今天, 禮拜天, 在台支那鬼子報(支那時報)又放鬼出來嚇人
david chou
Taiwan — a democratic island claimed as Chinese territory by Beijing — is high on Xi’s list of priorities. At the meeting, Xi is likely to press Trump to agree to change the island’s status by opposing Taiwan independence. A verbal confirmation of that or formal change in U.S. policy would be a major win for Beijing.
2
The Japan Times有轉載 [Appendix II], 雖然文字有微幅調整, 但內容沒有變.
我們雖然還沒有機會閱讀該項專訪的文字記錄全文或收聽專訪的錄影與錄音帶全部, 但對我台灣與台美鄉親而言, 能讀到日本時報的轉載全文, 就已經可以了.類似這樣的專訪, 做為關心台灣的政治.外交.軍事的台灣人與台美人, 最好都跟我一樣, 儘可能去閱讀第一手資訊, 不要倚賴台灣的媒體的報導, 特別是境內敵對勢力的傳媒的報導或二手傳播.
綠媒自由時報的平面版今天沒有刊載這條新聞.
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
========================
Appendix I
Taiwan Fears It’ll Be ‘On the Menu’ at Trump-Xi Summit
· Deputy Foreign Minister Francois Wu comments in an interview
· Wu Says Taiwan is looking to increase common interests with US
By Jenny Leonard, Yian Lee, and Miaojung Lin
April 25, 2026 at 6:00 AM GMT+8
Updated on April 25, 2026 at 3:45 PM GMT+8
A senior Taiwanese official expressed concern that President Donald Trump might make concessions on the self-governed island in his meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, adding Taiwan was working hard to prevent such a scenario.
“What we are the most afraid is to put Taiwan on the menu of the talk between Xi Jinping and President Trump,” Deputy Foreign Minister Francois Wu said Friday in an English-language interview with Bloomberg News. “We worry, and we need to avoid that it happens.”
[omit]
Taiwan fears it will be ‘on the menu’ at Xi’s summit with Trump
[U.S. President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping walk, as they hold a bilateral meeting at Gimhae International Airport on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit in Busan, South Korea, last October. | REUTERS]
By Jenny Leonard, Tan Ying Zhen and Miaojung Lin
BLOOMBERG
The Japan times
Taiwan fears it will be ‘on the menu’ at Xi’s summit with Trump
Taiwan fears it will be ‘on the menu’ at Xi’s summit with Trump
Jenny Leonard
At the meeting, Xi is likely to press Trump to agree to change the island's status by opposing Taiwan independence.
|
A senior Taiwanese official expressed concern that U.S. President Donald Trump might make concessions on the self-governed island in his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping and said that Taiwan was working hard to prevent such a scenario.
Trump is set to travel to Beijing May 14-15 for a summit with Xi that’s widely expected to include a variety of business deals and purchasing commitments. It was delayed from late March because of the Iran war and the need for Trump to stay in Washington.
Taiwan — a democratic island claimed as Chinese territory by Beijing — is high on Xi’s list of priorities. At the meeting, Xi is likely to press Trump to agree to change the island’s status by opposing Taiwan independence. A verbal confirmation of that or formal change in U.S. policy would be a major win for Beijing.
Asked if the U.S. has given Taipei any assurances that the language won’t be changed, Wu said: "Nothing is 100% sure.”
But Wu remained optimistic, as Taiwan has been seeking to expand shared interests with the U.S., particularly through the island's semiconductor industry and its significant investments in America.
“The more we share a common national interest, [the] more I think we feel comfortable that we will not be put on the menu," he said. "For now, we feel comfortable."
A White House official said Trump expects a very positive visit with Xi and that the administration’s stance on relations with Taiwan, known as the "One China" policy, is unchanged.
Under the policy, the U.S. acknowledges Beijing as China’s sole government without clarifying its position on Taiwan’s legal status. The U.S. has maintained unofficial relations with Taipei under that arrangement.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing didn’t respond to a request for comment outside of normal working hours.
Where Trump routinely talks warmly of Xi, he has a number of advisers who are hawkish on China and who have intervened in the past, including when there was internal debate about whether to allow China to buy Nvidia's advanced Blackwell chip, people familiar with the matter said.
The engagements between Taipei and Washington have been positive, the people said, but they added that it’s impossible to get reassurance from the White House about what exactly will be discussed or agreed to in the Beijing summit.
They also said that Trump’s aides don’t know — and don’t pretend to know — how the meeting will play out. That’s in part what causes the residual worry.
For Taiwan, the U.S. is an important security and strategic partner, and relations are built on "shared values and a long history of cooperation," Wu said.
Taiwan also recognizes the need to "strengthen its connections with the international community, particularly by deepening cooperation with like-minded countries such as those in Europe, in order to enhance overall resilience and deterrence," he added.
U.S. officials say the meeting will focus on trade and investment matters. They want to focus the Beijing trip on ensuring better access to critical minerals and rare earths that China last year cut off through sweeping export controls.
While the flow of the metals and minerals has picked up since the two leaders reached an agreement last fall in South Korea, the trade is still not back to the level it was before the controls took effect.
Another key outcome for Beijing would be restraining U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Trump this year delayed a weapons package to Taipei after pressure from Xi and said he was "talking to him about it” and that he would be making a determination "pretty soon.”
The comment alarmed some officials in Washington and Taipei, as well as U.S. lawmakers. Still, people familiar with the deliberations believe the pause is temporary and that the package will move ahead after the May summit.
China’s ruling Communist Party considers Taiwan its territory and has vowed to claim it someday, despite never having controlled the democratic island. Officials in Taiwan reject that stance, saying that the island is de-facto independent and has never been governed by Beijing.
Trump told The New York Times earlier this year that it was "up to Xi” what the Chinese leader would do with Taiwan but that it was unlikely he would move on it while Trump is president and that the U.S. leader would be "very unhappy” if he did.
The U.S. this week seized an Iranian tanker that Trump said contained a "gift from China” — possibly rocket fuel and other inputs. It came after Trump said he’d received written commitments from Xi that China wouldn’t send arms to Iran.
Appendix III
外交部政務次長吳志中接受美國Bloomberg專訪 強調台灣深化與美國及國際夥伴合作 持續強化整體韌性與嚇阻能力
發布時間：2026-04-25
資料來源：[外交部] 國際傳播司
2026/04/25
新聞參考資料第031號
https://www.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=95&sms=73&s=122141
外交部政務次長吳志中日前接受美國Bloomberg專訪，相關報導已於今（2026）年4月25日刊出。報導指出，台灣正持續透過擴大與理念相近國家合作與共同利益，強化國際支持的基礎，並積極因應區域安全挑戰。
報導引述吳政次表示，美國為台灣重要且關鍵之安全與戰略夥伴，雙方關係建立於共同價值與長期合作基礎，並在安全、經貿及科技等領域維持緊密合作，台美關係對維護台海和平穩定具有關鍵意義。
吳政次強調，在此基礎上，台灣將進一步深化與歐洲等理念相近國家的合作，透過強化在供應鏈、科技及安全等領域連結，提升整體韌性與嚇阻能力，並建立更為穩固的國際支持網絡。
報導另指出，台灣正持續擴大與主要夥伴的共同利益，包括半導體產業合作及對外投資，以深化與國際社會的互賴關係，並增進整體安全與發展空間。
吳政次於訪談中表示，面對區域情勢發展，台灣將持續秉持審慎樂觀態度，在強化自我防衛能力與社會韌性的同時，透過深化與包括美國在內的國際夥伴合作，共同維護印太地區和平、穩定與繁榮。
david chou
Michael Turton [他已可被稱為台灣的Patriot] 這樣說:
"The PRC wants Washington to say it does not support Taiwan independence because that will induce feelings of resignation and hopelessness in Taiwan. Skepticism of US commitments to Taiwan is already widespread, and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is constantly stoking that feeling. Lampton and Wang are right about one thing: the PRC would rather annex Taiwan without fighting, if it can."
在美支交往與搞什麼 “戰略合作夥伴關係” 的年代, 披著學術外衣的美國大紅鬼David M. Lampton (美國舔共與媚共 “Red Team” 之首) 與支那鬼子王缉思可不得了, 他們都紅透了半邊天, 吃香喝辣. 但在美國的大戰略家Michael Pillsbury的巨著 “Hundred-Year Marathon: China's Secret Strategy to Replace America as the Global Superpower (2015)” 橫空出世, 開始改變美國國安與外交事務界人士與華盛頓決策圈的對支那戰略的思維之後, 美國這些智庫界與學術界的紅鬼子就只有被disgraced, 且要夾著尾巴做人.
這批理論破產.誤國誤民.把支共與支帝鬼子養得又肥又大, 讓那些畜牲力足以來挑戰與打倒美國在印太與世界的霸權, 力足以危害台灣.日本.亞太.美國的美國 “Red Team”, 當然不甘心就此沉寂, 在Old Joe執政時數度宣示要派遣美軍保衛台灣之後. 這批沒有被打死的美國紅鬼子 (有些人原屬 “Blue Team”) 又活躍了起來, 他們現在的立論是: 第一, 美國不能與支那鬼子打仗, 不能介入台海戰爭, 因為即便美國戰勝, 也是慘勝, 不值得. 就算台灣丟了, 又如何, 又不會危害到美國的亞太霸權. 第二, 為了避免與支那鬼子來一場災難級的硬仗, 美國應該樂見台灣與支那 “和平解決爭端”, 即便是要搞所謂的 “和平統一”, 美國也不應反對, 因此, 華盛頓可以從 “不支持台獨”, 進而同意 “反對台獨”, 甚至進一步支持所謂的 ”和平統一”.
在Old Joe執政的後兩年, 支那鬼子就在高峰會提出這些要求, 美國的 “Red Team” 也在鼓吹, 但Old Joe團隊不為所動.
由於預期今年會有幾場川習會, 所以, 大約從去年底起, 美國的智庫界.學術界.媒體界又開始進行幾場台海問題的討論與論辯 [美國的親支賣台 “Red Team” 都沒有缺席], 關於這個, 我已開過幾次欄, 跟鄉親報告.
在這一個兩個月, 包括我在內的敏感的政治工作者與觀察家會發現, 老共的人馬一直在對美國人與台灣住民釋放一個訊息: 現在這一次會是台海問題和平解決的 “最後機會”, 你們別敬酒不吃, 吃罰酒.
================================================================
Appendix
Notes from Central Taiwan: As Trump-Xi nears, once again, the sell out
---By urging Washington to revive ‘does not support Taiwan independence’, a new ‘Foreign Affairs’ essay offers not deterrence, but a recipe for weakening Taiwan’s confidence and advancing Beijing’s aims
By Michael Turton / Contributing Reporter
Mon, Apr 27, 2026 page 12
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2026/04/27/2003856294
The March/April volume of Foreign Affairs, long a purveyor of pro-China pablum, offered up another irksome Beijing-speak on the issues and solutions for the problems vexing the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US: “America and China at the Edge of Ruin: A Last Chance to Step Back From the Brink” rang the provocative title, by David M. Lampton and Wang Jisi (王緝思).
If one ever wants to describe what went wrong with US-PRC relations, the career of Wang Jisi is a good place to start. Wang has extensive experience in the US and the West. He was a visiting academic at Oxford University, the University of California, Berkeley, the University of Michigan and Claremont McKenna College. He was Global Scholar at Princeton University 2011-2015, including 9 months at the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He also served on the board of trustees of the International Crisis Group.
These experiences, however, are just the shiny Western outcroppings of a life spent inside the PRC security state. Wang was director of the Institute of International Strategic Studies at the Central Party School of the Chinese Communist Party from 2001 to 2009. From 2008 to 2016, he served on the Foreign Policy Advisory Committee of the PRC’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to intelligence researcher Alex Joske (周安瀾), Wang has been “closely associated with China’s Ministry of State Security for decades.”
[US President Donald Trump, left, on Oct. 30 last year shakes hands with Chinese President Xi Jinping at a meeting in Busan, South Korea. In the lead up to a Trump-Xi meeting slated for next month, Foreign Affairs published an essay parroting Beijing’s propaganda about Taiwan.]
An operative of the PRC security state held positions in ranking public universities in the West? Yes, of course the universities knew, and shrugged. It goes without saying that no high-ranking intelligence professional in the West has such access to Chinese academia, or is able to publish freely in prestigious PRC magazines. Note also that despite these very obvious security state commitments, Wang is still feted as a “scholar” by Western scholars.
As for Lampton, in 2015 he was named the most influential China watcher by the Institute of International Relations at the China Foreign Affairs University in Beijing. Such an accolade could never go to someone the PRC disliked.
Before the meeting in October last year between US President Donald Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping (習近平) there was a months-long campaign to push PRC views in the US media (“Notes from Central Taiwan: The emerging argument to sell out Taiwan,” Nov. 3, 2025). Once again we have a Trump-Xi meeting coming, and once again we have “academics” calling for the US to embrace PRC positions on Taiwan.
PARROTING THE PRC’S POSITION
The Foreign Affairs piece starts with a robust commitment to PRC positions, reviews the “hostility” between the two states and then claims that the “best place to begin stabilizing the relationship is, perhaps counterintuitively, with its most dangerous dimension: the long-simmering issue of Taiwan.” The Taiwan issue, apparently, simmers all by itself. Nothing drives the tension. PRC expansionism? What’s that?
With that, the reader enters the world of familiar pro-PRC tropes: if we just say some words that are concessions to China, everything will be fine. What words should we say?
Sure enough, the Foreign Affairs piece (co-written, recall, by a PRC security state stalwart) says that “it is in Washington’s interest to reinstate its previous position that it ‘does not support Taiwan independence’.” Sound familiar? It’s a refrain throughout pro-PRC pieces for the last several years.
Stephen Wertheim last year: “Washington will not support Taiwan’s independence or rule out peaceful unification with the mainland, and in return, Beijing will avoid the use of force and ease its military intimidation of Taiwan.”
This demand was also the centerpiece of a 2023 Foreign Affairs essay, “Taiwan and the True Sources of Deterrence,” co-authored by Bonnie Glaser, Jessica Chen Weiss (白潔曦) and Thomas Christensen. In all three cases, in return, Washington gets nothing concrete in return.
Like the Lampton and Wang piece, those essays used some variant of the phrase “Taiwan’s permanent separation from China.” That phrase is a tell-tale sign that the writer is parroting PRC propaganda. Taiwan is not, and has never been, part of China, except in Chinese expansionist fever-dreams.
As many have observed, accepting the position that Washington does not support independence would render its position on Taiwan incoherent. If the US does not accept the possibility that Taiwan can go its own way, there is no point in defending Taiwan. Because “does not support independence” is the first step in dismantling Washington’s support of Taiwan, pro-PRC voices argue for it.
Further, the demand that Washington does something about Taiwan independence is merely a reframing of the old PRC goal of transferring tension between Taiwan and the PRC to the Washington-Taipei relationship. After all, if the PRC truly wanted to reduce tension, it could stop its cyberwarfare, cable cutting, arrest warrants for Taiwanese, theft of Taiwanese technology, “gray zone” intimidation, all on its own. No need for Washington to lift a finger.
Lampton and Wang even write sympathetically of the poor, put-upon PRC’s warmongering, saying “the Chinese government continues to reaffirm its preference for peaceful unification, insisting that it is stepping up full-scale deterrence, such as encircling the island with extensive live-fire exercises, only to prevent secession.” Help! Stop me before I live-fire again!
DOES TAIWAN HAVE A VOICE?
That bizarre sympathy for the aggressor is fallout from another tactic pro-PRC pieces like Lampton and Wang’s: Taiwan disappears, except as an “issue” between the US and the PRC, an abstraction devoid of its own agency. The people of Taiwan and their century-old desire for independence are never mentioned or consulted. Making Taiwan an abstraction also renders PRC expansionism invisible.
Again AWOL are US allies in the region. The creation of a bubble world in which the rest of the region does not exist is a common pro-PRC propaganda move. Japan appears only as a source of friction, due, of course, to Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s statement that a PRC invasion of Taiwan would constitute an existential threat to Japan, longstanding Japanese policy.
“The Chinese-Japanese relationship has deteriorated significantly since then,” Lampton and Wang write, “with China applying economic and diplomatic pressure on Japan.”
Then comes the implied threat that if the US would follow PRC wishes on Taiwan independence, it would “show Tokyo that Washington wants to lower the temperature in the region.” That would isolate Tokyo from Washington, a goal of Beijing’s. Of course, the implication is that the PRC will treat Washington like Tokyo if the US does not play ball.
Lampton and Wang go further, implying that Taiwan independence is of foreign manufacture, a staple of PRC propaganda. Note the phrase “external pressure” in this statement of theirs: “In some Chinese circles, for instance, there is a lack of confidence about China’s ability to resist external pressure in support of Taiwan’s separation from China.”
As JRR Tolkien wrote in The Lord of the Rings: “For yet another weapon, swifter than hunger, the Lord of the Dark Tower had: dread and despair.” The PRC wants Washington to say it does not support Taiwan independence because that will induce feelings of resignation and hopelessness in Taiwan. Skepticism of US commitments to Taiwan is already widespread, and the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) is constantly stoking that feeling. Lampton and Wang are right about one thing: the PRC would rather annex Taiwan without fighting, if it can.
Last time around this campaign did not achieve its goal, but then Trump was not engaged in a war that will give the PRC immense leverage, while distancing the US from its allies in the Pacific. The PRC and its numerous interlocutors may now feel that the time is ripe.
Let us pray that they are always wrong.
Notes from Central Taiwan is a column written by long-term resident Michael Turton, who provides incisive commentary informed by three decades of living in and writing about his adoptive country. The views expressed here are his own.
Dr. Michael Yeun
david chou
==========================
Appendix I
Taiwan Opposition Leader Eyes Trump Meeting After Xi Sitdown
Taiwan's Cheng Li-wun Seeks Trump Meeting After Beijing Trip
By Yian Lee, Stephen Engle, and Miaojung Lin
April 30, 2026 at 7:00 PM GMT+8
[omit]
Following an April 2026 meeting with Xi Jinping, Taiwan KMT chairwoman Cheng Li-wun is seeking a meeting with Donald Trump to promote a "peace agenda" that opposes Taiwan independence and advocates for reducing regional tensions. Cheng intends to argue against treating Taiwan as a geopolitical "pawn" and to clarify that KMT efforts to foster dialogue with Beijing do not indicate a shift away from the United States. Read the full story at Bloomberg.
Appendix II
Xi Is Pushing Trump to Officially Oppose Taiwan Independence
September 29, 2025 at 5:49 PM GMT+8
Chinese President Xi Jinping is renewing a push for the US to change a decades-old phrase describing its stance on Taiwan independence, a concession that would be a major diplomatic win for Beijing.
China has asked the Trump administration to officially declare that it “opposes” Taiwan independence, according to a person familiar with the matter. The suggested wording is stronger than the Biden administration’s previous statement that US officials “do not support” the self-ruled island seeking formal independence, and would add to China’s campaign to isolate Taiwan on the world stage.
The Trump administration has not made a decision regarding the demand, and it’s one in a long list of asks from the Chinese side under consideration, according to a separate person familiar with the matter. A State Department fact sheet on US ties with Taiwan is currently unavailable on its website.
Language defining the US relationship with Taiwan has long been a sensitive subject. In February, after the State Department abruptly removed from its website a phrase saying the US does “not support Taiwan independence,” Beijing swiftly urged Washington to “correct its wrongdoings.” Prior to that, the Biden administration removed the phrase in May 2022 but reinstated it after Chinese officials protested.
September 29, 2025 at 5:49 PM GMT+8
Language defining the US relationship with Taiwan has long been a sensitive subject. In February, after the State Department abruptly removed from its website a phrase saying the US does “not support Taiwan independence,” Beijing swiftly urged Washington to “correct its wrongdoings.” Prior to that, the Biden administration removed the phrase in May 2022 but reinstated it after Chinese officials protested.
Appendix III
AI Info [Old Joe執政時, 有關台灣獨立之發言, 這些發言顯示, 他是有史以來, 對 "台灣獨立" 的主張最友善的美國在位President]
President Joe Biden has stated on multiple occasions that Taiwan's future should be determined by its own people, emphasizing that Taiwan is independent and makes its own decisions. [1, 2]
Key Context and Clarifications:
· "Up to Taiwan" (Nov 2021): Following a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Biden clarified that the US is "not encouraging independence" but that Taiwan must decide its own future, not the US.
· "Independent" Comment (Nov 2021): Biden stated, "It's independent. It makes its own decisions," which generated confusion, but he immediately clarified that the US position—adhering to the Taiwan Relations Act—had not changed.
· 60 Minutes Interview (Sept 2022): Biden reiterated that while the US is not encouraging independence, "Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence" and that such a decision is up to them.
· "Strategic Ambiguity" Shift: These remarks were largely interpreted as a shift from the traditional US policy of "strategic ambiguity" toward greater clarity, with Biden indicating on multiple occasions that US forces would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
AI Info [Old Joe執政時, 有關台灣獨立之發言, 這些發言顯示, 他是有史以來, 對 "台灣獨立" 的主張最友善的美國在位President]
President Joe Biden has stated on multiple occasions that Taiwan's future should be determined by its own people, emphasizing that Taiwan is independent and makes its own decisions. [1, 2]
Key Context and Clarifications:
· "Up to Taiwan" (Nov 2021): Following a virtual meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, Biden clarified that the US is "not encouraging independence" but that Taiwan must decide its own future, not the US.
· "Independent" Comment (Nov 2021): Biden stated, "It's independent. It makes its own decisions," which generated confusion, but he immediately clarified that the US position—adhering to the Taiwan Relations Act—had not changed.
· 60 Minutes Interview (Sept 2022): Biden reiterated that while the US is not encouraging independence, "Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence" and that such a decision is up to them.
· "Strategic Ambiguity" Shift: These remarks were largely interpreted as a shift from the traditional US policy of "strategic ambiguity" toward greater clarity, with Biden indicating on multiple occasions that US forces would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]
Official Policy Stance:
Despite Biden's remarks, the White House has consistently maintained that US policy has not changed, adhering to the "One China" policy and recognizing the Taiwan Relations Act as the guideline for supporting Taiwan's ability to defend itself.
Official Policy Stance:
Appendix IV
While Pledging to Defend Taiwan from China, Biden Shifted on Taiwan Independence. Here’s Why That Matters.
President Biden’s comment on Taiwan independence is a break from his predecessors.
PublishedSeptember 22, 2022 12:06 p.m.
By David Sacks , CFR Expert, Fellow for Asia Studies
On Sunday evening, President Joe Biden made headlines when he asserted in a 60 Minutes interview that the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense if China were to launch an unprovoked attack. His embrace of strategic clarity, however, was not his most notable comment on Taiwan, since this was the fourth time that Biden has articulated such a commitment. Instead, the comment that will raise more alarms in Beijing was Biden’s statement that “Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence…that’s their decision.” While this comment might seem innocuous, it would mark a significant shift in U.S. Policy.
Since the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan (formally the Republic of China) in 1979 and established formal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China, U.S. policy has been to not support Taiwan independence. The State Department’s website currently notes, “we do not support Taiwan independence,” and Secretary of State Antony Blinken used the same language in his major speech outlining the Biden administration’s China policy.
In this regard, the Biden administration’s policy is the same as its predecessors. In the 1982 communique between the United States and China, the Reagan administration stated it had no intention of “pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’” (i.e. it would not support Taiwan independence). In June 1998, President Bill Clinton went further in his “three nos” statement, articulating that the United States did not support two China’s or one China, one Taiwan, Taiwan independence, or Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that required statehood. When Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian flirted with a referendum that would change Taiwan’s status, the Bush administration expressed its “opposition” to such a move, with Secretary of State Colin Powell stating, “we do not support an independence movement in Taiwan.” President George W. Bush subsequently publicly rebuked Chen, warning, “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”
This decades-long, bipartisan non-support for Taiwan independence is rooted in a belief that if Taiwan were to declare independence it would likely prompt China to use force against the island. Beijing made this clear in its 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which states, “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China…the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Most American experts take China at its word, with a recent CSIS survey finding that 77 percent believe China would immediately invade Taiwan if it declared independence.
Indeed, U.S. officials have long believed that Washington needs to be firm in not supporting Taiwan independence in order to deter Taipei from taking actions that could provoke an attack. While many Taiwanese wish for the day when they can pursue de jure independence, they too understand that doing so will likely prompt an attack, which is why support for the status quo among Taiwanese remains strong. According to one long-running survey, more Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo indefinitely (28.6 percent) than any other option, while the second-most popular response is to maintain the status quo and decide at a later date (28.3 percent). Only five percent of respondents want to pursue independence as soon as possible.
Some will argue that President Biden merely misspoke – indeed, after the president’s interview, the White House clarified that U.S. policy had not changed. But officials in Beijing will see this as further evidence that the United States is walking away from its one-China policy. They will view this statement alongside Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s remark that it is “up to Taiwan to decide” whether to declare independence and conclude that there is a coordinated effort underway to shift U.S. policy. They will also note former secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s call for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent country and former secretary of defense Mark Esper’s recommendation to ditch the one-China policy and see such changes as enjoying bipartisan support.
If China concludes that the United States is supporting Taiwanese independence, it will respond by ramping up its already heightened pressure campaign against Taiwan. This would likely include sending more military aircraft and warships across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, levying additional sanctions on Taiwanese products, further restricting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and stripping away some of its remaining diplomatic partners. Taiwan would find itself less secure as a result.
President Biden’s embrace of strategic clarity is a welcome and overdue adjustment to U.S. policy, but a critical corollary to that shift should be clear messaging that such a commitment would not be operative if Taiwan were to provoke a crisis by unilaterally declaring independence. In addition, moving to strategic clarity can and should be done in a way that is consistent with the U.S. one-China policy. Last and most important, words must be matched with actions if they are to have the intended effect of deterring China and reassuring allies. A good deal remains to be done if stability in the Indo-Pacific is to be maintained.
President Biden’s comment on Taiwan independence is a break from his predecessors.
September 22, 2022 12:06 p.m.
Since the United States severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan (formally the Republic of China) in 1979 and established formal diplomatic ties with the People’s Republic of China, U.S. policy has been to not support Taiwan independence. The State Department’s website currently notes, “we do not support Taiwan independence,” and Secretary of State Antony Blinken used the same language in his major speech outlining the Biden administration’s China policy.
In this regard, the Biden administration’s policy is the same as its predecessors. In the 1982 communique between the United States and China, the Reagan administration stated it had no intention of “pursuing a policy of ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’” (i.e. it would not support Taiwan independence). In June 1998, President Bill Clinton went further in his “three nos” statement, articulating that the United States did not support two China’s or one China, one Taiwan, Taiwan independence, or Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that required statehood. When Taiwan’s President Chen Shui-bian flirted with a referendum that would change Taiwan’s status, the Bush administration expressed its “opposition” to such a move, with Secretary of State Colin Powell stating, “we do not support an independence movement in Taiwan.” President George W. Bush subsequently publicly rebuked Chen, warning, “We oppose any unilateral decision by either China or Taiwan to change the status quo. And the comments and actions made by the leader of Taiwan indicate that he may be willing to make decisions unilaterally to change the status quo, which we oppose.”
This decades-long, bipartisan non-support for Taiwan independence is rooted in a belief that if Taiwan were to declare independence it would likely prompt China to use force against the island. Beijing made this clear in its 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which states, “In the event that the ‘Taiwan independence’ secessionist forces should act under any name or by any means to cause the fact of Taiwan’s secession from China…the state shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Most American experts take China at its word, with a recent CSIS survey finding that 77 percent believe China would immediately invade Taiwan if it declared independence.
Indeed, U.S. officials have long believed that Washington needs to be firm in not supporting Taiwan independence in order to deter Taipei from taking actions that could provoke an attack. While many Taiwanese wish for the day when they can pursue de jure independence, they too understand that doing so will likely prompt an attack, which is why support for the status quo among Taiwanese remains strong. According to one long-running survey, more Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo indefinitely (28.6 percent) than any other option, while the second-most popular response is to maintain the status quo and decide at a later date (28.3 percent). Only five percent of respondents want to pursue independence as soon as possible.
Some will argue that President Biden merely misspoke – indeed, after the president’s interview, the White House clarified that U.S. policy had not changed. But officials in Beijing will see this as further evidence that the United States is walking away from its one-China policy. They will view this statement alongside Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s remark that it is “up to Taiwan to decide” whether to declare independence and conclude that there is a coordinated effort underway to shift U.S. policy. They will also note former secretary of state Mike Pompeo’s call for the United States to recognize Taiwan as an independent country and former secretary of defense Mark Esper’s recommendation to ditch the one-China policy and see such changes as enjoying bipartisan support.
If China concludes that the United States is supporting Taiwanese independence, it will respond by ramping up its already heightened pressure campaign against Taiwan. This would likely include sending more military aircraft and warships across the median line in the Taiwan Strait, levying additional sanctions on Taiwanese products, further restricting Taiwan’s participation in international organizations, and stripping away some of its remaining diplomatic partners. Taiwan would find itself less secure as a result.
President Biden’s embrace of strategic clarity is a welcome and overdue adjustment to U.S. policy, but a critical corollary to that shift should be clear messaging that such a commitment would not be operative if Taiwan were to provoke a crisis by unilaterally declaring independence. In addition, moving to strategic clarity can and should be done in a way that is consistent with the U.S. one-China policy. Last and most important, words must be matched with actions if they are to have the intended effect of deterring China and reassuring allies. A good deal remains to be done if stability in the Indo-Pacific is to be maintained.
Information
From Asia Unbound and Asia Program
From Asia Unbound and Asia Program
Asia Unbound | Council on Foreign Relations
david chou
今天, 禮拜天, 在台支那鬼子報(支那時報)又放鬼出來嚇人, 它的頭版頭條標題是: "[台灣的外交部次長]吳志中: 擔憂台灣成川習會菜單" (IV)
================================
Appendix I
日學者：川習不排除訂「台灣密約」
聯合報／ 記者雷光涵／綜合報導
2026-05-01 01:53
https://udn.com/news/story/7331/9475516
美國總統川普五月中訪問北京，哈佛大學費正清中國研究中心前客座研究員峯村健司表示，去年他赴華府交流時，美政府官員曾提「政權內部作為參考」的塔夫脫—桂協定（Taft–Katsura Agreement）。峯村認為，未來美中領袖會談，除了公開的協議文件外，不排除另有類似的「台灣密約」。若川普承諾「有事不軍事介入」，可能加速中國推進統一台灣行動。
現為佳能全球戰略研究所高級研究員兼中國研究中心主任的峯村在日經商業撰文指出，塔夫脫—桂協定是一九○五年日俄戰爭期間，日本首相桂太郎與美國老羅斯福總統的特使、時任陸軍部長塔夫脫之間達成。內容是日本承認美國對菲律賓的統治，美方承認日本對朝鮮半島的支配，日本隨後據此推動併吞韓國。當時沒有公開，屬於祕密協定。
峯村表示，去年五月他在華府與兩名政府官員交流時，對方提到塔夫脫—桂協定。一九七○年代美中建交談判時，就曾存在與台灣有關的未公開安排。
他根據與美方官員的討論，推估川普政府可能尋求的交換條件：第一是縮減對中貿易逆差，若中方承諾大規模採購美國商品，川普用「台灣牌」誘因將大幅提高。
第二，格陵蘭或巴拿馬運河，若中國默許美國在這些戰略據點的控制權作為交換，美方可能承認中國併吞台灣。第三，朝鮮半島。中國容許美軍在朝鮮半島行動，美方在台灣議題上讓步。這類交換條件雖屬極端，但不能完全排除。
Appendix II
Nixon's "Five Principles" in Secret Talks with Zhou Enlai
February 22, 1972
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30341.html
Principle one. There is one China, and Taiwan is a part of China. There will be no more statements made—if I can control our bureaucracy—to the effect that the status of Taiwan is undetermined.
Second, we have not and will not support any Taiwan independence movement.
Third, we will, to the extent we are able, use our influence to discourage Japan from moving into Taiwan as our presence becomes less, and also discourage Japan from supporting a Taiwan independence movement. I will only say here I cannot say what Japan will do, but so long as the U.S. has influence with Japan—we have in this respect the same interests as the Prime Minister's government—we do not want Japan moving in on Taiwan and will discourage Japan from doing so.
The fourth point is that we will support any peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue that can be worked out. And related to that point, we will not support any military attempts by the Government on Taiwan to resort to a military return to the Mainland.
Appendix III
日本學者峯村健司（Minegishi Kenji）警告，2026年5月的美中「川習會」可能存在秘密的「台灣密約」。他認為，美方可能為換取經貿利益，對北京做出「台海有事不軍事介入」的承諾，這將導致台灣面臨極大安全風險，並加速中國統一進程。 [1, 2]
關鍵觀點與分析：
· 「台灣密約」風險： 曾任哈佛大學費正清中國研究中心客座研究員的峯村健司指出，在美中緊張局勢下，台灣可能被川普政府作為交易籌碼，換取中國介入伊朗局勢等利益。
· 歷史對比： 他以1905年「塔虎脫-桂太郎密約」（日本承認美國統治菲律賓，換取美國默許日本支配韓國）為例，警示大國可能私下重劃勢力範圍，將台灣推入危機。
· 「台海有事不軍事介入」： 峯村認為，若美國承諾在台海衝突中不軍事介入，中國大陸會加快對台施壓。
· 新書觀點： 峯村健司在其著作《臺灣有事與日本的危機：習近平的「新型統一戰爭」劇本》中，詳細描述了中國的秘密統一計畫以及日本在面對武力侵犯時的無策。 [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6]
峯村健司強調，在交易型外交思維下，不可排除這類「極端方案」的可能。
Appendix IV
Kenji Minemura
|
|
Kenji MINEMURA
https://cigs.canon/en/fellows/kenji_minemura.html
Senior Research Fellow
Visiting Professor, Hokkaido University Public Policy School
Expertise
· Enhancing dissemination of Japan's views and information to other countries, and international networking
· Assessment and analysis of long-term strategic trend in East Asia
· Study on policy simulation
Profile
Education
Mar.1997 | Graduated from the Faculty of International Politics and Economics Department of International Politics of Aoyama Gakuin University |
Career
Apr.2022- | Senior Researcher, Research Center for Public Policy Studies, Hokkaido University |
Apr.2020- | Senior Correspondent at Asahi Shimbun (in charge of diplomacy, US- China relations) |
Apr.2007-Jun.2013 | Correspondent of Asahi Shimbun China General Bureau (Beijing) |
Apr.1997-Mar.2007 | Asahi Shimbun reporter |
Publications
· Has the US-China Conquest "New Cold War" Begun (Chapter 1, 2, 3, 5) (Asahi Shimbun Publishing, 2020)
· Rush to China 21 (1, 2, 4, 1, 2, 5, 3) (Asahi Shimbun, 2008)
· 1 in 1.3 billion man Xi Jinping, a record of the power struggle for the throne (Redstone, 2016)
· The top of the 1.3 billion people: Xi Jinping, Linking Publishing Co., Ltd. (Taiwan), 2016)
· Infiltrating China 2000th (Asahi Shinsho, 2019) of a correspondent approaching the scene of strict caution
· Fate Xi Jinping Struggle Secret History (Bunshun Bunko, 2018)
· One-thirteen billion man, the greatest power struggle of mankind over the Chinese emperor (Shogakukan, 2015)
· Thought of "I have no enemy" China Democratization Fight for more than 20 years Chapter 2 (Fujiwara Shoten (Liu Xiaobo) 2011)
· No. 219: Kenji Minemura, "An Incomplete "Coronation": China's Military Parade and President Xi Jinping's US Visit" （AJISS-Commentary/Japan Institute of International Affairs）, Oct.2015
Papers
International Security Society "Post Corona" US-China Conflict (Lecture) (2021)
Others
Membership
· Member of the Japan Defense Society
Others
· Keynes Society of Japan "Global Political Economy Shaken by the US-China" New Cold War "" (Keynote Lecture) (2020)
Affiliated
· Japan Defense Society: US-China Relations after the US Presidential Election (Lecture) (2020)
Lecture
· Newspaper Association Award (2021) for LINE's scoop on personal information management issues and related coverage
· "Bourne-Ueda Memorial International Press Award" (2011) for coverage of China's security and information policies
david chou
今天, 禮拜天, 在台支那鬼子報(支那時報)又放鬼出來嚇人, 它的頭版頭條標題是: "[台灣的外交部次長] 吳志中: 擔憂台灣成川習會菜單" (V)
david chou
今天, 禮拜天, 在台支那鬼子報(支那時報)又放鬼出來嚇人, 它的頭版頭條標題是: "[台灣的外交部次長] 吳志中: 擔憂台灣成川習會菜單" (VI)
1A Foreword by
Eleanor Roosevelt
DUELL, SLOAN AND PEARCE
New York
COPYRIGHT, 1946
BY ELLIOTT ROOSEVELT
All rights reserved, including the right to reproduce this book or portions thereof in any form.
Second Printing
Endsheet photograph by Steichen Copyright, 1945
—The Conde Nast Publications Inc.
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
To all those who believed in my father.
Digitized by the Internet Archive in 2010