美國國安事務界的Elites已警覺到老川正在給台灣帶來深不可測的凶險, 已開始展開拯救台灣的行動, 老川會聽他們的忠告嗎?
david chou
美國國安事務界的Elites已警覺到老川正在給台灣帶來深不可測的凶險, 已開始展開拯救台灣的行動, 老川會聽他們的忠告嗎? (I)
1
American policymakers should recognize China’s strategy for what it is and stop giving ground on U.S. commitments to Taiwan—because for now, Xi is moving closer to the success he wants.
A worst-case scenario becomes more likely if China succeeds in its attempts to establish new norms for how the United States approaches Taiwan. But Washington can still disrupt Beijing’s strategy and undo the damage from Trump’s comments on Taiwan and his decision to pause arms sales. The first task is to approve the arms package. Xi may respond by canceling his September visit to Washington, but that would be a price well worth paying if he comes away understanding that Taiwan is not his for the taking.
To ease the doubts about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan that Trump has sown will require more than new arms sales, however. The Trump administration needs to take further action to deter Chinese aggression, such as by helping Taiwan develop its domestic defense industry through joint ventures and technology transfers. Taiwan needs to invest now to ensure that it can quickly scale up production during a crisis, when resupplying the island will be enormously difficult. It needs U.S. help to do so.
Just as important, Washington should send a strong signal that it is committed to Taiwan’s protection and expects its partners to contribute to a U.S.-led defense. President Joe Biden made such a public commitment on four separate occasions, endorsing what we termed “strategic clarity” in Foreign Affairs in 2020. Although senior officials unfortunately walked back the president’s comments, what is notable is that Biden’s statements did not spark a crisis in U.S. relations with China. On the contrary, they might well have discouraged Beijing from testing U.S. Will.
Making such a commitment credible today requires that the United States maintain sufficient military power in the region and that its forces are positioned to respond in a Taiwan contingency. It also requires that Washington push back against China’s attempts to assert its jurisdiction over Taiwan, such as by pursuing greater cooperation with Taiwan’s coast guard.
The United States has deterred Chinese aggression against Taiwan for decades and can continue to do so.
2
老川會聽他們兩位的忠告嗎? 我看機會不大, 若要奇蹟出現, 有賴耶和華intervenes.
我建議我的台美與台灣鄉親們, 好好閱讀Richard & David的全文 [Appendix I], 讀完之後, 再讀他們兩位合撰的 "American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous".
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
Appendix I
Taiwan Without Fighting: The Cost of Trump’s Equivocation
Richard Haass and David Sacks
June 22, 2026
RICHARD HAASS is President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, Senior Counselor at Centerview Partners, and the author of a weekly Substack newsletter, Home & Away.
DAVID SACKS is Fellow for Asia Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the forthcoming book The Realist: Hans Morgenthau and the Purpose of American Power.
The governments of the United States and China both assert that theirs is the most important bilateral relationship in the world. They also agree that the likeliest trigger for an armed conflict between them is Taiwan. In theory, then, it should come as a relief that U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping discussed Taiwan at length in Beijing last month and that the leaders emerged with a better understanding of each other’s positions.
Yet the U.S.-Chinese summit was anything but reassuring. Rather, it represented Xi’s opening move in what will be a sustained effort to get the Trump administration to distance itself from Taiwan. Trump’s visit had barely begun when China released a statement that shared a warning Xi had imparted to Trump: if Taiwan “is handled properly, the bilateral relationship will enjoy overall stability,” but if it is not, “the two countries will have clashes and even conflicts, putting the entire relationship in great jeopardy.”
Xi intends to change what it means for Taiwan to be “handled properly” by the United States. Like his predecessors, Xi believes preventing Taiwan’s permanent separation is a core national interest and views its continued autonomy as evidence that China’s civil war remains unfinished. Unlike his predecessors, however, Xi appears to consider it essential to his legacy that he make tangible progress toward bringing Taiwan under China’s authority. At the beginning of his tenure, in 2013, Xi noted that the Taiwan question cannot continue to be passed on from generation to generation. He has since asserted that gaining control of Taiwan is central to China’s rejuvenation, a task that must be fulfilled by 2049, a century after the founding of the People’s Republic of China.
Although Xi has instructed his military to be ready to take Taiwan by 2027, his preference is to gain control of the island without firing a shot. Going to war, even against a weaker foe, is always hazardous, as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the United States’ military campaign against Iran make clear. If Xi invaded Taiwan and ended up in a protracted conflict, he would risk his power and legitimacy. And Xi knows that using force against Taiwan would come at the expense of economic development because the United States and its allies would, at the very minimum, respond by cutting China off from advanced technology and imposing crippling economic and financial sanctions.
Xi seems to have concluded that the surest path to securing control of Taiwan without a war runs through Trump, who has frequently criticized Taiwan and questioned the wisdom of defending the island. Xi’s influence was apparent in the days after the May summit, as Trump borrowed rhetoric from Beijing in statements about Taiwanese domestic politics and paused a pending arms sale to Taipei. Trump then repeated his claim that Taiwan stole the U.S. chip industry and said he did not want the United States to fight a war over Taiwan 9,500 miles away. His administration got the message. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth subsequently failed to mention Taiwan in his speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, the first time a U.S. defense secretary omitted Taiwan from such a speech in a decade.
What is motivating Trump’s comments and his dismissal of decades of U.S. policy on arms sales to Taiwan is unclear. It might be a belief that this is the best path to de-escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait and avoiding an armed conflict. It could also reflect a conclusion that reducing support for Taiwan is a price worth paying for improved commercial access to China or a broader détente with Beijing.
The objective of China’s leader is far clearer. Xi is seeking to redefine what is considered normal in the United States’ approach to Taiwan. If China can bring about changes in U.S. policy that strengthen doubts regarding Washington’s reliability, doubts that have already gained ground because of the Trump administration’s general skepticism toward allies, many in Taiwan may conclude that they have no choice but to seek an accommodation on Beijing’s terms. Such a development would raise alarm throughout the region. U.S. allies would come to question the wisdom of putting their security in Washington’s hands, leading to a decisive shift in the balance of power in Beijing’s favor. American policymakers should recognize China’s strategy for what it is and stop giving ground on U.S. commitments to Taiwan—because for now, Xi is moving closer to the success he wants.
A NEW NORMAL
At the May summit in Beijing, Xi appeared to put two steps of his plan in motion. The first was to convince Trump that Taiwan is pursuing formal independence and that unless Washington reins in Taipei, such a move risks triggering a cycle of escalation that could lead to a U.S.-Chinese war. Xi’s words had the desired effect. In an interview with Fox News after the summit, Trump said that Taiwan has “somebody there now that wants to go independent” and that Taiwan’s leaders “want to get into a war and they figure they have the United States behind them.” Such statements are at odds with reality: Taiwan’s ruling Democratic Progressive Party is not pursuing independence and has responded with restraint to Chinese military provocations.
The next step, and a matter of more immediate concern, was to ensure that Trump did not approve a pending $14 billion arms package to Taiwan. Here, too, Xi made headway. Trump commented in the same interview that he was holding the arms package “in abeyance” and that he considered it a “very good negotiating chip.” Trump told reporters during the flight home from Beijing that he and Xi discussed arms sales “in great detail”—in contravention of a long-standing U.S. policy not to consult China on arms sales to Taiwan. The first Trump administration had reaffirmed that commitment, but now the president dismissed it when asked about it on the plane.
Even if the arms package moves forward in the end, the delay will have paid dividends for Beijing. China is less concerned about the delivery of specific weapons to Taiwan, especially given that the arms under review would not arrive on the island until years after the sale was approved. Rather, the intent behind getting Trump to withhold approval was to set a precedent that Washington would consult with Beijing on future arms sales and to sow doubts about the United States’ reliability, thereby undermining Taiwan’s resolve to defend itself and encouraging pro-Chinese politics on the island.
The U.S.-Chinese summit was anything but reassuring.
And now that Xi sees that Trump is willing to renegotiate decades-old elements of U.S. policy toward Taiwan, he will continue to press for concessions. He might, for instance, urge Trump to explicitly endorse Beijing’s view that Taiwan is a part of China, which would represent a fundamental shift in U.S. policy and undercut Taiwan’s international standing. Xi could press Washington to downgrade its security cooperation with Taiwan and even with Australia and the Philippines, which would further undermine deterrence. He could coax Trump to tell Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to refrain from playing a role in cross-strait matters.
China is attempting to set new norms around how the United States handles Taiwan. By drawing Trump into making statements and taking actions that his predecessors have not, Xi is establishing a new baseline to which he will hold Trump and his successors if they want to have productive relations with Beijing in other areas. China could demand that future U.S. presidents issue similar warnings to Taiwanese leaders about independence and consult Beijing on arms sales as a cost of doing business. If future administrations decline to do so, China could use their refusal as a pretext for increasing its coercion of Taiwan and taking punitive actions against the United States. Call it linkage, Chinese-style.
In the meantime, Beijing is increasing its pressure on Taiwan. A few weeks after Xi’s summit with Trump, China launched what it called a “special maritime law enforcement operation” off Taiwan’s east coast in which its coast guard interfered with commercial shipping. The Chinese coast guard also entered prohibited waters near an island Taiwan controls in the South China Sea. With these two unprecedented actions, Beijing is aiming to assert its jurisdiction over Taiwan’s waters and set the foundation for a future quarantine of the island.
THINGS FALL APART
The concessions Xi is pushing Trump to make are designed to raise doubts about U.S. commitments to Taiwan, which in turn serves China’s goals of drawing Taiwan further into its orbit and weakening the United States’ regional alliance network. Most immediately, the damage to U.S. credibility threatens to undo important progress Taiwan has made in boosting its defenses. Taiwan’s defense budget has doubled in nominal terms over the last decade, now standing at 3.3 percent of GDP, and Taiwan is aiming for five percent of GDP by the end of the decade—the level of spending the Trump administration has demanded that NATO allies reach by 2035. In May, Taiwan’s legislature approved a $25 billion special defense budget to procure critical capabilities from the United States, such as air defense interceptors, surface-to-air missiles, and antitank and antiarmor missiles.
But if Taiwan can no longer trust that the United States will help it bolster its defenses through arms sales and potentially intervene on its behalf, Taiwanese politicians will have a harder time making the case that further spending will do much to help Taiwan deter or fight off a Chinese attack. According to a 2026 survey conducted in Taiwan, only 34 percent of respondents agreed that the United States “is a credible country.” This number had already declined by more than ten percentage points in the last five years, and Trump’s comments and vacillation on the arms sale could make it dip further. As confidence in Washington’s protection erodes, skeptical politicians will grow even more reluctant to fund defense budgets they consider ineffective. The argument for more accommodation of China will in turn gain traction. Beijing hopes to exploit this opening to push the opposition Kuomintang in a more overtly pro-Chinese direction and return a refashioned KMT to power in 2028.
Xi’s preference is to gain control of Taiwan without firing a shot.
The consequences of a reduction in U.S. support for Taiwan will not stop there. U.S. policy toward Taiwan is seen throughout the Indo-Pacific as a critical indicator of the strength of U.S. commitments. If Washington is willing to negotiate away its support for Taipei, other countries in the region will conclude that they can no longer count on the United States to ensure their security. Countries such as Japan and South Korea might embark on larger military buildups, contemplate acquiring nuclear weapons, and pursue a more autonomous foreign policy that does not necessarily align with U.S. interests. Most countries, however, would conclude that they had little choice but to accommodate Beijing’s preferences.
Either way, the alliance network that anchors the U.S. position in Asia and that remains Washington’s central advantage over Beijing would be severely damaged. Chinese influence would increase, potentially enabling Beijing to constrict U.S. trade and investment relationships in the region. The United States, facing a bolder China and without strong alliances to support it, would have to spend even more on defense to ensure its security.
Crucially, a perceived decline in U.S. support for Taiwan would make it harder for other countries to take steps to strengthen deterrence, further destabilizing the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the United States has made significant progress in making Taiwan’s fate a matter of international concern. Bilateral statements with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, the United Kingdom, and the European Union, as well as multilateral statements from the G-7, have highlighted the importance of preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. Washington has encouraged its allies and partners to deepen their cooperation with Taiwan and consider how they would contribute in the event of a conflict. These countries’ willingness to risk Beijing’s wrath depends on the assurance of Washington’s backing. If the United States downgrades its own commitments to Taiwan, they will reassess theirs, too.
REGAINING BALANCE
The United States has good reasons not to let China drive a wedge between Washington and Taipei. From a military perspective, Taiwan occupies a critical position along the first island chain, which stretches from Japan through Taiwan and the Philippines. If China were to gain control of Taiwan, it would have a much easier time projecting power in the Pacific Ocean and threatening U.S. territory, and the United States would struggle to defend its treaty allies, above all Japan and the Philippines, from Chinese aggression. China would be able to control the sea-lanes that Japan relies on for energy and food, giving Beijing inordinate leverage over Tokyo. And after Russia’s invasion and attempted conquest of Ukraine, a Chinese attack that resulted in the annexation of Taiwan would further weaken the global norm against changing the status quo by force. More countries would be emboldened to pursue revanchist claims, resulting in a world of even greater chaos.
Allowing Taiwan to fall under Chinese control would also be a devastating blow for liberal democracy. The Taiwanese people have built one of Asia’s strongest democracies despite facing an existential threat from a far more powerful authoritarian neighbor and operating largely in isolation from other countries. Taiwan stands as an example to China’s citizens that a majority ethnic Chinese society can thrive as a democracy. Extinguishing it would have a chilling effect on democratic aspirations not just in the region but around the world.
A conflict over Taiwan would be economically devastating, too. According to Bloomberg, such a war would shave $10 trillion off global output, a shock greater than the COVID-19 pandemic. This is largely because Taiwan produces the vast majority of the world’s most advanced semiconductors, which are needed for everything from smartphones to computers, weapons, and artificial intelligence servers. But chip production is not all that makes Taiwan central to the global economy. The entire AI supply chain runs through Taiwan and is supported by an ecosystem of hundreds of Taiwanese companies. Because of this, Taiwan is now the United States’ fourth-largest trading partner; the United States imports more from Taiwan than it does from China. Although Washington is seeking to reshore semiconductor production, Taiwan will be a crucial economic partner for the foreseeable future. The most advanced chips produced in the United States today still need to be shipped to Taiwan for post-processing. Even if reshoring is wildly successful, the bulk of the world’s most advanced chips will be produced in Taiwan for many years to come.
A worst-case scenario becomes more likely if China succeeds in its attempts to establish new norms for how the United States approaches Taiwan. But Washington can still disrupt Beijing’s strategy and undo the damage from Trump’s comments on Taiwan and his decision to pause arms sales. The first task is to approve the arms package. Xi may respond by canceling his September visit to Washington, but that would be a price well worth paying if he comes away understanding that Taiwan is not his for the taking.
To ease the doubts about the U.S. commitment to Taiwan that Trump has sown will require more than new arms sales, however. The Trump administration needs to take further action to deter Chinese aggression, such as by helping Taiwan develop its domestic defense industry through joint ventures and technology transfers. Taiwan needs to invest now to ensure that it can quickly scale up production during a crisis, when resupplying the island will be enormously difficult. It needs U.S. help to do so.
Just as important, Washington should send a strong signal that it is committed to Taiwan’s protection and expects its partners to contribute to a U.S.-led defense. President Joe Biden made such a public commitment on four separate occasions, endorsing what we termed “strategic clarity” in Foreign Affairs in 2020. Although senior officials unfortunately walked back the president’s comments, what is notable is that Biden’s statements did not spark a crisis in U.S. relations with China. On the contrary, they might well have discouraged Beijing from testing U.S. will.
Making such a commitment credible today requires that the United States maintain sufficient military power in the region and that its forces are positioned to respond in a Taiwan contingency. It also requires that Washington push back against China’s attempts to assert its jurisdiction over Taiwan, such as by pursuing greater cooperation with Taiwan’s coast guard.
At the same time, the United States should make clear to China that it is not looking for a confrontation. It should reassure Beijing that Washington does not support Taiwan’s independence, that it continues to adhere to its “one China” policy, and that it would support any resolution of cross-strait differences that enjoys the consent of the Taiwanese people.
The United States has deterred Chinese aggression against Taiwan for decades and can continue to do so. The difficulty China’s military faces in launching an amphibious invasion, Taiwan’s defensive advantages, the United States’ upper hand in undersea warfare, and the combined power of allied forces all work in Washington’s favor—as long as the United States is seen as trustworthy by its partners, especially Taiwan and Japan.
But now, Washington must also hold off another line of attack from Beijing. An increasingly powerful, confident, and assertive China is attempting to squeeze Taiwan by persuading Washington to back away from Taipei one step at a time, beginning with delaying or canceling proposed arms sales. It is up to the Trump administration to stop playing into Xi’s hands—and to recognize that the surest way to prevent a conflict in the Taiwan Strait or a costly Chinese takeover of the island is to leave Beijing in no doubt about the United States’ commitment to Taiwan.
Recommended
American Support for Taiwan Must Be Unambiguous
To Keep the Peace, Make Clear to China That Force Won’t Stand
|
Why China Waits
Beijing Is Playing a Long Game on Taiwan
Amanda Hsiao and Bonnie S. Glaser
America and China at the Edge of Ruin
A Last Chance to Step Back From the Brink
David M. Lampton and Wang Jisi
Asia After America
How U.S. Strategy Failed—and Ceded the Advantage to China
The Real Threat to Taiwan
America Is Preparing for the Wrong Kind of Crisis
Taiwan Doesn’t Have to Choose
Cross-Strait Peace Requires Working With Both Beijing and Washington
Appendix II
陸或可不開火奪台? 學者揭川普動搖對台立場的代價
中時新聞網劉詠樂 的故事
https://www.chinatimes.com/realtimenews/20260622002389-260408?chdtv
美國學者指出，5月的川習會絲毫未能讓人安心，相反地，這代表大陸國家主席習近平在推動川普政府與台灣，保持距離這項長期努力中，所採取的第一步。他們認為，習近平意圖改變美國對於「妥善處理」台灣議題的定義。
美國對外關係委員會主席哈斯（Richard Haass）、亞洲研究員石可為（David Sacks）的文章，22日於《外交事務》網站上線。他們提到，習近平深知發動戰爭風險巨大，且可能導致美國及其盟友實施嚴厲的科技禁運與經濟金融制裁，進而衝擊大陸的經濟發展。
因此，習似乎已得出結論：不戰而勝、確保控制台灣的最可靠途徑，是藉助川普。川普多次批評台灣並質疑保衛台灣的價值。在峰會後，川普不僅引用北京的措辭抨擊台灣的政治動向，更暫停了一項對台軍售案，甚至稱台灣「竊取了美國晶片產業」。隨後，戰爭部長赫格塞斯在香格里拉對話中，更是成為十年來首位未在演說中，提及台灣的美國國防部長。
文章指出，習正試圖重新定義美國對台政策的「正常」標準。若大陸能促使美國改變政策，加劇人們質疑華府可靠性，那麼許多台灣民眾或許會認為，他們別無選擇，只能接受北京提出的條件。這樣的事態發展，將在整個地區引發警覺。美國盟友會開始質疑，將自身安全託付給華盛頓是否明智，從而導致力量平衡發生決定性的轉變、向北京傾斜。美國決策者應認清大陸的戰略，停止在對台承諾上做出讓步，因為就目前而言，習正朝著他想要的目標邁進。
川習會上，習似乎啟動他計畫中的2個步驟。透過將台灣描繪為追求法理獨立的挑釁者，習成功影響了川普的言論。下一步，也是更為迫切的一步，是確保川普不會批准一項價值140億美元的對台軍售計畫。
作者們認為，大陸不太關心具體武器是否運抵台灣，尤其考慮到這些武器，在軍售獲批數年後才會抵台。就算軍售案最終得以落實，但大陸也已成功開創「美國對台軍售需先諮詢北京」的先例，這將動搖台灣的防衛意志、散播疑美論，並助長台灣的親中勢力。
如今，習看到川普願重新談判美國對台政策中，一些沿用數十年的條款，他將繼續施壓，要求美國讓步。例如，他可能會敦促川普，明確支持北京關於「台灣是中國一部分」的觀點，這將標誌著美國對台政策的根本性轉變，並削弱台灣的國際地位。習可能敦促華府降低與台灣，乃至澳洲和菲律賓的安全合作級別，這將進一步削弱嚇阻力。他可能會勸說川普，指示日本首相高市早苗不要介入兩岸事務。
大陸正試圖為美國如何處理台灣問題，設定新的規範。透過引導川普發表前任未曾發表的聲明，並採取其前任未曾採取的行動，習正建立一個新底線，若川普及其繼任者希望在其他領域，與北京建立富有成效的關係，就須遵守這一底線。
大陸可能會要求未來的美國總統，向台灣領導人發出類似的獨立警告，並要求其在對台軍售中與北京協商，作為開展貿易的必要條件。如果未來的美國政府拒絕這樣做，大陸可能會以此為藉口，加強對台灣的脅迫力度，並對美國採取懲罰性措施。這可以稱為中國式的「連動」。
文章指出，美國對台政策的動搖，可能會使台灣在提升自身防禦能力方面，取得的重要進展付諸東流。2026 年民調顯示，僅34％ 台灣受訪者認為，美國是一個「可靠的國家」，此數據呈下降趨勢。
美國減少對台支持的後果遠不止於此。印太地區的盟友（如日、韓、菲），將被迫重新評估其國家安全策略。這可能導致區域軍備競賽，甚至促使部分國家追求核武，或轉向迎合北京的意願。
再來，台灣位處第一島鏈關鍵節點，若落入大陸控制，將直接威脅美國在太平洋的兵力投射能力及盟友安全。此外，台灣在全球先進晶片供應鏈中不可替代的地位，意味著一旦爆發衝突，全球經濟將面臨高達 10 兆美元的損失。
文章指出，華盛頓應認清大陸的策略，停止在對台承諾上退讓。要扭轉頹勢，美國首先必須核准對台軍售，習近平可能會因此取消原定於9月的訪美行程，但如果他最終明白台灣並非任其宰割，那麼這個代價也是值得的。此外，美方應協助台灣提升自主防衛產業，並透過維持強大的區域軍事存在，讓北京了解侵台的成本遠高於利益。
再來，華府應發出強烈訊號，表明其致力於保護台灣。；明確向北京傳達，華盛頓無意尋求對抗，堅持「一個中國」政策，並支持由台灣人民意志所決定的兩岸方案。但同時，也必須讓北京明白，美國對維護台海和平的承諾不容挑戰。
但如今，華府還須抵禦來自北京的另一波攻勢。一個日益強大、自信且強勢的大陸，正試圖透過說服華府逐步疏遠台北，首先是延遲或取消擬議中的軍售，來對台施壓。川普政府須認識到，要防止台海衝突，或避免大陸以高昂代價武力接管台灣，最可靠的方法就是，讓北京方面毫無疑問地確信，美國對台灣的承諾。
david chou
美國國安事務界的Elites已警覺到老川正在給台灣帶來深不可測的凶險, 已開始展開拯救台灣的行動, 老川會聽他們的忠告嗎? (II)
david chou
美國國安事務界的Elites已警覺到老川正在給台灣帶來深不可測的凶險, 已開始展開拯救台灣的行動, 老川會聽他們的忠告嗎? (III)
On China, Donald Trump Is Making Barack Obama’s Mistake
June 30, 2026!
By: Dustin Walker
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/on-china-donald-trump-is-making-barack-obamas-mistake
Beijing leverages opportunities for cooperation as a shield for its aggression. President Trump should refuse to play this game.
America’s president is softer on China in his second term than in his first. He is eager to cut a deal with Beijing, ready to set aside sensitive issues to avoid confrontation, and dangerously willing to take Chinese President Xi Jinping at his word.
That was the situation America found itself in under President Barack Obama a decade ago.
President Donald Trump can avoid this mistake by keeping America off the “China calendar.”
Competition and cooperation are not mutually exclusive. But too often, through solipsism and naivete, policymakers have fallen prey to the belief that America can only cooperate with China if it competes less aggressively. Thus follows the tyranny of the “China calendar”—the pernicious tendency to unilaterally delay or cancel competitive actions to avoid upsetting Beijing and disrupting scheduled diplomatic engagements. But as President Obama discovered too late, China is rarely reciprocal in its restraint.
President Obama froze new arms sales to Taiwan for more than four years while chasing a climate pact with China. Meanwhile, China escalated cyberattacks against US government agencies and companies, infamously stealing designs of more than two dozen US military weapons systems. It also accelerated its campaign to assert sovereignty claims in the East and South China Seas at the expense of US allies like Japan and the Philippines. During his visit to Washington in September 2015, President Xi pledged to halt state-sponsored cyberattacks and never to militarize the South China Sea. President Obama accepted those promises, and President Xi proceeded to violate them.
Beijing is once again seeking to use bilateral pageantry and the promise of cooperation to win concessions from Washington.
Last month, a summit between President Trump and President Xi achieved little, except to extend a trade truce. Unfortunately, Mr. Trump played into Beijing’s hands in advance of the meeting by freezing a $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan.
Since the summit, China has been testing the limits of US resolve. Chinese authorities arrested scholar and activist Min Zin, a US citizen, on espionage charges. China emplaced new structures and personnel at Scarborough Shoal, escalating its maritime confrontation with the Philippines. China continues naval blockade drills around Taiwan and maintains a rare-earth embargo against Japan.
Beijing is hoping a full “China calendar” and Mr. Trump’s desire for trade deals will weaken America’s will to compete. Trump and Xi are scheduled to meet in Washington in September, at APEC in November, and at the G20 in December. Beijing will try to use each of these meetings as leverage to constrain American actions aimed at defending its interests and those of its allies.
President Trump must not yield and should demand Min Zin’s release. His arrest is nothing more than hostage-taking with Chinese characteristics. Mr. Trump should complete authorized arms sales to Taiwan without delay. Taiwan’s ability to defend itself is not leverage, but the foundation of deterrence. The president should condemn China’s escalation at Scarborough Shoal and deploy additional US military assets to the Philippines until new structures and personnel are removed.
Congress must also do its part. To outcompete China in artificial intelligence, Congress should pass the AI Overwatch Act, the MATCH Act, the Remote Access Security Act, the Chip Security Act, the Deterring AI Model Theft Act, and the Chip EQUIP Act. David Feith, a former Trump administration official, has assessed that this historic package of bills would turn America’s advantage in computing power into a durable strategy.
Congress should also back up America’s allies. It should streamline arms sales to Taiwan by passing the Porcupine Act. It should prohibit consultation with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan with the Six Assurances to Taiwan Act. Congress should accelerate and expand foreign military financing for the Philippines. To demonstrate solidarity with Japan amid Chinese pressure, Speaker Mike Johnson should invite Prime Minister Takaichi to address a Joint Session of Congress this year.
A more stable relationship with China is a laudable goal. But achieving it is a test of America’s resolve, not its restraint. Forget the “China calendar.” The time for action is now.