Fwd: CRYPTO-GRAM, November 15, 2013

[Rene Abad]

fyi


---------- Forwarded message ----------
From: Bruce Schneier <schn...@schneier.com>
Date: Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 3:39 PM
Subject: CRYPTO-GRAM, November 15, 2013
To: CRYPTO-G...@listserv.modwest.com


CRYPTO-GRAM

November 15, 2013

by Bruce Schneier
BT Security Futurologist
schn...@schneier.com
http://www.schneier.com


A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and
commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.

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<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>.

You can read this issue on the web at
<http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-1311.html>. These same essays and
news items appear in the "Schneier on Security" blog at
<http://www.schneier.com/blog>, along with a lively and intelligent
comment section. An RSS feed is available.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

In this issue:
NSA Harvesting Contact Lists
NSA Eavesdropping on Google and Yahoo Networks
Code Names for NSA Exploit Tools
Defending Against Crypto Backdoors
Why the Government Should Help Leakers
NSA/Snowden News
The Trajectories of Government and Corporate Surveillance
A Fraying of the Public/Private Surveillance Partnership
Book Review: "Cyber War Will Not Take Place"
Understanding the Threats in Cyberspace
News
SecureDrop
Dry Ice Bombs at LAX
Schneier News
The Battle for Power on the Internet


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NSA Harvesting Contact Lists



A new Snowden document shows that the NSA is harvesting contact lists
-- e-mail address books, IM buddy lists, etc. -- from Google, Yahoo,
Microsoft, Facebook, and others.

Unlike PRISM, this unnamed program collects the data from the Internet
. This is similar to how the NSA identifies Tor users. They get
direct access to the Internet backbone, either through secret
agreements with companies like AT&T, or surreptitiously, by doing
things like tapping undersea cables. Once they have the data, they
have powerful packet inspectors -- code names include TUMULT,
TURBULENCE, and TURMOIL -- that run a bunch of different
identification and copying systems. One of them, code name unknown,
searches for these contact lists and copies them. Google, Yahoo,
Microsoft, etc., have no idea that this is happening, nor have they
consented to their data being harvested in this way.

These contact lists provide the NSA with the same sort of broad
surveillance that the Verizon (and others) phone-record "metadata"
collection programs provide: information about who are our friends,
lovers, confidants, associates. This is incredibly intimate
information, all collected without any warrant or due process.
Metadata equals surveillance; always remember that.

The quantities are interesting:

During a single day last year, the NSA's Special Source
Operations branch collected 444,743 e-mail address books from
Yahoo, 105,068 from Hotmail, 82,857 from Facebook, 33,697 from
Gmail and 22,881 from unspecified other providers....

Note that Gmail, which uses SSL by default, provides the NSA with much
less data than Yahoo, which doesn't, despite the fact that Gmail has
many more users than Yahoo does. (It's actually kind of amazing how
small that Gmail number is.) This implies that, despite BULLRUN,
encryption works. Ubiquitous use of SSL can foil NSA eavesdropping.
This is the same lesson we learned from the NSA's attempts to break
Tor: encryption works.

In response to this story, Yahoo has finally decided to enable SSL by
default: by January 2014.

The "New York Times" makes this observation:

Spokesmen for the eavesdropping organizations reassured The
Post that we shouldn't bother our heads with all of this. They
have "checks and balances built into our tools," said one
intelligence official.

Since the Snowden leaks began, the administration has adopted
an interesting definition of that term. It used to be that
"checks and balances" referred to one branch of the government
checking and balancing the other branches -- like the Supreme
Court deciding whether laws are constitutional.

Now the N.S.A., the C.I.A. and the White House use the term to
refer to a secret organization reviewing the actions it has
taken and deciding in secret by itself whether they were legal
and constitutional.

One more amusing bit: the NSA has a spam problem.

Spam has proven to be a significant problem for the NSA --
clogging databases with information that holds no foreign
intelligence value. The majority of all e-mails, one NSA
document says, "are SPAM from 'fake addresses and never
'delivered' to targets."

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-collects-millions-of-e-mail-address-books-globally/2013/10/14/8e58b5be-34f9-11e3-80c6-7e6dd8d22d8f_story.html
or http://tinyurl.com/kn8ld96

PRISM:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/us-tech-giants-nsa-data

The NSA at Tor:
https://www.schneier.com/essay-455.html
https://www.schneier.com/essay-454.html

How the NSA gets access:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/agreements-with-private-companies-protect-us-access-to-cables-data-for-surveillance/2013/07/06/aa5d017a-df77-11e2-b2d4-ea6d8f477a01_story.html
or http://tinyurl.com/qdawe6b
http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/aug/02/telecoms-bt-vodafone-cables-gchq
or http://tinyurl.com/ntk6vde
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324108204579022874091732470.html
or http://tinyurl.com/lat5vy7
http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa
or http://tinyurl.com/ps3g4z2
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/the-creepy-long-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855/
or http://tinyurl.com/o6b7unb
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jun/06/nsa-phone-records-verizon-court-order
or http://tinyurl.com/qaynuex

Metadata equals surveillance:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/metadata_equals.html

BULLRUN:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
or http://tinyurl.com/m47p5dc
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html
or http://tinyurl.com/m9chca6

Yahoo switching to SSL by default:
http://www.theverge.com/2013/10/14/4838878/yahoo-mail-is-switching-to-default-ssl-encryption
or http://tinyurl.com/n89gddz
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2013/10/15/yahoo_mail_encryption_by_default_in_2014/
or http://tinyurl.com/ktqqmy8
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/14/yahoo-to-make-ssl-encryption-the-default-for-webmail-users-finally/
or http://tinyurl.com/kdthaoj
https://twitter.com/ashk4n/status/389892774637891584

NSA source documents for the story:
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-nsas-overcollection-problem/517/
or http://tinyurl.com/lcdas97
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/how-the-nsa-tried-to-collect-less/518/
or http://tinyurl.com/kagnc6d
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/an-excerpt-from-intellipedia/519/
or http://tinyurl.com/mf9ku9r

"New York Times" story:
http://takingnote.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/10/15/the-n-s-a-may-have-your-address-book/
or http://tinyurl.com/kmwl7yt


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NSA Eavesdropping on Google and Yahoo Networks



The "Washington Post" reported that the NSA is eavesdropping on the
Google and Yahoo private networks -- the code name for the program is
MUSCULAR. I may write more about this later, but I have some initial
comments:

* It's a measure of how far off the rails the NSA has gone that it's
taking its Cold War–era eavesdropping tactics -- surreptitiously
eavesdropping on foreign networks -- and applying them to US
corporations. It's skirting US law by targeting the portion of these
corporate networks outside the US. It's the same sort of legal
argument the NSA used to justify collecting address books and buddy
lists worldwide.

* Although the "Washington Post" article specifically talks about
Google and Yahoo, you have to assume that all the other major -- and
many of the minor -- cloud services are compromised this same way.
That means Microsoft, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, Badoo,
Dropbox, and on and on and on.

* It is well worth re-reading all the government denials about bulk
collection and direct access after PRISM was exposed. It seems that
it's impossible to get the truth out of the NSA. Its carefully worded
denials always seem to hide what's really going on.

* In light of this, PRISM is really just insurance: a way for the NSA
to get legal cover for information it already has. My guess is that
the NSA collects the vast majority of its data surreptitiously, using
programs such as these. Then, when it has to share the information
with the FBI or other organizations, it gets it again through a more
public program like PRISM.

* What this really shows is how robust the surveillance state is, and
how hard it will be to craft laws reining in the NSA. All the bills
being discussed so far only address portions of the problem: specific
programs or specific legal justifications. But the NSA's surveillance
infrastructure is much more robust than that. It has many ways into
our data, and all sorts of tricks to get around the law. Note this
quote:

John Schindler, a former NSA chief analyst and frequent
defender who teaches at the Naval War College, said it is
obvious why the agency would prefer to avoid restrictions where
it can.

"Look, NSA has platoons of lawyers, and their entire job is
figuring out how to stay within the law and maximize collection
by exploiting every loophole," he said. "It's fair to say the
rules are less restrictive under Executive Order 12333 than
they are under FISA," the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Act.

No surprise, really. But it illustrates how difficult meaningful
reform will be. I wrote this in September:

It's time to start cleaning up this mess. We need a special
prosecutor, one not tied to the military, the corporations
complicit in these programs, or the current political
leadership, whether Democrat or Republican. This prosecutor
needs free rein to go through the NSA's files and discover the
full extent of what the agency is doing, as well as enough
technical staff who have the capability to understand it. He
needs the power to subpoena government officials and take their
sworn testimony. He needs the ability to bring criminal
indictments where appropriate. And, of course, he needs the
requisite security clearance to see it all.

We also need something like South Africa's Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, where both government and corporate
employees can come forward and tell their stories about NSA
eavesdropping without fear of reprisal.

Without this, crafting reform legislation will be impossible.

* We don't actually know if the NSA did this surreptitiously, or if it
had assistance from another US corporation. Level 3 Communications
provides the data links to Google, and its statement was sufficiently
non-informative as to be suspicious:

In a statement, Level 3 said: "We comply with the laws in each
country where we operate. In general, governments that seek
assistance in law enforcement or security investigations
prohibit disclosure of the assistance provided."

On the other hand, Level 3 Communications already cooperates with the
NSA, and has the codename of LITTLE:

The document identified for the first time which telecoms
companies are working with GCHQ's "special source" team. It
gives top secret codenames for each firm, with BT ("Remedy"),
Verizon Business ("Dacron"), and Vodafone Cable ("Gerontic").
The other firms include Global Crossing ("Pinnage"), Level 3
("Little"), Viatel ("Vitreous") and Interoute ("Streetcar").

Again, those code names should properly be in all caps.

When I write that the NSA has destroyed the fabric of trust on the
Internet, this is the kind of thing I mean. Google can no longer
trust its bandwidth providers not to betray the company.

* The NSA's denial is pretty lame. It feels as if it's hardly trying anymore.

* Finally, we need more encryption on the Internet. We have made
surveillance too cheap, not just for the NSA but for all nation-state
adversaries. We need to make it expensive again.


http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/nsa-infiltrates-links-to-yahoo-google-data-centers-worldwide-snowden-documents-say/2013/10/30/e51d661e-4166-11e3-8b74-d89d714ca4dd_story.html
http://apps.washingtonpost.com/g/page/world/the-nsas-three-types-of-cable-interception-programs/553/
or http://tinyurl.com/kh7g9jc

PRISM:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html
or http://tinyurl.com/mm3ttqt

My September quote:
https://www.schneier.com/essay-447.html

Level-3 statement:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/technology/nsa-is-mining-google-and-yahoo-abroad.html
or http://tinyurl.com/qys9fot

The NSA's betrayal of the Internet
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/conspiracy_theo_1.html
or http://tinyurl.com/nyxxyzd

The NSA's denial:
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/10/30/report-nsa-intercepts-google-and-yahoo-server-data/
or http://tinyurl.com/ld7kgk3
http://www.emptywheel.net/2013/10/30/nsa-non-denial-denial-241352052/
or http://tinyurl.com/q8kj7nt

Level-3's NSA code name:
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa
or http://tinyurl.com/k8gr7o2


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Code Names for NSA Exploit Tools



This is from a Snowden document released by "Le Monde":

General Term Descriptions:

HIGHLANDS: Collection from Implants
VAGRANT: Collection of Computer Screens
MAGNETIC: Sensor Collection of Magnetic Emanations
MINERALIZE: Collection from LAN Implant
OCEAN: Optical Collection System for Raster-Based Computer
Screens
LIFESAFER: Imaging of the Hard Drive
GENIE: Multi-stage operation: jumping the airgap etc.
BLACKHEART: Collection from an FBI Implant
[...]
DROPMIRE: Passive collection of emanations using antenna
CUSTOMS: Customs opportunities (not LIFESAVER)
DROPMIRE: Laser printer collection, purely proximal access
(***NOT*** implanted)
DEWSWEEPER: USB (Universal Serial Bus) hardware host tap that
provides COVERT link over US link into a target network.
Operates w/RF relay subsystem to provide wireless Bridge into
target network.
RADON: Bi-directional host tap that can inject Ethernet packets
onto the same targets. Allows bi-directional exploitation of
denied networks using standard on-net tools.

There's a lot to think about in this list. RADON and DEWSWEEPER seem
particularly interesting.

https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/807030-ambassade.html#document/p1
or http://tinyurl.com/ove78gw


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Defending Against Crypto Backdoors



We already know the NSA wants to eavesdrop on the Internet. It has
secret agreements with telcos to get direct access to bulk Internet
traffic. It has massive systems like TUMULT, TURMOIL, and TURBULENCE
to sift through it all. And it can identify ciphertext -- encrypted
information -- and figure out which programs could have created it.

But what the NSA wants is to be able to read that encrypted
information in as close to real-time as possible. It wants backdoors,
just like the cybercriminals and less benevolent governments do.

And we have to figure out how to make it harder for them, or anyone
else, to insert those backdoors.

How the NSA Gets Its Backdoors

The FBI tried to get backdoor access embedded in an AT&T secure
telephone system in the mid-1990s. The Clipper Chip included something
called a LEAF: a Law Enforcement Access Field. It was the key used to
encrypt the phone conversation, itself encrypted in a special key
known to the FBI, and it was transmitted along with the phone
conversation. An FBI eavesdropper could intercept the LEAF and decrypt
it, then use the data to eavesdrop on the phone call.

But the Clipper Chip faced severe backlash, and became defunct a few
years after being announced.

Having lost that public battle, the NSA decided to get its backdoors
through subterfuge: by asking nicely, pressuring, threatening,
bribing, or mandating through secret order. The general name for this
program is BULLRUN.

Defending against these attacks is difficult. We know from subliminal
channel and kleptography research that it's pretty much impossible to
guarantee that a complex piece of software isn't leaking secret
information. We know from Ken Thompson's famous talk on "trusting
trust" (first delivered in the ACM Turing Award Lectures) that you can
never be totally sure if there's a security flaw in your software.

Since BULLRUN became public last month, the security community has
been examining security flaws discovered over the past several years,
looking for signs of deliberate tampering. The Debian random number
flaw was probably not deliberate, but the 2003 Linux security
vulnerability probably was. The DUAL_EC_DRBG random number generator
may or may not have been a backdoor. The SSL 2.0 flaw was probably an
honest mistake. The GSM A5/1 encryption algorithm was almost certainly
deliberately weakened. All the common RSA moduli out there in the
wild: we don't know. Microsoft's _NSAKEY looks like a smoking gun, but
honestly, we don't know.

How the NSA Designs Backdoors

While a separate program that sends our data to some IP address
somewhere is certainly how any hacker -- from the lowliest script
kiddie up to the NSA -- spies on our computers, it's too
labor-intensive to work in the general case.

For government eavesdroppers like the NSA, subtlety is critical. In
particular, three characteristics are important:

* Low discoverability. The less the backdoor affects the normal
operations of the program, the better. Ideally, it shouldn't affect
functionality at all. The smaller the backdoor is, the better.
Ideally, it should just look like normal functional code. As a blatant
example, an email encryption backdoor that appends a plaintext copy to
the encrypted copy is much less desirable than a backdoor that reuses
most of the key bits in a public IV (initialization vector).

* High deniability. If discovered, the backdoor should look like a
mistake. It could be a single opcode change. Or maybe a "mistyped"
constant. Or "accidentally" reusing a single-use key multiple times.
This is the main reason I am skeptical about _NSAKEY as a deliberate
backdoor, and why so many people don't believe the DUAL_EC_DRBG
backdoor is real: they're both too obvious.

* Minimal conspiracy. The more people who know about the backdoor, the
more likely the secret is to get out. So any good backdoor should be
known to very few people. That's why the recently described potential
vulnerability in Intel's random number generator worries me so much;
one person could make this change during mask generation, and no one
else would know.

These characteristics imply several things:

* A closed-source system is safer to subvert, because an open-source
system comes with a greater risk of that subversion being discovered.
On the other hand, a big open-source system with a lot of developers
and sloppy version control is easier to subvert.

* If a software system only has to interoperate with itself, then it
is easier to subvert. For example, a closed VPN encryption system only
has to interoperate with other instances of that same proprietary
system. This is easier to subvert than an industry-wide VPN standard
that has to interoperate with equipment from other vendors.

* A commercial software system is easier to subvert, because the
profit motive provides a strong incentive for the company to go along
with the NSA's requests.

* Protocols developed by large open standards bodies are harder to
influence, because a lot of eyes are paying attention. Systems
designed by closed standards bodies are easier to influence,
especially if the people involved in the standards don't really
understand security.

* Systems that send seemingly random information in the clear are
easier to subvert. One of the most effective ways of subverting a
system is by leaking key information -- recall the LEAF -- and
modifying random nonces or header information is the easiest way to do
that.

Design Strategies for Defending against Backdoors

With these principles in mind, we can list design strategies. None of
them is foolproof, but they are all useful. I'm sure there's more;
this list isn't meant to be exhaustive, nor the final word on the
topic. It's simply a starting place for discussion. But it won't work
unless customers start demanding software with this sort of
transparency.

* Vendors should make their encryption code public, including the
protocol specifications. This will allow others to examine the code
for vulnerabilities. It's true we won't know for sure if the code
we're seeing is the code that's actually used in the application, but
surreptitious substitution is hard to do, forces the company to
outright lie, and increases the number of people required for the
conspiracy to work.

* The community should create independent compatible versions of
encryption systems, to verify they are operating properly. I envision
companies paying for these independent versions, and universities
accepting this sort of work as good practice for their students. And
yes, I know this can be very hard in practice.

* There should be no master secrets. These are just too vulnerable.

* All random number generators should conform to published and
accepted standards. Breaking the random number generator is the
easiest difficult-to-detect method of subverting an encryption system.
A corollary: we need better published and accepted RNG standards.

* Encryption protocols should be designed so as not to leak any random
information. Nonces should be considered part of the key or public
predictable counters if possible. Again, the goal is to make it harder
to subtly leak key bits in this information.

This is a hard problem. We don't have any technical controls that
protect users from the authors of their software.

And the current state of software makes the problem even harder:
Modern apps chatter endlessly on the Internet, providing noise and
cover for covert communications. Feature bloat provides a greater
"attack surface" for anyone wanting to install a backdoor.

In general, what we need is assurance: methodologies for ensuring that
a piece of software does what it's supposed to do and nothing more.
Unfortunately, we're terrible at this. Even worse, there's not a lot
of practical research in this area -- and it's hurting us badly right
now.

Yes, we need legal prohibitions against the NSA trying to subvert
authors and deliberately weaken cryptography. But this isn't just
about the NSA, and legal controls won't protect against those who
don't follow the law and ignore international agreements. We need to
make their job harder by increasing their risk of discovery. Against a
risk-averse adversary, it might be good enough.

This essay previously appeared on Wired.com.
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/how-to-design-and-defend-against-the-perfect-backdoor/
or http://tinyurl.com/o3uu76x

The NSA's secret agreements:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/senator_feinste.html

Clipper Chip:
http://www.nytimes.com/1994/06/12/magazine/battle-of-the-clipper-chip.html
or http://tinyurl.com/m7fse2w

How the NSA get around encryption:
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/06/us/nsa-foils-much-internet-encryption.html
or http://tinyurl.com/m9chca6
http://mashable.com/2013/09/11/fbi-microsoft-bitlocker-backdoor/
http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-57595202-38/feds-put-heat-on-web-firms-for-master-encryption-keys/
or http://tinyurl.com/l2nam6s
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/lavabit_unsealed
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/03/us/snowdens-e-mail-provider-discusses-pressure-from-fbi-to-disclose-data.html
or http://tinyurl.com/lz2moej

BULLRUN:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/05/nsa-gchq-encryption-codes-security
or http://tinyurl.com/m47p5dc

Subliminal channels:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subliminal_channel

Kleptography:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kleptography

Trusting trust:
http://cm.bell-labs.com/who/ken/trust.html

Debian bug:
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/kroll/software-transparency-debian-openssl-bug/
or http://tinyurl.com/o28vmhg

Linux backdoor:
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/the-linux-backdoor-attempt-of-2003
or http://tinyurl.com/l3o3e7s

DUAL_EC_DRBG:
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/09/nsa-backdoor/all/

SSL 2.0 flaw:
http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~daw/papers/ddj-netscape.html

GSM A5/1 flaw:
http://www.cs.technion.ac.il/users/wwwb/cgi-bin/tr-get.cgi/2006/CS/CS-2006-07.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/3cskp3

Common RSA moduli:
http://eprint.iacr.org/2012/064.pdf

_NSAKEY:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NSAKEY

NSA attacks Tor:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/04/tor-attacks-nsa-users-online-anonymity
or http://tinyurl.com/onbjqju

Possible Intel RNG backdoor:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/09/surreptitiously.html

Nonces:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptographic_nonce

Assurance:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2007/08/assurance.html

I am looking for other examples of known or plausible instances of
intentional vulnerabilities for a paper I am writing on this topic.
If you can think of an example, please post a description and
reference in the comments below. Please explain why you think the
vulnerability could be intentional. Thank you.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

Why the Government Should Help Leakers



In the Information Age, it's easier than ever to steal and publish
data. Corporations and governments have to adjust to their secrets
being exposed, regularly.

When massive amounts of government documents are leaked, journalists
sift through them to determine which pieces of information are
newsworthy, and confer with government agencies over what needs to be
redacted.

Managing this reality is going to require that governments actively
engage with members of the press who receive leaked secrets, helping
them secure those secrets -- even while being unable to prevent them
from publishing. It might seem abhorrent to help those who are seeking
to bring your secrets to light, but it's the best way to ensure that
the things that truly need to be secret remain secret, even as
everything else becomes public.

The WikiLeaks cables serve as an excellent example of how a government
should not deal with massive leaks of classified information.

WikiLeaks has said it asked US authorities for help in determining
what should be redacted before publication of documents, although some
government officials have challenged that statement. WikiLeaks' media
partners did redact many documents, but eventually all 250,000
unredacted cables were released to the world as a result of a
mistake.

The damage was nowhere near as serious as government officials
initially claimed, but it had been avoidable.

Fast-forward to today, and we have an even bigger trove of classified
documents. What Edward Snowden took -- "exfiltrated" is the National
Security Agency term -- dwarfs the State Department cables, and
contains considerably more important secrets. But again, the US
government is doing nothing to prevent a massive data dump.

The government engages with the press on individual stories. The
"Guardian," the "Washington Post," and the "New York Times" are all
redacting the original Snowden documents based on discussions with the
government. This isn't new. The US press regularly consults with the
government before publishing something that might be damaging. In
2006, the "New York Times" consulted with both the NSA and the Bush
administration before publishing Mark Klein's whistleblowing about the
NSA's eavesdropping on AT&T trunk circuits. In all these cases, the
goal is to minimize actual harm to US security while ensuring the
press can still report stories in the public interest, even if the
government doesn't want it to.

In today's world of reduced secrecy, whistleblowing as civil
disobedience, and massive document exfiltrations, negotiations over
individual stories aren't enough. The government needs to develop a
protocol to actively help news organizations expose their secrets
safely and responsibly.

Here's what should have happened as soon as Snowden's whistleblowing
became public. The government should have told the reporters and
publications with the classified documents something like this: "OK,
you have them. We know that we can't undo the leak. But please let us
help. Let us help you secure the documents as you write your stories,
and securely dispose of the documents when you're done."

The people who have access to the Snowden documents say they don't
want them to be made public in their raw form or to get in the hands
of rival governments. But accidents happen, and reporters are not
trained in military secrecy practices.

Copies of some of the Snowden documents are being circulated to
journalists and others. With each copy, each person, each day, there's
a greater chance that, once again, someone will make a mistake and
some -- or all -- of the raw documents will appear on the Internet. A
formal system of working with whistleblowers could prevent that.

I'm sure the suggestion sounds odious to a government that is actively
engaging in a war on whistleblowers, and that views Snowden as a
criminal and the reporters writing these stories as "helping the
terrorists." But it makes sense. Harvard law professor Jonathan
Zittrain compares this to plea bargaining.

The police regularly negotiate lenient sentences or probation for
confessed criminals in order to convict more important criminals. They
make deals with all sorts of unsavory people, giving them benefits
they don't deserve, because the result is a greater good.

In the Snowden case, an agreement would safeguard the most important
of NSA's secrets from other nations' intelligence agencies. It would
help ensure that the truly secret information not be exposed. It would
protect US interests.

Why would reporters agree to this? Two reasons. One, they actually do
want these documents secured while they look for stories to publish.
And two, it would be a public demonstration of that desire.

Why wouldn't the government just collect all the documents under the
pretense of securing them and then delete them? For the same reason
they don't renege on plea bargains: No one would trust them next time.
And, of course, because smart reporters will probably keep encrypted
backups under their own control.

We're nowhere near the point where this system could be put into
practice, but it's worth thinking about how it could work. The
government would need to establish a semi-independent group, called,
say, a Leak Management unit, which could act as an intermediary. Since
it would be isolated from the agencies that were the source of the
leak, its officials would be less vested and -- this is important --
less angry over the leak. Over time, it would build a reputation,
develop protocols that reporters could rely on. Leaks will be more
common in the future, but they'll still be rare. Expecting each agency
to develop expertise in this process is unrealistic.

If there were sufficient trust between the press and the government,
this could work. And everyone would benefit.

This essay previously appeared on CNN.com.
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/11/04/opinion/schneier-leakers-government/index.html
or http://tinyurl.com/jwb6lbw

WikiLeaks story:
http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/all-leaked-u-s-cables-were-made-available-online-as-wikileaks-splintered/
or http://tinyurl.com/3mugz7j
http://www.salon.com/2011/09/02/wikileaks_28/
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/07/31/us-usa-wikileaks-manning-damage-analysis-idUSBRE96U00420130731
or http://tinyurl.com/o79sfsl
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-201_162-6962209.html
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30WikiLeaks-t.html

Mark Klein story:
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/13/us/nationalspecial3/13nsa.html

The world of reduced secrecy:
https://www.schneier.com/essay-449.html

Whistleblowing as civil disobedience:
http://www.zephoria.org/thoughts/archives/2013/07/19/edward-snowden-whistleblower.html
or http://tinyurl.com/jwbcgom

Software to facilitate massive document exfiltrations:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/securedrop.html


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

NSA/Snowden News



Jack Goldsmith argues that we need the NSA to surveil the Internet not
for terrorism reasons, but for cyberespionage and cybercrime reasons.
http://www.newrepublic.com/node/115002/

Daniel Gallington argues -- the headline has nothing to do with the
content -- that the balance between surveillance and privacy is about
right.
http://mobile.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2013/10/23/edward-snowden-could-have-raised-nsa-spying-concerns-without-going-to-media
or http://tinyurl.com/lksejka

Good summary from the "London Review of Books" on what the NSA can and
cannot do.
http://www.lrb.co.uk/v35/n20/daniel-soar/how-to-get-ahead-at-the-nsa

"A Template for Reporting Government Surveillance News Stories." This
is from 2006, but it's even more true today.
http://www.concurringopinions.com/archives/2006/06/template_for_ne.html
or http://tinyurl.com/gpsyb
We've changed administrations -- we've changed political parties --
but nothing has changed.

There's a story that Edward Snowden successfully socially engineered
other NSA employees into giving him their passwords.
http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSBRE9A703020131108?irpc=932

This talk by Dan Geer explains the NSA mindset of "collect everything":
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/11/dan_geer_explai.html
The whole essay is well worth reading.
http://geer.tinho.net/geer.uncc.9x13.txt

This "New York Times" story on the NSA is very good, and contains lots
of little tidbits of new information gleaned from the Snowden
documents. "The agency's Dishfire database -- nothing happens without
a code word at the N.S.A. -- stores years of text messages from around
the world, just in case. Its Tracfin collection accumulates gigabytes
of credit card purchases. The fellow pretending to send a text message
at an Internet cafe in Jordan may be using an N.S.A. technique
code-named Polarbreeze to tap into nearby computers. The Russian
businessman who is socially active on the web might just become food
for Snacks, the acronym-mad agency's Social Network Analysis
Collaboration Knowledge Services, which figures out the personnel
hierarchies of organizations from texts.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/03/world/no-morsel-too-minuscule-for-all-consuming-nsa.html
or http://tinyurl.com/qdz55dk
This "Guardian" story is related. It looks like both the "New York
Times" and the "Guardian" wrote separate stories about the same source
material.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/02/nsa-portrait-total-surveillance
or http://tinyurl.com/q4pa5ff
"New York Times" reporter Scott Shane gave a 20-minute interview on
"Democracy Now" on the NSA and his reporting.
http://www.democracynow.org/2013/11/4/inside_the_electronic_omnivore_new_leaks
or http://tinyurl.com/mt9c6z4

"Der Spiegel" is reporting that the GCHQ used QUANTUMINSERT to direct
users to fake LinkedIn and Slashdot pages run by -- this code name is
not in the article -- FOXACID servers. There's not a lot technically
new in the article, but we do get some information about popularity
and jargon.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/ghcq-targets-engineers-with-fake-linkedin-pages-a-932821.html
or http://tinyurl.com/k3lb6qd
Slashdot has reacted to the story.
https://slashdot.org/topic/bi/gchq-responds-to-slashdot-linkedin-hack/
or http://tinyurl.com/mct8hrh
I wrote about QUANTUMINSERT, and the whole infection process, here.
https://www.schneier.com/essay-455.html


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

The Trajectories of Government and Corporate Surveillance



Historically, surveillance was difficult and expensive.

Over the decades, as technology advanced, surveillance became easier
and easier. Today, we find ourselves in a world of ubiquitous
surveillance, where everything is collected, saved, searched,
correlated and analyzed.

But while technology allowed for an increase in both corporate and
government surveillance, the private and public sectors took very
different paths to get there. The former always collected information
about everyone, but over time, collected more and more of it, while
the latter always collected maximal information, but over time,
collected it on more and more people.

Corporate surveillance has been on a path from minimal to maximal
information. Corporations always collected information on everyone
they could, but in the past they didn't collect very much of it and
only held it as long as necessary. When surveillance information was
expensive to collect and store, companies made do with as little as
possible.

Telephone companies collected long-distance calling information
because they needed it for billing purposes. Credit cards collected
only the information about their customers' transactions that they
needed for billing. Stores hardly ever collected information about
their customers, maybe some personal preferences, or name-and-address
for advertising purposes. Even Google, back in the beginning,
collected far less information about its users than it does today.

As technology improved, corporations were able to collect more. As the
cost of data storage became cheaper, they were able to save more data
and for a longer time. And as big data analysis tools became more
powerful, it became profitable to save more. Today, almost everything
is being saved by someone -- probably forever.

Examples are everywhere. Internet companies like Google, Facebook,
Amazon and Apple collect everything we do online at their sites.
Third-party cookies allow those companies, and others, to collect data
on us wherever we are on the Internet. Store affinity cards allow
merchants to track our purchases. CCTV and aerial surveillance
combined with automatic face recognition allow companies to track our
movements; so does your cell phone. The Internet will facilitate even
more surveillance, by more corporations for more purposes.

On the government side, surveillance has been on a path from
individually targeted to broadly collected. When surveillance was
manual and expensive, it could only be justified in extreme cases. The
warrant process limited police surveillance, and resource restraints
and the risk of discovery limited national intelligence surveillance.
Specific individuals were targeted for surveillance, and maximal
information was collected on them alone.

As technology improved, the government was able to implement
ever-broadening surveillance. The National Security Agency could
surveil groups -- the Soviet government, the Chinese diplomatic corps,
etc. -- not just individuals. Eventually, they could spy on entire
communications trunks.

Now, instead of watching one person, the NSA can monitor "three hops"
away from that person -- an ever widening network of people not
directly connected to the person under surveillance. Using
sophisticated tools, the NSA can surveil broad swaths of the Internet
and phone network.

Governments have always used their authority to piggyback on corporate
surveillance. Why should they go through the trouble of developing
their own surveillance programs when they could just ask corporations
for the data? For example we just learned that the NSA collects
e-mail, IM and social networking contact lists for millions of
Internet users worldwide.

But as corporations started collecting more information on
populations, governments started demanding that data. Through National
Security Letters, the FBI can surveil huge groups of people without
obtaining a warrant. Through secret agreements, the NSA can monitor
the entire Internet and telephone networks.

This is a huge part of the public-private surveillance partnership.

The result of all this is we're now living in a world where both
corporations and governments have us all under pretty much constant
surveillance.

Data is a byproduct of the information society. Every interaction we
have with a computer creates a transaction record, and we interact
with computers hundreds of times a day. Even if we don't use a
computer -- buying something in person with cash, say -- the merchant
uses a computer, and the data flows into the same system. Everything
we do leaves a data shadow, and that shadow is constantly under
surveillance.

Data is also a byproduct of information society socialization, whether
it be e-mail, instant messages or conversations on Facebook.
Conversations that used to be ephemeral are now recorded, and we are
all leaving digital footprints wherever we go.

Moore's law has made computing cheaper. All of us have made computing
ubiquitous. And because computing produces data, and that data equals
surveillance, we have created a world of ubiquitous surveillance.

Now we need to figure out what to do about it. This is more than
reining in the NSA or fining a corporation for the occasional data
abuse. We need to decide whether our data is a shared societal
resource, a part of us that is inherently ours by right, or a private
good to be bought and sold.

Writing in the "Guardian," Chris Huhn said that "information is power,
and the necessary corollary is that privacy is freedom." How this
interplay between power and freedom play out in the information age is
still to be determined.

This essay previously appeared on CNN.com.
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/16/opinion/schneier-surveillance-trajectories/index.html
or http://tinyurl.com/mdwfo6k

https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/10/the_trajectorie.html

Ubiquitous surveillance:
http://www.cnn.com/2013/03/16/opinion/schneier-internet-surveillance

Three hop analysis:
http://www.theatlanticwire.com/politics/2013/07/nsa-admits-it-analyzes-more-peoples-data-previously-revealed/67287
or http://tinyurl.com/nseaodw
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/07/you-may-already-be-a-winner-in-nsas-three-degrees-surveillance-sweepstakes
or http://tinyurl.com/lvz63g5

The public-private surveillance partnership:
https://www.schneier.com/essay-436.html

Chris Huhn's comment:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/oct/06/prism-tempora-cabinet-surveillance-state
or http://tinyurl.com/numre3y

Richard Stallman's comments on the subject:
http://ieet.org/index.php/IEET/more/stallman20131020


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

A Fraying of the Public/Private Surveillance Partnership



The public/private surveillance partnership between the NSA and
corporate data collectors is starting to fray. The reason is sunlight.
The publicity resulting from the Snowden documents has made companies
think twice before allowing the NSA access to their users' and
customers' data.

Pre-Snowden, there was no downside to cooperating with the NSA. If the
NSA asked you for copies of all your Internet traffic, or to put
backdoors into your security software, you could assume that your
cooperation would forever remain secret. To be fair, not every
corporation cooperated willingly. Some fought in court. But it seems
that a lot of them, telcos and backbone providers especially, were
happy to give the NSA unfettered access to everything. Post-Snowden,
this is changing. Now that many companies' cooperation has become
public, they're facing a PR backlash from customers and users who are
upset that their data is flowing to the NSA. And this is costing those
companies business.

How much is unclear. In July, right after the PRISM revelations, the
Cloud Security Alliance reported that US cloud companies could lose
$35 billion over the next three years, mostly due to losses of foreign
sales. Surely that number has increased as outrage over NSA spying
continues to build in Europe and elsewhere. There is no similar report
for software sales, although I have attended private meetings where
several large US software companies complained about the loss of
foreign sales. On the hardware side, IBM is losing business in China.
The US telecom companies are also suffering: AT&T is losing business
worldwide.

This is the new reality. The rules of secrecy are different, and
companies have to assume that their responses to NSA data demands will
become public. This means there is now a significant cost to
cooperating, and a corresponding benefit to fighting.

Over the past few months, more companies have woken up to the fact
that the NSA is basically treating them as adversaries, and are
responding as such. In mid-October, it became public that the NSA was
collecting e-mail address books and buddy lists from Internet users
logging into different service providers. Yahoo, which didn't encrypt
those user connections by default, allowed the NSA to collect much
more of its data than Google, which did. That same day, Yahoo
announced that it would implement SSL encryption by default for all of
its users. Two weeks later, when it became public that the NSA was
collecting data on Google users by eavesdropping on the company's
trunk connections between its data centers, Google announced that it
would encrypt those connections.

We recently learned that Yahoo fought a government order to turn over
data. Lavabit fought its order as well. Apple is now tweaking the
government. And we think better of those companies because of it.

Now Lavabit, which closed down its e-mail service rather than comply
with the NSA's request for the master keys that would compromise all
of its customers, has teamed with Silent Circle to develop a secure
e-mail standard that is resistant to these kinds of tactics.

The Snowden documents made it clear how much the NSA relies on
corporations to eavesdrop on the Internet. The NSA didn't build a
massive Internet eavesdropping system from scratch. It noticed that
the corporate world was already eavesdropping on every Internet user
-- surveillance is the business model of the Internet, after all --
and simply got copies for itself.

Now, that secret ecosystem is breaking down. Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis wrote about transparency, saying "Sunlight is said to
be the best of disinfectants." In this case, it seems to be working.

These developments will only help security. Remember that while Edward
Snowden has given us a window into the NSA's activities, these sorts
of tactics are probably also used by other intelligence services
around the world. And today's secret NSA programs become tomorrow's
PhD theses, and the next day's criminal hacker tools. It's impossible
to build an Internet where the good guys can eavesdrop, and the bad
guys cannot. We have a choice between an Internet that is vulnerable
to all attackers, or an Internet that is safe from all attackers. And
a safe and secure Internet is in everyone's best interests, including
the US's.

This essay previously appeared on TheAtlantic.com.
http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2013/11/a-fraying-of-the-public-private-surveillance-partnership/281289/
or http://tinyurl.com/lpgv6lc

The public/private surveillance partnership:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/08/the_publicpriva_1.html
or http://tinyurl.com/lr66rkp

PRISM:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/us-intelligence-mining-data-from-nine-us-internet-companies-in-broad-secret-program/2013/06/06/3a0c0da8-cebf-11e2-8845-d970ccb04497_story.html
or http://tinyurl.com/mm3ttqt

Increased outrage outside the US:
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/10/28/report-nsa-spain/3284609/
or http://tinyurl.com/mep8m8y

Losses due to NSA spying:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/08/07/nsa-snooping-could-cost-u-s-tech-companies-35-billion-over-three-years/
or http://tinyurl.com/laba7fu
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2013/10/wolf-richter-nsa-revelations-kill-ibm-hardware-sales-in-china.html
or http://tinyurl.com/meqjezj
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304073204579167873091999730
or http://tinyurl.com/lrkup9x

New rules of secrecy:
https://www.schneier.com/essay-449.html

The NSA and tech companies as adversaries:
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/01/google-yahoo-nsa-surveillance-reform
or http://tinyurl.com/leagmzv
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/01/technology/angry-over-us-surveillance-tech-giants-bolster-defenses.html
or http://tinyurl.com/pb7v45h
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/08/stop-clumping-tech-companies-in-with-government-in-the-surveillance-scandals-they-may-be-at-war/
or http://tinyurl.com/os3pv2n
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/09/yahoo-lawsuit-nsa-surveillance-requests
or http://tinyurl.com/nky7qud
http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57610342-83/apple-google-microsoft-unite-against-nsa-spying-program/
or http://tinyurl.com/mv7bker
http://news.yahoo.com/microsoft-google-team-sue-federal-government-over-nsa-180635058.html
or http://tinyurl.com/oevlmea
http://rt.com/news/yahoo-data-collection-court-case-165/
https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130924/18051224648/lavabit-asks-court-to-unseal-least-some-its-case-so-others-can-submit-amici-briefs.shtml
or http://tinyurl.com/k72a3k6
http://boingboing.net/2013/11/05/apple-hides-a-patriot-act-bust.html

Yahoo announce3s SSL by default:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/14/yahoo-to-make-ssl-encryption-the-default-for-webmail-users-finally/
or http://tinyurl.com/kdthaoj

Lavabit:
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/08/lavabit_e-mail.html

Silent Circle's new e-mail system:
http://www.computerworld.com.au/article/530582/silent_circle_lavabit_unite_dark_mail_encrypted_email_project/
or http://tinyurl.com/letnnmw

Brandeis quote:
http://www.law.louisville.edu/library/collections/brandeis/node/196


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

Book Review: "Cyber War Will Not Take Place"



Cyber war is possibly the most dangerous buzzword of the Internet era.
The fear-inducing rhetoric surrounding it is being used to justify
major changes in the way the Internet is organized, governed, and
constructed. And in "Cyber War Will Not Take Place," Thomas Rid
convincingly argues that cyber war is not a compelling threat. Rid is
one of the leading cyber war skeptics in Europe, and although he
doesn't argue that war won't extend into cyberspace, he says that
cyberspace's role in war is more limited than doomsayers want us to
believe. His argument against cyber war is lucid and methodical. He
divides "offensive and violent political acts" in cyberspace into:
sabotage, espionage, and subversion. These categories are larger than
cyberspace, of course, but Rid spends considerable time analyzing
their strengths and limitations within cyberspace. The details are
complicated, but his end conclusion is that many of these types of
attacks cannot be defined as acts of war, and any future war won't
involve many of these types of attacks.

None of this is meant to imply that cyberspace is safe. Threats of all
sorts fill cyberspace, but not threats of war. As such, the policies
to defend against them are different. While hackers and criminal
threats get all the headlines, more worrisome are the threats from
governments seeking to consolidate their power. I have long argued
that controlling the Internet has become critical for totalitarian
states, and their four broad tools of surveillance, censorship,
propaganda and use control have legitimate commercial applications,
and are also employed by democracies.

A lot of the problem here is of definition. There isn't broad
agreement as to what constitutes cyber war, and this confusion plays
into the hands of those hyping its threat. If everything from Chinese
espionage to Russian criminal extortion to activist disruption falls
under the cyber war umbrella, then it only makes sense to put more of
the Internet under government -- and thus military -- control. Rid's
book is a compelling counter-argument to this approach.

Rid's final chapter is an essay unto itself, and lays out his vision
as to how we should deal with threats in cyberspace. For policymakers
who won't sit through an entire book, this is the chapter I would urge
them to read. Arms races are dangerous and destabilizing, and we're in
the early years of a cyberwar arms race that's being fueled by fear
and ignorance. This book is a cogent counterpoint to the doomsayers
and the profiteers, and should be required reading for anyone
concerned about security in cyberspace.

This book review previously appeared in Europe's World.
http://europesworld.org/2013/10/01/cyber-war-will-not-take-place/

Thomas Rid, "Cyber War Will Not Take Place," Oxford University Press, 2013.


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

Understanding the Threats in Cyberspace



The primary difficulty of cyber security isn't technology -- it's
policy. The Internet mirrors real-world society, which makes security
policy online as complicated as it is in the real world. Protecting
critical infrastructure against cyber-attack is just one of
cyberspace's many security challenges, so it's important to understand
them all before any one of them can be solved.

The list of bad actors in cyberspace is long, and spans a wide range
of motives and capabilities. At the extreme end there's cyberwar:
destructive actions by governments during a war. When government
policymakers like David Omand think of cyber-attacks, that's what
comes to mind. Cyberwar is conducted by capable and well-funded groups
and involves military operations against both military and civilian
targets. Along much the same lines are non-nation state actors who
conduct terrorist operations. Although less capable and well-funded,
they are often talked about in the same breath as true cyberwar.

Much more common are the domestic and international criminals who run
the gamut from lone individuals to organized crime. They can be very
capable and well-funded and will continue to inflict significant
economic damage.

Threats from peacetime governments have been seen increasingly in the
news. The US worries about Chinese espionage against Western targets,
and we're also seeing US surveillance of pretty much everyone in the
world, including Americans inside the US. The National Security Agency
(NSA) is probably the most capable and well-funded espionage
organization in the world, and we're still learning about the full
extent of its sometimes illegal operations.

Hacktivists are a different threat. Their actions range from
Internet-age acts of civil disobedience to the inflicting of actual
damage. This is hard to generalize about because the individuals and
groups in this category vary so much in skill, funding and motivation.
Hackers falling under the "anonymous" aegis -- it really isn't correct
to call them a group -- come under this category, as does WikiLeaks.
Most of these attackers are outside the organization, although
whistleblowing -- the civil disobedience of the information age --
generally involves insiders like Edward Snowden.

This list of potential network attackers isn't exhaustive. Depending
on who you are and what your organization does, you might be also
concerned with espionage cyber-attacks by the media, rival
corporations or even the corporations we entrust with our data.

The issue here, and why it affects policy, is that protecting against
these various threats can lead to contradictory requirements. In the
US, the NSA's post-9/11 mission to protect the country from terrorists
has transformed it into a domestic surveillance organization. The
NSA's need to protect its own information systems from outside attack
opened it up to attacks from within. Do the corporate security
products we buy to protect ourselves against cybercrime contain
backdoors that allow for government spying? European countries may
condemn the US for spying on its own citizens, but do they do the same
thing?

All these questions are especially difficult because military and
security organizations along with corporations tend to hype particular
threats. For example, cyberwar and cyberterrorism are greatly
overblown as threats -- because they result in massive government
programs with huge budgets and power -- while cybercrime is largely
downplayed.

We need greater transparency, oversight and accountability on both the
government and corporate sides before we can move forward. With the
secrecy that surrounds cyber-attack and cyberdefense it's hard to be
optimistic.

This essay previously appeared in "Europe's World."
http://europesworld.org/commentaries/understanding-the-threats-in-cyberspace/
or http://tinyurl.com/msedsut


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News



Ed Felten makes a strong argument that a court order is exactly the
same thing as an insider attack:
https://freedom-to-tinker.com/blog/felten/a-court-order-is-an-insider-attack/
or http://tinyurl.com/lyah32e
This is why designing Lavabit to be resistant to court order would
have been the right thing to do, and why we should all demand systems
that are designed in this way.
http://boingboing.net/2013/10/15/why-email-services-should-be-c.html

There seems to be a bunch of research into uniquely identifying cell
phones through unique analog characteristics of the various embedded
sensors. These sorts of things could replace cookies as surveillance
tools.
http://www.hotmobile.org/2014/papers/posters/Hotmobile_poster_Dey.pdf
or http://tinyurl.com/movpmgo
http://blog.sfgate.com/techchron/2013/10/10/stanford-researchers-discover-alarming-method-for-phone-tracking-fingerprinting-through-sensor-flaws/
or http://tinyurl.com/kgru3xo
http://yro.slashdot.org/story/13/10/11/1231240/sensor-characteristics-uniquely-identify-individual-phones
or http://tinyurl.com/ls9bj7p
http://www.metafilter.com/132752/Leveraging-Imperfections-of-Sensors-for-Fingerprinting-Smartphones
or http://tinyurl.com/khz3g3n

Several versions of D-Link router firmware contain a backdoor. Just
set the browser's user agent string to
"xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide," and you're in. (Hint, remove the
number and read it backwards.) It was probably put there for
debugging purposes, but has all sorts of applications for
surveillance.
http://www.devttys0.com/2013/10/reverse-engineering-a-d-link-backdoor/
or http://tinyurl.com/kulv2oo
http://www.infoworld.com/d/security/backdoor-found-in-d-link-router-firmware-code-228725
or http://tinyurl.com/o4oarkn
There are open-source programs available to replace the firmware:
http://www.infoworld.com/d/networking/review-6-slick-open-source-routers-206810
or http://tinyurl.com/czjcnpw

The new iPhone has a motion sensor chip, and that opens up new
opportunities for surveillance.
http://www.wired.com/opinion/2013/10/the-trojan-horse-of-the-latest-iphone-with-the-m7-coprocessor-we-all-become-qs-activity-trackers/
or http://tinyurl.com/lgszxod

Slashdot asks whether I can be trusted:
http://ask.slashdot.org/story/13/10/22/1416201/ask-slashdot-can-bruce-schneier-be-trusted
or http://tinyurl.com/ltl6x4j

DARPA is looking for a fully automated network defense system, and has
a contest:
http://www.darpa.mil/NewsEvents/Releases/2013/10/22.aspx
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/10/23/darpa-announces-2-million-prize-in-self-patching-software-competition/
or http://tinyurl.com/kbyy2wy
http://gizmodo.com/darpa-will-give-you-2-million-to-build-hacker-proof-de-1451009416
or http://tinyurl.com/ou2d9nv
http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/35211/darpas-new-cyber-grand-challenge-the-development-of-selfhealing-software/
or http://tinyurl.com/ls6uuvz
http://news.slashdot.org/story/13/10/24/0242252/darpa-issues-2mil-cyber-grand-challenge
or http://tinyurl.com/njkjxd6
http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/1ozoiy/darpas_cyber_grand_challenge_cyber_defense/
or http://tinyurl.com/q4eyuz7

Cognitive biases about violence as a negotiating tactic: interesting paper.
http://www.academia.edu/4770419/The_Credibility_Paradox_Violence_as_a_Double-Edged_Sword_in_International_Politics_International_Studies_Quarterly_December_2013_
or http://tinyurl.com/nymrbuz

This article talks about applications of close-in surveillance using
your phone's Wi-Fi in retail, but the possibilities are endless.
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/10/19/how-stores-use-your-phones-wifi-to-track-your-shopping-habits/
or http://tinyurl.com/p6rz7d4
Basically, the system is using the MAC address to identify individual
devices. Another article on the system is here.
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/15/business/attention-shopper-stores-are-tracking-your-cell.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&
or http://tinyurl.com/nh968hw

Good story of badBIOS, a really nasty piece of malware. The weirdest
part is how it uses ultrasonic sound to jump air gaps.
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/meet-badbios-the-mysterious-mac-and-pc-malware-that-jumps-airgaps/
or http://tinyurl.com/q3e4zgj
I'm not sure what to make of this. When I first read it, I thought it
was a hoax. But enough others are taking it seriously that I think
it's a real story. I don't know whether the facts are real, and I
haven't seen anything about what this malware actually does.
http://boingboing.net/2013/10/31/badbios-airgap-jumping-malwar.html
http://www.reddit.com/r/netsec/comments/1pm66y/meet_badbios_the_mysterious_mac_and_pc_malware/
or http://tinyurl.com/oyqa9m8
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6654663
http://blog.erratasec.com/2013/10/badbios-features-explained.html
A debunking:
http://www.rootwyrm.com/2013/11/the-badbios-analysis-is-wrong/

This story of the bomb squad at the Boston marathon interesting
reading, but I'm left wanting more. What are the lessons here? How
can we do this better next time? Clearly we won't be able to
anticipate bombings; even Israel can't do that. We have to get better
at responding.
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2013/10/boston-police-bomb-squad/all/
or http://tinyurl.com/m6hxcya

Here's a demonstration of the US government's capabilities to monitor
the public Internet. Former CIA and NSA Director Michael Hayden was
on the Acela train between New York and Washington DC, taking press
interviews on the phone. Someone nearby overheard the conversation,
and started tweeting about it. Within 15 or so minutes, someone
somewhere noticed the tweets, and informed someone who knew Hayden.
That person called Hayden on his cell phone and, presumably, told him
to shut up. Nothing covert here; the tweets were public.
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/24/former-spy-chief-overheard-acela-twitter
or http://tinyurl.com/mgjg2be
I don't think this was a result of the NSA monitoring the Internet. I
think this was some public relations office -- probably the one that
is helping General Alexander respond to all the Snowden stories -- who
is searching the public Twitter feed for, among other things, Hayden's
name. Even so: wow.

This elliptic-curve crypto primer is well-written and very good.
http://arstechnica.com/security/2013/10/a-relatively-easy-to-understand-primer-on-elliptic-curve-cryptography/
or http://tinyurl.com/qznvhd4

The wings of the *Goniurellia tridens* fruit fly have images of an ant
on them, to deceive predators: "When threatened, the fly flashes its
wings to give the appearance of ants walking back and forth. The
predator gets confused and the fly zips off."
http://www.thenational.ae/news/uae-news/science/fruit-fly-with-the-wings-of-beauty
or http://tinyurl.com/cnccw2k

Interesting article on risk-based authentication. I like the idea of
giving each individual login attempt a risk score, based on the
characteristics of the attempt.
http://deloitte.wsj.com/cio/2013/10/30/risk-based-authentication-a-primer/
or http://tinyurl.com/l5t2mh4

This bizarre essay argues that online gambling is a strategic national
threat because terrorists could use it to launder money.
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/columns/column-online-gambling-is-a-strategic-national-threat/2151317
or http://tinyurl.com/mw3x3sc
I'm impressed with the massive fear resonating.

Adobe lost 150 million customer passwords. Even worse, it had a
pretty dumb cryptographic hash system protecting those passwords.
http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/nov/07/adobe-password-leak-can-check
or http://tinyurl.com/odowevq
http://nakedsecurity.sophos.com/2013/11/04/anatomy-of-a-password-disaster-adobes-giant-sized-cryptographic-blunder/
or http://tinyurl.com/n2fpgxj
http://xkcd.com/1286/

Microsoft has announced plans to retire SHA-1 by 2016. I think this is
a good move.
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2013/11/microsoft_retir.html


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SecureDrop



SecureDrop is an open-source whistleblower support system, originally
written by Aaron Swartz and now run by the Freedom of the Press
Foundation. The first instance of this system was named StrongBox and
is being run by "The New Yorker." To further add to the naming
confusion, Aaron Swartz called the system DeadDrop when he wrote the
code.

I participated in a detailed security audit of the StrongBox
implementation, along with some great researchers from the University
of Washington and Jake Applebaum. The problems we found were largely
procedural, and things that the Freedom of the Press Foundation are
working to fix.

Freedom of the Press Foundation is not running any instances of
SecureDrop. It has about a half dozen major news organization lined
up, and will be helping them install their own starting the first week
of November. So hopefully any would-be whistleblowers will soon have
their choice of news organizations to securely communicate with.

Strong technical whistleblower protection is essential, especially
given President Obama's war on whistleblowers. I hope this system is
broadly implemented and extensively used.

SecureDrop:
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/securedrop
https://pressfreedomfoundation.org/blog/2013/10/freedom-press-foundation-launches-securedrop
or http://tinyurl.com/mujzg8j

StrongBox:
http://www.newyorker.com/strongbox/

DeadDrop:
http://deaddrop.github.io/

Our security audit:
http://homes.cs.washington.edu/~aczeskis/research/pubs/UW-CSE-13-08-02.PDF
or http://tinyurl.com/prf7rxv

Obama's war on whistleblowers:
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/06/obamas-whistleblowers-stuxnet-leaks-drones
or http://tinyurl.com/buqm984
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20130722/01430523882/architect-obamas-war-whistleblowers-its-good-to-hang-admiral-once-while-as-example.shtml
or http://tinyurl.com/lz28uwl
https://www.cpj.org/reports/2013/10/obama-and-the-press-us-leaks-surveillance-post-911.php
or http://tinyurl.com/l3vx8k5

The US government sets up secure indoor tents for the president and
other officials to deal with classified material while traveling
abroad.
http://www.theage.com.au/world/barack-obamas-portable-secrecy-tent-some-assembly-required-20131111-2xb0l.html


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

Dry Ice Bombs at LAX



The news story about the guy who left dry ice bombs in restricted
areas of LAX is really weird.

I can't get worked up over it, though. Dry ice bombs are a harmless
prank. I set off a bunch of them when I was in college, although I
used liquid nitrogen, because I was impatient -- and they're harmless.
I know of someone who set a few off over the summer, just for fun.
They do make a very satisfying boom.

Having them set off in a secure airport area doesn't illustrate any
new vulnerabilities. We already know that trusted people can subvert
security systems. So what?

I've done a bunch of press interviews on this. One radio announcer
really didn't like my nonchalance. He really wanted me to complain
about the lack of cameras at LAX, and was unhappy when I pointed out
that we didn't need cameras to catch this guy.

I like my kicker quote in this article:

Various people, including former Los Angeles Police Chief
William Bratton, have called LAX the No. 1 terrorist target on
the West Coast. But while an Algerian man discovered with a
bomb at the Canadian border in 1999 was sentenced to 37 years
in prison in connection with a plot to cause damage at LAX,
Schneier said that assessment by Bratton is probably not true.

"Where can you possibly get that data?" he said. "I don't think
terrorists respond to opinion polls about how juicy targets
are."

http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lax-dry-ice-bombs-20131014,0,1147428.story
or http://tinyurl.com/lbjxre8
http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-dry-ice-bomb-suspect-protect-dog-20131018,0,3318134.story
or http://tinyurl.com/lqchfnz
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-me-1019-dryice-bombs-20131019,0,264254.story
or http://tinyurl.com/jvuqh36
http://www.dailynews.com/general-news/20131019/for-employees-lax-airport-security-is-built-on-trust
or http://tinyurl.com/k3duee6


** *** ***** ******* *********** *************

Schneier News



In Spring semester, I'm running a reading group -- which seems to be a
formal variant of a study group -- at Harvard Law School on "Security,
Power, and the Internet. I would like a good mix of people, so non
law students and non Harvard students are both welcome to sign up.


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