July/August 2026 Foreign Affairs
Published on June 23, 2026
The Mirage of China’s Military Edge
If China were to seize control of Taiwan by force, it would be a disaster, not only for Taiwan but also for the United States. A nearly $1 trillion economy would leave the free-market system and be incorporated into China’s state-directed, mercantilist one. A vibrant democracy nurtured and defended by the United States for many years would be snuffed out. American power and influence would be gravely diminished in East Asia, and China would become the region’s dominant power. Other governments there would be pressured to accommodate China’s political, economic, and even territorial demands. Beijing would certainly insist that they kick out U.S. forces. China’s global ambitions, meanwhile, would only grow.
Whether any of this might come to pass, however, hinges on China’s ability to take and hold Taiwan. The high-paced military buildup Beijing has undertaken over the past 30 years has yielded impressive improvements, and China’s interest in expanding its power and influence is obvious. But until China can be confident that an invasion of Taiwan would succeed—a lofty threshold to reach—improving capabilities and clear ambition are not enough reason for Beijing to use force. Military aggression short of a full-scale invasion would be foolhardy: it would not deliver the Chinese Communist Party the political ends it seeks, and it would risk the party’s grip on power.
The reality today is that China is not capable of conquering Taiwan. Nor is it likely to gain this capability any time soon. China’s buildup once threatened to shift the military balance in Beijing’s favor, but trends in military technology now favor Taiwan and the United States, not China. Recognition of China’s threat has motivated not just Taiwan and the United States but also Japan, the Philippines, and other countries both in the region and beyond to act to deter aggression by Beijing. Chinese leaders can still issue threats, run simulated attacks, and violate Taiwan’s maritime borders. For the foreseeable future, China can at any time inflict massive damage on Taiwan with military force. The danger is great enough to constrain Taiwan’s policies, deterring Taipei from declaring independence and compelling it to make the occasional political concession. Yet without the ability to conquer, China is constrained, too, and any rational Chinese government will avoid taking military action in the first place.
This stalemate has persisted for the past three-quarters of a century, since Chiang Kai-shek lost the Chinese Civil War on mainland China and fled to Taiwan. Maintaining it depends, in part, on understanding the current military balance. Alarmist predictions that China is outpacing the United States and will soon be able to win a war for Taiwan can encourage China and discourage combined action by Taiwan and its supporters. These pessimistic readings make it more difficult for Chinese leaders to accept the reality of the stalemate and return to their strategy of biding time when it comes to Taiwan.
For at least the next decade, favorable trends in hypersonic weapons, drone systems, electronic warfare, and cyberwarfare put the United States and its allies and partners in a strong position to deter China from an attack on Taiwan. China would need much greater military expenditures to overcome these advantages. Yet these positive trends are not self-sustaining. The technology of warfare does not stand still, and maintaining deterrence will require investment in innovation, particularly in space operations and artificial intelligence systems. Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines must continue to commit resources, engage in effective military planning and exercises, and respond to China’s aggressive actions. When China fortifies another reef in the South China Sea, the United States must deploy more hypersonic missiles to the Philippines’ Palawan Island. When China closes air and sea space around Taiwan for weapons demonstrations, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines must counter with their own live-fire exercises. When China protests the passage of American naval ships through the Taiwan Strait, the United States must send more ships through.
As long as Taiwan and its defenders stay on their current paths, the gap between China’s aspirations and its ability to realize them will only increase in the coming years. Beijing’s public rhetoric will continue to highlight its determination to accomplish the historic mission of taking Taiwan, but Chinese leaders will recognize that conquering Taiwan is unrealistic in the near term. They will understand that it is dangerous to base the government’s legitimacy on a goal it cannot achieve. There will still be competition between authoritarian China, with its state-directed economy and aggressive mercantilism, and the democratic United States, Japan, Philippines, and Taiwan, as well as their other allies and partners, with their market-based economies and commitment to the international economic system. But it will be a primarily economic and ideological contest, not a military one.
The Commission finds that, in many ways, China is outpacing the United States and has largely negated the U.S. military advantage in the Western Pacific through two decades of focused military investment. Without significant change by the United States, the balance of power will continue to shift in China’s favor.
The Commission finds that the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.
We recommend that the Joint Force be sized and structured to simultaneously---
(2). lead the effort, with meaningful allied contribution, to deter China from territorial aggression in the Western Pacific—and fight and win if needed.
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Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy
file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/RAND_MSA3057-5%20(1).pdf
[Congress created the Commission on the National Defense Strategy in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act as an independent body charged with assessing the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Its members are non-governmental experts in national security. The Commission released its final report on July 29, 2024. RAND contributed analytic and administrative support.]
[RAND hosted members of the Commission in September 2024 to hear their perspectives on the range of threats to U.S. national security, and what the United States should do to regain deterrence and meet the coming challenges.]