台灣託管獨立資訊發達騙不了
舊金山和約與台灣處置有關的內容,有前言和第2條。依照第2條日本放棄台灣,依照前言,遵守聯合國憲章的原則,那就是台灣託管、自組政府或獨立。
日本放棄的台灣就是自敵國分離的領土。憲章第77條規定,自敵國分離的領土應由聯合國託管。而託管最後的目的在使之自組政府或獨立,則寫在憲章第76條。1951.9.5舊金山和約的起草人杜勒斯也說明了,白紙寫黑字,跑不掉。
假使有人不明白,再來看看舊金山和約各國在1951.9.8簽字的前後,和約起草人杜勒斯的主張就是台灣託管,前後一致,絲毫不含糊。
(1)和約簽字前:(a)1950.11.14 在美國聯大代表團,杜勒斯發言:台灣暫由聯合國託管可能是正確的解決方法。原文為:Possibly a temporary United Nations trusteeship might be the right solution for Formosa. (見附件1)
(b)1951.2.12 與菲律賓總統季里諾談對日和約。季里諾表示支持聯合國託管台灣。杜勒斯回應,他個人也支持台灣託管,但中國國民黨澈底反對。(附件2)由此可見,中國國民黨如何害台灣。
(2)舊金山和約簽字後,1953年1月杜勒斯升任美國國務卿,著手執行台灣託管獨立,但被竊台的蔣介石知道,召見美國駐台大使藍欽要求澄清,遂胎死腹中。但至1955年國際仍在討論聯合國託管台灣(見附件3)
由於中國國民黨想永遠竊據,反對台灣託管,1954.12.2杜勒斯遂主導協防條約,只包括台澎不含金馬,以凸顯台灣不屬中華民國。故幾十年來,雖未經聯合國託管,台灣人自努力,等1949年流亡台灣的那批,中華民國總統及立委等死得差不多,於1996年選出自己的總統和國會議員,己經走到上述聯合國憲章第76條的自組政府這個階段。
只要把中華民國憲法及國號等拿掉,台灣就是聯合國憲章第76條所說的「獨立」國家。台灣人加油。
沈建德
2025.9.7
附件1
secret
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v06/d343
New York, November 14, 1950—9:15 a. m.
[Here follows a list of the 48 persons present.]
Formosa (US/A/C.1/2266).1
Mr. Allison stated that Formosa constituted one of the most controversial problems, not only in our own country, but also among our friends in the United Nations. The easiest way to illustrate this controversy was to indicate that of the nations most concerned with the Pacific war—the thirteen states on the Far Eastern Commission—six recognized the Chinese Communists. He pointed out that it had been agreed at Cairo and at Potsdam that Formosa should be Chinese. Pursuant to these agreements, the Chinese army had taken the surrender of the Japanese on Formosa, and China had maintained administrative control over the island. It was now the headquarters of the Nationalist [Page 557]Government. He referred to the President’s decision to use the Seventh Fleet to neutralize Formosa at the time of the Korean crisis.
Senator Lodge remarked that it was still not clear to him just exactly what we would like to have happen to Formosa. Mr. Dulles said he could provide one answer to this question, but he was not sure that his answer would have the weight of authority. He thought there was no agreed solution at the moment which could be said to be the policy of the United States. He personally had in mind several objectives for our action in Formosa. First, we should effectively neutralize the island; second, we should consider the development of some measure of local autonomy for the people of Formosa, who had always been in a constant state of unrest and oppression, no matter who rules Formosa. In the third place, there should not be any abrupt change in trade relations between Formosa and Japan, where there were two highly complementary economies. Those three things, he believed, the commission would have to take into account. The actual framework of the final solution would, of course, depend on the evolution of conditions throughout Asia. What happened in China would be important. Possibly a temporary United Nations trusteeship might be the right solution for Formosa. So far as he knew, there was no firm United States policy.
附件2
confidential
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1951v06p1/d508
Manila, February 12, 1951.
Participants: | President Quirino |
Ambassador Dulles | |
Ambassador Cowen |
The conversation then turned to territorial and security problems and President Quirino emphasized the deep interest of his country in the future of Formosa and expressed disagreement with what he understood would be the United States’ position that the future of Formosa should be determined in the first instance by only the Big Four. President Quirino intended that the Philippines should be a party to any determination of the future of Formosa and that in his opinion some form of United Nations trusteeship might be the most satisfactory solution. Mr. Dulles stated that the original position of the United States had been tentative only; that the United States would certainly wish to consider carefully the views of the Philippine Government on this matter and that he too had long been of the personal opinion that a United Nations trusteeship might be the best solution. However, the Chinese Nationalist Government was completely opposed to any such solution and it would therefore be useful to seek some other formula and in this regard the suggestions of the Philippine Government would be most welcome.
附件3