這幾年來, Old Donald政府 & Old Joe政府做了幾件對台灣人很有利的事
david chou
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Appendix I
AIT's Taiwan status comments consistent with long-held U.S. stance: Ex-envoys
Focus Taiwan, CNA English News
09/15/2025 11:45 AM
https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202509150006
Washington, Sept. 14 (CNA) Two former American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) officials told CNA on Saturday that recent comments by AIT on Taiwan's political status are consistent with the long-standing position of the United States on the issue.
Richard Bush, former AIT chair, and Robert Wang, ex-AIT deputy director, both told CNA in separate emails that the U.S. does not consider the political status of Taiwan to have been determined by any post-World War II documents, and that Washington expects the issue to be resolved peacefully.
Wang cited the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), a 1979 U.S. law governing its exchanges with Taiwan after Washington switched diplomatic recognition to Beijing. The TRA made clear that, "The United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China (PRC) rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means," he wrote.
"In other words, the TRA makes clear that the U.S. does not consider the political status of Taiwan to have been determined by any previous documents, including the World War II-era declarations or treaties," he wrote.
Bush shared a similar view, saying the U.S. has long stated that "cross-strait differences should be resolved peacefully and with the assent of the people of Taiwan."
Both former U.S. envoys made the remarks when asked by CNA to comment on AIT's statement Saturday responding to China's reliance on World War II-era documents, including the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, as justification for its sovereignty claim over Taiwan.
AIT represents U.S. interests in Taiwan in the absence of official diplomatic ties.
On Aug. 15, after the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Foreign Ministers' Meeting held in Anning, Yunnan, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi (王毅) said the Cairo Declaration and Potsdam Proclamation "clearly defined Japan's responsibility for the war and required that Japan return all the territories it had stolen from China, including Taiwan."
He described this as "an indisputable outcome of the victory in the World Anti-Fascist War and constitutes an important part of the post-war international order."
Asked to comment on the issue, an unnamed AIT spokesperson told CNA on Saturday that China "intentionally mischaracterizes World War II-era documents, including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation and the Treaty of San Francisco, "to try to support its coercive campaign to subjugate Taiwan."
"Beijing's narratives are simply false, and none of these documents determined Taiwan's ultimate political status," the spokesperson said.
"False legal narratives are part of Beijing's broader campaign to try to isolate Taiwan from the international community and constrain the sovereign choices of other countries regarding their interactions with Taiwan," the unnamed spokesperson added.
AIT's comments on the issue echoed Foreign Minister Lin Chia-lung's (林佳龍) Aug. 16 statement rebuking Wang's remarks.
Lin noted that after World War II, the San Francisco Peace Treaty -- binding under international law -- superseded the political statements made in the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation. The treaty did not cede Taiwan to the PRC, and the PRC has never governed Taiwan, officially named the Republic of China (ROC), he said.
Lin stressed that the ROC government is the "sole legitimate government" administering Taiwan and representing it internationally.
He added that this established the cross-strait status quo in which the ROC (Taiwan) and the PRC exist as equals, with neither subordinate to the other.
Chinese officials have repeatedly asserted that the 1943 Cairo Declaration and 1945 Potsdam Declaration are two historical documents which prove that mainland China has jurisdiction over Taiwan.
However, both documents only set the conditions for Japan's surrender, including forfeiting control of Taiwan and restoring it to the ROC.
(By Chung Yu-chen and Joseph Yeh)
Enditem/kb
Appendix II
China Uses UN to Advance Biggest Territorial Claim
By Micah McCartney
Newsweek China News Reporter
Newsweek is a Trust Project member
Published
Oct 02, 2025 at 04:04 AM EDT
https://www.newsweek.com/china-un-territorial-claim-taiwan-10808734
The Chinese government issued a rare white paper this week to reinforce its sovereignty claim over Taiwan as the United Nations General Assembly wrapped up its annual gathering in New York.
The position paper released by China's Foreign Ministry on Tuesday was part of an escalating war of words over wartime legalese that has unfolded across interested capitals in recent weeks.
The official document was released on the last day of the U.N. General Assembly’s high-level debate and followed earlier comments by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), Washington’s de facto embassy in Taipei, which had openly rejected Beijing’s interpretation of World War II-era agreements that China said proved its claimed to the self-ruled island democracy.
Why It Matters
The United States officially takes no position on sovereignty over Taiwan, but an AIT statement given to Taiwan's semi-official Central News Agency (CNA) last month—later backed by the U.S. State Department—marked a rare instance where the U.S. government publicly declared the island's postwar status as undetermined.
Washington is Taipei's strongest international backer, its main arms supplier, and supports the so-called "status quo” in the Taiwan Strait, which keeps the island autonomous from Beijing's control. China, meanwhile, considers Taiwan—a Japanese colony from 1895-1945—a red line in its relations with the U.S. and has not ruled out the use of force to achieve what it calls "unification" with the Chinese mainland.
Taiwan’s Foreign Ministry welcomed the U.S. move to support its position against the claims by China—asserted since Mao Zedong's Communist forces seized power from Chiang Kai-shek's nationalists, who later fled to the island—although the American position left open the possibility that Taiwan could one day be governed by an authority other than the one currently in Taipei.
Newsweek reached out to the Chinese Foreign Ministry via email outside normal office hours.
What To Know
In 1971, the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 transferred China's seat at the body from Taipei to Beijing, formally expelling Chiang's Republic of China government in the process. China's white paper described the vote as having “once and for all” resolved the question of China’s representation, saying it “fully embodies the one-China principle.”
Beijing argued there was “no such thing as two Chinas or one China, one Taiwan.” It accused “external forces” of trying to manipulate the U.N. framework. Although Resolution 2758 does not mention Taiwan, Chinese officials have long used the text as a legal basis for Taiwan’s exclusion from international institutions, noting that U.N. documents refer to the island as “a province of China.”
Taiwan and its partners counter that Resolution 2758 addressed representation at the U.N. but did not settle Taiwan’s status—the heart of the current dispute.
Last month, during celebrations marking the 80th anniversary of Japan's surrender at the end of World War II, China sought to reinforce its claim to Taiwan by framing the contested territory as having been returned to the mainland from Japanese occupation.
An AIT spokesperson told CNA that Beijing was “deliberately distorting” documents like the San Francisco Treaty to justify its coercion of Taipei. It stressed that “none of these documents determined Taiwan’s final political status,” calling China’s narrative “completely false” and part of a campaign to isolate Taiwan internationally.
What People Have Said
Lin Chia-lung, Taiwan's foreign minister, said: "Our country and the People's Republic of China are not subordinate to each other, and the People's Republic of China has no right to represent Taiwan in the international community."
What's Next
China is expected to continue pressuring Taiwan while maintaining near-daily military flights around it and staging large-scale drills. U.S. intelligence has assessed that Chinese President Xi Jinping has directed the People’s Liberation Army to be capable of moving against Taiwan by 2027.
Appendix III
MOFA response to media inquiries on AIT statement that China deliberately twisted meaning of World War II-era documents
Date：2025-09-13
Data Source：Department of North American Affairs
September 13, 2025
https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1328&s=120671
In response to media inquiries, a spokesperson for the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) said on the evening of September 12 that China had deliberately twisted the meaning of World War II-era documents—including the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Proclamation, and the Treaty of San Francisco—in an attempt to facilitate its coercive behavior toward Taiwan. Stating that Beijing’s narrative was totally wrong and that such documents never determined Taiwan’s ultimate political status, the spokesperson added that China’s false legal narratives aimed to isolate Taiwan from the international community and restrict other nations’ sovereign choices as to their interactions with Taiwan.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs notes that the AIT also expressed disappointment at Solomon Islands excluding dialogue and development partners from attending the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF) Leaders Meeting and reiterated the US position that all PIF partners, including Taiwan, should continue to be invited.
Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung welcomes and appreciates the AIT publicly and clearly reiterating the United States’ policy position regarding Taiwan, refuting China’s false and untrue statements, and once again demonstrating staunch support for Taiwan’s international participation. Furthermore, Minister Lin once again emphasizes the objective fact that neither the Republic of China (Taiwan) nor the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is subordinate to the other and that the PRC has no right to represent Taiwan in the international community.
The PRC government has recently turned to lawfare in a bid to alter the regional status quo and rationalize its aggressive actions, undermining peace and stability. As a responsible member of the international community, Taiwan will continue to maintain the status quo and encourage partner countries to clearly oppose China’s false statements. Taiwan will also continue to work with such partners as the United States to jointly safeguard peace, stability, and prosperity throughout the region and across the Taiwan Strait.
Appendix IV
Mainland reiterates Taiwan's status as inalienable part of China
The PRC State Council Information Office
Xinhua, September 19, 2025
Xinhua | September 19, 2025
Chen Binhua, a spokesperson for the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office, said that the historical and legal facts clearly show that Taiwan has belonged to China since ancient times.
A host of documents with international legal effect, including the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation, and the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, collectively reaffirm China's sovereignty over Taiwan, Chen said.
Taiwan's return to China was an important component of the outcomes of victory in World War II and the post-war international order, Chen said.
"The United States, as a signatory of the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation and one of the WWII victors, is fully aware of the historical and legal facts -- that Taiwan is a part of China and has been restored to China -- yet it has brazenly peddled the 'undetermined status of Taiwan' fallacy," he said.
Chen condemned the United States for slandering and vilifying China's legitimate actions to safeguard its national sovereignty and territorial integrity, misleading international public opinion, violating international law and the basic norms of international relations, and sending a gravely erroneous signal to separatists in Taiwan.
Chen urged the United States to adhere to the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiques. He also criticized Taiwan's Democratic Progressive Party authorities for manipulating specific media outlets to stage "a coordinated performance" with certain U.S. institutions in advocating the fallacy that "Taiwan's status is undetermined."
"Historical facts cannot be altered, and Taiwan's status as a part of China is indisputable," Chen stated, stressing that national reunification is an inevitable historical trend.
Appendix V
Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Lin Jian’s Regular Press Conference on September 17, 2025
PRC Foreign Affairs Ministry
Updated: September 17, 2025 19:46
https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/xw/fyrbt/202509/t20250917_11710263.html
CCTV: It was reported that the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) claimed that the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation and other documents “did not determine Taiwan’s ultimate political status.” A U.S. State Department spokesperson said when asked to comment that the AIT comments accurately conveyed the U.S.’ stance and that the Chinese mainland “distorted” the WWII-era documents to support its “coercive” actions against Taiwan, and that none of these documents decided the “ultimate political status” of Taiwan. What’s the Foreign Ministry’s comment?
Lin Jian: I responded to similar questions earlier this week. The restoration of Taiwan to China is an important part of the outcomes of WWII victory and post-war international order. The Cairo Declaration issued by China, the U.S. and the UK in 1943 stipulates clearly that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Taiwan, shall be restored to China. The Potsdam Proclamation jointly published by China, the U.S., the UK and the Soviet Union in 1945 stipulates that the terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out. In the same year, Japan signed the Japanese Instrument of Surrender, pledging to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith. These instruments with legal effect under international law have all clearly affirmed China’s sovereignty over Taiwan.
Taiwan is China’s Taiwan. As a signatory to the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, the U.S. is fully aware of the historical and legal fact that Taiwan is part of China. Yet the U.S. blatantly rehashes the fallacy that Taiwan’s status is “undetermined” and smears China’s legitimate actions to safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity to deliberately mislead international public opinion. What the U.S. has done severely violates international law and the basic norms in international relations and sends a gravely wrong signal to the “Taiwan independence” separatist forces.
History should not be distorted. The one-China principle is a prevailing consensus of the international community. The U.S.’s unilateral distorted interpretation will not shake the international community’s overwhelming commitment to the one-China principle. China urges the U.S. to earnestly abide by the one-China principle and the three China-U.S. joint communiqués, stop manipulating the Taiwan question, stop abetting and aiding “Taiwan independence” in any form and stop interfering in China’s internal affairs. No individual or force can ever hold back China from being reunified.
Appendix VI
AIT is right about Taiwan’s status
By Hideki Nagayama 永山英樹
Wed, Sep 24, 2025, page 8
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2025/09/24/2003844313
The American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) on Sept. 12 publicly stated that World War II-related documents do not determine Taiwan’s ultimate political status. This statement is correct.
Japan’s surrender of Taiwan and Penghu to the Republic of China (ROC) on Oct. 25, 1945 — Taiwan’s so-called “Retrocession Day” — was merely a political show under ROC military occupation.
yet the treaty did not From the standpoint of international law, it was unlawful and without effect. When the Treaty of San Francisco came into force on April 28, 1952, Japan formally renounced sovereignty over Taiwan and the Penghu Islands, designate a recipient. As a result, their legal status remained unresolved.
Although the ROC was in Taiwan at the time, Japan never formally transferred sovereignty to it after the war.
However, to legitimize the claim that the ROC took over Taiwan, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) issued a stern response to the AIT, asserting that there is no doubt that Taiwan’s sovereignty belongs to the ROC. It cited the 1952 Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Taipei, saying that articles 3 and 10 “reaffirm the status of Taiwan and Penghu as belonging to the ROC.”
However, this is a complete misinterpretation of the Treaty of Taipei by the KMT. Articles 3 and 10 are evidence that Japan did not recognize Taiwan and Penghu as belonging to the ROC.
Article 3 states: “The disposition of property of Japan and of its nationals in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores), and their claims, including debts, against the authorities of the Republic of China in Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and the residents thereof, and the disposition in Japan of property of such authorities and residents and their claims, including debts, against Japan and its nationals.”
Japanese are referred to as “nationals,” while those in Taiwan and Penghu are referred to as “residents,” not nationals of the ROC.
Article 10 states: “For the purposes of the present treaty, nationals of the Republic of China, shall be deemed to include all the inhabitants and former inhabitants of Taiwan (Formosa) and Penghu (the Pescadores) and their descendants who are of the Chinese nationality”
Instead of saying that “ROC nationals include the residents of Taiwan and Penghu,” it uses the phrase “shall be deemed to include.” How should the language of the articles be interpreted?
The original Japanese text uses a phrase that can be translated as “deemed to include,” while the official English version says “shall be deemed to include.” This shows that people living in Taiwan and Penghu were not originally nationals of the ROC — they are merely presumed to be for the purpose of the treaty.
While Japan signed the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty to end the war between Japan and the ROC, that does not mean Japan recognized Taiwan and Penghu as belonging to the ROC. As a party to the treaty, the KMT could not possibly have been unaware of that.
It is not only the US, but also, at a minimum, states such as Japan, the UK, Australia, France and Canada, as parties to the Treaty of San Francisco, that originally held that Taiwan’s status remained undetermined.
However, out of concern over the reaction of the People’s Republic of China or the ROC, most countries refrained from making public statements on the matter, although some later accepted the so-called “one China” principle.
Hideki Nagayama is chairman of the Taiwan Research Forum.
Translated by Kyra Gustavsen
Appendix VII
Taiwan's "Unsettled" International Status: Preserving U.S. Options in the Pacific
John Tkacik
Former Senior Research Fellow
John is a former Senior Research Fellow, The Heritage Foundation
June 19, 2008
|
Ma Ying-jeou, inaugurated as Taiwan's new president on May 20, 2008, has pledged to strengthen Taiwan's economic and political relationships with China. At the same time, he has good reason to preserve Taiwan's separate identity, and the U.S. has good reason to support him.
Taiwan is one of the most dynamic democracies in Asia and one of America's top 10 trade partners. Taiwan is also a significant security partner in the Western Pacific, and its location astride East Asia's sea and air lanes gives it considerable geostrategic importance. It would therefore seem self-evident that the United States can gain no long-term benefit and would likely suffer long-term costs if it were to consign this major Asian democracy to the gentle care of Asia's most powerful dictatorship: the People's Republic of China (PRC).
The problem is that China claims sovereignty over Taiwan—a sovereignty that it has threatened to protect with war, even nuclear war.1 The United States has thus far demurred to China's claims of sovereignty on the grounds that the Taiwan issue was left "unsettled" at the end of World War II. Moreover, the United States' has always maintained that the matter must be settled with the "assent of the people of Taiwan."
"Unsettled" sovereignty status is a rare but significant thorn in the body of international law. However, it does have advantages in the case of Taiwan. Although the United States recognizes the PRC's "sole legal government," it has remained ambiguous on the issue of who actually owns Taiwan. Calling Taiwan's status legally "unsettled" provides the United States with a legal framework for treating Taiwan as separate from China and enables the United States to provide political and military support to this vibrant democracy of 23 million people.[1]
However, interests in the U.S., Taiwan, and Asia—impelled by China—seek to settle the Taiwan issue sooner rather than later and in China's favor. As China's power and influence expand, its economic clout and new military might induce the United States to shy away from being too active in the Asia– Pacific region. Distracted by Iraq, Afghanistan, and a host of other crises, Washington avers—with not enough demonstrable proof—that China is very important to U.S. global foreign policy goals.[2]
Accordingly, the U.S. has urged Taiwan to reconcile with China by opening trade and transportation links across the Taiwan Strait.[3] China became Taiwan's top trade partner in 2006, and PRC–Taiwan trade is growing by more than 25 percent per year.[4] Many in Taiwan believe that only the Taiwan government's own minimal restrictions on trade and investment have prevented China's economy from swallowing Taiwan whole.
Taiwan is already deeply enmeshed in China's trade networks and supply chains, and this dependence continues to tighten. Additionally, as the American foreign policy bureaucracy increasingly views Taiwan as a near occasion of war, its enthusiasm for Taiwan will likely cool. Hence, Taiwan's ability to remain an autonomous actor in Asia will wane. Already, Taiwan's new leaders have been obliged to express some vague agreement that "Taiwan is part of One China," although they insist that they still reserve the right to "define one China" any way they wish.[5]
Over the past six years, American diplomats and national security officials have lost sight of Taiwan's unsettled status and have focused instead on assuaging China's angry outbursts regarding Taiwan. Only in 2007, after the United Nations issued a quiet declaration that it considers "Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the People's Republic of China,"[6] did American diplomats start becoming nervous. Some resuscitated the dormant doctrine of Taiwan's unsettled status and prodded the U.N. to recant. Yet U.S. policy toward Taiwan seems to lack coherence—a lack brought on by the absence of a conceptual context for understanding America's interests in Asia, where China's rise is rapid and assertive.
The Bush Administration should reeducate itself on Taiwan's unsettled international status if it intends to preserve America's broad strategic options in Asia for the next Administration.
Taiwan's Unsettled Status
Taiwan's sovereign status is perhaps the most celebrated case of "unsettled" dominion in the annals of international law.[7] After losing World War II in 1945, Japan "renounce[d] all right, title, and claim to Formosa [Taiwan] and the Pescadores,"[8] but de jure state sovereignty over Taiwan remained—purposefully—unassigned after the war. [9]
For nearly 60 years, U.S. policy has sought to nurture and strengthen Taiwan's autonomy from the People's Republic of China while denying China any pretext for increasing military tensions. This stratagem of tolerating China's claims of sovereignty over Taiwan while eschewing formal recognition of it has preserved Taiwan as one of Asia's most vibrant democracies, one of the top U.S. trading partners, and an important link in America's Western Pacific security architecture. Moreover, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada,[10] and Japan still hold similar views on Taiwan's sovereignty.[11]
Beijing bridles at this view that Taiwan's status is unsettled. Over the past decade, it has ratcheted up its military threats against Taiwan in a thus-far-successful campaign to weaken the Bush Administration's ardor for the island. Under the weight of Beijing's new economic, political, and military clout, Washington—with varying degrees of success—has pressured Taipei's leaders to bite their collective tongue about Taiwan's separate identity from China.
This tactic, however, overshot the mark. Receiving a bare minimum of legitimation and moral support from the United States for their continued de facto separation from Communist China, democratic Taiwan's people and their political leadership now believe that they have little choice but to accommodate China. How bad can it be? After all, Beijing has promised to grant Taiwan "a high degree of autonomy"[12] —rather like Hong Kong, some say.[13]
Putting Taiwan's unsettled status back on track is not as difficult as it sounds. China has long understood the U.S. position[14] and, while it does not like it, can hardly complain that the U.S. is violating any understandings, explicit or otherwise. Moreover, the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and existing U.S. policy are still buttressed by the consistent, albeit tacit, positions on Taiwan's international status held by several top American allies, including Japan, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom. Together, they can provide a coherent framework for maintaining Taiwan's full autonomy separate from China.
Nudging Taiwan Closer to China
For over 60 years, under both Democratic and Republican Presidents and Congresses, the United States has declined to recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan. U.S. diplomats confusingly call this "our one China policy" in the hope that simply adding "our" to the phrase will more easily differentiate it from Beijing's "one China principle."[15] It is confusing because the United States' "one China policy" does not treat Taiwan as part of "one China" at all. Instead, it treats Taiwan as a sovereign state for the purposes of U.S. domestic law in language that was explicitly intended by Congress to preserve America's security and economic interests in the Western Pacific.[16]
Over the past year, the State Department has quietly but unmistakably reaffirmed that the United States has important interests in maintaining Taiwan as a competent international actor separate from China.
Alas, this has not been a consistent stance. President George W. Bush was said to hold a personally jaundiced view of Chen Shui-bian, Taiwan's outgoing president, who harbored aspirations of an independent Taiwan but, practically, sought simply to keep Taiwan separate from China. Washington pulled every available lever to rein in President Chen, from calling him "provocative" to denying his aircraft rest stops en route to visits to Latin America. In the end, President Bush even declined to approve the sale of military equipment that Taiwan desperately needs.[17]
President Bush's personal animus dispirited the Chen government—which was perhaps too insistent on Taiwan's sovereignty—and Taiwanese voters, who polling data indicate have begun to believe that the U.S. truly wants Taiwan to submit to China's claims of sovereignty over their island.[18] Likewise, Taiwan's incoming administration believes that the United States wants them to reconcile with China economically, politically, and militarily. In addition to many other reasons that President Ma Ying-jeou has given for building closer cross-strait relations, he has long argued that in terms of U.S. security and diplomatic policy in Asia, his policies on China would help to achieve the U.S. goals of peace and economic development in the Pacific region.[19]
Taiwan's incoming government was elected on a platform of broadening economic and trade linkages with China. Taiwan will soon establish civil aviation links across the Taiwan Strait and will welcome 3,000 Chinese tourists daily by the end of 2008, increasing to 10,000 per day by 2012.[20] Taiwan will open up to Chinese investment, and a real estate delegation from China has promised to invest $16 billion in Taiwan land development this summer.[21] The new government also promises to eliminate barriers on outbound Taiwan industrial investments in China, including the most advanced microelectronics projects, and to explore a currency convertibility arrangement between Taiwan and China.[22]
At the same time, heeding Beijing's concerns, sometimes preemptively, the Bush Administration has inadvertently helped to isolate Taiwan diplomatically, economically, and militarily in the international arena. For example, Vincent Siew, Taiwan's new vice president, visited China in early April 2008 and conferred directly with Chinese President Hu Jintao, but Washington refused to permit Siew to visit the United States, fearing that it would somehow upset the Chinese.
The Bush Administration is still refusing to consider Taiwan's urgent request for replacement F-16C/D fighter aircraft, despite the Pentagon's reported judgment that the aircraft are a "military necessity."[23] The White House apparently hopes that President Ma will decide after his inauguration that requesting F-16s would jar his negotiations with China and will back away from it. Whether President Ma makes the request will speak volumes about his vision for cross-strait relations.
Denying Taiwan's request for defense articles that the Pentagon considers a military necessity violates both the spirit and the letter of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which requires that "The United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles…in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability."[24]
The Status Quo for Six Decades
For 60 years, the United States has remained strictly agnostic about Taiwan's legal status in the international community. To be precise, the United States has "not formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and [has] not made any determination as to Taiwan's political status."[25] This policy has given legitimacy under international law to the U.S.'s long-term defense commitment to aid the Taiwan people's resistance to Beijing's claimed "sovereign" right to control them.
This long-standing position dates at least to April 11, 1947, when Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that the transfer of sovereignty over Taiwan from Japan to China "has not yet been formalized."[26] Consequently, the United States chose to preserve its say in the disposition of Taiwan. As a "top secret" State Department position paper explained:
[The future status of Taiwan] was deliberately left undetermined, and the U.S. as a principal victor over Japan has an interest in their ultimate future. We are not willing that that future should be one which would enable a hostile regime to endanger the defensive position which is so vital in keeping the Pacific a friendly body of water.[27]
For this reason, Taiwan's formal international political status was left undetermined by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which formally ended World War II in the Pacific.[28] The Soviet delegate declared that the inability of the victors in the Pacific War to reach a consensus on the disposition of Taiwan was a major reason that the Soviet Union refused to sign the treaty.[29] Japan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and other signatories of the treaty still hold the position that Taiwan's status is undetermined.
Yet even as the United States formally recognized Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China (ROC) government as the sole sovereign government of China on the mainland, where in fact it had no authority, it refused to recognize ROC sovereignty over Taiwan, where it did have authority. It was a logical paradox: The United States was pledged to defend only those parts of ROC territory that were not sovereign Chinese land—the island of Taiwan.[30]
This paradox became plain during the hearings on ratification of the U.S.–Republic of China Mutual Defense Treaty in 1955. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee report on the Treaty notes that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles "informed the committee that the reference…to ‘the territories of either of the Parties' was language carefully chosen to avoid denoting anything one way or another as to their sovereignty."[31]
That few of Taiwan's allies recognized that the Taipei-based Republic of China exercised sovereignty over Taiwan was not only an accepted fact of life in the ROC government; at times, even the ROC government itself seemed to recognize it. When asked about "the status of Taiwan" during congressional hearings on the ROC–Japanese Peace Treaty of 1952, Taiwan's foreign minister replied:
[T]he delicate international situation makes it that [Taiwan does] not belong to us. Under present circumstances, Japan has no right to transfer [Taiwan] to us; nor can we accept such a transfer from Japan even if she so wishes…. In the [ROC]–Japanese peace treaty, we have made provisions to signify that residents including juristic persons of [Taiwan] bear Chinese nationality, and this provision may serve to mend any future gaps when Formosa and the Pescadores are restored to us.[32]
Leaving the United Nations
By 1971, most of the rest of the world had decided that the Communists in Beijing, not the Nationalists in Taipei, were the only authorities competent to speak for China in the United Nations. The nuance of Taiwan's anomalous unsettled status was lost in the cacophony of the broader debate over Chinese representation. As U.N. General Assembly members chose up sides on the China seat, the Nationalists were certain to lose the vote.
In July 1971, the United States abandoned its "one China" policy that would allow only one Chinese government—in the U.S.'s opinion, the Nationalist government—to represent China in the United Nations. The U.S. instead proposed a dual representation formula in which both the Beijing and Taipei regimes would be represented in the General Assembly, and the Security Council would decide which regime would control China's seat on the Security Council.[33] As Henry Kissinger points out, Taiwan's unsettled status was "the legal buttress of State's dual-representation position."[34]
While the U.S. mission to the United Nations under then-Ambassador George H. W. Bush made "valiant efforts" (in Henry Kissinger's words),[35] the White House clearly had little enthusiasm for "dual representation." Taiwan's ambassador even admitted to Secretary of State William Rogers that "a lot of people think that the President [Richard Nixon]…doesn't have his heart in it."[36]
In the end, the U.N. General Assembly passed Resolution 2758, expelling the U.N. mission of the Chinese Nationalists,[37] and seated in its stead the Chinese Communists' mission from the People's Republic of China. Taiwan qua "Taiwan" was technically never expelled from the United Nations. It was not a matter of Taiwan's representation, but of China's representation.
Interestingly, when Resolution 2758 came to a vote on October 25, 1971, the United States along with 34 other members, including Australia and Japan, voted against seating China because it meant displacing Taiwan.[38]
When the General Assembly vote concluded, the "representatives of Chiang Kai-shek" stormed out of the building rather than wait to see whether the ROC mission could at least be permitted to continue to represent Taiwan. No further vote on Taiwan's representation took place despite the U.S. position that Taiwan's people should have a voice in the forum.
Why had the Nationalists walked out? Chiang Kai-shek wanted to fight it out on an all-or-nothing basis. There are also reports that Chiang's advisors convinced him that if the ROC mission stayed to represent Taiwan, Chiang would be under pressure to demonstrate in some constitutional way that his Chinese government-in-exile represented the people of Taiwan rather than the vast population of China. Doing so would require Chiang to dismantle his existing regime (which was elected in 1947 on the Chinese mainland and continued to rule in Taiwan under emergency martial law provisions without benefit of elections), adopt an entirely new constitution, and install an entirely new government.[39]
The fact that both the Nationalist Chinese in Taiwan and the Communist Chinese in Beijing implied that Taiwan's status was indeed settled and that Taiwan was assuredly part of China made the U.S. "unsettled" proposition somewhat fragile.
The Shanghai Communiqué and Beyond
On his historic opening visit to China, President Richard Nixon finessed the dilemma of Taiwan's status in the Shanghai Communiqué by observing: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position."[40] As long as both Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong claimed that Taiwan was part of China, Nixon could simply leave it at that. Yet in the painfully negotiated translation of the Shanghai Communiqué, the United States insisted that the term "acknowledge" be translated as renshidao (takes note of) rather than as chengren (recognize)[41] to remind the Chinese that the United States was not quite prepared for a final settlement of Taiwan's status.
Even until 1976, regardless of what Kissinger had told his Chinese counterparts, the United States still viewed the status of Taiwan as undetermined, a point that Kissinger agonized over in secret policy sessions at the State Department. Kissinger asked his top China aides: "[I]f Taiwan is recognized by us as part of China, then it may become irresistible to them…. [O]ur saying we want a peaceful solution has no force, it is Chinese territory, what are we going to do about it?"[42] Arthur Hummel, the State Department's senior China hand and later ambassador to Beijing, sighed, "Down the road, perhaps the only solution would be an independent Taiwan."[43]
Given political sensitivities in both Taipei and Beijing at the time, the United States could not quite abide Hummel's idea of "independent Taiwan," yet even when the Carter Administration normalized relations with China, it carefully stated in the Normalization Communiqué of December 16, 1978, that the "United States acknowledges" China's position that "Taiwan is part of China." Again, this did not necessarily connote formal U.S. recognition of the Chinese position, as Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher stressed in several congressional hearings.[44]
Accordingly, when Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, Congress felt at liberty to mandate that Taiwan be treated as a sovereign foreign state for the purposes of U.S. law, including anti-boycott laws and military sales. Congress also intended that Taiwan should continue to be represented in international organizations: "Nothing in this [law] may be construed as a basis for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued membership in any international financial institution or any other international organization."[45]
President Ronald Reagan took a personal part in reiterating the U.S. position on Taiwan's undetermined status by communicating Six Assurances directly to Taiwan's President Chiang Ching-kuo on July 14, 1982, pledging that "[t]he United States had not altered its longstanding position regarding sovereignty over Taiwan."[46]
The Six Assurances have been embraced by all subsequent U.S. Administrations as part of the canon of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.[47]
The U.N. and Taiwan
Regrettably, U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon appears intent on settling the matter of Taiwan's sovereignty on his own. On March 28, 2007, without consulting with the United States or any other Security Council members except presumably China, he issued a letter asserting under the terms of U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2758 that "the United Nations considers Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the People's Republic of China."[48] Even though the letter was unpublicized and low-key, it was a tremendous coup for Beijing. It had finally persuaded the United Nations to take sides with China and against the United States and Taiwan on the matter.
China has worked assiduously to bar Taiwan's public health officers from participating in the World Health Organization (WHO). In 2003, Taiwan was one of the countries hit worst by the transnational epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),[49] primarily because its medical infrastructure had no institutional communications with the WHO. Yet China, which had failed to keep the WHO apprised of SARS outbreaks on its own territory, successfully pressured the WHO to refuse to deal with Taiwan except through China's WHO mission.[50]
In early 2007, the U.S. Department of Agriculture became alarmed that Beijing's representatives to the World Organization for Animal Health,[51] which develops international health standards for food animals, were asserting jurisdiction over Taiwan animal disease issues. Unlike Taiwan, China refuses to accept U.S. beef, and the Department of Agriculture was concerned that China would find some way to complicate U.S. beef exports to Taiwan.[52]
Then, in December 2007, the Chinese embassy in Thailand reportedly deposited at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) regional office in Bangkok notification of a new civilian aviation route along the median line of the Taiwan Strait, adjacent to Taiwan's air defense identification zone. Taiwan learned about it from "friendly civil aviation officials" who had casually notified their Taiwan air traffic control colleagues of the action. China did not request approval. It simply notified the ICAO of the new route.[53]
U.S. experts reportedly believe that the new air route was an initiative of the People's Liberation Army, which is responsible for all of China's civil aviation routing. One U.S. observer suggested that "if Taiwan had more status at the international aviation decision-making authority, it perhaps could react to the PLA route request with less anxiety."[54] While the United States generally supports Taipei in organizations like the ICAO when China begins "nibbling away at the island's strategic depth," the observer commented that the conflict between the U.S. and President Chen Shui-bian "may have reduced greatly our incentive to carry Taiwan's water in ICAO."[55] The U.S. State Department expressed concern to China about the move, and while China has not yet begun using its claimed air corridor over the Taiwan Strait, neither has China withdrawn the notification.[56]
China's successes in persuading the U.N. Secretariat and the bureaucracies of various U.N. specialized agencies to assert Chinese authority over Taiwan's international presence is doubly disturbing because it lends U.N. legitimacy to China's right to use military and non-military coercive force against Taiwan—a right that China wrote into its national legal code with the Anti-Secession Law of March 2005.
A more disquieting scenario is that a China that can successfully assert its sovereignty over Taiwan could also claim sovereign jurisdiction over the waters of the Taiwan Strait. In its 1992 Territorial Sea Law,[57] China claims sovereign jurisdiction in the waters of and airspace over 24 nautical miles in the Taiwan Strait. Theoretically, China already considers the Taiwan Strait a domestic waterway for civil aviation and maritime navigation purposes. If at some point in the future China gained Taiwan's acquiescence and an international consensus that Taiwan is sovereign Chinese territory, China would be in a legal position to restrict international transit of the Taiwan Strait.
Top U.S. defense officials indicate that they have already crossed swords with their PLA counterparts over transit of the strait. Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command Admiral Timothy Keating has said, "We don't need China's permission to go through the Taiwan Straits…and we'll do that whenever we need to, let me rephrase that. Whenever we choose to."[58] But if the United States tacitly accepts China's claims of sovereign jurisdiction over Taiwan—especially if Taiwan is also pressured to accept them—the U.S. should ultimately expect that the U.S. Navy's freedom of transit in the Taiwan Strait will be attenuated accordingly.
Resurrecting Taiwan's "Unsettled" Status
The matter of Taiwan's international status vis-à-vis the United Nations is neither academic nor trivial. To counter Secretary-General Ban's edict, some State Department offices have begun to resurrect the long-standing agnostic undetermined/unsettled formula on Taiwan's international status. In June 2007, the State Department included the following phrase in standard letters to citizens concerned about Taiwan: The United States has "not formally recognized Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and [has] not made any determination as to Taiwan's political status."[59]
This was the first time in 25 years that the State Department had expressed on paper that "the United States takes no position on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty."[60] However, a standard letter to concerned citizens was perhaps insufficient for the United Nations. In July 2007, the United States reportedly presented a nine-point demarche in the form of a "non-paper" to the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs that both restated the U.S. position that it takes no position on the question of Taiwan's sovereignty and specifically rejected recent U.N. statements that the organization considers "Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the PRC."[61]
U.S. Non-Paper on the Status of Taiwan
1. The United States reiterates its One China policy which is based on the three US–China Communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act, to the effect that the United States acknowledges China's view that Taiwan is a part of China. We take no position on the status of Taiwan. We neither accept nor reject the claim that Taiwan is a part of China.
2. The United States has long urged that Taiwan's status be resolved peacefully to the satisfaction of people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beyond that, we do not define Taiwan in political terms.
3. The United States noted that the PRC has become more active in international organizations and has called on the UN Secretariat and member states to accept its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. In some cases, as a condition for the PRC's own participation in international organizations, Beijing has insisted the organization and its member states use nomenclature for Taiwan that suggests endorsement of China's sovereignty over the island.
4. The United States is concerned that some UN organizations have recently asserted that UN precedent required that Taiwan be treated as a part of the PRC and be referred to by names in keeping with such status.
5. The United States has become aware that the UN has promulgated documents asserting that the United Nations considers "Taiwan for all purposes to be an integral part of the PRC." While this assertion is consistent with the Chinese position, it is not universally held by UN member states, including the United States.
6. The United States noted that the UN General Assembly resolution 2758 adopted on 25 October 1971 does not in fact establish that Taiwan is a province of the PRC. The resolution merely recognized the representation of the government of the PRC as the only lawful representation of China to the UN, and expelled the representative of Chiang Kai-shek from the seats they occupied at the UN and all related organizations. There is no mention in Resolution 2758 of China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.
7. While the United States does not support Taiwan's membership in organizations such as the UN, for which statehood is a prerequisite, we do support meaningful participation by Taiwan's experts as appropriate in such organizations. We support membership as appropriate in organizations for which such statehood is not required.
8. The United States urged the UN Secretariat to review its policy on the status of Taiwan and to avoid taking sides in a sensitive matter on which UN members have agreed to disagree for over 35 years.
9. If the UN Secretariat insists on describing Taiwan as a part of the PRC, or on using nomenclature for Taiwan that implies such status, the United States will be obliged to disassociate itself on a national basis from such position.[62]
Nonetheless, as 2007 progressed, Beijing's diplomats and propagandists were on the verge of persuading the more uninformed of their U.S. counterparts to turn a blind eye as the United Nations administers the coup de grâce to one of America's most stalwart friends in democratic Asia. Despite furtive protests from the United States, the U.N. bureaucracy has not retracted its illicit—but formal—position that Taiwan is an "integral part of the PRC."
While some U.S. diplomats were aghast, others were unconcerned by the U.N.'s move. On August 30, 2007, when asked about Taiwan's bid to join the United Nations, a senior White House Asia expert pronounced that "Taiwan, or the Republic of China, is not at this point a state in the international community," although he added, "The position of the United States government is that the ROC—Republic of China—is an issue undecided, and it has been left undecided, as you know, for many, many years."[63] By saying this, he may have started a process of erosion in the U.S. policy that Taiwan's status is "undetermined" by effectively determining that Taiwan is "not…a state in the international community."
Under most accepted definitions of "state" in international law, Taiwan's Republic of China government does qualify. Indeed, 23 other members of the United Nations maintain full diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Even U.S. law treats Taiwan precisely as it treats all "foreign countries, nations, states, governments, or similar entities."[64] To state flatly that Taiwan is not a state is both gratuitous and harmful, and it edges U.S. policy a bit closer to tacit acceptance that Communist China has sovereignty over democratic Taiwan.
What the Administration and Congress Should Do
To protect U.S. allies and U.S. interests in Asia, the Bush Administration must reaffirm its existing definition of Taiwan's undetermined status and the TRA provisions that require the U.S. to treat Taiwan as an independent nation for purposes of domestic law.
The United States should publicly restate its long-standing position on Taiwan's sovereignty in the same terms that it used with the U.N. Under-Secretary-General. This is necessary because to do otherwise would imply a declaration that America can and does recognize that China has the sovereign right to use force, military or otherwise, against the island. The TRA states explicitly that any attack on Taiwan would be a threat to international peace and security. This is a position that is well understood in Beijing, where scholars continue to comment on the fact that the United States may "not support Taiwan independence," but neither does it "oppose it."[65]
The Administration should:
· Promptly and publicly back away from the stance that "Taiwan is not a state" in the international community. While current U.S. relations with China make it impossible to declare that Taiwan is a state, nothing can possibly justify the U.S. bureaucracy's assertion that Taiwan is not a state. In fact, under the 1933 Montevideo Convention, Taiwan possesses all the attributes of a state.[66] Under any reading, the United States tacitly accepts that Taiwan functions in the international community as a sovereign state. All treaties in force between the U.S. and Taiwan prior to January 1, 1979, remained in force, and the United States continues to conduct defense and security affairs, including arms sales, with Taiwan as an entity wholly autonomous from the People's Republic of China.
· Reaffirm Taiwan's unsettled status. Taiwan's territorial status may continue to be undetermined. The United States therefore does not accept the sovereign right of any third country to use any force against Taiwan.
· Reaffirm that Taiwan's future rests on the assent of the people of Taiwan. While current U.S. diplomatic formulae include assertions that the Taiwan issue is a matter for "the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait" to resolve, the context must be clarified. As President Ronald Reagan pledged, the United States "will not…prejudice the free choice of, or put pressure on, the people of Taiwan" about their future.[67] As a reflection of America's democratic values, the United States must give preferential weight to the people of Taiwan in determining their own future.
· Reaffirm the legitimacy of Taiwan's elected leaders. Taiwan's new president will immediately need to engage his counterparts in Beijing. It is essential to his credibility and self-confidence that the United States reaffirm that Taiwan's democratically elected leaders are the legitimate representatives of the 23 million people of Taiwan. The United States must continue to urge the Chinese government to open a dialogue with Taiwan's elected leaders.[68]
· View Taiwan as a "de facto entity with an international personality."[69] If Administration officials must say something about Taiwan's status, they should at least describe Taiwan with some accuracy. Whatever else Taiwan may or may not be, it certainly is a "de facto entity with an international personality" within the context of the Taiwan Relations Act and President Reagan's Six Assurances.
· Encourage U.S. allies to support the status quo on Taiwan's international status. Japan, Canada, Australia, the United Kingdom, and other key U.S. allies share the U.S. understanding that Taiwan's international status is unsettled, but these countries are unlikely to push the issue individually. Washington should take the lead in assembling a consensus among them to preserve an international status quo that withholds recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and maintains Taiwan's ability to function as an autonomous actor in the international community.
Conclusion
The people of Taiwan voted an avowedly pro-independence government out of office on March 22, 2008. The Bush Administration believed that this government had provoked various Chinese leaders into intemperate threats of war, even nuclear war. President Ma Ying-jeou, who is committed to a new relationship with China and campaigned with the best wishes of the Bush Administration, took office in Taipei on May 20. However, he will be left to bargain with Beijing with little material or moral support from the Bush Administration.
The United States can do much better by its loyal democratic ally. For the past several years, Washington has averted its eyes as Beijing has leveraged its military buildup, economic might, and global prestige against Taiwan. Perhaps Washington has judged that China's cooperation, such as it is, in various crises from North Korea and Iran to Burma and Sudan is too important to jeopardize with a restatement of decades-long U.S. policy.
It is time to take stock of where America's real long-term interests lie. At its base, the Chinese Communist Party is a Leninist, state-mercantilist entity that runs a regime grounded in dangerous and aggressive nationalism. As the U.S. and the influence of its democratic values recede from the region, China fills the vacuum. A distracted Washington is allowing a laser-focused Beijing to shape the strategic agenda in the Pacific. America's democratic friends and allies in Asia, from Japan to Singapore to India to Australia, are anxiously watching America's new willingness to accept China's new preeminence in the region.
How the United States defends democratic Taiwan's international identity in the current environment will tell Asia and the world much about Washington's willingness to stand against the broader challenge from China. In the final tally, America's strategic posture in 21st century Asia rests on the collective decision of Asian democracies either to balance China or to bandwagon with it. Asia cannot balance without U.S. leadership.
John J. Tkacik, Jr., is Senior Research Fellow in China, Taiwan, and Mongolia Policy in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.
Show References
Authors
John Tkacik
Former Senior Research Fellow
david chou
1
美國國務卿Antony J. Blinken日前接受The Foreign Affairs的Dan Kurtz-Phelan訪問, 他說: “支那人總是喜歡說, 台灣沒有其他人的事, 它是我們支那人的事. 但世人實際上已經說: 不, 台灣不干支那人的事, 台灣就是我們的事." (“The Chinese like to say Taiwan is no one else’s business, it’s our business. The world has said actually, no, it is our business.”)
2
Dan是這樣問的:
QUESTION: There’s lots of commentary and lots of arguments in places like Foreign Affairs about splitting this grouping, whether that’s a reverse Kissinger, bringing Russia away from China, or I guess a reverse-reverse Kissinger, where you again split China off from Russia. You’ve spent a lot of time working and sitting in meetings with your Chinese counterparts, some meetings with your Russian counterparts, trying to do this. What is your sense of whether there are policy options that the United States has that could lead to divisions in this grouping that over time would become real rifts?
我(美)國國務卿這樣回答:
SECRETARY BLINKEN:
[skip]
China has a different choice to make. It aspires to leadership, and in aspiring to leadership it also has to, I think, assess how its own reputation is seen around the world. And in our efforts to demonstrate, for example, that Chinese actions have helped keep the Russian war against Ukraine going, because, for example, China is by far the biggest provider – its companies are the biggest provider to Russia’s defense industrial base: 70 percent of the components going into things that Russia needs to make for the war, 90 percent of the microelectronics coming from China. It doesn’t like the fact that we’ve exposed this, because on the one hand it’s saying we’re for peace, we’re not taking sides, we want to get to peace; and yet, it’s taking actions that are continuing to fuel this war, a war that poses not only the obvious threat to the Ukrainian people, but probably the biggest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War. So, I think China has to ask itself hard questions about some of the alignment that it’s engaged in with these adversarial countries. I don’t pretend to know what decisions it’s going to make.
[skip]
Look again at the war against Ukraine by Russia. The two biggest drivers right now of keeping that war going: I mentioned China’s contributions to Russia’s defense industrial base; North Korea’s contributions with missiles, with technology, and of course with now 10,000 or so North Korean forces. So the biggest drivers of keeping this war going are coming from the Asia-Pacific. European allies recognize that.
國務卿的回答---”The world has said actually, ------- it is our business.”---follows了台灣關係法的一個條款:
台灣建州運動與David Chou的觀念是:
Taiwan (Formosa) Matters Most
"A Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency," declared Shinzo Abe, former Prime Minister of Japan. "It is also a contingency for the Japan-U.S. alliance," he followed.
The defense of Taiwan or a fight over Taiwan is a "4-in-1 war" or a "all-for-one-and-one-for-all war."
Taiwan is not dragging America and other liberal democracies into a war. The incoming or ongoing invasion of Taiwan is exactly the first operation of a global conquest agenda of the imperialist, expansionist, revanchist, and evil Empire of China.
To the people of Taiwan, it's a war of life and death, self-rule and submission, freedom and slavery, and dignity and humiliation.
For the United States, it's a war to safeguard "Pax Americana" ( "U.S.-led Liberal World Order"), "Free and Open Indo-Pacific," and, according to the Taiwan Relations Act, America's security, strategic, political, and economic interests in Taiwan.
As far as Japan is concerned, it's a war to keep its major sea lanes or maritime lifelines safe.
With regard to the liberal democracies in the world, it's a war to secure the supply chain of chips and other high-tech products and the "Liberal International Order."
可惜沒有證據顯示: 老川的腦袋裡有我們這種觀念.
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
Secretary Antony J. Blinken With Daniel Kurtz-Phelan of The Foreign Affairs Interview
Interview
Antony J. Blinken, Secretary of State
Washington, D.C.
December 18, 2024
QUESTION: I’m Dan Kurtz-Phelan and this is The Foreign Affairs Interview.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: I think what we’re handing over is a strong hand for the next administration to play. It will have to decide how it plays it.
QUESTION: In the four years since Joe Biden took office, the geopolitical landscape has radically changed. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought war back to Europe; Hamas’s October 7th assault on Israel sparked a widening conflict in an already chaotic Middle East; and Chinese aggression in the Taiwan Strait has refocused attention on the Indo-Pacific as a possible theater of combat. Through it all, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has been at the helm of U.S. foreign policy, shuttling between capitals, negotiating with allies and adversaries, and helping to shape a vision for American engagement with the world – a vision he laid out in a recent essay for Foreign Affairs.
Now, on the eve of Donald Trump’s return to office, Blinken reflects on the geopolitical challenges facing the United States today and offers lessons from his own tenure for American foreign policy going forward.
Secretary Blinken, thank you so much for taking the time for this conversation, given all going on in the world, and for the essay you wrote for the November/December issue of Foreign Affairs.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Thanks, Dan. Good to be with you.
QUESTION: The essay starts out by noting how contested and complicated the world is today, and so I want to start with your analysis of this pretty challenging, to put it mildly, moment in the global landscape. I don’t imagine that when you started this job almost four years ago you imagined you’d be contending with major wars in the Middle East and in Europe, that you’d see the kinds of provocations we see almost daily from the Chinese in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea, that you’d be hearing nuclear threats from Vladimir Putin that are serious enough that you have at least most of the American Intelligence Community spooked. And so I thought before getting into responses and the policy response from this administration, it’d be useful to step back and get your sense of what brought us here over these past years or decades – what forces or decisions account for this not especially orderly moment in geopolitics.
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Dan, I think it’s evident that we’re in a new era, a new phase. The post-Cold War era is over, and there is a very robust competition on to shape what comes next. And we have a number of revisionist powers in different ways but nonetheless joined in wanting to exert their own spheres of influence, wanting to perpetuate their autocratic rule, wanting to reshape the international system in ways that benefit them – whether that’s Iran, whether that’s North Korea, whether that’s Russia, or in different ways, China – all coming to the fore. I think you have the extraordinary rapidity of technological change, which has also contributed to this.
And then you have to look at when we came in what we inherited, because it’s easy with distance now to forget where we were. We had the worst economic crisis going back to the Great Depression. We had the worst global health crisis going back at least 100 years. We had democratic divisions in our own country, and we had alliances and partnerships that were fraying and partners that were looking to hedge their bets in different ways and a perception around the world – including from these adversaries that were aligning in new ways – that the United States was in inexorable decline. And I think that’s easily forgotten.
And what’s also taken for granted is what we were able to do to put the United States back in a position of strength: historic investments at home, whether it was through infrastructure, whether it was through the CHIPS and Science Act, whether it was through the IRA, that restored our competitiveness. And if you just look at where we are now, leaving aside the extraordinary macro numbers on unemployment, on getting inflation down to the point that we’re the envy of other major economies, on household incomes going up – people still hurting because they’re not fully feeling the benefit, but it’s moving in that direction.
Foreign direct investment, which I see as one of the most important measures that we sometimes overlook in both directions – we’re the largest recipient, we’re also the largest contributor. Those relationships on foreign direct investment exhibit trust and confidence in the future. People don’t make the investments without it. It also reduces our dependencies in significant ways on, for example, China.
So we were able to do that and restore our competitiveness and at the same time – and we can come to this – re-engage, reinvest, and re-energize, and even reimagine our alliances and partnerships. The result is, despite the fact that you have a world that does have a greater multiplicity, a greater complexity, a greater interconnectedness of challenges than at any time since I’ve been doing this over 32 years, we’re in a much stronger position to contend with those challenges.
QUESTION: Let me focus on the dimension of this that I think is most surprising to many people, which is just the return of a kind of war that seemed like it was a relic of the past. There’s obviously a political version of this debate, which you hear from people in Trump world. But if we go a little bit deeper, this does seem like a real systemic change and something that people in your position and policymakers in the United States more generally will be grappling with going forward. How do you understand that systemic change? What has brought – both in the Middle East and Ukraine – the kind of war that, again, seemed like a thing of the past, back to a really central preoccupation of American foreign policy?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: You have a number of countries that for a variety of reasons have calculated that, first of all, their own interests could be advanced in that way, and they’ve also sought to align in different ways with themselves, mostly marriages of convenience if not conviction, but ones that have an impact. And this is the product of choices that they’ve made.
But let’s take each of these individually. The Russia aggression against Ukraine didn’t start in 2022; it started in 2014. And the Russian aggression against neighbors and in an attempt to recreate a greater Russia, or certainly to exert a sphere of influence, goes back well before that – 2008 and Georgia. Now, at that time the United States had 200,000 troops who were either in Iraq or Afghanistan, so we were tied down in ways that we no longer are, as a result of ending the war in Iraq and ending America’s longest war in Afghanistan, freeing up resources, freeing up focus. But Russia’s been on this effort for some time, culminating in the reinvasion of Ukraine in 2022.
China has also made, I think, no mystery of the fact that certainly going back to 2015, economically, it was determined to dominate the industries and technologies of the future. But beyond that, we saw emerge over that period of time a policy that was much more overtly aggressive abroad as well as repressive at home. So again, that’s been in the making for some time.
These things don’t happen like with a light switch. It’s an evolution of things. And again, I think because these countries – as well as others – had a perception of the United States as being in decline when we took office, they were moving forward in those ways. I think we’ve put a big dent both in that perception and in – to the extent there was a reality to it – in that reality. The pushback against Russia has been quite remarkable, but so was the pushback against China. We now have greater convergence among allies and partners in Europe, in the Indo-Pacific, and beyond on how to deal with Russia and how to deal with China than we’ve had at any time since I can remember.
QUESTION: The central focus of the Foreign Affairs essay in many ways is this grouping of countries that many people call an axis, though you do not use that word – the China, Russia, Iran, North Korea grouping. And as you noted, that group is cooperating in fairly alarming new ways that really seek to alter some of the basic principles of the international system and undermine U.S. leadership in that system.
As you project forward 15 years, long beyond your tenure here at the State Department, if they have succeeded, if we see that axis succeeding, grouping succeeding, what will the world look like? What will that world that they seek to shape look like? And what will the decisions or mistakes that the U.S. and its allies have made that have allowed them to get there?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: I think if you’re projecting forward and they have their way, you’ll certainly see at the very least a reassertion of spheres of influence that the United States and likeminded countries are kept out of. You’ll see greater bifurcation, greater divisions in the world. You may see – metaphorically, at least – different kinds of iron curtains coming down, whether it’s on the way people are treated within countries, or technology and the way it’s used among countries.
And I think it also portends potentially a world of conflict, because I think what history teaches us, among other things, is that if you get into a spheres-of-influence world where countries are allowed to treat their own people, as well as treat each other in ways that are inimical to everything we’ve tried to establish after two World Wars to make sure that there wouldn’t be a third, you’re likely heading for a world of conflict, a world where – because whether we like it or not, we’re going to remain interconnected, where we simply can’t put our heads in the sand and think that these things are going to happen and leave us immune, leave us unscathed. It will inevitably draw us in.
So I think the challenge is we’ve – in my estimation, at least – had a period of renewal, a renewal of our engagement around the world, a renewal of American leadership, a renewal of our alliances and partnerships but using them in new ways, building a bridge between the Euro-Atlantic theater and the Indo-Pacific theater, creating a greater understanding that there is really an indivisibility of security that affects allies and partners in all of these areas. I think if we lose that and if we retreat, then far from protecting ourselves and staying out of wars and conflicts, we’re going to see more of them emerge and inevitably we’ll be drawn in.
So that’s what I would be concerned about if we regress from this period of renewal. And the foundation that we’ve set, I think what we’re handing over is a strong hand for the next administration to play. It will have to decide how it plays it.
QUESTION: There’s lots of commentary and lots of arguments in places like Foreign Affairs about splitting this grouping, whether that’s a reverse Kissinger, bringing Russia away from China, or I guess a reverse-reverse Kissinger, where you again split China off from Russia. You’ve spent a lot of time working and sitting in meetings with your Chinese counterparts, some meetings with your Russian counterparts, trying to do this. What is your sense of whether there are policy options that the United States has that could lead to divisions in this grouping that over time would become real rifts?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Look, I think many of these countries have made an affirmative choice, made an affirmative decision that’s less reflective of what we’ve done and is more the result of their calculation of what their self-interest is, what their weaknesses are. And that, in some ways, has brought them together, but it’s really been an affirmative choice, not a response to us.
I think Russia’s on a course where that’s likely to continue. And I suspect North Korea, given some of the benefits that it’s getting, is likely to continue on that course. Iran, which as a result of actions we’ve taken and others have taken, is in a position of increased weakness, is going to be even more dependent on some of these new relationships – particularly, for example, the relationship with Russia.
China has a different choice to make. It aspires to leadership, and in aspiring to leadership it also has to, I think, assess how its own reputation is seen around the world. And in our efforts to demonstrate, for example, that Chinese actions have helped keep the Russian war against Ukraine going, because, for example, China is by far the biggest provider – its companies are the biggest provider to Russia’s defense industrial base: 70 percent of the components going into things that Russia needs to make for the war, 90 percent of the microelectronics coming from China. It doesn’t like the fact that we’ve exposed this, because on the one hand it’s saying we’re for peace, we’re not taking sides, we want to get to peace; and yet, it’s taking actions that are continuing to fuel this war, a war that poses not only the obvious threat to the Ukrainian people, but probably the biggest threat to European security since the end of the Cold War. So, I think China has to ask itself hard questions about some of the alignment that it’s engaged in with these adversarial countries. I don’t pretend to know what decisions it’s going to make.
There’s another aspect to this, Dan, too. What we’ve seen very deliberately on our part is this effort to, as I say, build these bridges between the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific theaters to show that what happens in one place is inevitably going to have repercussions in the other. And as a result of that, we have broken down silos in ways that I haven’t seen before. We have in NATO now four Indo-Pacific partners who are part of NATO discussions, come to the summits, and are working on concrete projects. This is not an effort to bring NATO out of area. It’s because out-of-area is coming to the NATO countries.
Look again at the war against Ukraine by Russia. The two biggest drivers right now of keeping that war going: I mentioned China’s contributions to Russia’s defense industrial base; North Korea’s contributions with missiles, with technology, and of course with now 10,000 or so North Korean forces. So the biggest drivers of keeping this war going are coming from the Asia-Pacific. European allies recognize that.
Similarly, what we’ve been able to do in opening people’s eyes is get a much bigger focus and much bigger interest from the Euro-Atlantic area on, for example, Taiwan. There’s a greater understanding now, since we took office, that were there to be a crisis over Taiwan as a result of actions that China takes, this would not leave anyone immune. You’ve got 50 percent of commercial container traffic going through the Taiwan Strait every day, 70 percent of the microchips made on Taiwan. You would have a crisis for the global economy if there were to be a crisis over Taiwan, and that has gotten these countries in Europe much more invested in going to China and saying no, we need to maintain peace and stability. The Chinese like to say Taiwan is no one else’s business, it’s our business. The world has said actually, no, it is our business.
So even though there is greater adversarial alignment out of necessity – the Russians desperately needed it after their initial efforts to erase Ukraine from the map failed – even though we see that, I think that’s far outweighed by what we’ve been able to do in bringing allies and partners much closer together with U.S. leadership and also, as I said, creating bridges between them in ways we haven’t seen before. There is now much greater derisking when it comes to China that we see both in Europe but also in the Asia-Pacific area, the Indo-Pacific area. And all these things don’t just happen. They’re a result of very sustained diplomacy to focus countries on these common interests that we have. And we now see that playing out in ways that, I think, set a much stronger foundation for the future.
[skip]
QUESTION: And it’s military support; it’s the very creative use of declassified intelligence. That failed to deter him. What are the lessons that you draw from that deterrence failure in some sense?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: Yeah.
QUESTION: Not to say it was possible to deter him, but we did not succeed in deterring him. And when you apply those lessons to China, and to the Taiwan Strait especially, what does that mean about where we are in deterrence in the Taiwan Strait and what we need to be doing more of?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: So when we had this extraordinary information and we were able to use it in ways that we’d never been able to use it before – I wish we’d been able to do the same thing in 2014. We weren’t. There was so much that we knew but couldn’t share in 2014 – not ahead of time, but for example with the downing of the airplane – to try to rally the world in different ways. We were able to do it and it was quite remarkable.
But even as we worked to deter the Russian aggression, including by testing out whether Russia was actually serious about alleged security concerns it had, we engaged them. I spent a lot of time with Mr. Lavrov on this. We engaged them at NATO; we engaged them at the OSCE. And then it became apparent that this was not about purported Russian security concerns posed somehow by Ukraine or NATO, but all about Putin’s imperial ambitions.
But even as we were working to deter by exposing, by engaging, we also used that time to prepare and, as I said, to put Ukraine in a position where it could defend effectively against the Russian aggression. And it did, given what Russia’s ambitions were in taking over the country. It stopped it, it pushed them back, only because we had incredible courage on the part of Ukrainians but also because we were prepared. We’d given them things that they needed; we’d gotten the world ready. And then we were able to move on sanctions, on pressure against Russia immediately. We were able to move on reinforcing NATO’s eastern flank immediately, which I think helped deter any kind of wider aggression that could have taken place.
When it comes to China and the lessons learned, there are a few things that really stand out. One of the, I think, extraordinary moments was when, early on in the aggression against Ukraine, the Japanese prime minister at the time, Kishida, stood up and Japan stood strongly with Ukraine. And he said we’re doing this because what’s happening in Europe today could be happening in Asia tomorrow. And there was this recognition that it was so important to stand together against an aggression not only against Ukraine and its people but against the principles at the heart of the international system that had been put in place to prevent conflict in the first place: territorial integrity, sovereignty, independence – these concepts that are at the heart of the United Nations Charter. Countries understood that it was strongly in their interest to stand up for those principles, even if the violation of those principles was happening half a world away.
And I think that’s been readily apparent to China, is they’ve seen the response to the Russian aggression, as they’ve heard increasingly a chorus of countries saying we have to preserve stability; we have to preserve the status quo; we have to preserve peace across the Taiwan Strait, because were that to change it would deeply affect our interests. And our diplomacy has very much worked on that. And then, again, because countries are seeing that the Russian war effort has been fueled in part by China’s support for Russia’s defense industrial base and what North Korea’s doing, that’s caused them to shift, I think, dramatically in their approach to China.
If you look at where we were when we took office, because we were so divided from allies and partners, they were all hedging their bets. Europe was on the brink of signing a trade agreement with China. You had countries that were joining Belt and Road. You had the BRICS process as well. But fundamentally what we’ve now seen is a convergence, a convergence in how to approach the challenge posed by China. If you read what European leaders are saying and major leaders in Asia are saying about how to deal with China, we’d basically be reading from each other’s talking points.
And the efforts to de-risk, the efforts to come together on everything from investment screening to export controls, to secure supply chains, all of these things, as well as protecting technology, protecting, as well, our workers against unfair trade practices and against overcapacity, the convergence is extraordinary. And I think that’s been a product of the fact that eyes have been opened to this fact that so much of this is really indivisible.
QUESTION: You write in the essay about the need to compete intensely but responsibly with China, which means, in your words, “making clear that the United States’ goal is not regime change and that even as both sides compete, they must find ways to coexist.” At a high level, that seems very sensible. But when you look at China’s role in the world and the way that role is changing over time, it is hard to imagine how you could change the current leadership in China or how you could have the current leadership in China and have a China in the world that is powerful and prosperous and quite active that would be consistent with the kind of world the United States wants to see. Do you see a path to that, given where Chinese behavior is now? And how do you see the arguments – Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher made this in our pages – that you really need to change the nature of government in China in order to have true coexistence?
SECRETARY BLINKEN: We cannot, will not in my estimation, change the nature of China’s governance, its regime – call it what you want. And embarking on that course would be a fool’s errand. But we can, we must, and we are standing up strongly and building convergence with other countries to make sure that China can’t do what it’s setting out to do, which is to reshape the rules of the road, to reshape the international system in ways that allow it to advance its interests where they’re in conflict with ours, to advance its values where they’re in conflict with ours. And that’s exactly what we’ve been able to do over these last four years. China is not going anywhere; we’re not going anywhere. And we have to start from that premise. But I think the notion of regime change policies is incredibly misguided.
Policy change – that’s different, and that’s what we’re focused on. And we’re going to be much more effective in doing that when we have this convergence with other countries. When we’re dealing, for example, with some of the unfair trade practices or overcapacity that China’s engaged in and countries – not just the United States – are deeply fearful of another China shock that we experienced a decade or 15 years ago – when any one of our countries is trying to deal with that alone, that’s one thing. Even the United States, dealing with it alone as the most powerful country in the world where we have greater GDP than the next three countries combined – nonetheless, we’re still 20 percent or so of world GDP. When we’re aligned with major partners in Europe, with the European Union, with partners in the Indo-Pacific, we might be 50 or 60 percent of world GDP, a much heavier weight that’s going to have a much greater impact on China changing its policies.
China also has reputational concerns. As I said, if it pretends to leadership, well, it can’t do it in a way that is simply through coercion and through bullying, because other countries eventually will stand up against that. Its own soft power is something that it takes seriously, even if it’s not been especially effective yet in asserting it. And that also gives you an ability to shape its policies and approach. The support for Russia’s defense industrial base, we’ve exposed that. China is very uncomfortable with that.
And I’ll say this. I’ve spent a lot of time with my Chinese counterpart Wang Yi – many, many, many hours. And every meeting – almost every meeting – starts the same way. It starts with him complaining about a litany of things that we’ve done, which to me is the greatest evidence of the success of our approach. And it often focuses on everything we’ve done to bring these other countries into some kind of alliance against China, which he says is anachronism of the Cold War. Well, the very fact that they spend so much time complaining about it is the most powerful evidence of the success that we’ve had.
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david chou
Q Hi.
THE PRESIDENT: Where in Connecticut are you from?
Q Greenwich.
THE PRESIDENT: That’s great.
Q China just tested a hypersonic missile. What will you do to keep up with them militarily? And can you vow to protect Taiwan?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes and yes. We are — militarily, China, Russia, and the rest of the world knows we have the most powerful military in the history of the world. Don’t worry about whether we’re going to — they’re going to be more powerful. What you do have to worry about is whether or not they’re going to engage in activities that will put them in a position where there — they may make a serious mistake.
And so, I have had — I have spoken and spent more time with Xi Jinping than any other world leader has. That’s why you have — you know, you hear people saying, “Biden wants to start a new Cold War with China.” I don’t want a Cold War with China. I just want to make China understand that we are not going to step back. We are not going to change any of our views.
MR. COOPER: So, are you saying that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if —
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COOPER: — China attacked?
====================
Appendix
Remarks by President Biden in a CNN Town Hall with Anderson Cooper
00001. Briefing Room
00002. Speeches and Remarks
Baltimore Center Stage
Baltimore, Maryland
(October 21, 2021)
8:00 P.M. EDT
MR. COOPER: With that, I want to welcome the 46th President of the United States, President Joe Biden. (Applause.)
So, there’s a lot to get to tonight, and we got a lot of great questions from our audience. We want to get into the details of what you’re calling the Build Back Better plan.
Before we get into that though, I just want to know — there’s been a lot of negotiating going on behind the scenes, as I’m sure you are very involved with. Are you close to a done deal?
THE PRESIDENT: No problems. It’s all done. (Laughter.)
No, look, Anderson, we’ve been — I’ve probably spent, well, well over 100 hours. This is a — this is a big deal. We’re both have — we have two plans: one is the infrastructure plan — roads, highways, bridges, buses, trains, et cetera — and the other one is what I call the “care economy”. It has a lot of money in there for environmental remediation as well as care economy. For example, you know, we want to get the economy moving, but millions of women can’t go to work because they don’t have any childcare. That kind of thing.
So, there’s a lot of pieces in there. There’s a lot that people don’t understand. And, by the way, all of it’s paid for — every single penny. It’s not going to raise one single cent (inaudible).
MR. COOPER: We’re going to get into a lot — a lot of those details. Just, though, are you close to a deal?
THE PRESIDENT: I think so. You know, look, I’ve been — I was a senator for 370 years. (Laughter.) And I was never — I was relatively good at putting together deals.
MR. COOPER: Is this the toughest deal you’ve worked on?
THE PRESIDENT: No. No. I think banning assault weapons was the toughest deal I worked on — and succeeded. (Applause.)
MR. COOPER: You’re flying — you’re flying to Europe, I think, in eight days.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COOPER: Do you think you’ll have a deal by the time you get on Air Force One in eight days?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, look, you know, it’s like my asking you, “Are you sure your next show is going to be a success?” Right? You know.
MR. COOPER: Yes. (Laughter.)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, you’re more confident than I am. Look — hey, look, it’s all about compromise. You know, “compromise” has become a dirty word, but it’s — bipartisanship and compromise still has to be possible.
When I ran for the presidency, I said I’m running for three reasons: one, to restore the soul and decency in the country; two, to build the middle class and the working class so they were — we build from the middle out; and three, to actually unite the country. And everybody has been saying, “Well, that’s crazy. You can’t do it.” If we can’t eventually unite this country, we’re in deep trouble.
MR. COOPER: Bottom line: Do you think you will get a deal?
THE PRESIDENT: I do think I’ll get a deal.
MR. COOPER: All right, let’s get some — let’s go to the audience. This is Nicholas Vaught. He’s the coordinator at the Applied Liberal Studies Program at Morgan State University. He’s a Democrat.
Nicholas, your question.
THE PRESIDENT: Morgan State.
Q Morgan State.
THE PRESIDENT: All right, man. (Applause.) I’ve spoken there.
Q So, my wife and I have two young boys, Arthur and Teddy. However, the cost of childcare is nearly double our mortgage. We want to have more children, but even though we earn a good salary now, childcare is so expensive. So how will this new infrastructure plan help middle-class families pay for childcare?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, let me ask you: Do you have — how old are your kids?
Q Three and a half and six months old.
THE PRESIDENT: God love you. (Laughter.)
Well, look, there’s two pieces. There’s the childcare — having someone take care of your child while you are working, while you and your wife are working. Under this proposal I have, no one will have to pay — unless you’re making more than — individually, you’re each making — making over 300 grand –$150,000 apiece.
Q We’re educators.
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, God. (Laughter.) And, by the way, I’m married to one: Dr. Biden — right here. (Applause.)
So — so you will not have to pay more than 7 percent of your income for childcare — 7 percent. And the way we do that is we provide for the ability to have childcare centers funded. The money won’t even go — you don’t — the — figure your income; you get 7 percent with the total cost.
But there’s another piece here: You now are qualified to be able to have a Child Tax Credit. It used to be that when you — you know, when you — if you were — had enough money to pay significant taxes, you could write off 2,000 bucks for every child you had and reduce it from your taxes. But if you were making 60,000 bucks a year and you didn’t have that much to write off, you didn’t get anything.
Well, I call this a tax break for middle-class people. If you’re making in the $150,000 range right now, you’re in a situation where you can get, if you have a child under 7, $350; if you have a child over 7, between 7 and 17, you can get $300. And you get a direct payment. You — the IRS sends you money.
MR. COOPER: Joe Manchin wants a work requirement with your enhanced tax credit for kids. Is that something you would support?
THE PRESIDENT: No. Here’s the deal: All these people are working anyway. (Applause.)
And, by the way, you know, why should somebody who is not working and has — you know, makes — has a million-dollar trust fund, why should they get the benefit, and someone making 60 grand and not working, but staying home, why should they not get anything? I don’t get that.
MR. COOPER: You’re also proposing, for the first time ever, federal paid parental leave. And — (applause) —
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. That’s a different issue. Yeah.
MR. COOPER: Right. A different issue. Right. But this is — but this is in your proposal. How much time off would parents actually get under your proposal? Because at one point, you talked about 12 weeks. Now there’s reports it’s down to maybe four weeks.
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, it is down to four weeks. And the reason it’s down to 4 weeks is I can’t get 12 weeks. (Laughter.)
And — but, look, here’s the deal, guys: How many people do you know — not a joke — or maybe yourself — have had a circumstance where you are working like the devil, you’re making 7 bucks an hour, 15 bucks an hour, or 20 bucks an hour, and you have a child that’s sick at home — or you have a mother or a father, husband and wife, son or daughter, and you need to stay home to help them?
We’re one of the few industrial countries in the world that doesn’t have paid leave — so that when you stay home to help that person, to take care of that person, you’re still getting your pay. And it does not hurt the business at all. The business isn’t paying for it; the federal government is paying for it. It’s a little bit like, as I said, a tax cut for people who are not able to otherwise take care of their families.
And, look, I’m looking out here, and a lot of you are part of that sandwich generation: You have young kids, and you have aging parents. And one of the things all the polling data shows, Anderson, is people are more concerned about taking care of the elderly, because they don’t know what to do, than they are even their children.
MR. COOPER: I want to talk about this. I want you to meet Vanessa Antrum from Bowie, Maryland. She’s retired. She’s a caregiver for her elderly parents.
THE PRESIDENT: God love you.
MR. COOPER: She’s a Democrat.
Vanessa, your question.
Q Yes. Mr. President, my parents have been married for 73 years and both are dealing — (applause) — yes. Both of them are dealing with dementia. My father, who was a veteran, is completely bedridden, and my mom is experiencing issues with walking.
I have found the process for me to provide care for them in my home very hard. They have worked all their life only for me to experience a lot of red tape to provide support —
THE PRESIDENT: Bingo.
Q — in a loving home environment. What is being done to support the elderly, especially for a middle-class family like mine?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all — (applause) — if my mom were here, she’d say you’re a good daughter, number one.
Q Yes. Thank you.
THE PRESIDENT: Number two, I was in a situation like you, where I was making more money — I was making $42,000 a year as a senator at the time, although I was listed the poorest man in the Senate for 36 years, but — (laughter) — I still made more money than most people because Senate salaries kept going up.
What happened was my — my dad got sick, and he was in hospice, so Jill and I took my dad home and we took care of him in our house. But we were lucky because we had the ability to have — I have a sister who is an angel and a brother who’s a wonderful guy, and we all took turns in our house taking care of them.
But here’s the deal: Right now, under Medicaid, there are 860,000 — I think it’s 860- — don’t hold me to the exact number, but it’s over 800,000 — who qualify for home healthcare aid for their parents, but there’s no money there. There’s no money there.
So what we do is we provide the funding for Medicaid to allow you to be able to keep — if your parents had their home — keeping them in their home if you wanted, or get help in your home with homecare from professionals providing — helping you take care of them — helping you take care of them.
And in many cases where you’re not taking care of them in your own home and they’re staying — and they’re staying in their home, you’re going to be able to have the ability to have someone come in and make their meals for them. They don’t have to be there 24/7.
So, there’s a lot of things we’re doing. In addition to the process, we’re going to be able to train up those homecare workers who are usually minority women, women of color, as well as immigrants. And they have the capacity to learn more as they go along, to move to the point where they can become practical nurses and things like that.
So, it makes a lot of sense, and it’s cheaper — cheaper than it is to not do it.
MR. COOPER: One of the other things that Democrats are looking to do is to expand Medicare to include dental, vision, and hearing as well. Given all the negotiations that are going on, will all three of those still be covered?
THE PRESIDENT: That’s a reach. And the reason why it’s a reach — it’s not — I think it’s a good idea, and it’s not that costly in relative terms, especially if we allow Medicare to negotiate drug prices.
But here’s the thing: Mr. Manchin is — is opposed to that, as is — I think Senator Sinema is as well.
MR. COOPER: Opposed to all of them?
THE PRESIDENT: Opposed to all three. Because they don’t want — he says he doesn’t want to further burden Medicare so that — because it will run out of its ability to maintain itself in X number of years. There’s ways to fix that, but he’s not interested in that part either. (Laughter.)
But, look, Joe — Joe is not a bad guy. He’s a friend. And he’s always, at the end of the day, come around and voted for it.
But — but here’s the point: We’re in a situation now where if you are in a circumstance that you’re not able to provide — let me cut to the chase; I’m taking too long. (Laughter.)
One of the things we were able to do in the meantime is — the most expensive of these things would be dental. Okay? Now, we’re talking about — and I don’t have a deal on it yet — maybe getting an $800 voucher from Medicare for dental work that you may need.
And the hearing is a very important thing because — as Kyrsten Sinema, who supports this, points out — hearing is directly related to dementia. When you can’t hear, you have a problem, and it impacts on dementia.
So, we’re able to, I — and it’s cheaper to be able to take care of hearing. But I think I’ve been able to take care of that without changing Medicare, because what’s happening is now you have these hearing aid companies; you no longer are going to have to go to the doctor and spend five grand and get an app- — you can go buy at Walgreens, and buy over-the-counter hearing aids. (Applause.)
So — the harder one, though, is we — we haven’t gotten a consensus yet on how to deal with seeing, glasses. And — but that’s — so “it’s not done yet” is the answer.
MR. COOPER: All right. I want to get another question in. This is Ben Frederick. Ben is a realtor, a lifelong resident of Baltimore. He’s an independent. Serves on the Maryland Multi-Housing Association.
THE PRESIDENT: By the way, Ben, the Bidens all hail from Baltimore, beginning in 1850. (Laughter.) I don’t know how the hell they kicked me out, but I’m — (laughter).
MR COOPER: Ben, what’s your question?
Q IRS data shows that the top 5 percent of income earners pays 60 percent of the income taxes in this country. I hear you repeatedly say that the wealthy are not paying their fair share of income taxes. What is the percentage of income that you believe is fair?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think what’s fair is that — this present tax code, the highest tax rate is 35 percent, number one. Okay?
Number two, you’re in a circumstance where corporate America is not paying their fair share. And I come from the corporate state of the world: Delaware. More corporations in Delaware than every other state in the union combined. Okay?
Now, here’s the deal though: You have 55 corporations, for example, in the United States of America making over $40 billion, who don’t pay a cent. Not a single little red cent.
Now, I don’t care — I’m a capitalist. I hope you can be a millionaire or a billionaire. I — not a problem. But at least pay your fair share. Chip in a little bit.
And so —
MR. COOPER: Well, let me — let me follow up, because Kyrsten Sinema, who you mentioned — Senator Sinema is opposed to any tax rate hikes for corporations and for high earners. Speaker Pelosi suggested today she could accept that.
The question is: A, would you accept that — no rate hikes — tax rate hikes for corporations or high earners? And if so, how would you pay for this plan otherwise?
THE PRESIDENT: Because you don’t have — look, here’s the deal: The tax rate — the corporate tax rate was 35 points-some — 37 percent. Barack and I thought it should come down. We thought it should come down to 28 percent.
In the process, it came down to 21 percent under Trump, which even the corporate leaders — and you know if you’re in real estate — major real estate. Ask them. They know they should be paying a little more than 21 percent. Because the idea that if you’re a schoolteacher and a firefighter, you’re paying at a higher tax rate than they are, as a percentage of your taxes.
But here’s the deal: I believe that we can do the — we can pay for this whole thing — I have it written on a card here, but I won’t bore you with the detail. But, for example, if you in fact made sure that you paid a minimum 15 percent — minimum 15 percent — if you’re paying nothing — minimum 15 — that’s almost — that’s over almost $400 billion over 10 years.
MR. COOPER: So you would be willing to go along with what Senator Sinema and, it seems like, Speaker Pelosi is willing to consider: no tax hike for corporations or for high-earning individuals?
THE PRESIDENT: Here’s what I’m willing to do: I’m willing to make sure that we pay for everything without anyone making less than $400,000 paying a single cent more in taxes. That’s my objective.
And so, there’s ways to do that. For example — you covered it on your show — the minimum international tax at 15 percent.
MR. COOPER: But no rate — actual rate hikes?
THE PRESIDENT: No. No. I don’t think we’re going to be able to get to vote. Look — (laughs) — when you’re in the United States Senate and you’re President of the United States and you have 50 Democrats, every one is a President. (Laughter.) Every single one. So, you got to work things out.
But where I am is, I’m hearing now — I’ll turn on the news and I’ll hear that “Biden’s caved on such and…”
Look, Biden has a simple proposition. Biden is going to get — all the elements of these two bills have profound impact on economic growth; reduce, not increase, inflation; don’t add a penny to the debt; as well as grow the economy. According — I had 17 Nobel laureates in economics sent me a letter recently saying that my proposals would actually reduce inflation, diminish (inaudible).
But here’s the point. The point of it all is that I’m prepared — I can’t think of anything that was consequential and changing the circumstance for the middle class and working class in America that came as a consequence of a single piece of legislation.
I got a portrait of Roosevelt in my office. Okay? Social Security is not anything like it is today when he passed it. It evolved. It moved. It grew.
So I’m prepared to do the things that can get done now that can begin to change the lives of ordinary Americans to give them a fighting chance and come back and try to get others later.
MR. COOPER: Let’s talk about another one of those things. This is Sondra Guttman, an English professor at — (applause) — at Loyola University — also a Democrat.
Sondra, what’s your question?
THE PRESIDENT: And, by the way, you got another English professor who teaches writing here. (Laughter.)
Q Thank you for taking my question, Mr. President. We’ve heard in the news that the proposal for two years of free community college may be cut from your economic package. An educated citizenry is absolutely crucial to solving complex problems like climate change — (applause) — and the systematic inequities in this country. We hope that this is not cut from the package, but if it is, what can you do to ensure that all Americans can get the education that they need to face these issues?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, first of all, Professor, you made a very profound point, and I’m not — I’m not being sarcastic — and that is — and Jill uses a slightly different phrase: “Any country that out-educates us will out-compete us.” Any country that out educates will out- — out-educates will out-compete us.
You have the vast majority — of the 37 major cor- — countries in the world — economies — we rank 35 in our investment in education. We’re in a situation where if you — if you think about it, when we — what caused us to move ahead and dominate the 20th century: In the late 1900s — in the early 1900s, late 1890s, we came up — we said, 12 years of free education. That was revolutionary at the time. I mean, seriously.
Now, if we were sitting down today and saying, “Oh, we got to put together an education system,” raise your hand if anybody thinks 12 years is enough to compete in the 21st century?
So, that’s why what I propose is: free child — free school — free school for every three- and four-year-old in America, no matter what their background.
All the data shows that no matter what home they come from, they increase exponentially their prospects of succeeding all the way through 12 years of school. You know — you know all the statistics.
The statistics go that if you come from a home where there’s no books in the home and a single mom or a single dad, they don’t — they’re not well educated, they don’t talk a lot, the kid from the middle class — average middle-class home versus that home will go to school having heard 1 million more words spoken than the child who didn’t. A gigantic disadvantage.
MR. COOPER: Mr. President, the question was on the — the — on community colleges —
THE PRESIDENT: No, I know. I —
MR. COOPER: — which — which was a big campaign promise that you made. You talked about that a lot on —
THE PRESIDENT: Oh, I —
MR. COOPER: — the campaign trail.
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, and I’m going to get it done. (Applause.) And if I don’t, I’ll be sleeping alone for a long time. (Laughter.)
But here’s the deal: So far, Mr. Manchin and one other person has indicated they will not support free community college. So, what I’ve — what I think we can get done is we can significantly increase the amount of money by 500 bucks a payment for Pell Grants. And Pell Grants are available, and they can apply for up to 30 percent of the cost of community college and/or — and/or college help tuition.
So, it’s not going to get us there. It’s not going to get us the whole thing, but it is a start.
I’m convinced — absolutely, positively convinced that we’re going to be able to — and, by the way, we have in the law — in the legislation, money for community colleges that deal with — dealing with apprenticeships, dealing with teaching people particular skills that are not getting — will not get you a two-year degree but will teach you the skill.
So, I think we can get all of that done this time out.
But I promise you — I guarantee you, we’re going to get free community college in the next several years and across the board. (Applause.)
MR. COOPER: What was that conversation when you realized you weren’t able — going to be able to get it in this bill at this time, and you had dinner with Dr. Biden that night, what was that conversation like? (Laughter.) How did you break that news?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, the White House has a lot of bedrooms. (Laughter.) And she went like this. (Points.) (Laughter.) “Down the hall.”
MR. COOPER: All right.
THE PRESIDENT: No, look, it really makes a gigantic difference. And think of this: You have more countries in the world with — having — providing college — I mean, providing professional education beyond 12 years. We rank like, I think it’s — don’t hold me to the number — I think it’s 16 or 17 in the world — the United States of America, for God’s sake.
MR. COOPER: I want —
THE PRESIDENT: This is about putting us in the game.
MR. COOPER: This is John Meche. He’s a doctoral candidate at Morgan State University and an independent. John, welcome. What’s your question? (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Where — where are you?
MR. COOPER: Morgan State.
Q Morgan State.
THE PRESIDENT: I know all these Morgan men, man. (Applause.)
I’ve spoken there a couple times. And, by the way, the guy who runs my operation is a — anyway — (laughter) — I — I keep talking about Delaware State, but they keep saying about Morgan State, you know?
Q Morgan State.
President Biden, I had so much faith in your election win, but based on history, the bipartisan efforts of the Democratic Party are held hostage by rogue moderates and Republicans. Why not do like the Republicans and usher through the Democratic agenda? (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Well, two reasons. If you notice, the Republicans haven’t passed a single, solitary thing. Zero. So, ushering through their agenda — their agenda right now is just “stop Biden.” Although, I shouldn’t make it so personal. “Stop my administration” — that’s what the agenda is. It’s much easier to stop something than to start something.
And look, what we did is, when I wrote — I’m going to back up just a second. I apologize. I wrote — I personally — during the campaign, before I got elected, I wrote the infrastructure bill relating to what we do to highways and all that kind of thing. Hard — hard data. And I wrote the — what they call — what’s now called the “care economy” piece and has a gigantic piece of environmental pieces in it too.
And I went before the joint session of Congress, and I laid out exactly what I was for. And so, I made it clear what I was for. Initially what happened was, I got no support for anything from our Republican friends. And then they said, “Maybe we can work out a bipartisan deal on infrastructure.” And we did. We worked on it. It didn’t give me everything I wanted. It didn’t have as much money in there for the environment, although it has tens of billions of dollars in there, but didn’t have what I wanted in it. But we made a bipartisan deal.
Now, what’s coming along is this reconciliation — they call it a fancy word — for the other pieces that have the childcare pieces, have the economy that relates to allowing people to — women to go back to work. It has about $450 billion for environmental remediation, and so on.
And that’s the one that is the issue.
MR. COOPER: Well, let me — let me ask you — just getting to — to his question: You — we’ve talked a lot about Senator Manchin and Senator Sinema. You seem relatively confident you can kind of get Senator Manchin on board.
There’s a lot of Democrats in the House and Senate who are confused about where Senator Sinema actually stands on things. (Applause.) And I know she’s been negotiating directly with you and the White House. What is your read on her?
And I — obviously, you need her to remain positive in your direction, so I don’t know what you’re going to say. (Laughter.) But what is your read on —
THE PRESIDENT: No —
MR. COOPER: Do you know where she stands?
THE PRESIDENT: First of all, she’s smart as the devil, number one. Number two, she’s very supportive of the environmental agenda in my legislation — very supportive.
She’s supportive of all — almost all the things I mentioned, relating to everything from family care to all — to all those issues.
Where she’s not supportive is she says she will not raise a single penny in taxes on the corporate side and/or on wealthy people. Period.
And so, that’s where it sort of breaks down, and there’s a few other issues it breaks down on. But what we’re trying to do is reach a point here where I’m able to present to the Senate — they’re able to vote on — and the House — a serious, serious piece of legislation that changes the dynamic for working-class folks in America and middle-class folks, and begins to have the very wealthy and corporations just begin to pay their fair share — not a lot.
How we get there — we’re down to four or five issues, which I’m not going to negotiate on national television, as you might guess.
MR. COOPER: We’d be interested —
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, no.
MR. COOPER: — in hearing them, if you want. (Laughter.)
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, no. I know. But, all kidding aside, I think we can get there.
MR. COOPER: You talked about the environmental piece. You said Senator Sinema is on board with that. Certainly, Senator Manchin is not. It gets to our next question.
This is from Kobi Khong. He’s originally from Anaheim, California. He’s a Sophomore Class President at Johns Hopkins University, a Democrat. (Applause.)
Kobi, what’s your question?
THE PRESIDENT: Mr. President.
Q One of the largest issues that people have trouble comprehending the severity of is climate change. Many legislators and politicians today are lenient, as they won’t have to live with the future effects. Without the legislative support for the climate aspects of your budget proposal and the earth rapidly approaching the Paris Agreement’s 1.5 degrees limit, what other backup plans do you have to ensure a future for the next generations?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that’s — (applause). Mr. President, you got it right. The existential threat to humanity is climate change. And when President Trump pulled out of the Paris Accord — which, when I was with the Obama administration, we helped negotiate — the agreement was that we could not — if we reached beyond 1.5 degrees Celsius increase in temperature, we’re gone. Not a joke. Not a joke.
And so, we decided that — he pulled out. First thing I committed to do is rejoin that accord, number one. (Applause.)
But number two — number two: What you have to do is you look at — there’s multiple ways in which we can deal with climate. I’m going off to COP26 in Scotland, and — in, I don’t know, I guess it’s two weeks or a week. I — I’m losing track of time.
And — and I’m presenting a commitment to the world that we will, in fact, get to net-zero emissions on electric power by 2035 and net-zero emissions across the board by 2050 or before. But we have to do so much between now and 2030 to demonstrate what we’re going to — that we’re going to do.
So, let me give you a couple examples.
MR. COOPER: Let me just follow up, though, very quickly on that, because the — the key climate provision that was in the Build Back Better plan, as you call it — the Clean Electricity Performance Program — that’s been dropped now from this spending bill. Reported —
THE PRESIDENT: No, it hasn’t.
MR. COOPER: It has not?
THE PRESIDENT: No, it ha- — look —
MR. COOPER: But Senator Manchin is opposed to that.
THE PRESIDENT: He’s opposed to it. But here’s the deal: That is only one of well over — well over a trillion dollars’ worth of expenditures for climate change. It’s $150 billion. It’s important.
And what it says is that if, in fact, the utility doesn’t pull back and continue to reduce the amount of carbon that they admit, that what will happen is they will end up paying a penalty. And so, there’s a penalty incurred.
Joe Manchin’s argument is: Look, we still have coal in my state. You’re going to eliminate it eventually. We know it’s going away. We know it’s going to be gone. But don’t rush it so fast that my people don’t have anything to do.
I think that’s not what we should be doing, but the fact of the matter is we can take that $150 billion, add it to the $320 billion that’s in the — in the law now that he’s prepared to support for tax incentives — tax incentives to have people act in a way that they’re going to be able to do the things that need to be do from —
For example, if you’re — if you — if you got windows that are the, you know, the wind is blowing through, you get an incentive to put new windows in your home. You get — you — help get it paid.
We’re going to significantly reduce the amount — the cost of solar panels on your roof. We’re going to continually — and, for example, there’s new battery technologies that are being — I went out in Silicon Valley; there’s a battery that’s about that wide and about that thick. If you have solar power, you put that in your basement and the sun doesn’t shine for seven days, you still have all the power you need.
MR. COOPER: But the concession has been agreed to for Senator Manchin —
THE PRESIDENT: No, no, no.
MR. COOPER: — about coal in his state —
THE PRESIDENT: No, no —
MR. COOPER: Is that true?
THE PRESIDENT: Nothing has been formally agreed to. The concession has been — the negotiation is: I’ve been saying to Joe, “Look, I’ll take — if we don’t do it in terms of the — the electric grid piece, what we’ll do is — give me that $150 billion. I’m going to add it to be able to do other things that allow me to do things that don’t directly affect the electric grid in the way that there’s a penalty, but allow me to spend the money to set new technologies in place.”
For example, we can save significant amounts of money and, as a consequence of that, significant amounts of energy, if, in fact, we are able to put the high-tension wires underground. It costs a hell of a lot more to do it. It creates real good jobs; it creates a hell of a lot more to do it. But, in fact, it would do a lot to keep things from happening that are dangerous. Half the forest fires out West are those towers coming down, setting fires, et cetera.
So, there’s a lot of things Joe is open to my convincing him that I can use it to increase environmental progress without it being that particular deal.
MR. COOPER: We’re going to take a quick break. When we get back, we got a lot more questions for President Biden. (Applause.)
(Commercial break.)
MR. COOPER: And welcome back. We are live at a CNN Town Hall event in Baltimore, Maryland, with President Joe Biden.
So, before we get to our next question, I want to just bring up the current labor market shortages. Millions of jobs are unfilled, businesses are struggling to meet demand. Is there anything you can do to either encourage people to go back to work or make jobs more attractive that they want to go back to work?
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah, so, first —
MR. COOPER: Is there a role for the federal government?
THE PRESIDENT: First of all, we’ve created more jobs in the first eight months of my administration than any President in American history — total number of jobs created.
But the problem for the people not going back to work is twofold. Number one, they’re reluctant to go back to work because they’re afraid of COVID — many of them. So they don’t want to go back and they don’t want to be exposed to either the customers because they’re not required to wear masks or not required to have shots, or they don’t want to go back because they’re not sure of the people waiting on them and they — at the table, or the people coming up in the food market. So, a lot of it has to do with COVID. Number one.
Number two — and that’s why, you know, we were able to go from — when I first got elected — when I first was elected, there were only 2 million people who had COVID shots in the United States of America — had the vaccine. Now we got 190 million, because I went out and bought everything I could do — and buy in sight, and it worked. (Applause.)
But here’s the deal: The second thing — the second thing that has happened, Anderson, is that people are now using this as an opportunity to say, “Wait a minute, do I want to go back to that $7-an-hour job?”
I won’t name the particular restaurant chain, but they found out when they — they couldn’t hire anybody. When they found out, they started to pay 20 bucks an hour, everybody wanted to go back to work. Not a joke.
So what you see is wages are actually up for those who are working, because for the first time in a long time, employees are able to bargain. “You’re the boss? You want me to work for you? What are you going to pay me? How are you going to do it?” I’m not being facetious.
The third thing that’s out there is there’s a circumstance that exists where people are really worried about what they’re going to do — I mean, how — how can I say this?
How many people do you know — and maybe some in this audience — who, because of what you’ve been through — a loss of a husband, wife, brother, mother, father, son, whatever — or you’ve had something that’s really impacted you with COVID that you really find yourself just down? I mean just down. And so, there’s a lot of people who are just down. They’re not sure how to get back in the game. They’re not sure whether they want to get back in the game.
Think of this: If you’re graduating from Morgan State, okay? (Applause.) Right? Well, guess what? You didn’t have those great dances the last four years that you’d had before you went out at Morgan. No, I’m not joking. Graduated from high school, you don’t have your prom, you don’t have your graduation, you don’t have the thing — all the things that matter to people that go into things they look forward to. So, a lot of it has to do with us getting back on our feet and getting back on our feet in terms of our attitudes about what the future looks like for us.
MR. COOPER: What do you say to someone who’s down? Because —
THE PRESIDENT: What I say —
MR. COOPER: — there’s a lot of people watching tonight who are.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, there are. And I tell you what: There’s plenty of help. Look, being down, having some problem in terms of needing some — some advice — if you have a broken spirit, it’s no different than a broken arm. You shouldn’t be ashamed of it. You should seek the help. There’s a lot of people who can help. (Applause.)
And — but I really mean it.
MR. COOPER: Yeah.
THE PRESIDENT: I — I don’t — I’m not saying that’s the whole problem, but I’m saying it is an element in terms of attitude about people — what they want.
Look, how often I get asked the question, “What’s Christmas going to be like? How about Thanksgiving? Is it going to be okay? I mean, what’s going to happen? I mean, how will I be able to buy gifts for my kids?” How — there’s a lot of anxiety people have.
MR. COOPER: Yeah. I want to ask a question along the lines of concern about Christmas and holidays and the supply chain.
Anna Hirsch is here, a student at Loyola University, who is originally from Connecticut. She’s a Democrat. Anna, what’s your question? (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Hello, Anna.
Q President Biden, growing up in a small town, I’ve been surrounded by small-business owners, including my mom who owns her own interior design business. With the current supply chain crisis, small businesses are in jeopardy of not being able to get products that they need —
THE PRESIDENT: They are.
Q — because priority is given to large businesses. Does your administration have any policies or plans in place to aid the current supply chain problem and/or to help small businesses that are affected by this?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes on both. (Applause.) Here — but you — but you have it exactly right.
We have a significant supply chain problem. In the Obama-Biden administration, all of American business — and it made sense — it was just on time. You wanted to make sure that you didn’t waste any money and/or time between producing whatever you’re producing and having it done. You didn’t — so that’s how you saved money. You didn’t buy the material six months ahead of time and then keep it in your inventory and then move it. It was on time.
Now, that’s a big problem. You can’t — people can’t do it. They want to get out ahead. What I’ve recently done — and people said — doubted we could get it done. I was able to go to the private por- — 40 percent of all products coming into the United States of America on the West Coast go through Los Angeles and — and — oh, what am I doing here?
MR. COOPER: Is it Long Beach or —
THE PRESIDENT: Long Beach. Thank you.
And I know both the mayors. So I went to them and I said, “What can we do?” So I met with — and they’re privately owned, these ports — these two. So I met with the business people. I met with all their major customers — the Walmarts of the world and all the rest. There are like 70 ships waiting out there unable to get unloaded.
So, I — and because — not always — the longshoremen don’t always get along with the business folks in there. I got — I have a relationship with them. And I brought them together, and I said, “You got to be open 24/7.” No port there was open tw- — open five days a week, 40 hours a week. 24/7 — they’ve all agreed to it. They’ve agreed to it.
MR. COOPER: Would you consider the National Guard to help with the supply chain issue?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, absolutely, positively, I would do that. But in addition to that, what you got to do is you got to get these ships in and unloaded.
And one of the things in my — my infrastructure plan: There’s $16 billion for port expansion. We have to be able to move things along. Because what’s happening is, when we — a product your mother may need for interior design, in terms of drapery or colors or something, that is imported from somewhere else. Well, guess what? A lot of these places, particularly in South Asia, are closing down because of COVID. The businesses are just flat closing. They’re —
MR. COOPER: So, would you consider the National Guard for trucking? For — because there’s a lot of problems —
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COOPER: — with not enough truck drivers right now.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. But here’s — and that’s why what we’re doing now —
MR. COOPER: Do you have a timetable for that?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I had a timetable to — first of all, I want to get the ports up and running, and get the railroads and the rail heads and the trucks in port ready to move. Because I’ve gotten Walmart and others that say, “We’re going to move stuff off of the port, into our warehouses.” Which (inaudible).
MR. COOPER: So, are you — but you’re actually talking about having National Guardsmen and women —
THE PRESIDENT: The answer is —
MR. COOPER: — driving trucks?
THE PRESIDENT: The answer is: Yes, if we can’t move the — increase the number of truckers, which we’re in the process of doing.
MR. COOPER: Okay.
THE PRESIDENT: If we did at this moment, we’re not — but the whole point is: We’ve got to get the small business as well, because the big guys are in trouble. And a lot of the product that your mother makes, the product she — the things she does in her interior design building, the material she buys from the larger outfits. I assume; I don’t know that.
I — I — but my whole point is: Small businesses need the help badly. Small businesses make up 60 percent of all the revenue coming from business out there.
MR. COOPER: I want to bring in Linda Harris. She’s from Elkridge, Maryland. She’s a software project manager, Democrat. Linda, what’s your question?
Q Hey, President Biden.
THE PRESIDENT: Hey.
Q My middle-class family of four lives on a pretty tight budget. My husband and I both work full-time at well-paying jobs, but we still struggle some months to make the ends meet. With rising gas prices and utility prices and grocery prices, we’re feeling our discretionary income get squeezed and reduced. What plans does the administration have to help ease this kind of current crunch we’re feeling?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, there’s a number of things that have already been done. And it’s hard — and people don’t think about — the American Rescue Plan has provided for an awful lot — the $1.9 billion we passed right at — right after I got elected.
So, what you got is you got that — that $1,400 check in the mail, and you got a lot of things that help ameliorate some of the concerns and costs, because we knew what we were coming into. We knew we had inherited the wind, and things were going to get worse before they got better.
But in terms of being able to have what my dad used to say, “a little breathing room,” just a lit- — my — my dad busted his neck. He didn’t have a good-paying job. My dad was a well-read high-school-educated guy who thought his greatest sin in the world was he didn’t get to go to college.
And — but my dad was one of those guys that worked like hell, would come home for dinner, and then he’d go back and finish up work and close the shop. He — and — and the whole point of it was that all we want to give — all he’d talk about is “Joey, all I need is just a little breathing room, a little space — a little space.”
MR. COOPER: Let me — let me ask you about that, just in terms of inflation, because you had told us at a town hall, I think it was in July, that the — it was just near-term inflation. The Wall Street Journal recently talked to like 67 financial experts who said that they saw high inflation going all the way — or deep into 2022. Do you think it’s going to last for a while?
THE PRESIDENT: I — I don’t think so. I don’t think it will last if — depending what we do. If we stay exactly where we are, yes. If we don’t make these investments, yes.
MR. COOPER: What about gas prices? Because some states —
THE PRESIDENT: Gas pri- —
MR. COOPER: — are seeing —
THE PRESIDENT: Gas prices relate to a foreign policy initiative that is about something that goes beyond the cost of gas. And we’re about $3.30 a gallon most places now, when it’s up from — when it was down in the single digits. I mean — single di- — a dollar-plus. And — and that’s because of the supply being withheld by OPEC.
And so, there’s a lot of negotiation that is — there — there’s a lot of Middle Eastern folks who want to talk to me.
MR. COOPER: Mm-hmm.
THE PRESIDENT: I’m not sure I’m going to talk to them. But the point is, it’s about gas production. There is things we can do, in the meantime, though.
MR. COOPER: Do you think there’s a — I mean, do you see a — do you have a timeline for gas prices of when you think they may start coming down?
THE PRESIDNET: My guess is you’ll start to see gas prices come down as we get by — going into the winter — I mean, excuse me, into next year, in 2022. I don’t see anything that’s going to happen in the meantime that’s going to significantly reduce gas prices.
But, for example, for natural gas to heat your homes as winter is coming, there’s a lot — what people don’t realize: We put in billions of dollars in what they call “LIHEAP.” LIHEAP is the provision whereby you’re able to get funding from the federal government based upon your need to heat your home, and it is subsidized in a significant way. And there’s billions of dollars we have passed in the legislation I got passed in — in March of this year, because we anticipated that would be a problem, as well.
But the answer ultimately is — “ultimately” meaning the next three or four years — is investing in renewable energy. What I was able to do — (applause) — no, I — and, by the way, I really — I’m not — I’m not being — I mean, I’m being literal when I say this: What I was able to do when I ran — and you remember, Anderson, because I was on your show a couple times, and the issue was whether or not I could ever get the labor unions to support my environmental programs.
And I went out and I went to the IBEW and, as well, to the autoworkers, and I laid out my plan. They fully embraced it. Why? Because — and I spent time at General Motors and other companies, and I got General Mo- — I didn’t get them — General Motors decided, after a long time spent talking to me — they were suing California because they had a higher standard — mileage standard. They dropped the suit and agreed that they would be 50 percent electric vehicles by 2030 — by 2030. (Applause.) And now you have all three — all three major manufacturers saying the same thing.
So, what will ha- — what will happen is: You’re going to see a dramatic drop — a dramatic drop in what’s going to happen in terms of gas prices as we go into the next two or three years. Even if we’re not able to break the monopoly price — they’re keeping it up because — anyway.
So there’s — there — but I don’t — I must tell you, I don’t have a near-term answer. There’s two things I could do: I could go in the petroleum reserve and take out and probably reluce [sic] — reduce the price of gas maybe 18 cents or so a gallon. It’s still going to be above three bucks.
And one of the things that I refuse to have happen, because I didn’t want anybody — I made a commitment: If you pass the stuff I’m talking about, not — not one single penny in tax would go against anybody making less than 400 grand.
And so, if you notice, this is — these highway bills are not paid for by gas tax. They’re paid for by direct expenditures in other areas. So, the average person doesn’t have to pay more.
But it’s going to be hard. It’s going to be hard. There’s a possibility to be able to bring it down. Depends on — little bit on Saudi Arabia and a few other things that are in the offing.
MR. COOPER: Let me take a quick break. We’ll have more from President Joe Biden. (Applause.)
(Commercial break.)
MR. COOPER: And welcome back to our CNN Town Hall with President Joe Biden. (Applause.) Got a lot more questions to get to.
I want to introduce Neijma Donner, a professor and social worker at the University of Maryland, Baltimore. She’s an independent and mother of two young boys. We’re going to be talking about COVID.
Neijma, what’s your question?
Q Thank you for taking my question, President. When will the vaccines for young children be ready? And how accessible will they be once released?
THE PRESIDENT: I believe — and I want to make it clear: Unlike past administrations, science will dictate this. I’m not telling anyone at — (applause) — no, I really mean it. (Applause.)
But I do ask my COVID team what the expectations are. The expectations are it’ll be ready in the near term — meaning weeks, not — not months and months. Okay? That’s number one.
Number two, there are over 800,000 sites right now that exist in America where you can go get a vaccine. And you’re going to be able to do that with your children, particularly — we’re going to try to work it out to deal with childcare centers — make it available there — as well as your pediatricians and the — you know, and the docs — and finding places where you can do it. Some places are talking about doing at — you know, in churches on the weekend and that kind of thing.
So there’ll be plenty of places to — to be able to get the vaccine when — if and when it is approved.
And it’s likely to be approved. I spent a lot of time with the team on these things. And it’s likely to be approved and what — whether it’s Moderna or whether it’s Pfizer or whether it’s J&J, it’s going to be approved. And it will be a much smaller dose — basically the same dose, but a smaller dose. And they’re doing a lot of tests on it right now.
And — and those of you who have children or brothers or sisters who are between — you know, who are in that age category above 12, get — get the vaccine for them. Get the vaccine. (Applause.) Get it now.
MR. COOPER: Let me ask you — Mr. President — Mr. President —
THE PRESIDENT: By the way, there’s two famous guys in this audience here. I just noticed. (Laughter.) Ben Cardin — (applause) — and Chris Van Hollen. (Applause.) And the mayor! Holy mackerel.
MR. COOPER: Mr. —
THE PRESIDENT: This is a busman’s holiday for you guys, having to come here. (Laughter.) But thank you.
MR. COOPER: Mr. President, let me ask you a follow-up about that. As many as one in three emergency responders in some cities like Chicago, Los Angeles, right here in Baltimore, are refusing to comply with city vaccine mandates.
I’m wondering where you stand on that. Should police officers, emergency responders be mandated to get vaccines? And if not, should they be — stay at home or let go?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes and yes. (Applause.)
And, by the way — by the way, I waited until July to talk about mandating, because I tried everything else possible. The mandates are working. All the stuff about people leaving and people getting — you have — you have everyone from United Airlines to Spirit — all these airlines. They’re — we’re not going to get all — 96, 97 percent of the people have gotten the vaccine.
All the talk about all these folks who are going to leave the military if they were mandated — not true. You got about a 90-something percent vaccination rate.
I mean, so there’s a — the idea is that — look, the two things that concern me — one, are those who just tried to make this a political issue. “Freedom. I have the freedom to kill you with my COVID.” (Laughter.) No, I mean, come on. “Freedom.” (Laughter.) Number one.
Number two — the second one is that, you know, the gross misinformation that’s out there. Like what they’re saying about my buddy Colin Powell — (applause) — and he was my friend — who passed away. “Colin Powell was vaccinated, and he still died.” Well, he knew he had serious underlying conditions. And it would be difficult — he clearly would have been gone earlier had he not gotten the vaccine, had he not gotten the — the shots.
But my generic point is: There’s so much misinformation.
And you know what I find fascinating? I turn on Fox to find out how popular I am. (Laughter.) Well, I —
MR. COOPER: How are you doing there?
THE PRESIDENT: I’m doing very well. (Laughter.) I think I’m at 3 percent favorable. But — (laughter) —
But all kidding aside, one of the things I find: Do you realize they mandate vaccinations?
MR. COOPER: At Fox headquarters.
THE PRESIDENT: Yeah. (Applause.) I find that mildly fascinating.
MR. COOPER: You find that mildly fascinating?
THE PRESIDENT: Mildly fascinating.
MR. COOPER: I want to bring in — (laughter) — Thaddeus Price from — (applause). This is Thaddeus Price from Randallstown, Maryland. He’s a program coordinator at Morgan State University and a Democrat. (Applause.)
Thaddeus, welcome.
Q Good evening, Mr. President. You received overwhelming support from the Black community, and rightfully so. (Applause.) Rightfully so. But now many of us are disheartened —
THE PRESIDENT: Yep.
Q — as we watch a Congress fail to support police reform. We watch our voting rights vanish before our very eyes. (Applause.)
Mr. President, my question is: What will you do over the next three years to rectify these atrocities, secure our democracy, and ensure that freedoms and liberties that all Americans should be entitled to? (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: First of all, you’ve stated the proposition accurately, in my view. I did get overwhelming support from the African American community. Only folks in Maryland understand Delaware is the eighth-largest Black population in America, as a percent of population. It’s been the source of my support. The only folks that helped me more than Black men are Black women. (Applause.)
And — and I tell you what my greatest regret is: My greatest regret is I have these — had these three major pieces of legislation that are going to change the circumstances for working-class folks and African Americans, as well, that I’ve been busting my neck trying to pass. But what it’s done is prevented me from getting deeply up to my ears — which I’m going to do once this is done — in dealing with police brutality, dealing with the whole notion of: What are we going to do about voting rights? It’s the greatest assault on voting rights in the history of the United States — for real — since the Civil War.
Q Yes. Yes, sir.
THE PRESIDENT: And, you know, for example: When I was in the Chair- — when I was Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, I thought I had done something really important. And I was able to get passed and extended the Voting Rights Act for 25 years and get everyone on that committee, including the southern — the senator from South Carolina and others, to vote for it. I thought we had moved.
The point I’m making is this: We’re at a terrible place right now. And so, when this gets done — and in the meantime, here’s what I’ve done: I have the authority to deal with federal law enforcement.
So federal law enforcement, I’ve — we’ve issued mandates: no chokeholds, number one; make sure that we’re going to be able to do — have no no-knock warrants; in a position where we’re going to be able to see to it that we are able to go look at — and we’re doing it in four cities right now — patterns of abuse and patterns of misconduct of police departments; making sure that we have access to police records, in terms of what’s happening in —
So there’s a lot I’ve been able to do by executive order, in essence.
MR. COOPER: Let me ask you, on voting rights: If it is as important to you as you say, I think there’s a lot of Democrats who look at the filibuster and would like to see it changed, even if it was just on this one case. (Applause.) Why do you oppose that?
THE PRESIDENT: By the way, I think they make a very good point.
Here’s the deal: If, in fact, I get myself into, at this moment, the debate on the filibuster, I lose three — at least three votes right now to get what I have to get done on the economic side of the equation — the foreign policy side of the equation.
So, what I have said — you’re shaking your head no, but let me tell you something, Jack: It’s the truth. (Laughter.) Number one.
Number two. Number two, what I have proposed in the meantime is — it used to be the filibuster. The way it worked — and we have 10 times as many — more than that — times the filibuster has been used since 1978. It used to be you had to stand on the floor and exhaust everything you had, and you — when — and when you gave up the floor and someone else sought the floor, they had to talk until they finished. You’re only allowed to do it a second time. After that, it’s over; you vote — somebody moves for the vote. I propose we bring that back now, immediately. (Applause.)
But I also think we’re going to have to move to the point where we fundamentally alter the filibuster. The idea that, for example, my Republican friends say that we’re going to default on the national debt because they’re going to filibuster that and we need 10 Republicans to support us is the most bizarre thing I ever heard.
I think you’re going to see an aw- — if they — gets pulled again, I think you’ll see an awful lot of Democrats being ready to say, “Not me. I’m not doing that again. We’re going to end the filibuster.”
But it still is difficult to end the filibuster, beyond that. That’s another issue. But —
MR. COOPER: But — but are you saying once you get this current agenda passed on spending and social programs that you would be open to fundamentally altering the filibuster or —
THE PRESIDENT: I am open to —
MR. COOPER: — doing away with it?
THE PRESIDENT: — fundamentally altering —
MR. COOPER: Or doing away with it?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, that remains to be seen, exactly what that means, in terms of “fundamentally altering” it, whether or not we just end the filibuster straight up.
There are certain things that are just sacred rights. One’s a sacred obligation that we never are going to renege on a debt. We’re the only nation in the world — we have never, ever reneged on a single debt.
MR. COOPER: But when it comes to voting rights, do you —
THE PRESIDENT: Voting rights is equally as consequential.
MR. COOPER: When it comes to voting rights — just so I’m clear, though — you would entertain the notion of doing away with the filibuster on that one issue? Is that correct?
THE PRESIDENT: And maybe more.
MR. COOPER: And maybe other issues? (Applause.)
Okay, let’s — just a short time ago, the full House voted to hold — to hold former Trump ally, Steve Bannon — current Trump ally as well — (laughter) — in criminal contempt of Congress.
A week ago, you said the Department of Justice should prosecute those who defied subpoenas from the January 6th Committee. Was that appropriate for you to weigh in on?
THE PRESIDENT: No, the way I said it was not appropriate. I said — they asked me would I — do I think that he — they should be prosecuted for denying the — for not showing up at the committee. And I said, “Yes.”
Now that — when I’ve made a commitment — the plu- — the — one of the things I was committed to do when I ran was re-establish the reputation and integrity of the Justice Department. It has become the most — it was corrupted under the last administration.
I should have chosen my words more wisely. I did not, have not, and will not pick up the phone and call the Attorney General and tell him what he should or should not do in terms of who he should prosecute. (Applause.)
But, I answered the question honestly. And I think that a — anyone who does not respond to that kind of en- — question from the — from the — a legitimate committee in the House of Representatives or the United States Senate should be held accountable.
So that’s as much as I can say without coming and looking like I’m telling the — I have yet to talk to the Attorney General about anything (inaudible) —
MR. COOPER: The Attorney General put out a statement saying that they would make the decision on their own.
THE PRESIDENT: And they will.
MR. COOPER: Yeah.
THE PRESIDENT: I guarantee that.
MR. COOPER: You’ve decided not to exert executive privilege to shield the former President in the House’s investigation into January 6th. Why? What were you —
THE PRESIDENT: Well, again, I’m leaving that to them to tell me what — and I didn’t — it’s not a blanket “I will not release the information.” It’s, I’m asking them to take a look at what is legitimate — what would legitimately fall in the position that future Presidents’ authority would be compromised by that, and what is. I don’t think there’s much legitimacy in the claim.
So that’s being looked at right now.
MR. COOPER: We’re going to take another quick break. We’ll have more with President Joe Biden. (Applause.)
(Commercial break.)
MR. COOPER: And welcome back to our CNN Town Hall with President Joe Biden. We’re taking questions from the audience on a range of topics.
I want to bring in Megan Crawford from Towson, Maryland. She’s a law student at the University of Baltimore and a Republican.
Megan, welcome. (Applause.)
Q Throughout your campaign, you’ve criticized former President Trump for his treatment of illegal immigrants and the southern border. Given that it’s nearly been a year into your campaign, why haven’t you been to the southern border of our country? And why did your stance on allowing immigrants suddenly revert to Trump-era policies?
THE PRESIDENT: Well — (applause) — they’re legitimate questions. Number one, the Remain in Mexico policy, which I oppose, the Court said I had to maintain it. So, we’re repealing it. That’s one of the reasons why we haven’t changed it.
We have made a gigantic change — there were over 5,000 children — children — in the — in the custody of the Border Patrol. There are now 504. We are making more progress than you think.
And we have a circumstance where one of the things that is going to bear fruit, I believe, is: I put together a program when I was a senator, and the Vice President is helping — helping initiate it now, where we provide for funding to change the circumstances on the ground in the countries in Central America.
For example, you’re in a circumstance where, you know, people don’t just sit around their — their hand-hewn table and say, “I got a great idea: Let’s sell everything we have, give it to coyote, let them take us across the border, drop us in a desert — a place they don’t want us. Won’t that be fun?”
People do it because they’re desperate. They’re desperate. And what I’ve been trying to do — and I’m trying to do in this legislation, as well — is get funding so we have funding for immigration officers to be able to hear cases immediately of whether or not they justify having asylum granted to them.
MR. COOPER: Mr. President —
THE PRESIDENT: We don’t have that.
MR. COOPER: You have kept in place, under a Public Health Authority known as Title 42 —
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COOPER: — which is a Trump-era policy, which allows immediate or very quick return to people who crossed over the border based on COVID protocols.
THE PRESIDENT: Yes. And that is — we’ve maintained that because of the extent of the — of the — continued extent of COVID in those countries from which people are coming. It’s very, very high. And so, we’ve maintained the policy.
We are — we are not sending back children. We send back adults, and we send back fa- — large families. But we don’t send back children in that circumstance.
And so that’s why I have a proposal to provide for over a billion doses of COVID vaccine to the rest of the world, including a significant portion to Latin and Central America.
MR. COOPER: Do you have plans to visit the southern border?
THE PRESIDENT: I’ve been there before, and I haven’t — I mean, I know it well. I guess I should go down. But the — but the whole point of it is: I haven’t had a whole hell of lot of time to get down. I’ve been spending time going around looking at the $900 billion worth of damage done by — by hurricanes and floods and — and weather, and traveling around the world.
But I plan on — now, my wife, Jill, has been down. She’s been on both sides of the river. She’s seen the circumstances there. She’s looked into those places. You notice you’re not seeing a lot of pictures of kids lying on top of one another with — you know, with — with bla- — with, you know, looks like tarps on top of them.
We’ve been able to deal that — we’ve been able to significantly increase funding through the HHS — Health and Human Services — to provide shelter for these kids and people. But there’s much more to be done.
And — and I realize — I — I think it is — it’s the thing that concerns me the most about being able to get control of it. Because I got to, number one, get enough funding to provide for immediate determination of whether or not someone that is, in fact, legitimately claiming a right to stay in the country because of legitimate fears. And it’s purely for economic reasons to get in line but not get in the country.
So, what we’re doing is bringing a lot of folks who are coming in and they’re doing ankle bracelets instead of people being sent back, depending on whether or not their claim appears to be legitimate.
MR. COOPER: Let me ask you about two other issues in the news. In less than two weeks, Minneapolis voters are going to decide whether or not to replace the police department in Minneapolis with what they would call a “Public Safety Department.” What do you think of that?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, it depends what they mean by that. Look, I — I — I grew up in a neighborhood —
MR. COOPER: They said the Public Safety Department would be — have a more comprehensive public health approach to the delivery of functions of public safety and could include licensed peace officers — police officers.
THE PRESIDENT: Well, could. I think you need police officers. I think we need police officers to protect us. I think they have to be under certain changed circumstances. But I think we have to provide for them more opportu- — I call for more money for police to go to community policing, as well as dealing with additional help for psych- — psychologists and others working with police departments.
MR. COOPER: You’ve never been a fan of defunding police.
THE PRESIDENT: No, I haven’t. I’ve never supported. But I’ve been a fan — (applause) — of controlling police and making sure they’re held accountable. That’s a — they’re two different issues.
And one of the things — look, when we had community policing, initially in the late ‘90s, violent crime dropped significantly — significantly. And the reason it did is because we had significant number of police. What I did: I eliminated the LEAA funding — Law Enforcement Assistance Act — (applause) — and I put in place the proposal that required community policing.
What that meant was: If you were all — it’s going to take a second, but it’s important. (Laughter.) If your — what — what that meant, if your city had authorized a police force of 100 people, you could not take the money for community policing and fire 50 people and rehire 50 so now I just had the federal government paying for half and you didn’t increase the number of police.
You had to increase the number of police beyond your wh- — whatever. So, I remember my son Beau was the chief law enforcement officer of the state of Delaware as attorney general of the state of Delaware. And he used to do what I did.
He’d go down the east side where you can find the best basketball in the coun- — in — in the city. You know, every — every town has those — those places. And he’d sit there on the bench with my son — my grandson, Hunter, who’s now 16, who was then 5, sitting the bench and he’d get to know these guys.
And he’d walk over and he’d knock on the window of the police car that was sitting there — the cop not getting out of the car — and say, “Get the hell out of the car and meet these folks.” “No.”
I’ll give you one example: What we required initially was every police — every community policeman — there were two assigned — they were assigned in groups of two — they had to know the neighborhood.
I remember getting a call, as you — you’ve been to Delaware; you go down that road as you’re heading down to the (inaudible) station — Martin Luther King Boulevard. There was a woman who lived in one of those apartments in the second floor that sort of had an outcroppings — a Victorian kind of — it was a two-story place.
And what — but the cops made sure they had — she had their phone number. So, when a drug deal was going down, she’d pick up the phone on call and say to that police officer with a cellphone that the drug deal is going down, knowing that she would never be fingered, knowing that she would never be the one told it happened. And so, crime began to drop.
They had to know who owned the local liquor store. They had to know and walk in and shake hands with the local minister. They had to know — that’s community policing.
MR. COOPER: Let me try to get in a couple other questions —
THE PRESIDENT: I’m sorry.
MR. COOPER: — from our audience.
THE PRESIDENT: Ask easy ones.
MR. COOPER: But before we do, just another quick news question: New York City is removing a statue of Thomas Jefferson from its legislative chamber because of Jefferson’s history as a slave — slave holder. Do you support that decision?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think that’s up to the locality to decide what they want to do on that. Look, there’s — there’s a lot of — there’s a lot of people who have no social redeeming value, historically. And there’s others who have made serious mistakes in they — in — in terms of what — what exists now in terms of what we should be talking about, but have done an awful lot.
And so, the very thing — for example, I just spoke at the Martin Luther King dedication. And I pointed out that we’re right across from the Lincoln Memorial. Well, you know, and — and you talked about — and — and then the Jefferson Memorial. And what — what are we doing? I talked about how they said, “We’re unique in all the world, as a nation. We’re the only nation founded on an idea. We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men and women are created equal, endowed by…”
No nation has ever been founded on an idea. Have we ever lived up to it? No.
MR. COOPER: Let me br- —
THE PRESIDENT: But it’s a pretty big idea that somebody wrote that down and got the rest of the country to agree to it. So it depends. It depends. And it’s —
MR. COOPER: Let me bring — let me bring in Glenn Niblo, a student at Loyola University, originally from Connecticut. He’s a Republican. Glenn, welcome. (Applause.)
Q Hi.
THE PRESIDENT: Where in Connecticut are you from?
Q Greenwich.
THE PRESIDENT: That’s great.
Q China just tested a hypersonic missile. What will you do to keep up with them militarily? And can you vow to protect Taiwan?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes and yes. We are — militarily, China, Russia, and the rest of the world knows we have the most powerful military in the history of the world. Don’t worry about whether we’re going to — they’re going to be more powerful. What you do have to worry about is whether or not they’re going to engage in activities that will put them in a position where there — they may make a serious mistake.
And so, I have had — I have spoken and spent more time with Xi Jinping than any other world leader has. That’s why you have — you know, you hear people saying, “Biden wants to start a new Cold War with China.” I don’t want a Cold War with China. I just want to make China understand that we are not going to step back. We are not going to change any of our views.
MR. COOPER: So, are you saying that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if —
THE PRESIDENT: Yes.
MR. COOPER: — China attacked?
THE PRESIDENT: Yes, we have a commitment to do that.
MR. COOPER: All right. We’re going to — we’re going to — we’re going to take another quick break. We got more questions from the audience. We’ll be right back. (Applause.)
(Commercial break.)
MR. COOPER: And welcome back. We are live with President Joe Biden, here in the city of Baltimore.
Just in the few minutes we have left: The country lost — and I know you lost somebody who you considered close friend, General Colin Powell. What’s something about him that people didn’t know?
THE PRESIDENT: He had enormous integrity; they knew that. But he’s one of the few serious, serious players I’ve dealt with over these years who, when he made a mistake, he acknowledges it. He said, “I ackno- — I was wrong about it.”
MR. COOPER: That’s rare these days. (Applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: No, it’s rare. It’s been rare — it’s rare in human nature for someone in a powerful position to say they are wrong. They are wrong. “I made a mistake.” That’s a hard thing to do. And I’ve had to do it about a half a dozen times lately. (Laughter.) But — but all kidding aside —
And the second thing about him was he had a lot of serious — he had real compassion. You know, his — well, I’ll tell you afterwards, but — because we only have a few minutes.
He and I went out to the Secret Service racetrack. He had a brand-new Corvette his — his family bought — his kids bought him. And I have a ’67 327/350, and we raced. We raced. (Laughter and applause.)
And, you know — you know, the only reason — no, I’m serious. It was on “Jay Leno.” Check it out. “Jay Leno Live.” He’s — he’s a hell of a guy.
MR. COOPER: Who won?
THE PRESIDENT: Well, I won only because he was worried I was going to crash into him. (Laughter.) Because I don’t have positraction, so I was burning rubber the whole way out there, and I could see him going, “Whoa.” (Laughter.)
MR. COOPER: All right. So just — my final question is: You famously — at the signing ceremony, I think it was, for Obamacare, you famously leaned in to the then-President, and — I’m not going to say a direct quote, but — (laughter) — off-mic, you said, “This is a big [effing] deal.” (Laughter.)
And I’m wondering: The Build Back Better plan — is it a bigger effing deal than that? (Laughter and applause.)
THE PRESIDENT: Sixty seconds. We got in the car to go over to the — the Department of Education after we did that.
MR. COOPER: Oh, I thought you were talking about drag racing still.
THE PRESIDENT: No, no. He got in the car, and he was laughing like hell. I said, “What’s so damn funny?” And he told me.
I whispered in his ear — this way. I looked to see where it was. I said, “I’m going to — and this is a big deal.” And I didn’t realize the guy behind me was really lipreading. You can see it. (Laughter.) No, I’m serious.
The answer is: Yes, this is bigger. No, it is bigger because — not — not because what he did wasn’t enormous. He broke the ice. Enormous.
But part of what I have in here is we also increased access to the Affordable Care Act, and we reduced the price an average of 60 bucks a month for anyone who’s in the Affordable Care Act. Plus, on top of that, we have another 300 billion dollars’ worth of healthcare ever — in it.
So, it’s — I would say this is a bigger darn deal. (Applause.)
MR. COOPER: Mr. President, thank you very much. Appreciate your time.
THE PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.
david chou
Immediate Release
Statement on the Development of the 2025 National
Defense Strategy
May 2, 2025
|
Statement by Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and Senior Advisor Sean Parnell:
Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth has directed Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby to begin the development of the 2025 National Defense Strategy (NDS).
The NDS serves as the strategic roadmap for the Department of Defense. As such, it will provide clear direction for the Department to implement President Trump's America First and Peace Through Strength agenda. Consistent with the President's intent, the NDS will prioritize defense of the U.S. homeland, including America's skies and borders, and deterring China in the Indo-Pacific. At the same time, the NDS will prioritize increasing burden-sharing with allies and partners around the world, in the process strengthening those relationships and setting conditions for lasting peace.
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
1000 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1000
MAY O1 2025
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE PERSONNEL
SUBJECT: National Defense Strategy
This memorandum provides my guidance to develop the National Defense Strategy (NDS).
The NOS is the single most important document to ensure the Department is operating in accordance with the President's and my intent. In order to drive urgent action on President Trump's imperatives to put America First and achieve Peace Through Strength, the NDS process will commence immediately, using the 2025 Interim National Defense Strategic Guidance as its basis and framework.
The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy will lead the NDS process, with review and feedback from across the Department's Components at the principal level. The NOS drafting team will be led by Policy with a Joint Staff deputy. In addition, each of the Services will provide a strategist at the O-6/GS-l 5 level to the NDS drafting team.
All DoD Components should be maximally responsive to the NOS drafting team throughout the process. In order to rapidly drive change toward an America First defense strategy, I have directed that a final draft of the NDS be provided to me no later than August 31 , 2025.
This is a time of great danger, but we will meet it. DoD will deliver on the President's charge to achieve Peace Through Strength. There is no time to lose.
Taiwan must get serious on defense
By Elbridge Colby
5/11/2024
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/05/11/2003817679
With each passing day, the threat of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) assault on Taiwan grows. Whatever one’s view about the history, there is essentially no question that a PRC conquest of Taiwan would mark the end of the autonomy and freedom enjoyed by the island’s 23 million people. Simply put, the PRC threat to Taiwan is genuinely existential for a free, democratic and autonomous Taiwan.
Yet one might not know it from looking at Taiwan. For an island facing a threat so acute, lethal and imminent, Taiwan is showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses. This is incredibly dangerous because the fate of Taiwan depends on the military defensibility of the island. It will ultimately be military power that will deter and, if necessary, defeat a PRC invasion of Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will not be stopped by hashtags and good wishes from afar. Yet in August last year [2023], Taiwan announced plans to spend just US$19 billion on defense — a measly 2.5 percent of the island’s GDP. While it is true that Taiwan has made some progress, for instance in adopting an asymmetric approach to its defense, its spending and pace of preparations have been woefully inadequate given the awing scale of China’s military buildup.
Even worse, there are concerns about how serious Taiwan really is about the threat. There are few visible indicators of a society preparing to repel an attack as one might see in, say, Israel. Indeed, Taiwanese leaders often appear more concerned about advertising their concern for the plight of others than about ensuring their own defenses, arguing, for example, that “the defense of Ukraine is also the defense of Taiwan.”
What might be causing Taiwan to be adopting this lackluster approach towards defense? Let’s examine the possibilities to see why they are all deeply unwise and ill-founded.
First, Taiwan may believe that it is already doing enough to protect its people and deter China. But let’s put things in context. China’s official defense budget is about 12 times more than what Taiwan spends. Some US government estimates put China’s actual defense spending at about $700 billion — about three times larger than the official figure. If true, Taiwan may be spending up to 37 times less on defense than the country that is threatening to absorb it by invasion. By these numbers alone, Taiwan’s current defense spending is not just imprudent. It is borderline suicidal.
Nor is Taiwan’s level of spending especially onerous. Americans, by contrast, spend 3.5 percent of their GDP on defense. Poland, which shares a border with Ukraine, spends almost 4 percent. Israel, which faces fewer existential threats than Taiwan, spent 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense in 2022 and well over 5 percent for much of the past two decades. Given the massive disparity in military power in the Taiwan Strait, spending 5 percent of its GDP on defense should be the floor for Taiwan. Indeed, if its security and autonomy are at stake, why not spend 10 percent?
Taiwan’s meager defense spending is doubly problematic because, despite progress in formally adopting an asymmetric strategy, the bulk of the spending still goes to big-ticket items like fighter jets and warships that are expensive and extremely vulnerable to PLA strikes. Taiwan still remains very much behind in the acquisition of asymmetric capabilities that can meaningfully deter and deny a Chinese invasion. The US must do everything in its power to get Taiwan these weapons as quickly as possible. Yet Taiwanese leaders themselves have undermined this effort by urging the US to send key weapons, industrial base attention, and money to Ukraine rather than Taiwan.
Second, Taiwan may be banking on the idea that China will not invade. But there’s a reason that it’s a truism that basing one’s strategy and defense posture on hope is unwise. For an island facing the very realistic prospect of conquest by a far stronger military, it is incredibly reckless — not least because China is very clearly preparing to invade Taiwan.
In case there was any doubt, CIA Director William Burns confirmed last year that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also said that Xi intends to unify Taiwan with China “on a much faster timeline” than previously anticipated. Meanwhile, China continues to develop, at historic speeds, the capabilities that would enable an invasion. Taiwanese defense strategy must be based on a full recognition of these realities, however unpleasant they might be. US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo recently said that “we must be ready now, next week, next month, and in the decades to come” and that China could strike with little warning. Leaders in Taipei must take this message to heart.
Third, Taiwan may be thinking that, regardless of its lackluster defense spending, the US can always be counted on to come to its rescue. It is true that Taiwan is a very important strategic interest to the US. It is not, however, an existential interest. America has a strong interest in defending Taiwan, but Americans could survive without it. Our leaders cannot and realistically will not ask the American people to sacrifice for Taiwan at a cost that would be intolerable to the US. And they are unlikely to ask America’s sons and daughters to fight and give more than the Taiwanese themselves are willing to. It would in fact be immoral to put our troops in harm’s way for Taiwan when Taiwanese leaders haven’t done their part to ensure our doing so would not be reckless and futile.
The fact is that Americans already face a myriad of challenges at home. And after two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans will undoubtedly be skeptical about entering into another costly, bloody war. Taipei must not take America’s commitment for granted but must work hard for it — not as a favor to Americans, but to make it more palatable for America to help defend Taiwan. In sum, Taiwan must dramatically increase its own defense spending, readiness and preparations if it is to stand a chance of deterring, let alone, defeating a Chinese invasion alongside American help.
Further — and crucially — if Taiwan does not get serious about its defense, then even if Americans do want to intervene, it may be a moot point. As Paparo recently testified, Taiwan’s ability to defend itself will have an outsized effect on our collective ability to defeat a Chinese invasion — or deter one in the first place. The opposite is also true. If Taipei fails to invest in the island’s defenses, then there may come a time when Taiwan is simply no longer defensible. At that point, America’s hands will be tied, and we will be forced to prepare to deny China’s hegemonic ambitions after Taiwan falls. To be clear, we very much do not want this outcome, but Taiwan’s lassitude is raising the risks we will be forced to confront this awful choice.
Taiwan is running out of time. It is on a knife’s edge in terms of its defensibility against a determined Chinese assault that Beijing is manifestly preparing for. Taiwan’s task is very challenging yet straightforward. Significantly increase your defense spending. Pursue every conceivable measure to strengthen the island’s defenses against invasion and blockade. Make the case to the world about why the defense of Taiwan is critical rather than engage in triple bank shot posturing about battles half a world away. Demand that production and deliveries of weapons needed for the island’s defense be prioritized over all else. And match your actions and rhetoric with the urgency the moment requires. Taiwan must change before it is too late. It is now or never.
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (As Delivered)
May 31, 2025
“And our common sense approach to achieving security — achieving peace through strength — requires seeing things crystal clearly. It requires confronting obvious truth about the threats we face in the Indo-Pacific. And requires meeting those threats with a very real sense of urgency. -----let me begin by saying, we do not seek conflict with Communist China. We will not instigate nor seek to subjugate or humiliate. ------- But we will not be pushed out of this critical region. And we will not let our allies and partners be subordinated and intimidated. ----China seeks to become a hegemonic power in Asia. No doubt. It hopes to dominate and control too many parts of this vibrant and vital region. Through its massive military build-up and growing willingness to use military force to achieve its goals, including grey zone tactics and hybrid warfare, China has demonstrated that it wants to fundamentally alter the region's status quo. We cannot look away, and we cannot ignore it. China's behavior towards its neighbors and the world is a wake-up call. And an urgent one. -------We are watching very closely China's destabilizing actions. And any unilateral attempt to change the status quo in -----and the First Island Chain by force or coercion is unacceptable. Every day you see it. China's military harasses Taiwan. ------It has to be clear to all that Beijing is credibly preparing to potentially use military force to alter the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. We know. It's public that Xi has ordered his military to be capable of invading Taiwan by 2027. The PLA is building the military needed to do it. Training for it every day. And rehearsing for the real deal. Admiral Paparo has spoken very clearly about this on multiple occasions. Again, to be clear: any attempt by Communist China to conquer Taiwan by force would result in devastating consequences for the Indo-Pacific and the world. There's no reason to sugarcoat it. The threat China poses is real. And it could be imminent. We hope not. But it certainly could be. ------Nobody knows what China will ultimately do, but they are preparing. And therefore we must be ready as well. Urgency and vigilance is our only option at the Department of Defense with our allies, ------ But we must ensure that China cannot dominate us — or our allies and partners. -----President Trump has also said that Communist China will not invade Taiwan on his watch. So, our goal is to prevent war, to make the costs too high, and peace the only option. And we will do this with a strong shield of deterrence, forged together with you – America's great allies and defense partners. ------But if deterrence fails, and if called upon by my Commander in Chief, we are prepared to do what the Department of Defense does best – fight and win — decisively.
[“Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (As Delivered)”;
May 31, 2025;
|
david chou
這幾年來, Old Donald政府 & Old Joe政府做了幾件對台灣人很有利的事
(V)
第五件: 在Old Joe總統擔任美軍統帥時, 他所任命的印太美軍司令平實但有力的發言總能安定台灣人的心. Adm. John C. Aquilino總是說, "If deterrence fails, our job is to fight and win." [(美國對付支那邪惡帝國與北京支共流氓政權在第一島鏈的侵擾與擴張以及對Pax Americana的顛覆與挑戰是採取嚇阻的政策) 若嚇阻失敗, 就要戰勝共軍.]
這對位處第一島鏈的國家或地區的人民[包括台灣人]起到安定與振奮自由民主陣營的人心的作用.
我現在以前印太美軍司令Adm. John C. Aquilino在美國參議院軍事委員會一項聽證會的證詞 [Appendix] 為例, 讓鄉親們看華府與印太軍區美軍為維護台海的和平與秩序以及Pax Americana或美國所建立的Liberal International Order所做的努力.
[to be continued]
David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement
[宣揚台灣建州的主張與理念的一個直播節目預計在十天後開播, 在台中. ]
=========================================
APPENDIX
[節錄] STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL JOHN C. AQUILINO,
U.S. NAVY COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND:
U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND POSTURE
18 APRIL 2023
The men and women of USINDOPACOM work tirelessly every day to prevent conflict in this region, not to provoke it. War is not inevitable. However, this decade presents a period of increased risk as illustrated by Russia’sillegitimate, unprovoked war in Ukraine; the People's Republic of China (PRC)’s nuclear and conventional buildup; the PRC’s malign behavior, including its "No Limits" expanding partnership with Russia; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)’s continued missile provocations and nuclear rhetoric; and the risk of violent extremism. Our National Defense Strategy (NDS) identifies the PRC as the most consequential strategic competitor to the United States and the only competitor capable of combining its economic, diplomatic, military, and technological capabilities to mount a sustained challenge to the rules-based international order.
Seize the Initiative is USINDOPACOM'S approach to implement the NDS and accomplish our defense priorities - defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks, deter aggression, and build a resilient joint force. By design, this approach prevents conflict through integrated deterrence, ensures we can fight and win should deterrence fail, and provides the Secretary of Defense and President with options for any contingency.
Key Adversarial Challenges
As stated in the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy, the Indo-Pacific is the epicenter of 21st century geopolitics. The region features authoritarian regimes using military threats to subvert the existing rules-based international order while seeking to undermine confidence in U.S. commitment to the region. The PRC is taking increasingly coercive actions to reshape the Indo-Pacific region in its favor, supported by a rapidly modernizing People's Liberation Army (PLA) that is executing the largest military buildup since WWII. Russia's irresponsible behavior, exemplified by its illegal, illegitimate invasion of Ukraine, continues to pose an acute threat. The DPRK is increasing its bellicose behavior through development of ballistic missile and nuclear technology threatening the U.S. homeland and placing regional partners at increased risk. Violent extremism also remains a threat in this theater.
People's Republic of China (PRC)
Strategic Intent
The PRC aspires to become the world's leading power in its drive toward "national rejuvenation," to replace the existing international order with a system that benefits authoritarian regimes at the expense of all other nations. Militarily, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has directed the PLA to develop the capability to seize Taiwan by force and surpass the United States as the dominant power in the Pacific. The PRC further seeks a network of overseas military installations and expeditionary capabilities to expand the PLA's ability to project power globally.
The CCP uses all elements of national power to create an international environment favorable to authoritarian regimes that furthers their totalitarian reach. The PRC is implementing a trifecta of global initiatives to reshape international norms for development, trade, and security under the Global Security Initiative (GSI), Global Civilization Initiative (GCI), and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). While each includes deceptively attractive language and concepts, they suffer from lack of specificity, vague implementation plans, and unclear goals allowing for PRC interpretation and enforcement. These initiatives seek to undermine the existing fair and respected international architecture and replace it with a system that encourages repressive, authoritarian governance and protectionist economics that distort markets by avoiding openness and transparency.
CCP representatives exploit, distort, and misrepresent international law for their own benefit and at the expense of all other nations. The CCP is attempting to portray troubling aspects of its own domestic legal framework as globally accepted international law to assert regional dominance. Domestic laws such as the Anti-Secession Law, China Coast Guard Law, Maritime Traffic Safety Law, Civil-Military fusion legislation including the National Defense Transportation Law, and so-called emergency fast-track laws provide the CCP with the domestic legal architecture to advance its ambitions and streamline political decisions under a veneer of international legal legitimacy. The CCP is also engaging in a large-scale campaign to influence media outlets around the world in an effort to advance their narratives while mischaracterizing or obfuscating facts.
Destabilizing Actions
Taiwan
The PRC sees unification with Taiwan as "indispensable for the realization of China's great rejuvenation" and a top priority. To this end, the PRC uses all elements of national power, most notably a mix of military, economic, legal, information, and diplomatic tools, in pursuit of this goal. Beijing publicly claims a preference for peaceful unification over conflict; however, its consistent pressure tactics and coercive behavior demonstrates a significant disconnect between their words and their deeds.
During the CCP's 20th Party Congress, Xi Jinping unequivocally stated China will never renounce the right to use force as a means to achieve unification with Taiwan. Such rhetoric accompanies a concerted effort to develop military capabilities the PRC sees as necessary to seize Taiwan by force.
Implementing Seize the Initiative
Seize the Initiative is USINDOPACOM's approach to defend the nation and deter conflict. If deterrence fails, this approach ensures our forces are prepared to fight and win.
Conclusion
In the last year, the global security environment dramatically changed. The PRC accelerated their whole-of-government assault against the rules-based international order and partnered with Russia to advance their goals. Strategic competition with the United States now encompasses all forms of national power across all domains. We see increasing efforts to drive wedges between the US and like-minded nations in an attempt to dominate the region.
Implementing the NDS in the near, mid, and long-term requires the United States to present a persistent, lethal, and integrated joint force west of the IDL that can deny adversary objectives while simultaneously demonstrating U.S. commitment and resolve to our allies and partners. Seize the Initiative is our approach, in support of the NDS, to deliver combat credible integrated deterrence by building a distributed force posture, improving our joint and combined operational campaign, advancing our warfighting capabilities and enhancing our network of allies and partners. To be successful, we all must execute with a sense of urgency.
I will continue to advocate for the most pressing and pertinent requirements in the near and mid-term, but I cannot emphasize enough the importance of passing timely appropriations. The Department cannot move faster in the current year or adequately plan or execute programming in the FYDP without the resources to initiate new starts or properly sustain required programs. Continuing resolutions(CRs) result in cumulative and detrimental effects on our buying power, which are exacerbated by inflation, and add to the increased levels of operational risk.
Conflict in the INDOPACOM AOR is neither imminent, nor inevitable. Nevertheless, we do not have the luxury of time, we must act now to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific.
david chou
National Security Strategy
of the United States of America
DECEMBER 2017
https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
Introduction
China and Russia challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity. They are determined to make economies less free and less fair, to grow their militaries, and to control information and data to repress their societies and expand their influence.
PILLAR III
Preserve Peace Through Strength
A central continuity in history is the contest for power. The present time period is no different. Three main sets of challengers—the revisionist powers of China and Russia, the rogue states of Iran and North Korea, and transnational threat organizations, particularly jihadist terrorist groups—are actively competing against the United States and our allies and partners.
China and Russia want to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests. China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor. Russia seeks to restore its great power status and establish spheres of influence near its borders. The intentions of both nations are not necessarily fixed. The United States stands ready to cooperate across areas of mutual interest with both countries.
For decades, U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. China gathers and exploits data on an unrivaled scale and spreads features of its authoritarian system, including corruption and the use of surveillance. It is building the most capable and well-funded military in the world, after our own. Its nuclear arsenal is growing and diversifying. Part of China’s military modernization and economic expansion is due to its access to the U.S. innovation economy, including America’s world-class universities.
In addition, after being dismissed as a phenomenon of an earlier century, great power competition returned. China and Russia began to reassert their influence regionally and globally. Today, they are fielding military capabilities designed to deny America access in times of crisis and to contest our ability to operate freely in critical commercial zones during peacetime. In short, they are contesting our geopolitical advantages and trying to change the international order in their favor.
Moreover, deterrence today is significantly more complex to achieve than during the Cold War. Adversaries studied the American way of war and began investing in capabilities that targeted our strengths and sought to exploit perceived weaknesses.
P I L L A R I V
Advance American Influence
Th e United States offers partnership to those who share our aspirations for freedom and prosperity. We lead by example. “The world has its eye upon America," Alexander Hamilton once observed. “Th e noble struggle we have made in the cause of liberty, has occasioned a kind of revolution in human sentiment. The influence of our example has penetrated the gloomy regions of despotism.”
Champion American Values
The extraordinary trajectory of the United States from a group of colonies to a thriving, industrialized, sovereign republic—the world's lone superpower—is a testimony to the strength of the idea on which our Nation is founded, namely that each of our citizens is born free and equal under the law. America’s core principles, enshrined in the Declaration of Independence, are secured by the Bill of Rights, which proclaims our respect for fundamental individual liberties beginning with the freedoms of religion, speech, the press, and assembly. Liberty, free enterprise, equal justice under the law, and the dignity of every human life are central to who we are as a people.
These principles form the foundation of our most enduring alliances, and the United States will continue to champion them. Governments that respect the rights of their citizens remain the best vehicle for prosperity, human happiness, and peace. In contrast, governments that routinely abuse the rights of their citizens do not play constructive roles in the world. For example, governments that fail to treat women equally do not allow their societies to reach their potential.
No nation can unilaterally alleviate all human suffering, but just because we cannot help everyone does not mean that we should stop trying to help anyone. For much of the world, America’s liberties are inspirational, and the United States will always stand with those who seek freedom. We will remain a beacon of liberty and opportunity around the world.
The United States also remains committed to supporting and advancing religious freedom— America’s first freedom. Our Founders understood religious freedom not as the state’s creation, but as the gift of God to every person and a fundamental right for our flourishing society.
And it is part of our culture, as well as in America’s interest, to help those in need and those trying to build a better future for their families. We aid others judiciously, aligning our means to our objectives, but with a firm belief that we can improve the lives of others while establishing conditions for a more secure and prosperous world.
The Strategy in a Regional Context
China and Russia aspire to project power worldwide, but they interact most with their neighbors.
Indo-Pacific
A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.
Although the United States seeks to continue to cooperate with China, China is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda. China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical aspirations. Its efforts to build and militarize outposts in the South China Sea endanger the free flow of trade, threaten the sovereignty of other nations, and undermine regional stability. China has mounted a rapid military modernization campaign designed to limit U.S. access to the region and provide China a freer hand there. China presents its ambitions as mutually beneficial, but Chinese dominance risks diminishing the sovereignty of many states in the Indo-Pacific. States throughout the region are calling for sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response that upholds a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.
Priority Actions
POLITICAL: Our vision for the Indo-Pacific excludes no nation. We will redouble our commitment to established alliances and partnerships, while expanding and deepening relationships with new partners that share respect for sovereignty , fair and reciprocal trade, and the rule of law. We will reinforce our commitment to freedom of the seas and the peaceful resolution of territorial and maritime disputes in accordance with international law. We will work with allies and partners to achieve complete, verifiable, and irreversible denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and preserve the non-proliferation regime in Northeast Asia.
MILITARY AND SECURITY: We will maintain a forward military presence capable of deterring and, if necessary, defeating any adversary. We will strengthen our long-standing military relationships and encourage the development of a strong defense network with our allies and partners. For example, we will cooperate on missile defense with Japan and South Korea to move toward an area defense capability . We remain ready to respond with overwhelming force to North Korean aggression and will improve options to compel denuclearization of the peninsula. We will improve law enforcement, defense, and intelligence cooperation with Southeast Asian partners to address the growing terrorist threat. We will maintain our strong ties with Taiwan in accordance with our “One China” policy, including our commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide for Taiwan’s legitimate defense needs and deter coercion. We will expand our defense and security cooperation with India, a Major Defense Partner of the United States, and support India’s growing relationships throughout the region. We will re-energize our alliances with the Philippines and Thailand and strengthen our partnerships with Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and others to help them become cooperative maritime partners.
https://media.defense.gov/2020/May/18/2002302061/-1/-1/1/2018-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-SUMMARY.PDF
China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power through an all-of-nation long-term strategy, it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future. The most far-reaching objective of this defense strategy is to set the military relationship between our two countries on a path of transparency and non-aggression.
China and Russia are now undermining the international order from within the system by exploiting its benefits while simultaneously undercutting its principles and “rules of the road.”
Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future.
david chou
這幾年來, Old Donald政府 & Old Joe政府做了幾件對台灣人很有利的事 (VII)
第七件: 美國上屆的國會與Old Joe政府合作, 同意給台灣一筆無償軍援, 雖然有些 "右瘋" 共和黨籍參眾議員 [他們多半親Old Donald] 反對, 但還是通過. [Appendix I] 本屆國會 "America First" 或 "MAGA" 派的議員也反對再給台灣無償軍援, 但人數已減少許多. [Appendix II] 比較值得注意的是, 被美國與台美人之中的 "右瘋" 視為 "左瘋" 的國會議員 [特別是眾議院那幾名Progressive Wing的議員] 在上屆的國會中並沒有反對, 在這件事上, 他們的見識把Old Donald的黨羽都比了下去, 不過, 在本屆國會中, 卻有幾名 "左瘋" 跟著 "右瘋" 反對, 還好無償軍援案還是以極懸殊的比例通過.
[本欄今天結束]
David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement
========================
Appendix I
Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024
Roll Call 146 | Bill Number: H. R. 8036
Apr 20, 2024, 01:19 PM | 118th Congress, 2nd Session
Vote Question: On Passage
Indo-Pacific Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2024
Vote Type: Yea-And-Nay
Status: Passed
VOTES
yea: 385
nay: 34
present: 1
Appendix II
Greene knocks Republicans, Democrats after all her defense funding amendments fail
07/18/25 8:44 AM ET
https://thehill.com/homenews/house/5408033-marjorie-taylor-greene-defense-appropriations-amendments/
Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene (R-Ga.) blasted her Republican and Democratic colleagues early Friday after all six of her amendments to the House’s defense appropriations bill failed.
The lower chamber advanced the legislation, which allocates about $832 billion in funding for Department of Defense programs for fiscal 2026 in a vote overnight.
Greene’s amendment to cut funding for the Israeli Cooperative Program — an agreement through which the U.S. provides Israel $500 million for programs for missile defense — was spiked in a 6-422 vote.
The amendment garnered support from GOP Rep. Thomas Massie (Ky.) and a group of progressive Democrats: Reps. Al Green (Texas), Summer Lee (Pa.), Ilhan Omar (Minn.) and Rashida Tlaib (Mich.).
The Georgia Republican’s amendment to bar funds in the bill from being used for assistance to Ukraine was also rejected in a 76-353 vote. All 76 lawmakers who backed the amendment were Republicans.
“Tonight all of my amendments to cut $1.6 billion of foreign aid out of our Defense budget failed because both Republicans and Democrats refuse to stop sending your hard earned tax dollars to foreign countries,” Greene wrote in a post on the social platform X.
“For example, $118 million to foreign countries for disaster relief like floods that haven’t even happened yet,” the lawmaker added. “And $15 million for AIDS education activities for soldiers in Africa. I mean can’t they figure that out by now? And my amendment to stop sending money to Ukraine. Yep that one failed too.”
She warned that the U.S. is “$37 TRILLION in debt and Congress will never ever fix it because they will never ever stop the insane out of control spending that drives inflation up and makes your life unaffordable.”
The House passed the overall defense funding bill in a 221-209 vote. Three Republicans opposed it, while five Democrats joined the rest of the GOP lawmakers in getting the bill over the hump.
The legislation bolsters funding for active, reserve, and National Guard service members by $6.6 billion over the current funding levels. If signed into law, basic pay for military personnel would increase by 3.8 percent starting next year. The bill also secured $174 billion for procurement and $283 billion for operation and maintenance, among other measures.
It marks only the second appropriations bill Republicans have advanced for fiscal 2026, as efforts to pass the now-signed megabill of President Trump’s spending and tax priorities took up much of the party’s focus in recent months.