Epistemology As Map-Making

[P0ck]

I think the main distinction between Korzybski's general semantics epistemology and the one described in this forum comes from the definition of "knowledge".

It seems that the definition used here acknowledge that we can't "know" anything for sure but it does not seem to make a distinction between knowledge that is more certain (factual) and less certain (inferential) "knowledge".

In Korzybksi's system, epistemology is seen as a kind of map-making activity.

For example, in general semantics (Korzybski's system), we make the following distinction in a device called the "structural differential" which helps us distinguish between different levels of abstractions:

0 - Event or Process Level : The totality of the universal energy processes and event that are happening.

1 - Object level : The tiny part of those events that we can sense using our senses or instruments. Those experienced as raw sensation, also called the "silent level". At this level, one may be able to "know" something without being necessarily able to put it into words.

2 - Label level : The verbal, descriptive level, where we put names onto objects and sensations and classify them. It's at this level that we can say our "knowing" of reality becomes theory-laden, although it is a little bit at a lesser level in the level before in such thing as "non-verbal thinking".

3 - Inference level 1 : we make inferences about our experiences that goes beyond our direct experience, for example, "objects called apple taste good, if I see such an object, it will taste good also.".

4 - Inference level 2 : Here we make inferences out of inferences, for example, from the theory that "object called apples taste good", we might infer that "peaches must taste good because they look a bit like apples".

5 - Etc level : Here we can make inference about inference about inference unendingly. We can talk about our talking and talk about that, etc..

6 - The arrow : An arrow connect back our high-level abstraction with the process level as our high-level abstraction influence our behaviour and thus our future observation and thus makes some new one.

Thus, all our knowledge-building activities are trying to map-out the event-level through our observation.

Also, this system, called the strucutural differential is a non-aristotelian system based on a non-aristotelian logic described as:

• not "A is A" (identity) but "A is not A" (non-identity) - "The map is not the territory"

The first "A" is not the same as the second (different space-time location, specular light reflection, time of writing, etc)

• not "A is either A or not A" (excluded middle) but "A can be part A and not A" (Non-allness) "A map covers not all the territory"

If no two things are exactly the same, it follows that the map cannot be the same as the territory but only represent part of it at best.

• not "A cannot be A and not A at the same time" (non-contradiction) but "A can be A and not A at the same time" (self-reflexiveness) "A map is self-reflexive"

If one were to make a as-good-as-he-can-make map of his town for example, he would have to include himself making the map into his map, therefore including his map into his map.

In my opinion, this non-aristotelian logic system can act as a "scheffer's stroke" for the mind as far as making distinctions between things goes.

So, creating knowledge about reality is a lot like making good, accurate, useful maps of something. A good explanation, like a good map, describe reality accurately to a certain degree.

As described in the previous discussions here about language and lying, some maps are like a kid's scribble, some are like stick figures, some are like a picasso and some are more like realistic portait or photoraphs, each with their own level of accuracy.

Or like a curve-fitting equation describe some shape in the real world, it can represent the shape to a very good level of accuracy to a very poor one.

I think that what you call very good "explanations" are in fact, very good description of reality. For example, take the spinning blades of a fan:

A fan when turned on looks to human as a disk, but when turned off, we can see the blade. Now however you describe this it will look something like this "When looking at a fan at a speed lower than 25 revolution a minute, an observing human can see the individual blades, but if the blades revolve at speed higher than this, one can only see a disk.". Now one might say that a 25 revolution a minute, the "blades-sees-not effect" happens and is the "cause" of not seeing the blade. So here the "blades-sees-not effect" adds absolutely nothing to the descritption if not just a new category of event, but I bet you would agree that the "explanation" is merely a good description of what was observed.

The same would be true if you added the fact that the average human eyes has this vision effect in other similar situation and people calls it the whatever effects, the whatever effects would be called the cause of the illusion, but that name would only refer to a longer description of what is observed.

In this way, what I call "knowledge", is only a very good description of what we or people have observed in the past, and we can apply that "knowledge" as inference in similar or analogous situation of the present in order to infer "prediction" of the future based on analogy.

By the way, psychologist-philosopher Julian Jaynes had this cool concept of metaphier and metaphrand and how all our language is metaphorical in his theory of consciousness, we find the same kind of thing in the "grovian model" (by david grove), an advanced neuro-linguistic programming model of how metaphors are deeply ingrained inside ourselves and our language, very cool stuff.

Nicolas M. Kirchberger

[Elliot Temple]

On Nov 11, 2012, at 9:15 PM, P0ck <obero...@gmail.com> wrote:

>
>
> I think the main distinction between Korzybski's general semantics
> epistemology and the one described in this forum comes from the definition
> of "knowledge".
>
> It seems that the definition used here acknowledge that we can't "know"
> anything for sure but it does not seem to make a distinction between
> knowledge that is more certain (factual) and less certain (inferential)
> "knowledge".

It doesn't just not make a distinction. It denies there is such thing as degrees of certainty (aka justification aka epistemic status aka authority).

People learn by guesses and criticism (it's an evolutionary process). An idea is either criticized or it isn't. FYI this position is Popper's and Deutsch's.

Do you have a criticism of this epistemology?

What problem(s) are you trying to solve with alternative ideas?

> - not "A is A" (identity) but "A is not A" (non-identity) - "The map is

> not the territory"
>
> The first "A" is not the same as the second (different space-time location,
> specular light reflection, time of writing, etc)
>

> - not "A is either A or not A" (excluded middle) but "A can be part A

> and not A" (Non-allness) "A map covers not all the territory"
>
> If no two things are exactly the same, it follows that the map cannot be
> the same as the territory but only represent part of it at best.
>

> - not "A cannot be A and not A at the same time" (non-contradiction) but

When you have disagreements with people of this size, it's hard to discuss this much stuff at once. What happens is you say things people disagree with towards the start of your posts, then you continue on building on that. But building on ideas that are in dispute doesn't work great. It can be more useful to discuss focus on the early disagreements more and come to a resolution (persuade other people or change your mind, or some of both).

It also helps not to use terminology and references that most of the people you're talking to don't know. Or when it's important, to focus more attention and explanation on them instead of doing them in passing.

-- Elliot Temple
http://beginningofinfinity.com/