The October 1973 War

[Rene Seiler]

Thewar began on 6 October 1973, when the Arab coalition jointly launched a surprise attack against Israel on the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, which had occurred during the 10th day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan in that year.[67] Following the outbreak of hostilities, both the United States and the Soviet Union initiated massive resupply efforts to their allies (Israel and the Arab states respectively) during the war,[68][69][70] which led to a confrontation between the two nuclear-armed superpowers.[71]

Fighting commenced when Egyptian and Syrian forces crossed their corresponding ceasefire lines with Israel and entered the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal in Operation Badr and advanced into the Sinai Peninsula; the Syrians launched a coordinated attack in the Golan Heights to coincide with the Egyptian offensive and initially made gains into Israeli-held territory. After three days of heavy fighting, Israel halted the Egyptian offensive, resulting in a military stalemate on that front, and pushed the Syrians back to the pre-war ceasefire lines. The Israeli military then launched a four-day-long counter-offensive deep into Syria, and within a week Israeli artillery began to shell the outskirts of the Syrian capital of Damascus. Egyptian forces meanwhile pushed for two strategic mountain passes deeper within the Sinai Peninsula but were repulsed, and Israeli forces counter-attacked by crossing the Suez Canal into Egypt and advancing towards Suez City.[72][73] On 22 October, an initial ceasefire brokered by the United Nations unravelled, with each side blaming the other for the breach.

By 24 October, the Israelis had improved their positions considerably and completed their encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army and Suez City, bringing them within 100 kilometres (62 mi) of the Egyptian capital of Cairo. Egypt then repelled advances by Israel with the concluding twin victories at the battles of Ismailia and Suez. This development led to dangerously heightened tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union, and a second ceasefire was imposed cooperatively on 25 October 1973, to officially end the war.

On 19 June 1967, shortly after the Six-Day War, the Israeli government voted to return the Sinai to Egypt and the Golan Heights to Syria in exchange for a permanent peace settlement and a demilitarization of the returned territories.[75][76][77] This decision was not made public at the time, nor was it conveyed to any Arab state. Israeli Foreign Minister Abba Eban has said that it had been conveyed, but there seems to be no solid evidence to corroborate his claim; no formal peace proposal was made either directly or indirectly by Israel.[78] The Americans, who were briefed of the Cabinet's decision by Eban, were not asked to convey it to Cairo and Damascus as official peace proposals, nor were they given indications that Israel expected a reply.[79][80] Eban rejected the prospect of a mediated peace, insisting of the need for direct negotiations with the Arab governments.[81]

Armed hostilities continued on a limited scale after the Six-Day War and escalated into the War of Attrition, an attempt to wear down the Israeli position through long-term pressure.[83] In December 1970, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had signaled in an interview with The New York Times that, in return for a total withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula, he was ready "to recognize the rights of Israel as an independent state as defined by the Security Council of the United Nations."[84] On 4 February 1971, Sadat gave a speech to the Egyptian National Assembly outlining a proposal under which Israel would withdraw from the Suez Canal and the Sinai Peninsula along with other occupied Arab territories.[85]

Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring coincidentally proposed a similar initiative four days later, on 8 February 1971. Egypt responded by accepting much of Jarring's proposals, though differing on several issues, regarding the Gaza Strip, for example, and expressed its willingness to reach an accord if it also implemented the provisions of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. This was the first time an Arab government had gone public declaring its readiness to sign a peace agreement with Israel.[84]

Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir reacted to the overture by forming a committee to examine the proposal and vet possible concessions. When the committee unanimously concluded that Israel's interests would be served by full withdrawal to the internationally recognized lines dividing Israel from Egypt and Syria, returning the Gaza Strip and, in a majority view, returning most of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, Meir was angered and shelved the document.[86]

The United States was infuriated by the cool Israeli response to Egypt's proposal, and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Joseph Sisco informed Israeli ambassador Yitzhak Rabin that "Israel would be regarded responsible for rejecting the best opportunity to reach peace since the establishment of the state." Israel responded to Jarring's plan on 26 February by outlining its readiness to make some form of withdrawal, while declaring it had no intention of returning to the pre-5 June 1967 lines.[87] Explicating the response, Eban told the Knesset that the pre-5 June 1967 lines "cannot assure Israel against aggression".[88] Jarring was disappointed and blamed Israel for refusing to accept a complete pullout from the Sinai Peninsula.[87]

The U.S. considered Israel an ally in the Cold War and had been supplying the Israeli military since the 1960s. U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger believed that the regional balance of power hinged on maintaining Israel's military dominance over Arab countries and that an Arab victory in the region would strengthen Soviet influence. Britain's position, on the other hand, was that war between the Arabs and Israelis could only be prevented by the implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 and a return to the pre-1967 boundaries.[89]

Sadat also had important domestic concerns in wanting war. "The three years since Sadat had taken office ... were the most demoralized in Egyptian history. ... A desiccated economy added to the nation's despondency. War was a desperate option."[90] Almost a full year before the war, in a meeting on 24 October 1972, with his Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, Sadat declared his intention to go to war with Israel even without proper Soviet support.[91]

In February 1973, Sadat made a final peace overture that would have included Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula that he relayed to Kissinger via his adviser Mohammad Hafez Ismail, which Kissinger made known to Meir. Meir rejected the peace proposal despite knowing that the only plausible alternative was going to war with Egypt.[92]

Four months before the war broke out, Kissinger made an offer to Ismail, Sadat's emissary. Kissinger proposed returning the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control and an Israeli withdrawal from all of Sinai, except for some strategic points. Ismail said he would return with Sadat's reply, but he never did. Sadat was already determined to go to war. Only an American guarantee that the United States would fulfill the entire Arab program in a brief time could have dissuaded Sadat.[93]

Sadat declared that Egypt was prepared to "sacrifice a million Egyptian soldiers" to recover its lost territory.[94] From the end of 1972, Egypt began a concentrated effort to build up its forces, receiving MiG-21 jet fighters, SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 and SA-7 antiaircraft missiles, T-55 and T-62 tanks, RPG-7 antitank weapons, and the AT-3 Sagger anti-tank guided missile from the Soviet Union and improving its military tactics, based on Soviet battlefield doctrines. Political generals, who had in large part been responsible for the rout in 1967, were replaced with competent ones.[95]

On 27 to 30 September, two batches of reservists were called up by the Egyptian Army to participate in these exercises. Two days before the outbreak of the war, on 4 October, the Egyptian command publicly announced the demobilization of part of the reservists called up during 27 September to lull Israeli suspicions. Around 20,000 troops were demobilized, and subsequently some of these men were given leave to perform the Umrah (pilgrimage) to Mecca.[98]

Despite refusing to participate, King Hussein of Jordan "had met with Sadat and Assad in Alexandria two weeks before. Given the mutual suspicions prevailing among the Arab leaders, it was unlikely that he had been told any specific war plans. But it was probable that Sadat and Assad had raised the prospect of war against Israel in more general terms to feel out the likelihood of Jordan joining in."[100]

On the night of 25 September, Hussein secretly flew to Tel Aviv to warn Meir of an impending Syrian attack. "Are they going to war without the Egyptians, asked Mrs. Meir. The king said he didn't think so. 'I think they [Egypt] would cooperate.'"[101] This warning was ignored, and Israeli intelligence indicated that Hussein had not said anything that was not already known. Throughout September, Israel received eleven warnings of war from well-placed sources. However, Mossad Director-General Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option, even after Hussein's warning.[102] Zamir would later remark that "We simply didn't feel them capable [of war]."[102]

On the day before the war, General Ariel Sharon was shown aerial photographs and other intelligence by Yehoshua Saguy, his divisional intelligence officer. Sharon noticed that the concentration of Egyptian forces along the canal was far beyond anything observed during the training exercises, and that the Egyptians had amassed all of their crossing equipment along the canal. He then called General Shmuel Gonen, who had replaced him as head of Southern Command, and expressed his certainty that war was imminent.[103]

3a8082e126