So, it's a bit late, and I'm a bit grogy but I think this is where the
issue might be. It's not good enough just to call regenerate if the
entropy pool isn't properly seeded, otherwise the key generated will be
predictable.
And while the hwrng is enable I don't think it actively contributes to
the kernel entropy pool. I *thought* that is where there is the user
space rngd daemon, but again... tired...
The issue is the creation of /var/lib/systemd/random-seed, which
could/should be done by dd'ing from /dev/hwrng to this file. If software
creates this, then it will be predictable.
> So ignoring the root login over 22 with no password... or
> nodejs/bonescript/etc.. At least the key is safe. ;)
touche, we are plugging a leak while water is pouring over our heads :)
I still advocate removing the the no password root login thing.