台灣建州運動要對Doug Bandow的提議給予回應, 但必須提出不公開的對案
david chou
台灣建州運動要對Doug Bandow的提議給予回應, 但必須提出不公開的對案
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Create a Path for Taiwanese to Flee to America
The U.S. should create an immigration “pressure valve” for Taiwanese who want to escape war or life under China.
January 1, 2026 • Commentary
https://www.cato.org/commentary/create-path-taiwanese-flee-america
This article appeared in The Dispatch on January 1, 2026.
Taiwan may be the most dangerous military flashpoint in Asia, and perhaps the world, with conflict possible between the United States and People’s Republic of China. Washington officials debate how best to defend the island state. President Joe Biden four times promised war if China invaded. President Donald Trump recently announced a major new weapons deal for Taipei.
The issue is more than geopolitics. Leading businesses are obsessed with Taiwan’s chip industry, citing semiconductor production in almost every discussion of the island’s future. Beijing, too, understands that chips matter, though its principal concern remains territorial unification.
Economics is a poor reason to go to war, hearkening back to mercantilist times. Indeed, chip factories are unlikely to survive if war were to break out: To Taiwan’s outrage, U.S. officials have advocated that Washington destroy such facilities if Beijing succeeds in conquering the island.
However, there is another reason not to fixate on the buildings where wafers are etched or the land upon which factories sit. Taiwan’s real asset is its people: engineers, operators, managers, and entrepreneurs who possess the dense web of skills, beliefs, and habits that power this complex industry. Land can be acquired. Buildings can be constructed. Machines can be copied.
It is harder to replicate the larger system, based on human capital and institutions, that makes them productive. The core point, made by Nobel laureate economist Paul Romer, is that growth comes from ideas. Unlike land, ideas can be used by many people at once. Develop a better production process or superior supply chain, and these practices can be applied repeatedly at low marginal cost. Indeed, economist Julian Simon termed people “the ultimate resource.” It is human ingenuity that determines how to use resources, overcoming scarcity by finding efficiencies and substitutes. Hence, more capable people in a free economy means more solutions and higher living standards.
That in turn yields a policy option underused by Washington. Since Taiwan’s most important value is human capital, the United States should target that resource as something to protect and, if necessary, relocate. That idea sounds novel only because Washington is stuck in a binary: deter or concede by force. The U.S. should create an immigration “pressure valve” for Taiwanese who want to escape war or life under China. Done at scale, it would enrich the U.S., reduce the likelihood of panic in Taiwan in a crisis, and lower the odds of a great power confrontation spiraling into a nuclear disaster.
Whether to defend Taiwan militarily is a vital but separate question, one warranting serious debate. Whatever the answer, policymakers should broaden the menu of peaceful choices and reduce hostage dynamics.
Start with the human stakes. Taiwan is a free society. In a blockade or an invasion, the Taiwanese people would face a grim choice between submission and war, and any large movement of people would likely be improvised under threat. The results could range between vastly inadequate and wholly disastrous—imagine a panicked, Kabul-style onrush from the entire country. In contrast, a standing, legal pathway to move to the United States would provide individuals and families with an option other than a last-minute stampede.
Moreover, consider the economic gains for America. Taiwanese engineers and managers possess tacit knowledge—the “how” that is difficult to record but crucial in advanced manufacturing. They would bring networks connecting design, tooling, materials, packaging, and equipment. Increasing the community of skilled people would generate more ideas, turning the latter into greater and improved output. If the U.S. wants advanced chip capacity, it needs fabrication plants, power, water, and permits. It also needs people who know how to run those fabs at high yield. Enhanced immigration would directly ease that constraint.
There is also a strategic payoff. Military risks, and especially nuclear dangers, rise when leaders believe they face a “now or never” moment and when opponents have no safe off-ramp. An immigration option would reduce this perceived policy trap. If a meaningful share of the know-how and talent embedded in Taiwan’s semiconductor ecosystem could relocate over time, the stakes of any single crisis would fall. The geopolitical cliff edge would remain but become less steep.
Giving Taiwanese an escape option might also moderate Beijing’s incentives. Its fixation on “reunification” treats land as the prize. But if the people who generate much of Taiwan’s strategic value could leave, coercion would become less rewarding. Even the threat of war would become less effective if the “asset” were no longer fully captive to geography.
What would such a policy look like? Create the Taiwan Freedom Visa program. Offer an expedited path to U.S. residency for all Taiwanese citizens with clean background checks who wish to live in freedom. Take practical steps to make relocation productive, such as credential recognition. Include extended families, which makes people more likely to move and stay. Above all, design a program large enough to matter and create real optionality.
The objections are predictable. Some would warn of a Taiwanese “brain drain.” But the premise is contingency. The island is already under threat. Creating legal pathways would not force anyone to leave. It would simply give them a choice. Others would fear moral hazard: If Taiwanese can leave, Washington would care less about the island’s security. That would be a choice, not a law of nature. The U.S. could, if it desired, pursue both deterrence and refuge, though a decision to risk war with China should not be taken lightly. Beijing would call such a policy a provocation, but China calls many things a provocation, including Taiwanese elections. Washington should not grant authoritarian Beijing a veto over the immigrants America accepts.
Romer taught that ideas drive growth and policy can accelerate idea creation. Simon taught that people are the ultimate resource and solve problems. Taiwan is proof of both. The United States already understands that chips matter. It should now recognize that the most valuable element of “chip-making” is the people involved. To reduce the chance that a dispute over Taiwan ends in catastrophe, Washington should expand its peaceful options. An immigration pressure valve for Taiwanese is one. It would help Americans and Taiwanese, while lowering the odds of a crisis, especially one that turns into a nuclear nightmare.
About the Authors
Doug Bandow
david chou
台灣建州運動要對Doug Bandow的提議給予回應, 但必須提出不公開的對案(II)
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John J. TKacik談的與Doug Bandow談的都是高度敏感的議題, 容易引起鄉親與民眾的恐慌, 但又不能不談, 這分寸真難拿捏. 為我台灣族人的命運.前途.利益著想與籌謀的 "台灣建州運動" 總會從最糟的情況出發, 給台灣人提出最好的建議. 但有些事太敏感, 無法公開談論, 只能在檯面下談論或操作, 但由於建州派沒有執政, 也缺乏資源, 所以我們的影響與起到的作用十分有限.
"Mr. Elbridge Colby, now the Pentagon’s top policy secretary, posited in his 2021 book of the same name that a “strategy of denial” is key to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait.------ Mr. Colby’s vision, however, addressed only the military dimensions of “denial. The political dimension is equally important."
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John這次大膽提出 "First, that the ROC Taiwan government have a “continuity of government” evacuation blueprint in place." 這項建議, 這個建議必然會遭到境內外敵對勢力的阻礙.
很巧, 我在兩個月前, 就分別與兩位人士對此高度敏感的議題進行探討, 他們其實對這個議題都沒有概念, 因此, 都是我在談, 從法律與政治兩個角度切入.
星期專論》拒止：台海戰爭與台灣獨立
譚慎格（John J. Tkacik）
2026/03/22 05:30
John J. Tkacik, Jr. On Taiwan: ‘Denial: War in the Strait and Taiwan Independence’
John J. Tkacik, Jr.
Taipei Times
Mon, Mar 23, 2026 page 8
China’s supreme objective in a war across the Taiwan Strait is to incorporate Taiwan as a province of the People’s Republic. It follows, therefore, that international recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence is a consummation that China’s leaders devoutly wish to avoid. By the same token, an American strategy to deny China that objective would complicate Beijing’s calculus and deter large-scale hostilities. For decades, China has cautioned “independence means war.” The opposite is also true: “war means independence.” A comprehensive strategy of denial would guarantee an outcome of de jure independence for Taiwan in the event of Chinese invasion or occupation, even if it is only diplomatic recognition of a captive nation.
One might object that, goodness gracious, once the People’s Liberation Army invades and subdues Taiwan, a fat lot of good “de jure independence” is going to do. To be sure, should the People’s Liberation Army occupy Taiwan, its first order of business will be to dismantle the ROC Taiwan civil government and establish a puppet regime subordinate to the Chinese Communist Party. But at the very least, American diplomatic recognition of an independent Taiwan state immediately upon the commencement of hostilities would bolster Taiwan’s morale and deepen a sense of national identity, factors that have proven to be dramatic force multipliers in Ukraine and Israel.
Mr. Elbridge Colby, now the Pentagon’s top policy secretary, posited in his 2021 book of the same name that a “strategy of denial” is key to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Five years ago, he believed “denial” was achievable with “rock-solid” defenses on Taiwan combined with credible external military assistance to defend Taiwan. Mr. Colby’s vision, however, addressed only the military dimensions of “denial.” The political dimension is equally important. Any strategy to deter Chinese military aggression must include a capacity to prevent China from thwarting Taiwan independence after hostilities erupt.
This requires three things:
First, that the ROC Taiwan government have a “continuity of government” evacuation blueprint in place. Beyond the morale factor of maintaining coherent government in a nation under siege, an “independent Taiwan” can continue to exist as a legally recognized entity beyond China’s reach. Either the existing “Republic of China” 1) will itself partially relocate to safety abroad, say, in Japan or the United States or some safe haven, to carry on international relations, or 2) will have designated some successor governing authority already in situ overseas, like the Taiwan Representative office in Washington, D.C. The necessity for the ROC Taiwan to have “continuity of government” is clear in the US’ “Taiwan Relations Act.” Trillions of dollars are in jeopardy otherwise. “Taiwan” maintains “ownership of, and other rights to, and interests in,” hundreds of billions if not trillions of US dollars in “properties, tangible and intangible, and other things of value” overseas. That is, bank accounts, foreign exchange reserves, government, military and naval properties, real estate, financial assets and the like. These are all reserved to the ROC (Taiwan) government regardless of China’s invasion or occupation.
If it hasn’t already, Taiwan should incorporate into its own “Multi-domain Denial, Resilient Defense” strategic plan something akin to Singapore’s “Total Defense” concept of ensuring continuity of government in exile should the homeland be invaded and occupied. It is of existential urgency that the ROC Taiwan government prepare to relocate to safety. Likewise, Taiwan’s keystone commercial, industrial, technology, insurance and financial institutions should have similar contingency plans, especially those international legal persons whose licensing and charters are established under Taiwanese law.
This may be the most difficult to achieve. The ROC is a constitutional democracy with a robust opposition. Alas, reaching consensus on “continuity of government” prior to actual hostilities is problematic. Ukraine’s people were divided between Ukrainian and Russian speakers even after the 2013 “Maidan Demonstrations” ousted a corrupt pro-Putin government. While Taiwan’s population is not so deeply divided, the March-April 2014 “Sunflower Movement” exposed similar cleavages in sentiment toward China. In 2026, Taiwan still cannot reach a consensus on the nation’s defenses. The goal of a multi-party government-in-exile that could function overseas in the absence of democratic elections, as its legitimating instrument may be elusive.
Second, there must be coordination with safe-haven countries to recognize and secure the ROC authorities’ continued operation in exile. This seems already under way. Taiwan has reached significant trade and investment agreements with the United States and several other countries, and I suspect that these have facilitated mutual understandings on serving as a safe haven.
Third, safe-haven states must commit to formal recognition of Taiwan’s independence once hostilities begin. The United States, at least, has a solid statutory foundation for immediate recognition of Taiwan’s independence. Under US law, Taiwan’s legal status as a “foreign country, nation, state, government, or similar entity” is already established. Indeed, ever since 1979, US law has defined “Taiwan” as “the governing authorities on Taiwan recognized by the United States as the Republic of China prior to January 1, 1979, and any successor governing authorities.” So, whatever occupation authority the People’s Republic inflicts on Taiwan, that regime cannot, under US law, be recognized as a “successor” to “the authorities recognized by the US as the ‘Republic of China’ prior to January 1, 1979.”
In any event, with a continuity-of-government structure abroad, Taiwan independence will live on after any cross-Strait conflict, and international sentiment is likely to be very sympathetic.
Some will fret that US President Donald Trump is a deal-maker, not a diplomat, and he is temperamentally unsuited to confronting Chinese Chairman Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan Strait security in his summit with Xi next week. But in the spirit of “hear his words, observe his actions” (聽其言觀其行), Mr. Trump’s conspicuous reticence on Taiwan Strait security has been matched by his quiet display of genuine support for Taiwan’s security. His December 17th approvals of US$11.1 billion in new defense systems for Taiwan were the largest package of Taiwan arms sales approvals ever. And we hear that a bigger package is in the pipeline. This is unsurprising, given that the United States has more to lose than China has to gain from hostilities across the Strait.
There are obvious reasons for the Trump Administration’s fondness of Taiwan. Taiwan is now America’s fourth-largest trading partner (after Mexico, Canada and China). In its National Security Strategy issued four months ago (December 4, 2025), the White House acknowledged that “there is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan” in America’s strategic posture “because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production” — an understatement, to say the least. The White House’s “Strategy” explained that Taiwan is also crucial to American security, “mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters.” “Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan” is an American “priority.”
Presumably, all this National Security Strategy talk of “island chains” and “distinct theaters” assumes that China is the preeminent adversary. Hence, preserving Taiwan’s de facto independence from China is the real “priority” described by the White House NSS paper.
As Mr. Colby wisely counsels, denial is the most effective strategy “to deter and prevent large-scale military conflict.” If China is convinced that the likeliest outcome of Taiwan hostilities would be American recognition of Taiwan’s de jure independence — the outcome it most wants to avoid — it would be a real strategy of denial.
John J. Tkacik, Jr. is a retired US foreign service officer who has served in Taipei and Beijing and is now director of the Future Asia Project at the International Assessment and Strategy Center. He is also on the Advisory Board of the Global Taiwan Institute.