren't replying to anyone (besides yourself).

> If not, can you explain why its
> anything other than an objective falsehood?
>
> Also, can you point out another idea which you consider to be a
> subjective truth?

Who is "you"? Who are you asking? Why are you asking?


All of this is rather unclear. I reply in hopes of indicating some ways to write better posts.

[Dan Frank]

On Fri, Jan 25, 2013 at 1:32 PM, Elliot Temple <cu...@curi.us> wrote:
>
> On Jan 24, 2013, at 6:18 PM, Rami Rustom <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Jan 24, 2013 at 12:14 PM, Rami Rustom <rom...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>> I recently encountered somebody using the term "subjective truth"
>>> without explaining what it is. So I said:
>>>
>>> What is a subjective truth?
>>>
>>> Do you mean ideas like this? *I like chocolate ice cream more than
>>> vanilla ice cream.* But I would consider that an objective truth.
>>>
>>> Or do you mean ideas like this? *Chocolate ice cream tastes better
>>> than vanilla ice cream.* I consider this objectively false since there
>>> are people that like the taste of vanilla over chocolate.
>>>
>>> So, these qualia-dependent ideas are not subjective truths. They are
>>> objective truths (or falsehoods).
>>>
>>> Or am I missing something? What sort of ideas do you think could be
>>> subjective truths?
>>>
>>>
>>> So he replied:
>>>
>>> Start quote.
>>>
>>>> Subjective truths are value-based statements which are not objective truths. "I think chocolate ice cream is the best flavor" is a subjective opinion, not objective fact.
>>
>> [So, with the help of your ideas, I said:]
>
> Who is "your"? You do not quote anyone else with attribution (you do have a "start quote" but no attribution other than to "he". presumably "he" and "your" are not the same person but it's rather hard to tell). It's important when using words which refer to other things (like "he", "that", "your") that the other thing is in the email and not too hard or ambiguous to find.
>

Rami is relaying a conversation he had with someone else. The
brackets are added text that is addressed to the List, so that "your"
is to the list.

Everything that follows after the brackets was the original message he
sent to some unnamed unknown individual. He was talking directly to
that individual, so "you" in that context is totally clear. But if
you miss that context it's very confusing from an outside perspective.

>>
>> It is an objective fact that "best flavor" is ill-defined.
>>
>> It's an objective fact that you made that comment and think that (in
>> the hypothetical).
>>
>> It's also an objective fact that this comment can express some ideas
>> you have, and that you really have those ideas.
>>
>>
>> Notice that the versions that I stated, are either objective fact or
>> objective falsehood, and none are subjective truths. I'll list them
>> again with slight variation to mimic your version:
>>
>> - "I like chocolate ice cream more than vanilla ice cream." This is an
>> objective fact.
>>
>> - "Chocolate ice cream is the best-tasting ice cream." This is an
>> objective falsehood because it implies that it applies to all people,
>> and of course there is at least one person that likes vanilla over
>> chocolate thus successfully criticizing the idea, thereby rendering it
>> false.
>>
>> The criticism I used above applies to your idea
>
> What is "your idea"? This is again a reference with no referent.
>

Still addressing the unknown individual this was reposted from. He's
talking to one person, so "you" makes sense in that context.

>> that you've labeled as
>> a "subjective truth". Do you agree?
>
> who is "you"? you did not quote anyone. you aren't replying to anyone (besides yourself).

Same as above.

>> If not, can you explain why its
>> anything other than an objective falsehood?
>>
>> Also, can you point out another idea which you consider to be a
>> subjective truth?
>
> Who is "you"? Who are you asking? Why are you asking?
>
>
> All of this is rather unclear. I reply in hopes of indicating some ways to write better posts.
>

All of this is still addressed to that person. He's asking them.

He's just reposting the conversation wholesale, presumably to get
criticism on his comments.

I don't think this post would be improved by the suggestions you've
made, at least not for the original goal of writing to some other
individual person.

But if he's going to keep sending them to the list I think they would
be improved by more of a preface that gives more context, otherwise
your misunderstanding will continue to be easy to make.