世界首屈一指的 “習(近平)學家” ---[前澳大利亞總理/外長/駐美大使] Kevin Rudd (陸克文)---談 “支共2028武力犯台”
david chou
世界首屈一指的 “習(近平)學家” ---[前澳大利亞總理/外長/駐美大使] Kevin Rudd (陸克文)---談 “支共2028武力犯台” (I)
Kevin不是 “綠蛆” [有極少數的鄉賢因與DPP/DPP政權/TIW不睦, 所以, 把綠營的人馬稱為 “綠蛆”], 我們幾名台美與台灣鄉賢無需把他的發言看做是在 “販賣芒果乾”, 我們必須把他當成礦坑裡那隻在為Formosan Miners發出警訊的Canary (a canary in a coal mine), 我們必須正視他的發言, 並做出必要的準備. [Kevin以前批判過Old Don, Old Don因此對他很感冒, 他也因此付出了必須離開駐美大使這個職位的代價, 但我們不能因為老川討厭他或對他心存芥蒂, 就以人廢言.]
Kevin認為, 習某會在2028年武力犯台. 我現在就請鄉親們閱讀ABC對Kevin專訪的Transcript. [Appendix]
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
==================
Appendix
VIDEO: Former PM Kevin Rudd speaks to 7.30
Sarah Ferguson
ABC (Australian Broadcasting Corporation) News
Posted Tue [Aug. 4, 2026] at 6:05pm, Updated Tue at 7:27pm
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2026-08-04/former-pm-kevin-rudd-speaks-to-7-30/106996418
[Sarah Ferguson speaks with former prime minister and former Australian ambassador to the US, Kevin Rudd, who is taking up a new position as president of the Asia Society.]
[Transcript]
SARAH FERGUSON, PRESENTER: Kevin Rudd, welcome to 7. 30.
KEVIN RUDD, GLOBAL PRESIDENT AND CEO OF THE ASIO[sic ]SOCIETY: Good to be back.
SARAH FERGUSON: You are surely the only Western leader to have spoken with Xi Jinping in Mandarin at length. Since then, you've studied him since in great detail. You say about Xi that he means what he says. Now he says he wants China and Taiwan reunified. You see a potential danger over Taiwan as soon as 2028. Why is that?
KEVIN RUDD: The first thing is that Xi Jinping will get his reappointment as General Secretary of the Communist Party in October of ‘27. That'll be for a record fourth term.
Secondly, you have the Taiwanese presidential elections occurring in January of ’28 and if the ruling Democratic Progress Party, the DPP, is reappointed, it is conceivable given its historical pro-independence stance, that Xi Jinping would regard this as a trigger in terms of China's long established anti-succession law.
And the third factor is Xi Jinping's calculus, I should say, of the robustness of President Trump's posture on deterrence by the United States against China over Taiwan. If you put those three factors together, it elevates the risk, which is why we need to be super mindful about the deterrence equation leading into ‘28.
SARAH FERGUSON: Well, with the delivery of the first nuclear powered submarine under the AUKUS deal not due until 2032, Australia could only be peripheral at most to such a conflict. Is that right?
KEVIN RUDD: Well, the posture of successive Australian governments over the years, including myself as prime minister and foreign minister, is that we never publicly speculate on what Australia might or might not do in the eventuality of a Taiwan Straits crisis. That doesn't actually help in the material world.
In terms of the arrival of Australian submarines, frankly, that five-year period will fast come by and this will be a great addition to the Royal Australian Navy's capabilities set in terms of our ability to maintain Australia's own sovereign interests in the Indo-Pacific as well.
When we look, for example, at the expansion of China's own submarine fleet, look for example, at the fact that China now has some 60 to 75 submarines of which 15 to 20 are nuclear powered. And a number in addition to that are ballistic missile submarines that is nuclear armed.
The fact that we, from time to time, receive inbound commentary from various Chinese commentators such as Victor Gao about it being inappropriate for Australia to acquire these capabilities. Frankly, we need to put it into a context, which is China has a massive submarine fleet and it's growing. They are currently at size when compared boat for boat against the size of the US Pacific submarine fleet. And the Chinese surface fleet is already at some 370 boats larger than the US surface fleet of some 290 operational ships as we stand.
So it's important that Australia has its own naval capabilities given in fact the changes to the strategic and military balance which are occurring within our wider region. Our job is to look after Australia and of course our wider allied interests.
SARAH FERGUSON: It's been confirmed, after Pat Conroy on this program raised doubts that there will be a rotation of US subs at the Stirling Naval Base in WA into the future. Does that make Stirling a significant potential target for the Chinese military?
KEVIN RUDD: Look, I think it's irresponsible for anyone, particularly someone who's previously served as prime minister or foreign minister or ambassador of the United States to comment on the nuclear targeting program of either the Russian Federation or the Chinese.
The bottom line is our job as Australia is to ensure that we enhance our own national security over time. We live in a highly volatile region, the Indo-Pacific. We need greater naval capabilities in order to sustain our own national interests. And that's where these assets of ours are important additions to Australia's overall defence capabilities.
Obviously the Chinese system would prefer that we were not heading in that direction. You could see that from the official commentary. But the bottom line is, if we were to listen to everything that Chinese official commentary had said about Australia's defence capabilities, including our alliance with the United States over the last half century, then we'd be doing nothing.
Our job is to defend Australia and to look after Australian national interests. This helps in us doing that.
SARAH FERGUSON: And just briefly, what lessons is China going to draw from US errors in Iran? Kind of looping back to where we started about potential danger over Taiwan. Looking at Iran, what lessons are they drawing about the US from what's happened there?
KEVIN RUDD: Well, there's often a saying within Chinese political circles about the United States, which is whenever the US gets really serious about the China strategic and military and economic challenge, don't worry, our old friend will always come back. Then you ask, "Well, who's our old friend?" And they say, "The Middle East, of course."
And so when they look at Iran, they see that in the context of what happened in the past with Iraq and earlier of course with Afghanistan and against the central defining strategic challenge of the 21st century, which is which power will emerge as the centre of the global geopolitical and geoeconomic order over the course of the next half century.
The Chinese will look at Iran and say, "This has been a useful distraction from our perspective." I think more broadly, they will look at it also and say, "What has this done in terms of US magazine depth? The availability of its own ammunition and supplies against future Indo-Pacific contingencies?"
And they'll also look at the political reaction within the United States, which is one which becomes increasingly exhausted with foreign wars and particularly ones which the United States itself has initiated.
So the Chinese will take in strategic terms, overall comfort, in my judgement as an analyst, from what they've seen in terms of US posture over Iran.
SARAH FERGUSON: You've been one of the most consequential Australian diplomats for years. You are now free of the constraints of being an ambassador. What can you tell us about Donald Trump that you couldn't tell us then?
KEVIN RUDD: President Trump is an interesting sort of fellow to deal with. I mean, as you know, we had a few exchanges on live global television during Prime Minister Albanese's visit to the US last October.
But by and large, I mean, if you are focused about the national interest that you wish to advance with the US administration, as we have been with AUKUS, as we have been with critical minerals, as we have been with trade, as we have been with critical technologies, you can make progress because the administration is wider, deeper and broader than the White House itself.
And by the way, I mean, we've had this important relationship with the United States for more than a hundred years. President Trump's term in office will last another two years. We need to take a long historical view of this as well.
SARAH FERGUSON: And just finally, you're from Queensland. Could you have anticipated 30 years ago that Pauline Hanson would be out polling your own party in government and the opposition coalition?
KEVIN RUDD: Well, it's very easy to play the politics of protest. It's very hard to do the grinding business of government, which looks after practical problems of national security, such as you and I have been discussing here this evening, of the economy and growing it, environmental sustainability so that we don't all exhaust and expire the planet through climate change and delivering basic services for the Australian people, including housing affordability, which has been eating away so badly at people's standard of living over a long period of time.
The hard business of government is to come up with practical responses to each of those challenges. The easy business of politics is simply to act as a protest vector and then lace it and spice it with the politics of race. That's what Mrs Hanson's been doing ever since she emerged in my fair state of Queensland a quarter of a century ago.
Her script hasn't changed. But ask this question of yourselves, what single answer does she have to any of the list of problems and challenges which I went through before? Zip is the answer to that.
SARAH FERGUSON: Kevin Rudd, thank you very much indeed for joining us.
KEVIN RUDD: Good to be with you.
david chou
Appendix I
[Ezra] Well, that brings up Taiwan, which is something we should talk at least a little bit about before we end. What I hear in your managed strategic competition framework is an orientation toward clarity. Where do we compete? Where do we cooperate?
Taiwan ---the fundamental nature of that is ambiguity. America has a studied, ambiguous description of what Taiwan is and what is going on with it, and even what our policy toward it may be.
We know what Xi Jinping wants, which is ultimately unification and control of Taiwan, but we don’t know what he will do to get it or when. That’s the one where I hear the most constant concern because neither side, I think, really understands the other.
So how do you think about where the Chinese are on Taiwan, and then how do you think about the overall framework for managing that strategic competition appropriately?
[Kevin] Now, Ezra, this is a really important element of our overall conversation because it’s the most time-relevant in terms of problems that could arise before you and I look much grayer.
I look much grayer than you, by the way. My hair turned white because of the global financial crisis.
It might fall out if we have a Taiwan crisis.
So where is Chinese thinking on Taiwan? Xi Jinping has made it clear that he wants a reunification with Taiwan before the centenary of the founding of the People’s Republic, and that’s in 2049. That sounds like an eternity away. It’s now 23 years away, so that’s not exactly an eternity.
Second, his policy toward Taiwan is increasingly hard and sharp.
[Ezra] Give me an example of what you mean by that. What is he actually saying?
[Kevin] He is saying, on the question of Taiwan, in his most recent engagements with President Trump in Beijing, that unless this is handled prudently, this is a very dangerous issue that could result in a collision and conflict.
He hasn’t used those formulations before. So these are not just: I’m shooting the breeze with my best pal Don, and this is what I felt like this morning after I’d had my waffle.
[Ezra] And he’s not like Trump. He speaks very carefully.
[Kevin] Yes, he’s a Leninist, and words are bullets for these guys, and they often result in bullets.
And then third, what do we see? The patterns of Chinese military exercises in relation to the Taiwan Strait move from just being abstract exercises of China’s military preparedness against, for example, a Taiwanese unilateral declaration of independence.
[Ezra] Don’t we have satellite imagery of very precise replicas of various Taiwanese buildings for military exercises?
[Kevin] Well, because I’m still subject to various national security requirements, given my most recent job, you can speculate on that. I couldn’t possibly comment.
[Ezra] I’m just saying we’ve come across reporting on that.
[Kevin] That’s good. I’m glad that you’ve so reflected.
Anyway, we’ve moved from abstraction to reality. We’ve moved from ahistoric time to historic time.
In Xi’s calculus, he’s now 73 years old. He’s up for reappointment at the end of next year. He probably has a couple of terms in him yet. But he’s also, as a good Marxist-Leninist, looking to where the dialectical forces take him in terms of unique periods of opportunity.
Does he perceive 2028 as a unique period of opportunity? I don’t know, but I do notice a sharpening in his levels of preparedness.
[Ezra] Something you said at the beginning of this conversation is that he wants China unified and its enemies divided.
Say what you will about Trump, whatever you believe about him, this is— and he is — a divisive time and force in American life. The next presidential election year is 2028. There is not going to be a lot of appetite among the American people for foreign adventurism, particularly after the Iran war has proved something of a disaster. In America, there’s not a high level of commitment to Taiwan. It’s not a place we think about.
I’m not saying that Xi Jinping is going to choose to invade Taiwan at that moment, but he and the Chinese Communist Party see America as in a political and even terminal decline via historical materialism.
So I wonder how he sees this, and if this is a sort of moment of opportunity.
[Kevin] Yes, I’m worried very much that Xi Jinping could miscalculate in 2028. Why I say 2028, by the way, and not 2027 or 2026, is that the Taiwanese have their own presidential elections in January 2028. And if the existing Democratic Progressive Party, which is anathema to Xi Jinping, gets re-elected, it will be for its fourth term, and it has run consistently on an independence-leaning platform. Will they get re-elected in January 2028? I don’t know, but I think it’s a 50-50 possibility.
Does this, therefore, become a trigger for Xi Jinping to say enough is enough? Open question---given he will have just been reappointed as general secretary of the party the previous October or November. And he’s aware that 2028 is a presidential election year here in the United States.
What do I fear? A miscalculation by Xi Jinping about the level of American resolve. Do the Chinese conclude post-Iran, for example, that the likelihood of any American leadership to deploy forces in the event of a Taiwan crisis would be reduced as a result of the Iran experience?
And then there’s the more mechanical question of the extent to which the American arsenal depth, magazine depth and capability set have been impaired as a result of Iran.
So my concern as an analyst is: Could he arrive at a conclusion through a bout of excessive self-confidence that a unique opportunity has arisen? The danger is that he actually miscalculates.
To act against Taiwan would be to cause President Trump to look weak. And the one thing I’ve observed about President Trump in the last several years I’ve been in Washington: The last thing President Trump likes is to look weak.
So I think we are in potentially dangerous territory.
[Ezra] One question I hear from Americans is: Well, why should we care about Taiwan? Why is this our problem?
When you say: What if they miscalculate American political will? — they might calculate it correctly. There is an American elite commitment to Taiwan. Do swing voters in Ohio care about Taiwan? Does the American public, in general, care about Taiwan?
What is your actual answer to that? Why is the answer to Taiwan’s being a flashpoint actually to say: Maybe it shouldn’t be? Maybe it’s not America’s problem?
[Kevin] I think the reason you’ve had such buy-in to deterrence over Taiwan is not because of some feel-good American emotional commitment to those nice folks over there. It’s actually much more hardheaded than you would give credit to.
No. 1, it was the Congress that framed the Taiwan Relations Act back in 1979, at the time of diplomatic recognition of the mainland, which is a de facto form of security guarantee for the Taiwanese---and that’s an act of your Congress. Therefore, if you go to the congressional leadership, Democrat and Republican, they have seen themselves as the long-term custodians of that set of arrangements.
But the second is this. Let’s hypothetically assume, Ezra, that Xi Jinping walks into Taiwan tomorrow, decapitates the leadership, it’s gone, and it has now become China’s province. A fully fledged red flag goes up over the presidential building in downtown Taipei, and the first party secretary arrives to take over the administration of the province and the suppression of the locals, there having been much bloodshed in the process.
I think at that point, what Americans need to consider is what happens to the rest of the world’s perception and conclusion about U.S. strategic reliability worldwide at that point. It becomes very much the point at which the notion of Pax Americana disappears in the collective consciousness of allies around the world.
The Japanese, for example, may then conclude it’s time for them to go nuclear. If they go nuclear, the Koreans will conclude: Well, if the Japanese are going nuclear, we’ll be going nuclear.
In other words, the whole dynamic of this region changes.
And the third thing for Americans to consider: Is it the conclusion here in the United States that China, already having assembled the world’s largest surface fleet, for example, having taken Taiwan, that it’s time then to deliver to the Chinese people a grand peace dividend that we will then reduce the size of the Chinese military by two-thirds because we’ve achieved our historical mission, and we’ll all, therefore, have better social security payments as a result?
Unlikely, because Xi Jinping’s made plain that China’s power projection should be pan-regional beyond the Taiwan Strait, and because of existing behaviors, increasingly global.
And then I think there’s this final point, which is if you guys still see yourselves as the light on the hill, are you indifferent to places which have, of their own volition, evolved into democracies and to open societies and open economies around the world, like the 23 million people in Taiwan? And if you’re indifferent to that, what does it say about your indifference to freedom worldwide?
I think those are active considerations for the American body politic. But as a barbarian living in your midst, far be it for me to tell you what’s right or wrong.
[Ezra] So then what is a wise policy behind those considerations?
The wise policy is, in fact, the least expensive and most effective: sustained deterrence. If you sustain deterrence, and we therefore sustain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait, as Deng Xiaoping once said, we kick the ball down the road for future generations who will be much wiser than us to resolve this intractable problem.
I think that is a good place to end.
The Ezra Klein Show
What Americans Need to Understand About China
By Ezra Klein
Produced by Rollin Hu
""July 14, 2026
Opinion | What Americans Need to Understand About China - The New York Times""
What Xi Jinping Wants
""Kevin Rudd, a former prime minister of Australia, went back to school to try to understand how the Chinese president thinks.""
This is an edited transcript of “The Ezra Klein Show.” Since 2012, Xi Jinping has been the leader of the Chinese Communist Party. He has consolidated power to a level very few people ever expected, and under his rule, China has strengthened technologically, diplomatically and militarily. It is now widely understood to be an industrial juggernaut on a scale the world has never seen, in a way the world does not quite know how to respond to.
But Xi’s ambitions for China go far beyond that. In the long term, he wants China to be the pre-eminent world power. In the near term, he wants it to control Taiwan.
You cannot understand modern China — what it is now and where it is going — without understanding Xi and the power he wields and the ideology that drives him.
My guest today is Kevin Rudd, who has had a unique way of trying to understand that ideology from many different angles. Rudd has an amazing biography. He began as an Australian foreign service officer serving in China. He’s a fluent Mandarin speaker who rose to be prime minister of Australia in the late 2000s. Along that rise, he got to know Xi personally, in a way very few other world leaders have.
Then, after serving as prime minister, Rudd went on to pursue a doctorate at Oxford, and he wrote his dissertation on Xi Jinping’s ideology, reading everything that has come out under Xi’s name — which is quite a lot. He has published that in a book, “On Xi Jinping.” He is also the author of “The Avoidable War.” He recently served as the Australian ambassador to the U.S., and he’s now the president of the Asia Society.
So Rudd has a really rare set of perspectives — academic, diplomatic and political — on China, Xi Jinping and the U.S.-China relationship.
Ezra Klein: Kevin Rudd, welcome to the show.
Kevin Rudd: Thanks for having me on the show.
Before we get to Xi, I want to talk a bit about your career. Not many people go from being prime minister to getting a Ph.D. and being a grad student again. So tell me a little bit about your path.
Well, I seem to have this permanent appetite for career demotion. I was prime minister, then foreign minister, then did a Ph.D. and became ambassador. I’m now running a think tank. So it’s one steady slide for me.
Why did I do a Ph.D.? A lot of folks in the world and, particularly, my former counterparts as international political leaders, would ask me this question: Hey, Kevin, you’re a China guy. What does Xi Jinping think?
And I thought I knew pretty well the answers to that until I began to have doubts myself about the authenticity of my answers. So I decided to force myself to read everything that this guy had ever written, and I thought the best way to force myself to read everything this guy had ever written was to enroll in a Ph.D. at Oxford at the age of 59.
That’s exactly what I did. The principle at play was male vanity: It would be too humiliating and too embarrassing having enrolled in such a program to then withdraw because you’d lost enthusiasm.
It’s a commitment device.
Yes, that’s right.
But you also had a history with China. You began your career working in the foreign service. Do I have that right?
As a kid, I started first-year university with modern Chinese language, classical Chinese language and Chinese history. So I’d done four or five years of that. Then, because I was essentially unemployable in the 1980s, I found that the only place that had an interest in taking on my talents was the Australian foreign service.
Eventually, I ended up in Beijing as one of their better Chinese linguists at the time. They did send me to Sweden first — just to make sure I would lose my language. [Laughs.]
What year were you in Beijing at that time?
In Beijing from ’84 through until virtually the beginning of ’87.
What was it like then?
It was China at its most dynamic. It was China opening up to the world for the very first time, where all things were possible under heaven. This was almost the high days and holy days of China’s international engagement, and it was fully two years before Tiananmen, which was the first great Leninist wake-up call.
I think it’s after this period, but when do you first come across Xi Jinping?
Well, it’s interesting. When I was a junior woodchuck in the Australian Embassy at the time ——
Is that an official term? [Laughs.]
Increasingly, yes. Basically, the guy who does the photocopying.
When I was there, our prime minister was visiting at the time — a guy called Bob Hawke.
And Bob wanted to go to places other than Beijing. So we organized for him to go to one of the newly opening-up cities, what they called a special economic zone, at a place called Xiamen.
I went to Xiamen to do the advance work, and I met with the then vice mayor of Xiamen, who was a guy by the name of Xi, given name Jinping. That’s where we first met.
Was it a long and extensive boozy dinner? No. But it was the first time I met the guy.
I’ve met a lot of politicians in my time, for my sins. Sometimes you run across somebody, and you can feel the gravity of history warping around them.
The first time I met Barack Obama, you could feel the weight in the room. It shifted things. Trump has this quality. I’ve met people early in their careers, and they just have that quality. I’ve met other people who don’t, even though they rise quite far.
What was Xi like? Did he feel different to you than other mayors and vice mayors and party bureaucrats? Would you have told me after that meeting: I just met somebody, and that young man is going somewhere?
Because I was a student of contemporary Chinese politics, I knew of his father, Xi Zhongxun, who was already a member of the Politburo. But I’d be fibbing to you if I said to you today that the room shook for me when I first met him.
Much later on, when I was prime minister of Australia and Xi Jinping was visiting Australia as vice president of China, I remember sitting in front of the fireplace in the prime minister’s residence in Canberra — it was winter — and spending a couple of hours over a glass of Australian red, talking about the state of the world with him, in Chinese.
That’s when I sensed that this was a man of history — for the simple reason that all of his references were about his place in the context of unfolding Chinese history. So that’s the first time in which I had that sense we were dealing with something, somebody, some person, who was unique.
Say more on that. When you say that he referenced himself in the unfolding, what was he unfolding, and what was his self-understood role? Because this was before he was leader of the party.
That’s true — and when his position was still somewhat contested. It wasn’t absolutely clear that he would become paramount leader.
The conversation, which, as I said, ran for a couple of hours, was free-flowing. We didn’t have interpreters.
Essentially, his thesis was that China is intrinsically a great power. Historically, it was demonstrated as such throughout a couple of thousand years of recorded history.
Not the 5,000 that the Chinese often boast about, but just a couple of thousand. Given we’re up to the 250th anniversary of the birth of this country as a republic, a couple of thousand is pretty good — and certainly, measured against Australia, it’s very good.
But he saw that the trend of Chinese history was: China was a great power when it was: a) unified and b) able to keep foreign adversaries under control and divided. And China collapsed as a great power when neither of those propositions held true.
So for those reasons, spinning into the 20th century and then into the 21st century, when I was meeting with him, he saw the contemporary mandate of the Chinese Communist Party as to maintain China’s domestic unity and to keep it free from external pressure so that it could once again become a global great power.
He wouldn’t say directly: I, Xi Jinping, therefore have a unique mandate to do this on behalf of 1.4 billion Chinese people. But for me, the subtext was pretty clear.
So Xi is a man with a sense of history. And also a man with a very particular history. You mentioned his father a moment ago. Tell me his story.
The United States must step in to remove the "governing authorities on Taiwan" from the Legislative Yuan, which is being used by the Chinese Revolutionary Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) to obstruct budgets and arbitrarily enact bills, thus carrying out their overt scheme to paralyze the Republic of China's government-in-exile in Taipei. |
美國須出面解除 「在台灣的治理當局」 (the governing authorities on Taiwan) 被中國革命黨(KMT)以及台灣人民黨(TPP)利用立法院多數杯葛預算及亂制定法案，以行他們癱瘓中國共和國在台北流亡政府的陽謀。 |
david chou
AI 摘要
「抗中保台」口號是 2019 年民進黨黨內初選及香港爆發「反送中」運動後，由蔡英文與綠營陣營逐漸拉高聲調喊響。面對北京推出「一國兩制台灣方案」與香港情勢惡化，該口號在同年下半年正式成為選戰主軸，並助其贏得 2020 年總統大選。
背景與時間點
· 2019年初：中國領導人習近平發表「告台灣同胞書」，提出「習五條」與「一國兩制台灣方案」，蔡英文隨即強勢回應，奠定對中強硬基調。
· 2019年中（6月起）：香港爆發「反送中」運動，衝突持續多月，台灣社會高度關注，民進黨藉此將兩岸與主權危機意識拉到高點。
Stenographic Transcript
Before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
HEARING TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON UNITED STATES INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND IN REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR FISCAL YEAR 2022 AND THE
FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM
Tuesday, March 9, 2021
Washington, D.C
Senator Sullivan: Let me ask, you know, when I talk to officials, and I would love your view on this, our intel community, the common theme I hear with regard to China's actions under Xi Jinping's leadership is alarm. That is a phrase that is used a lot -- alarm. And they point to things, just within the last year, the COVID outbreak and the non-cooperation that China has had with the rest of the world; the border conflict with India, and cyberattacks that were probably launched by China against India, major cyberattacks; an economic embargo against one of our most important allies in the region, Australia; crushing dissent in Hong Kong; very aggressive military actions in the Taiwan Strait, South China Sea; Japan, Xinjiang. Do you agree these 11 are alarming maneuvers? This is within the last year.
Admiral Davidson: Yes, sir.
Senator Sullivan: And what does this kind of do to your timeline if you are extrapolating out with regard to any potential conflict or timeline in the Taiwan Strait, when you look at how aggressive Xi Jinping's leadership has been?
Admiral Davidson: I think our concerns are manifest here during this decade, not only on the development, the numbers of, you know, ships, aircraft, rockets, et cetera, that they have put in the field, but the way they are advancing those capabilities as well, in combination with everything that you just cited -- Hong Kong, Xinjiang, and Tibet, and the line of actual control, and the South China Sea and the East China Sea. I worry that they are accelerating their ambitions to supplant the United States, and our leadership role in the rules-based international order, which they have long said that they want to do that by 2050, I am worried about them moving that target closer. Taiwan is clearly one of their ambitions before then, and I think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in the next six years.
david chou
OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
March 2026
https://www.odni.gov/wp-content/uploads/dlm_uploads/ATA-2026-Unclassified-Report.pdf
[ODNI stands for OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE]
P. 22
China–Taiwan
In 2026, Beijing probably will continue seeking to set the conditions for eventual unification with Taiwan short of conflict. China, despite its threat to use force to compel unification if necessary and to counter what it sees as a U.S. attempt to use Taiwan to undermine China’s rise, prefers to achieve unification without the use of force, if possible. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also continues to develop military plans and capabilities for attempting to achieve unification using military force if directed to do so.
The PLA probably is making steady but uneven progress on capabilities that it would use in any attempt to seize Taiwan and deter—and, if necessary, defeat—U.S. military intervention.At times, it has increased the scope, size, and pace of operations around Taiwan.
• The IC assesses that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification. However, China publicly insists that unification with Taiwan is required to achieve its goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049—the 100th year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing almost certainly will consider a variety of factors in deciding whether and how to pursue military approaches to unification, including PLA readiness, the actions and politics of Taiwan, and whether or not the U.S. will militarily intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.
• Chinese officials recognize that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be extremely challenging and carry a high risk of failure, especially in the event of U.S. intervention.
A conflict between China and Taiwan may disrupt U.S. access to trade and semiconductor technology critical to the global economy. If the U.S. were to intervene, it probably would face significant but recoverable disruptions to its transportation sector from Chinese cyber attacks. Even without Washington’s involvement, U.S. and global economic and security interests would face significant and costly consequences, with tech supply chains disrupted and investor fear across markets. In addition, a protracted war with the U.S. risks unprecedented economic costs to the U.S., Chinese, and global economies.
This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
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