前太平洋美軍總司令Adm. Dennis C. Blair發表了一篇足以振奮台灣與台美Patriots軍心與人心的長文

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david chou

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Jun 26, 2026, 8:01:04 PM (10 days ago) Jun 26
to BATA Group, Allen Kuo, Chilly Chen, Ting-Kuei Tsay, Sim Kiantek, Ted Lau, Michael Richardson, Raymond Chuang, John Chou, John 2 Hsieh, Douglas Chiang

前太平洋美軍總司令Adm. Dennis C. Blair (USN,Ret.,1999-2002)在The Foreign Affairs發表了一篇足以振奮台灣與台美Patriots.美國.日本.菲律賓軍心與人心的長文(I)


由於文章太長, 為了避免我的LKK老鄉親們或不習慣閱讀與軍事有關的論文的鄉親們頭疼, 我只選擇節錄其中的幾個段落, 主要是開頭幾段與結尾那一節的三段.[但我會把全文寄給兩三位前輩,雖然他們年事已高. 我知道, 他們會跟我一樣,從頭到尾認真讀.][Appendix]

這篇文章是我多年來所閱讀的軍事論文之中最能振奮我台灣人[認同或關心台灣.願意或願意協助 "抗支保台" 的台灣住民或台美人鄉親]的論文.雖然Adm. Blair都挑有利我們這一方(Patriotic台灣人 & 台美人.美國.日本.菲律賓)有利的說,但無妨.

[to be continued]

David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement

===================================

Appendix

The Mirage of China’s Military Edge

Panic Is Misguided—and Counterproductive

Dennis Blair

July/August 2026 Foreign Affairs

Published on June 23, 2026

The Mirage of China’s Military Edge



If China were to seize control of Taiwan by force, it would be a disaster, not only for Taiwan but also for the United States. A nearly $1 trillion economy would leave the free-market system and be incorporated into China’s state-directed, mercantilist one. A vibrant democracy nurtured and defended by the United States for many years would be snuffed out. American power and influence would be gravely diminished in East Asia, and China would become the region’s dominant power. Other governments there would be pressured to accommodate China’s political, economic, and even territorial demands. Beijing would certainly insist that they kick out U.S. forces. China’s global ambitions, meanwhile, would only grow.

Whether any of this might come to pass, however, hinges on China’s ability to take and hold Taiwan. The high-paced military buildup Beijing has undertaken over the past 30 years has yielded impressive improvements, and China’s interest in expanding its power and influence is obvious. But until China can be confident that an invasion of Taiwan would succeed—a lofty threshold to reach—improving capabilities and clear ambition are not enough reason for Beijing to use force. Military aggression short of a full-scale invasion would be foolhardy: it would not deliver the Chinese Communist Party the political ends it seeks, and it would risk the party’s grip on power.

The reality today is that China is not capable of conquering Taiwan. Nor is it likely to gain this capability any time soon. China’s buildup once threatened to shift the military balance in Beijing’s favor, but trends in military technology now favor Taiwan and the United States, not China. Recognition of China’s threat has motivated not just Taiwan and the United States but also Japan, the Philippines, and other countries both in the region and beyond to act to deter aggression by Beijing. Chinese leaders can still issue threats, run simulated attacks, and violate Taiwan’s maritime borders. For the foreseeable future, China can at any time inflict massive damage on Taiwan with military force. The danger is great enough to constrain Taiwan’s policies, deterring Taipei from declaring independence and compelling it to make the occasional political concession. Yet without the ability to conquer, China is constrained, too, and any rational Chinese government will avoid taking military action in the first place.

This stalemate has persisted for the past three-quarters of a century, since Chiang Kai-shek lost the Chinese Civil War on mainland China and fled to Taiwan. Maintaining it depends, in part, on understanding the current military balance. Alarmist predictions that China is outpacing the United States and will soon be able to win a war for Taiwan can encourage China and discourage combined action by Taiwan and its supporters. These pessimistic readings make it more difficult for Chinese leaders to accept the reality of the stalemate and return to their strategy of biding time when it comes to Taiwan.


Taiwanese, American, Japanese, and Philippine leaders must be confident but not complacent. Deterring the formidable but not superior Chinese military will require resources and commitment. For the United States, this means military modernization programs that put China in a position where it must invest more just to keep up. It means continued forward basing and deployments, regional coordination, and sending a clear message to Beijing that unprovoked aggression against Taiwan will lead to a fight it will not win. The elements of such a strategy are all in place. If they can be sustained, there is every reason to believe that the United States and its partners will preserve the peace.

[skip]

American war games confirm that, although the new systems the PLA has fielded in recent years have cut into Taiwanese and American advantages, they have not overcome them. China, in these simulations, has been able to inflict increasing levels of damage on Taiwanese and American military forces and on Taiwan itself, but not to seize and hold the large, strongly defended island. A few well-publicized war games conducted by American civilian think tanks using unclassified data resulted in Chinese victories. These results occur when the United States is slow to respond to an attack and when the game models give too much weight to China’s superior numbers of long-range missiles and do not account for various countermeasures that can render these Chinese systems ineffective. These models simply cannot replicate decisive maritime battles that involve an invasion and engage large naval forces. In more sophisticated simulations of a Taiwan invasion that the Department of Defense held in the past decade, played with all the highly classified systems from both sides, China was consistently thwarted in achieving its objective of conquering the island.

[skip]

STAY THE COURSE

 

For at least the next decade, favorable trends in hypersonic weapons, drone systems, electronic warfare, and cyberwarfare put the United States and its allies and partners in a strong position to deter China from an attack on Taiwan. China would need much greater military expenditures to overcome these advantages. Yet these positive trends are not self-sustaining. The technology of warfare does not stand still, and maintaining deterrence will require investment in innovation, particularly in space operations and artificial intelligence systems. Taiwan, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines must continue to commit resources, engage in effective military planning and exercises, and respond to China’s aggressive actions. When China fortifies another reef in the South China Sea, the United States must deploy more hypersonic missiles to the Philippines’ Palawan Island. When China closes air and sea space around Taiwan for weapons demonstrations, the United States, Japan, and the Philippines must counter with their own live-fire exercises. When China protests the passage of American naval ships through the Taiwan Strait, the United States must send more ships through.

As long as Taiwan and its defenders stay on their current paths, the gap between China’s aspirations and its ability to realize them will only increase in the coming years. Beijing’s public rhetoric will continue to highlight its determination to accomplish the historic mission of taking Taiwan, but Chinese leaders will recognize that conquering Taiwan is unrealistic in the near term. They will understand that it is dangerous to base the government’s legitimacy on a goal it cannot achieve. There will still be competition between authoritarian China, with its state-directed economy and aggressive mercantilism, and the democratic United States, Japan, Philippines, and Taiwan, as well as their other allies and partners, with their market-based economies and commitment to the international economic system. But it will be a primarily economic and ideological contest, not a military one.

Keeping the competition stable and peaceful requires that both Beijing and Washington change the way they perceive and talk about the military balance. China must acknowledge the high risks and low probability of success of an attack on Taiwan, and tone down its nationalistic boasts of military prowess and exaggerated claims of American weakness. The United States must continue to devote attention and resources to maintaining its military edge and display confidence in its abilities rather than give credence to alarmist and hyperbolic warnings of imminent defeat. If all sides recognize the military reality, they can avoid outright conflict—and even preserve the possibility of cooperation that benefits them all.



david chou

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Jun 27, 2026, 8:35:34 PM (9 days ago) Jun 27
to BATA Group, Allen Kuo, Chilly Chen, Ting-Kuei Tsay, Sim Kiantek, Ted Lau, Michael Richardson, Raymond Chuang, John Chou, John 2 Hsieh, Douglas Chiang

前太平洋美軍總司令Adm. Dennis C. Blair (USN,Ret.,1999-2002)在The Foreign Affairs發表了一篇足以振奮台灣與台美Patriots.美國.日本.菲律賓軍心與人心的長文(II)


1

Adm. Blair很特別在他從太平洋美軍司令 (即美國太平洋軍區司令)退下後,又陸續擔任幾個要職,但無論如何,他很少在台軍的漢光演習觀演以及與台海戰爭有關的兵棋推演中缺席,他這些活動當然都是得到聯參會與國防部的指示與授權,這就像美國軍情局或太平洋美軍的軍情單位的負責人來台,會晤台灣的政軍領導人並且建立台美兩軍軍事情報合作,必須經過聯參會與國防部的指示與授權一樣.

由於Adm. Blair一直在關切與update台灣戰區的情勢與發展, 所以, 他當然密切關注支那.美國.第一島鏈國家的軍事建設, 也會注意這些國家的軍心.民心.士氣, 他因此必須寫這篇文章, 來鼓舞台灣的Patriots.日本人.菲律賓人的抗支士氣與意志, 鄉親們有沒有注意到他的論文的副標題是:"Panic Is Misguided—and Counterproductive".

Adm. Blair當然注意到, 幾乎所有的兵推(除了台灣自己單獨做的兵推)都是台灣這一方慘敗, 即便有美軍介入, 美國也只是慘勝 [他在論文中有提到兵推], 這些兵推必然也會影響一些或許多美國人的抗支士氣以及軍事介入台海戰爭的意願, 甚至會滋生 "棄台論", 我們從Lyle Goldstein.Jennifer Kavanagh.Doug Bandow這幫主張要讓台灣人自衛.讓台灣人自生自滅.美軍不介入台海戰爭的人的論文就可知.



2

在2026 NDS只提First Island Chain的Collective Defense & Collective Deterrence (不提台灣)以及Secretary of War Pete Hegseth在2026 Shangri-la Dialogue也罕見不提台灣之後,我就一直在琢磨這個現象背後的原因,我只是還沒有做出結論.但無論如何,此事應該沒有或不會純是因為老川行政團隊要與支共北京流氓政權建立 "A Constructive Relationship of Strategic Stability" 那麼單純.

我最近想起我以前讀過的 [bipartisan]The Commission on the National Defense兩年前發表的一篇報告[Appendix],我最近又再讀一遍.

鄉親們不必跟我一樣閱讀那份報告,只要讀下面幾段即可:

The Commission finds that, in many ways, China is outpacing the United States and has largely negated the U.S. military advantage in the Western Pacific through two decades of focused military investment. Without significant change by the United States, the balance of power will continue to shift in China’s favor.

 

The Commission finds that the U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.

 

We recommend that the Joint Force be sized and structured to simultaneously---

 

(2). lead the effort, with meaningful allied contribution, to deter China from territorial aggression in the Western Pacific—and fight and win if needed.

 

The United States must take immediate steps across economic, diplomatic, and military fronts to make clear the U.S. will and capability to impose overwhelming consequences in response to Chinese aggression.

3

可能是戰爭部長Pete Hegseth與戰爭部第三號人物Elbridge "Bridge" Colby在幾個月前讀了或又讀了這份報告,所以他們從今年1月調整了他們的Approach [不過他們在國會作證時,都跟國會議員說,第一島鏈的防衛當然包括台灣, 對台軍售的政策也沒有改變] & Rhetorics.

[to be continued]

David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement

 

===========================


Appendix
 

Report of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy

file:///C:/Users/user/Downloads/RAND_MSA3057-5%20(1).pdf

 

[Congress created the Commission on the National Defense Strategy in the Fiscal Year 2022 National Defense Authorization Act as an independent body charged with assessing the 2022 National Defense Strategy. Its members are non-governmental experts in national security. The Commission released its final report on July 29, 2024. RAND contributed analytic and administrative support.]



[RAND hosted members of the Commission in September 2024 to hear their perspectives on the range of threats to U.S. national security, and what the United States should do to regain deterrence and meet the coming challenges.] 






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