台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動
david chou
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界人士/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的言論與行動, 我當然也不例外, 如果我們台派政權/ 台派/ 台灣人/ 台美人沒有人努力研究Bridge的思想與戰略, 那我們這個民族就不好在這個世界立足或存活了.
Bridge是什麼樣的人? 可用一句話來描述他: Colby is well known for his laser-like focus on Communist China's unpeaceful and turbulent rise and revisionist China's catastrophe-inviting challenge to American hegemony.
為了維護美國的世界(特別是印太地區)霸權, Bridge提出了聞名於世的 "Strategy of Denial".
Appendix I
In Defense of Elbridge Colby
By Justin Logan
July 9, 2025 12:36PM
https://www.cato.org/blog/defense-elbridge-colby
Today, Politico published an attack on Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby that was fueled by anonymous rumors and unsubstantiated claims. It’s clear that policy disagreements with Colby are fueling the attacks, so it’s worth taking them on.
The article claims that Colby has “made a series of rapid-fire moves that have blindsided parts of the White House and frustrated several of America’s foreign allies.” Below is a list of those lodging criticisms of Colby to Politico:
· An anonymous “person familiar with the situation”;
· An anonymous “person familiar with the Trump administration dynamics”;
· An anonymous “US official familiar with conversations” with US allies;
· An anonymous “person familiar with talks” with the Japanese;
· An anonymous “hawkish… senior GOP aide”;
· An anonymous “State Department official”;
· An anonymous “former US official familiar with policy discussions” and
· Democratic Representative Adam Smith.
· Colby “prompted” the decision to slow delivery of weapons to Ukraine, most relevantly Patriot air defense batteries, out of concern that US stocks were dwindling and inadequate to back longstanding US policy objectives elsewhere;
· Colby allegedly did not consult the State Department or NSC when he undertook a review of the AUKUS agreement between the US, UK, and Australia;
· Colby told the Brits that they should not focus on sending a British aircraft carrier to Asia, but instead should focus on European security; and,
· He “irked allies by pushing them too hard to boost defense spending.”
Let’s take the substantive complaints in turn:
Ukraine
Politico reported last week that the Defense Department decided to slow delivery of weapons to Ukraine out of fears that US “magazine depth,” or the inventory of the relevant weapons, was running dangerously low. This is the job of the undersecretary of defense. But were the decisions “rogue,” as Politico reports? No—as CNN reports, his boss, SECDEF Pete Hegseth, signed off on the decision.
We don’t know exactly what happened surrounding the signoff, but as an outside observer, I would surmise that Hegseth spoke to the president (who is famously averse to paper trails and prefers making decisions verbally) to clear it with him and took whatever the president replied with as a signoff. Now, Trump appears to be walking back the idea that he agreed to this, which is the danger that comes with getting your boss to agree to something but not in writing. Regardless, Politico’s allegation that the slowing of Patriots and other weapons was a “rogue decision” from Colby has already been disproved.
AUKUS review
Two of the US authors of the AUKUS agreement recently conceded that concerns about it “are not unfounded” and that “there are sensible reasons for the Trump administration to pose hard questions in its review.” Australia’s defense minister remarked that “We’ve been aware of [the review] for some time. We welcome it. It’s something which is perfectly natural for an incoming administration to do.”
So the idea that a review is ipso facto some kind of betrayal strains logic. Accordingly, Politico focuses on the claim that Colby should have consulted more closely with the NSC and State Department before undertaking a review. But the questions Colby raised in his confirmation hearing about the deal were different. As he noted, “If we can produce the attack submarines in sufficient number and sufficient speed [to fulfill delivery to Australia in addition to arming ourselves], then great. But if we can’t, that becomes a very difficult problem.” Some might call this putting America first. But either way, figuring out how many submarines the United States can produce isn’t a problem for the NSC, much less the State Department, to work on.
Brits in Asia
Politico claims that Colby discouraged the Brits from sending an aircraft carrier to the Pacific, with the implication that Europe should focus on Europe. I think this is a very reasonable policy argument—secure your own neighborhood before you go gallivanting around the globe pretending to deter China—but let’s deal with the complaint about process.
The message is entirely consonant with what Colby’s boss, Pete Hegseth, has said. In Brussels in February, Hegseth urged Europeans to “spend more on your defense, for your country, on that continent,” and that “it makes a lot of sense, just in a commonsense way, to use our comparative advantages. European countries spending here in defense of this continent” and Americans with Asian allies in Asia. To claim Colby was going rogue here requires ignoring the public statements of the Secretary of Defense.
Pushed Allies Too Hard
The final complaint is that Colby pushed allies, including Japan, too hard to spend more on their own defense. This complaint is simply infuriating and shows the extent to which large swaths of the US foreign policy establishment put America last. Japan has a lot more to lose from Chinese expansion than the United States does. Yet somehow Japan seems to think it has options, canceling meetings because they were miffed at being pressed too hard to spend more on defense and spending only 2 percent of GDP on defense.
It makes sense that other countries would try to shirk on their own defense if America is willing to subsidize them indefinitely. But the idea that American foreign policy officials would get upset at a US official pressing “frustrated” allies to do more for their own defense is outrageous. The United States is $36 trillion in debt, running $2 trillion budget deficits each year, spending over a trillion a year on (mostly other countries’) defense, and we are supposed to just keep throwing money at Ukraine, and NATO, and Japan, and one-quarter of Earth’s countries indefinitely and without limits?
Appendix II
美中台博弈／川普對華戰略意圖 台灣成焦點是福還是禍？
聯合報 ／ 副總編輯郭崇倫
2025-07-19 07:00
https://vip.udn.com/vip/story/122870/8881374?from=vipudn_newest_index
[節錄]
美國國防部8月將提出四年一度「國防戰略」（National Defense Strategy）報告，揭示川普對華政策真正意圖。這篇報告總其成者的是國防次長柯伯吉（Elbridge Colby），美國國安決策菁英圈中的「優先派」（prioritizer），認為應該盡快收縮歐洲與中東的軍事部署，集中對付中國大陸，柯伯吉就是優先派的代表人物。
david chou
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
美國前國務院資深顧問Christian Whiton是川普的人馬, 但他不是孤立主義者, 他親台護台, 我在過去的貼文中, 曾把他在The National Interest發表的兩篇文章列入附錄[見Appendices II & III], 讓肯認真讀我的Posts的鄉親們參考.Christian 剛發表了一篇長文[Appendix I], 向台北投下一顆很嚇人的震撼彈, 他指出: (1) William-Bikhim Administration對Trump II政府外交的 "失敗" 可說是Bikhim對美外交的失敗, 因為她疏於經營Donald Trump & Trumpian Republicans的關係. 他這項指控可能導致William在尋求連任時, 不再找Bikhim搭擋.(2)William-Bikhim Administration在華盛頓找了一家公關公司來遊說川普政府, 但無法達成任務.為今之計, William-Bikhim Administration應該考慮聘請DC International Advisory來做遊說工作. 我覺得很奇怪, TIW & Bikhim過去與Stephen Yates & Christian Whiton是有互動的, 那為什麼沒有延攬DC International Advisory來對Donald Trump & Trump Administration進行遊說?本欄今天結束.
美國前國務院資深顧問Christian Whiton是川普的人馬, 但他不是孤立主義者, 他親台護台, 我在過去的貼文中, 曾把他在The National Interest發表的兩篇文章列入附錄[見Appendices II & III], 讓肯認真讀我的Posts的鄉親們參考.Christian 剛發表了一篇長文[Appendix I], 向台北投下一顆很嚇人的震撼彈, 他指出: (1) William-Bikhim Administration對Trump II政府外交的 "失敗" 可說是Bikhim對美外交的失敗, 因為她疏於經營Donald Trump & Trumpian Republicans的關係. 他這項指控可能導致William在尋求連任時, 不再找Bikhim搭擋.(2)William-Bikhim Administration在華盛頓找了一家公關公司來遊說川普政府, 但無法達成任務.為今之計, William-Bikhim Administration應該考慮聘請DC International Advisory來做遊說工作. 我覺得很奇怪, TIW & Bikhim過去與Stephen Yates & Christian Whiton是有互動的, 那為什麼沒有延攬DC International Advisory來對Donald Trump & Trump Administration進行遊說?本欄今天結束.
David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement=======================
David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement=======================
Appendix IHow Taiwan Lost Trump
Losing on trade is only Taipei's latest misstep with the new administration and the New Right.
Aug 05, 2025
https://capitalistnotes.substack.com/p/how-taiwan-lost-trump
After failing to reach a trade deal with the Trump administration, Taiwan last Friday was dealt steeply escalated tariffs of 20% on most goods exported to the United States—up from 10% and notably worse than levies applied to Japan, South Korea, and Europe, which obtained deals with Washington.
Of all of the countries that have seen their fates altered negatively by President Donald Trump's second term and its budding American renaissance, Taiwan ranks near the top of the list. Its government has created a strong case study for how not to handle the post-globalist United States.
The tariff hike came on the heels of the recent humiliating cancellation of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s visit to the United States—reportedly decided by Trump himself. Lai’s itinerary included stops in Dallas and New York as part of a “transit visit” on his way to one of the dwindling number of countries in Latin America with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations.
A presumed reason for the cancellation was that Trump is in full deal-making mode with China, which mistakes de facto independent Taiwan for its property. With trade deals effectively settled with the wealthy and energy-exporting Middle East, and nearing completion with Japan, South Korea, and Europe, finishing the China deal would account for most of the trade that matters to America. (Canada and Mexico will inevitably settle on terms advantageous to Trump.)
Taiwan’s government privately blames this quest by Trump not just for the trip cancellation, but also for its failure to finalize a trade deal before the August 1 deadline. But that explanation is disputed by administration insiders. Trump officials say that the president would have approved Lai’s trip had he dropped New York and visited only Dallas. They also have questioned Taiwan’s trade-negotiating strategy and contrasted it with those of more successful countries like Japan.
The problem is bigger than Trump’s current focus on a deal with China and an expected summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping later this year. The lamentable situation in which Taipei finds itself goes back years and cannot be easily reversed.
Taiwan’s bad strategy started to become obvious the very day Trump was reelected last year, when Lai failed to attempt to call Trump to offer his congratulations. Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, had done precisely that in 2016 when Trump was first elected. That Trump actually took the call made news since American leaders seldom talk to their Taiwanese counterparts given the lack of formal diplomatic relations.
Given the controversy over that 2016 discussion there was a chance Trump might decline a repeat performance to avoid angering China. But then again, maybe the ebullient victor would have taken the call, reaffirmed a new precedent that the leaders of America and Taiwan could speak directly to each other, and signaled decent relations.
Some in Taipei have said that Lai was advised by friends with ties to Trump not to attempt the call. That in itself is a problem: such advisors gave bad advice, perhaps because they lacked real access to Trump. Lai should have had the judgment to let Trump himself decide whether or not to take a congratulatory call. Instead, Lai issued a pro forma statement through a spokesman.
This action struck some of those in Washington who follow Taiwan as remarkably different than the seeming joy Taiwanese officials expressed over the inauguration of Joe Biden as president four years earlier. Biden had been vice president for eight years during the Obama administration, which saw Chinese economic, military, and technological threats to the free world mushroom amid U.S. economic and military decline and weak policy that included keeping Taiwan at an arm’s length. Biden was also a product of the decades he spent in the Senate and embodied a failed foreign policy establishment whose most indelible assumption was that China’s rise to supremacy was inevitable but would be peaceful unless the United States did something provocative like stand up for itself. As vice president, Biden took to the New York Times in 2011 to opine soothingly but ludicrously about Beijing’s parasitic economic policies: “But, I remain convinced that a successful China can make our country more prosperous, not less.”
Taiwan’s representative to Washington, Hsiao Bi-khim, was permitted to attend Biden’s inauguration ceremony. She and her colleagues celebrated it as if it were a major diplomatic breakthrough. Hsiao, who described her style as “cat warrior” diplomacy, declared on video from the cheap seats at the inauguration that “freedom is our common objective.” She did so speaking through a face mask despite being outdoors—a symbol of the Taiwanese government’s unfortunate pandemic response that prevented most Americans from visiting for years.
Sadly, Taiwanese diplomats professed themselves to be well positioned during the Biden administration, despite a lack of much evidence. Biden did in fact break with U.S. precedent of intentional ambiguity by saying that the United States would defend Taiwan if China attacked. However, Biden’s aides walked backed each of his statements—sometimes just moments after the left the microphone—in what we can now see was control of a dotard who was not really in charge of the administration that bore his name. Many American voters supported Trump in order to put an end to what they saw as the Biden administration’s weakness toward Beijing.
Taiwanese voters elevated Hsiao to the vice presidency in 2024. Most analysts who follow Taiwan in Washington believe that Lai defers to her on policy toward the United States. This is a problem. Like all Taiwanese representatives in Washington since the United States terminated formal relations in 1979, Hsiao was impeded by her inability to function as a real ambassador would. But that was not the only problem: she is easily recognizable as part of the clique that hates Trump and all of his policies.
Throughout her tenure she was most at ease with what one might call the “human rights industrial complex” in Washington—the archipelago of people and organizations ranging from International Republican Institute to the National Endowment for Democracy claiming to be both Democrat and Republican, but more properly seen as part of globalist uniparty in the Washington swamp that views Trump as the biggest threat to democracy. Trump has sought to stop federal funding of these globalist organizations.
In 2022, Hsiao published an opinion piece in the leftwing Washington Post effectively aligning Taiwan with the Biden administration’s decision to intervene on behalf of Ukraine, writing: “The war in Ukraine has made it clear to the world how important it is for democracies to stand shoulder to shoulder against authoritarian aggression.” This probably seemed politically safe at the time, but was a pointless risk to anyone who understood Trump’s political base, much of which viewed Biden’s intervention as an expensive and risky extension of the globalist project.
The presence of Hsiao in Washington did not make much sense during the two years that Democrats controlled the White House and both houses of Congress. Her joy toward for the Biden administration alienated Republicans on whom it will always fall to deliver real help for Taiwan—especially on arms sales—and to advocate strong policy toward China generally. An unsourced claim about Hsiao by Taiwan’s president’s office saying she was “…named in international media as one of Washington, DC’s most influential ambassadors” is plainly ludicrous.
Today, with Republicans in control of all of Washington, led by Trump at the White House, it makes even less sense for people who think like Hsiao to guide Taiwan’s relations and represent its image. She has not condemned or alienated Trump specifically, but there is little doubt she would have preferred a second Biden term and has no political or personal avenue to relate to Trump or his top aides. Like her political faction, she is a woman of the globalist Left.
Inexplicably, her approach continues in Taipei despite major change in Washington. On July 29, Lai warmly received the head of the National Endowment for Democracy, Damon Wilson, at the Taiwanese presidential office. Trump has sought to eliminate the government-funded Endowment, which demonized him and even had a board member who likened him in writing to “Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini.” It is also party to a lawsuit titled “National Endowment for Democracy v. United States of America.” How could it possibly be wise for Lai to take this meeting and make it so public? Did Hsiao advise it?
Unfortunately, these mistakes come at a time when Taiwan’s image in the United States is poor and declining.
Far from being seen as an asset in the struggle with China, most Americans who follow foreign policy see Taiwan as a liability. Not only might Taiwan drag America into an unwanted war with China, there is little cultural affinity for Taiwan as something America must defend. Taiwan’s own government declines to position it as a capitalist bastion of freedom that will do whatever it takes to survive, instead advertising it as a computer chip factory.
Trump is famous for leaving the details of foreign policy and foreign culture to his lieutenants, but there is one thing he clearly knows about Taiwan: it sent a boxer, Lin Yu-ting, whom a test indicated had male chromosomes, to the last Olympics. The boxer brought home a gold medal after pummeling a woman. The Taiwanese government dispatched U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets to welcome his flight home. Trump lamented the boxer’s victory along with another one by a transgender Algerian who similarly beat up a woman.
Trump is convinced that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry purloined U.S. technology. He remarked last year, “You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business… and they want protection.” Taiwanese organizations and Trump’s opponents in the media jumped in to “fact check” Trump’s shocking and false assertion. Except it wasn’t false and like much of what Trump has said that is shocking, further examination proved the claim to be true, at least in part. The Department of Justice charged Taiwanese citizens in 2008 and 2018 with stealing semiconductor trade secrets. In the early 2010s, I spoke personally with a veteran of the Taiwanese chip business who sheepishly volunteered that his job in the 1990s was “reverse engineering” U.S. semiconductors—the process of inferring design and manufacturing processes from a finished product in order to steal them. (Ironically, I was then on a junket to Taiwan funded by its government, which today vociferously denies claims of theft.)
Those close to Trump also know him to pay attention to how much a government spends on defense. It is possible that Trump knows that Lai has promised to increase Taiwanese defense spending 3% of national output. It is more likely that he knows that Taiwan actually spends less than this amount and at one point was set to decrease military spending this year.
Taiwan’s annual defense expenditure is only about $20 billion. For comparison, often-threatened Israel, with less than half of Taiwan’s population, spends more than twice what Taiwan spends on defense. Trump and his top policy appointee at the Defense Department, Bridge Colby, have both suggested Taiwan should be spending about 10% of its gross domestic product on defense, bringing it closer to Israel’s historical norm. A debate about whether or not this is the right amount seems never to occur. From Washington’s vantage, Taipei is making claims it will increase spending modestly and then failing to meet those modest goals.
Trump officials who focus on Taiwanese politics may understand and even have some sympathy for Lai given that he faces a legislature controlled by his political opposition. But any hope that Lai could improve the situation just failed in spectacular form. Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) attempted in July to recall 24 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) members of the legislature. The DPP failed in each case—a public rebuke unprecedented in Taiwanese political history. While DPP officials blame grassroots activists for starting the recall effort, it was advocated and managed in part by Lin Yu-chang, the party’s since-resigned secretary general, and Ker Chien-Ming, the party’s legislative caucus whip.
The failure underscores a perception that Lai and his DPP are in trouble with the electorate and unable to address basic voter concerns, hoping instead that sounding hawkish on China and the opposition KMT’s dubious business ties to China and soft-on-Beijing reputation will sustain the DPP.
Absent is any real debate within the DPP about critical issues for business, such as immigration liberalization for temporary residents, over-regulation of banks and insurance companies, and the cost of energy. Taiwan has extraordinary tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade to keep out American agriculture. It also curbs investments from Chinese, even when such inbound capital flows could come with no strings attached. Taiwan failed to attract virtually any of the capital fleeing from Hong Kong after Beijing effectively ended the rule of law there in 2020; Singapore has been the primary beneficiary.
Americans trying to live or do business in Taiwan face multiple nuisances. Despite any official ban, expats report great difficulty opening Taiwanese bank accounts without a Taiwanese spouse and even then only with significant delay and hassle. Credit is difficult to obtain for highly creditworthy Americans.
To appease environmentalists, the DPP shut down the country’s nuclear power plant and must subsidize increasingly expensive electricity for consumers. Its government-run power company lost a tidy $13 billion last year. Some DPP officials see a silver lining to Taiwan’s newfound, nuclear-free dependence on foreign energy imports. They believe that imports of U.S.-produced natural gas will decrease much of the $74 billion trade-in-goods deficit the United States has with Taiwan—Washington’s sixth-largest deficit. However, gas imports will not rectify this situation substantially: what Trump officials see is a DPP-led government beholden to lefty cultural issues like denuclearization and transgenderism, indifferent to U.S. business, unserious about defense, and unwilling to close a trade deficit.
Taipei is aware of its trouble with Trump. But efforts to change the dynamic are ineffective to the extent they exist at all. In May, Taiwan’s representative office in Washington hired Ballard Partners at a rate of $60,000-per-month for “strategic advocacy and government relations.” At first glance, it might seem wise to hire the Trump-friendly lobbying firm that recently employed Attorney General Pam Bondi, among many others associated with Trump. The reality is that this facile act is insulting to those who have sought to help Taiwan in Washington inside and outside of government. As they see it, the DPP had a long record of playing footsie with fellow lefties among the Obama and Biden crowd and taking for granted Republican support. Then, once it realized there is an ascendant New Right in American politics that is largely indifferent to Taiwan, Taipei decided to throw a bone to some lobbyists it read somewhere are in Trump’s good graces. (Incidentally, there are rumors aplenty that Ballard has worn out at least some of its welcome among top Trump allies and appointees.)
And therein lies the true crux of Taiwan’s loss of Trump—and why the decayed state will outlast any eventual trade deal. It isn’t just diplomatic slights of Trump, inadequate defense and misleading promises, doubts about whether Taiwan will fight, the theft of U.S. intellectual property, celebrating what is in effect an Olympic gold medal in domestic abuse, indulging other woke passions, and anti-business practices. It is the failure even to seriously attempt to address any of these issues and an inability to understand and relate to the New Right in America. This deficiency cannot be rectified easily by throwing some money at a lobbying firm that may or may not be influential over Trump and inviting more irrelevant former officials to come to Taiwan to be feted, deposit invariably sanguine and pollyannish views about U.S.-Taiwan relations, and receive a sash from the president.
Trump has effectively brought down the curtain on the globalist, post-Cold War era. A new world order is taking shape—one that almost none of the elite foreign policy and economic experts predicted or understand. It has many actors and moving parts around the world, but at its heart is a New Right in America that won’t win every election, but is ascendant and will be a political force with which to reckon not only for the rest of the Trump administration and any Republican successor, but for many years to come. It is with this very different environment that Taiwan must grapple—likely with its own revised form of politics yet to be revealed.
Christian Whiton was a State Department senior advisor in the second Bush and first Trump administrations. He advised the Secretary of State and other senior officials about public affairs and East Asia matters. He is a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a principal at Rockies Aria LLC, a public affairs and government relations firm. He previously worked for KPMG LLP, Fidelity Investments, and Oppenheimer & Co. He is the author of “Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War” and edits “Capitalist Notes” on Substack. He has appeared on Fox Business, Fox News, BBC, CNBC, Newsmax, NHK, Sky News Australia, and numerous other outlets. Mr. Whiton has a BA from Tulane University and an MBA from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Share Capitalist Notes by Christian Whiton
Correction: A previous version of this the post listed 12 recall elections, which has been corrected to 24 elections.
Appendix II
Taiwan Will Fight China in a War For Its Freedom
Taiwan can hold out, given it has the both the political will and military means to fight for its freedom.
August 6, 2021
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/taiwan-will-fight-china-war-its-freedom-191353
Yes, Taiwan will fight.
Donald Trump was never pro-Taiwan. What I mean by that is that he never saw the nation as an asset in our struggle with China.
Some believe that Taiwan is a liability for America. They fear that China will inevitably swallow the democratic island of 24 million people by force, and that while the United States should try to deter such a calamity, there is no need to risk World War III by fighting the Chinese over an island in their backyard.
The pro-Taiwan camp differs. It holds that Taiwan puts the lie to the entire reason for existence of the Chinese Community Party (CCP). The CCP says the Chinese people need the iron fist of the Party to stave off the chaos and the humiliation at the hands of foreigners that marked China’s chaotic modern history. In Taiwan, ethnically Chinese people live in freedom, govern themselves democratically, and have the rule of law. They’re also better off economically: according to the Central Intelligence Agency, Taiwan has a per capita income of $24,502, compared to $16,117 for China.
To put it another way, the pro-Taiwan crowd sees the country as an invaluable political warfare tool in the Free World’s struggle with Beijing. Knowledge of Taiwan’s success is one of several factors eroding support for the CCP, and the CCP knows it.
But Trump didn’t. To his credit, he eventually had some political appointees beneath him who were very pro-Taiwan. This feature may have been unintentional, given Trump’s galactic incompetence with personnel—an eighth wonder of the world. But it worked out for Taiwan. Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, gave strong verbal support to Taiwan, approved several arms packages for the country, including new F-16 fighters, and sent his under secretary to visit the nation. He also dropped pointless and insulting curbs on diplomatic engagement with Taiwan that had often led U.S. and Taiwanese officials to meet in coffee shops. Pompeo was also tougher on China than any secretary of state since John Foster Dulles, if not ever. Pompeo heralded an end to “blind engagement” of Beijing and condemned China’s military aggression and human rights abuses.
But the rub for Trump was a belief that Taiwan wouldn’t fight in a war, at least not for long. An interesting feature of Washington’s feckless national security establishment has been a stark shift in views on China, from a belief that its threat to Taiwan was overblown to an assumption that it will eventually conquer the island. In part because of a lack of communication between top levels of both nations’ militaries (in contravention of law), and thanks to decades of pre-Trump neglect of getting adequate U.S.-made arms to Taiwan, there is a view that the country would fold rapidly in a conflict with China. If we wake up one Sunday to learn that China has plastered Taiwan with hundreds of conventional missiles, with paratroopers presumably on the way, and the Chinese navy dominating the Taiwan Strait, will the Taiwanese even hold out long enough for Washington to marshal its too-few ships and aircraft in the Pacific for a fight?
I think they will.
First, there is the political angle. While the Free World lost Hong Kong to the CCP, its people, who struggle on through more subdued means, did not lose their freedom in vain. Supposedly concerned only about money, the people of Hong Kong, through protest and resistance, showed that free ethnically Chinese people will not surrender their freedom without a fight. While this now seems obvious, it was in doubt before Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement in 2014 and much broader protests of 2019 and 2020. This sentiment was echoed on Taiwan, where the tough-on-Beijing ruling party and president achieved resounding success in 2020 elections and relegated to a fringe the old voices that still entertained union with China under the CCP.
Then there is the military angle. Under Trump, officials at the State Department, National Security Council, and Pentagon accelerated quick, simpler arms sales to Taipei, which in turn increased its defense spending. They set aside costly options like the F-35 fighter, and instead moved pragmatic aircraft and other weapons like tanks, drones, missiles, and missile-defense systems to the country—all paid for by Taiwan. Just this week, the Biden administration continued the trend by notifying Congress it intended to export M109 self-propelled howitzers to Taiwan. The country is developing its own electric submarine, which could help the U.S. Navy and Air Force sink a Chinese invasion force.
Taiwan can hold out, given it has the both the political will and military means to fight for its freedom. Beijing likely suspects this, and should understand that the risks it would face in attacking Taiwan are too great, especially since failure would destabilize the Chinese government.
Washington could make the world a safer place by acknowledging this reality as well, and dispensing with the defeatist, pessimistic view of Taiwan. Furthermore, it is negligent that our two militaries do not drill together and have a unified military command, ideally with Japan involved as well. By taking these steps, Taiwan can be an even greater asset in our deterrence of China and struggle against CCP aggression.Christian Whiton, a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest, is the author of Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War. He was a State Department senior advisor during the George W. Bush and Trump administrations.
Appendix III
Why Taiwan Is America’s Best Asset Against China
June 4, 2019
By: Christian Whiton
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-taiwan-americas-best-asset-against-china-61062
Notwithstanding Washington drama and parlor games, the biggest story of the decade is that America’s response to China’s economic and military aggression has changed dramatically. With bipartisan support in Congress, President Donald Trump has moved forcefully to toughen allied solidarity in the Pacific and to resist Chinese economic warfare. But Washington has overlooked one key asset in this fight—Taiwan—and often instead mistook it for a liability. This distinction is fundamentally important as we ponder the durability of the Chinese Communist Party amid an economic slowdown and as the world marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre this week.
The island nation of twenty-four million free people is frequently threatened by China with reunification—a euphemism for military invasion and conquest, and an end to the de facto political independence that Taiwan has enjoyed since 1949. The United States doesn’t have a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, but it is bound by a 1979 law to sell it the arms it needs for its defense—a standard previous U.S. administrations have usually failed to meet.
Previous U.S. messaging has also been dubious. For example, in 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell went to Beijing and asserted that Taiwan wasn’t a sovereign nation. Additionally, Powell said the United States sought the “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan and China. In other words, leave your freedom at the door.
Armchair experts who have skimmed the Wikipedia entry on Chinese culture observe that Beijing’s rulers cannot afford to “lose face,” which would occur if Taiwan were to declare independence formally. Fair enough, but this sentiment is frequently extended radically to areas where Taiwan is left unable to secure its national interests.
Every year, China enhances its offensive military posture against Taiwan. Beijing also picks off more of the handful of remaining minor nations that have formal relations with Taiwan instead of China. This is important to note because official foreign relations are necessary for Taiwanese leaders to visit America (seldom Washington, DC) under the artifice of a “transit stop” on their way to state visits elsewhere.
Moreover, China prevents Taiwan from entering multilateral forums like the World Health Organization, and Taiwan’s status as something other than a real country often prevents it from securing trade deals with other nations or economic blocs like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. On top of that, experts dismiss Taiwan’s protestations and efforts to rectify these problems as dangerously provocative toward China.
Past U.S. presidents of both parties have effectively adopted what Bill Clinton’s top Asia policy official called “strategic ambiguity.” When Chinese officials asked Joseph Nye what the United States would do if they attacked Taiwan, he said, “We don’t know and you don’t know. It would depend on the circumstances.” An endless academic debate over whether to make formal our implicit likelihood to come to Taiwan’s defense—and whether this would increase or decrease the chances of peace or create a moral hazard—has led nowhere.
It’s time to change the premise of the debate. Even without formally dispensing with the fiction of our forty-year-old “One-China Policy,” which supposes there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it, American policymakers can take a very different view of Taiwan that serves U.S. Interests.
Most fundamentally, Washington should see Taiwan as a free society that puts the lie to the Chinese Communist Party’s ultimate claim of legitimacy. Throughout its seventy years of rule, the Party has justified its totalitarianism on the basis that any other form of government would lead to chaos and corruption—features that marked much of China’s history and which some historians blame for why greatness and global power have eluded the world’s most populous nation.
Taiwan is a living rebuke of this fiction. It shows that an ethnically Chinese-majority country can achieve stability and prosperity through democracy and the rule of law. Since Taiwan evolved into a full democracy in 1996, it has had three peaceful changes of power between political parties and its per capita income has grown to more than $50,000—now ranked twenty-eighth in the world. Furthermore, Taipei has achieved this despite persistent threats and intimidation from Beijing.
Also, Taiwan elected the first woman head of state in Asia who was not the relative or spouse of a previous president. It has grown from an impoverished low-tech manufacturing center to a diversified economy and creative society. Last month it became the first Asian country to legalize gay marriage, and unlike the United States, did so through a vote of its national legislature. Taiwan also protects the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, whereas China may have as many as three million Muslims in political reeducation camps at the present time.
Democratization has allowed Taiwanese to develop a pro-Taiwan identity that no longer rests on a thin, race-based notion of ethnicity. In addition, like most democracies, Taiwan seeks peace with its neighbors.
Every time that Chinese officials rationalize or justify the subservience of law to the whims of the Party, every time they lock someone up for having the wrong views or worshipping the wrong God, every time they run over protesters with tanks in the name of social harmony, every time they threaten their neighbors with military force, Taiwan stands as an example of a different and better way for ethnically Chinese citizens to govern themselves.
In the free world’s long competition with China’s government, America should put Taiwan in the spotlight, not treat it like a liability. It represents the future everyone should want for China—a future that would be marked by collaboration rather than confrontation with America and the rest of the free world.
For starters, Washington should put an end to infantile diplomatic insults to Taiwan, like prohibiting Taiwanese exchange cadets at U.S. service academies from wearing their uniforms, and not allowing Taiwanese diplomats to come to important meetings at the White House, State Department, and Pentagon. America should call its respective embassies and ambassadors what they are instead of the stepchild legation known as the “American Institute in Taiwan,” and get rid of its useless domestic outpost in Arlington, Virginia. Consider the advanced talks Washington has held with Iran and North Korea—countries with which America does not have formal diplomatic relations. Surely the United States can afford the same courtesy to a democratic friend.
Policymakers should also implement congressional legislation that calls for exchanges of senior members of each country’s government, including military flag officers. The forced estrangement of the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries is dangerous and leaves an obvious force-multiplier against Beijing gathering dust on a shelf—what is needed is a joint command like the ones America has with Japan and South Korea.
Finally, Washington should negotiate a formal trade agreement with Taiwan. This too can be a model for China, considering it could include all of the intellectual property protections and other provisions to which Beijing has balked at agreeing.
None of this amounts to a “regime change” policy toward China per se. But it would reprise the nonviolent cultural warfare America waged against the Soviet Union even as Washington negotiated at times with Moscow during the Cold War. Spotlighting the benefits of an alternative to your opponent’s political system can be smart statecraft. In America’s long contest with China’s government, Washington should do so whenever practicable.
Christian Whiton was a State Department deputy special envoy from 2003 to 2009. He serves as a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and the author of Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War.
Appendix IHow Taiwan Lost Trump
Losing on trade is only Taipei's latest misstep with the new administration and the New Right.
Aug 05, 2025
https://capitalistnotes.substack.com/p/how-taiwan-lost-trump
After failing to reach a trade deal with the Trump administration, Taiwan last Friday was dealt steeply escalated tariffs of 20% on most goods exported to the United States—up from 10% and notably worse than levies applied to Japan, South Korea, and Europe, which obtained deals with Washington.
Of all of the countries that have seen their fates altered negatively by President Donald Trump's second term and its budding American renaissance, Taiwan ranks near the top of the list. Its government has created a strong case study for how not to handle the post-globalist United States.
The tariff hike came on the heels of the recent humiliating cancellation of Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te’s visit to the United States—reportedly decided by Trump himself. Lai’s itinerary included stops in Dallas and New York as part of a “transit visit” on his way to one of the dwindling number of countries in Latin America with which Taiwan has formal diplomatic relations.
A presumed reason for the cancellation was that Trump is in full deal-making mode with China, which mistakes de facto independent Taiwan for its property. With trade deals effectively settled with the wealthy and energy-exporting Middle East, and nearing completion with Japan, South Korea, and Europe, finishing the China deal would account for most of the trade that matters to America. (Canada and Mexico will inevitably settle on terms advantageous to Trump.)
Taiwan’s government privately blames this quest by Trump not just for the trip cancellation, but also for its failure to finalize a trade deal before the August 1 deadline. But that explanation is disputed by administration insiders. Trump officials say that the president would have approved Lai’s trip had he dropped New York and visited only Dallas. They also have questioned Taiwan’s trade-negotiating strategy and contrasted it with those of more successful countries like Japan.
The problem is bigger than Trump’s current focus on a deal with China and an expected summit between Trump and Chinese leader Xi Jinping later this year. The lamentable situation in which Taipei finds itself goes back years and cannot be easily reversed.
Taiwan’s bad strategy started to become obvious the very day Trump was reelected last year, when Lai failed to attempt to call Trump to offer his congratulations. Lai’s predecessor, Tsai Ing-wen, had done precisely that in 2016 when Trump was first elected. That Trump actually took the call made news since American leaders seldom talk to their Taiwanese counterparts given the lack of formal diplomatic relations.
Given the controversy over that 2016 discussion there was a chance Trump might decline a repeat performance to avoid angering China. But then again, maybe the ebullient victor would have taken the call, reaffirmed a new precedent that the leaders of America and Taiwan could speak directly to each other, and signaled decent relations.
Some in Taipei have said that Lai was advised by friends with ties to Trump not to attempt the call. That in itself is a problem: such advisors gave bad advice, perhaps because they lacked real access to Trump. Lai should have had the judgment to let Trump himself decide whether or not to take a congratulatory call. Instead, Lai issued a pro forma statement through a spokesman.
This action struck some of those in Washington who follow Taiwan as remarkably different than the seeming joy Taiwanese officials expressed over the inauguration of Joe Biden as president four years earlier. Biden had been vice president for eight years during the Obama administration, which saw Chinese economic, military, and technological threats to the free world mushroom amid U.S. economic and military decline and weak policy that included keeping Taiwan at an arm’s length. Biden was also a product of the decades he spent in the Senate and embodied a failed foreign policy establishment whose most indelible assumption was that China’s rise to supremacy was inevitable but would be peaceful unless the United States did something provocative like stand up for itself. As vice president, Biden took to the New York Times in 2011 to opine soothingly but ludicrously about Beijing’s parasitic economic policies: “But, I remain convinced that a successful China can make our country more prosperous, not less.”
Taiwan’s representative to Washington, Hsiao Bi-khim, was permitted to attend Biden’s inauguration ceremony. She and her colleagues celebrated it as if it were a major diplomatic breakthrough. Hsiao, who described her style as “cat warrior” diplomacy, declared on video from the cheap seats at the inauguration that “freedom is our common objective.” She did so speaking through a face mask despite being outdoors—a symbol of the Taiwanese government’s unfortunate pandemic response that prevented most Americans from visiting for years.
Sadly, Taiwanese diplomats professed themselves to be well positioned during the Biden administration, despite a lack of much evidence. Biden did in fact break with U.S. precedent of intentional ambiguity by saying that the United States would defend Taiwan if China attacked. However, Biden’s aides walked backed each of his statements—sometimes just moments after the left the microphone—in what we can now see was control of a dotard who was not really in charge of the administration that bore his name. Many American voters supported Trump in order to put an end to what they saw as the Biden administration’s weakness toward Beijing.
Taiwanese voters elevated Hsiao to the vice presidency in 2024. Most analysts who follow Taiwan in Washington believe that Lai defers to her on policy toward the United States. This is a problem. Like all Taiwanese representatives in Washington since the United States terminated formal relations in 1979, Hsiao was impeded by her inability to function as a real ambassador would. But that was not the only problem: she is easily recognizable as part of the clique that hates Trump and all of his policies.
Throughout her tenure she was most at ease with what one might call the “human rights industrial complex” in Washington—the archipelago of people and organizations ranging from International Republican Institute to the National Endowment for Democracy claiming to be both Democrat and Republican, but more properly seen as part of globalist uniparty in the Washington swamp that views Trump as the biggest threat to democracy. Trump has sought to stop federal funding of these globalist organizations.
In 2022, Hsiao published an opinion piece in the leftwing Washington Post effectively aligning Taiwan with the Biden administration’s decision to intervene on behalf of Ukraine, writing: “The war in Ukraine has made it clear to the world how important it is for democracies to stand shoulder to shoulder against authoritarian aggression.” This probably seemed politically safe at the time, but was a pointless risk to anyone who understood Trump’s political base, much of which viewed Biden’s intervention as an expensive and risky extension of the globalist project.
The presence of Hsiao in Washington did not make much sense during the two years that Democrats controlled the White House and both houses of Congress. Her joy toward for the Biden administration alienated Republicans on whom it will always fall to deliver real help for Taiwan—especially on arms sales—and to advocate strong policy toward China generally. An unsourced claim about Hsiao by Taiwan’s president’s office saying she was “…named in international media as one of Washington, DC’s most influential ambassadors” is plainly ludicrous.
Today, with Republicans in control of all of Washington, led by Trump at the White House, it makes even less sense for people who think like Hsiao to guide Taiwan’s relations and represent its image. She has not condemned or alienated Trump specifically, but there is little doubt she would have preferred a second Biden term and has no political or personal avenue to relate to Trump or his top aides. Like her political faction, she is a woman of the globalist Left.
Inexplicably, her approach continues in Taipei despite major change in Washington. On July 29, Lai warmly received the head of the National Endowment for Democracy, Damon Wilson, at the Taiwanese presidential office. Trump has sought to eliminate the government-funded Endowment, which demonized him and even had a board member who likened him in writing to “Hitler, Stalin, and Mussolini.” It is also party to a lawsuit titled “National Endowment for Democracy v. United States of America.” How could it possibly be wise for Lai to take this meeting and make it so public? Did Hsiao advise it?
Unfortunately, these mistakes come at a time when Taiwan’s image in the United States is poor and declining.
Far from being seen as an asset in the struggle with China, most Americans who follow foreign policy see Taiwan as a liability. Not only might Taiwan drag America into an unwanted war with China, there is little cultural affinity for Taiwan as something America must defend. Taiwan’s own government declines to position it as a capitalist bastion of freedom that will do whatever it takes to survive, instead advertising it as a computer chip factory.
Trump is famous for leaving the details of foreign policy and foreign culture to his lieutenants, but there is one thing he clearly knows about Taiwan: it sent a boxer, Lin Yu-ting, whom a test indicated had male chromosomes, to the last Olympics. The boxer brought home a gold medal after pummeling a woman. The Taiwanese government dispatched U.S.-made F-16 fighter jets to welcome his flight home. Trump lamented the boxer’s victory along with another one by a transgender Algerian who similarly beat up a woman.
Trump is convinced that Taiwan’s semiconductor industry purloined U.S. technology. He remarked last year, “You know, Taiwan, they stole our chip business… and they want protection.” Taiwanese organizations and Trump’s opponents in the media jumped in to “fact check” Trump’s shocking and false assertion. Except it wasn’t false and like much of what Trump has said that is shocking, further examination proved the claim to be true, at least in part. The Department of Justice charged Taiwanese citizens in 2008 and 2018 with stealing semiconductor trade secrets. In the early 2010s, I spoke personally with a veteran of the Taiwanese chip business who sheepishly volunteered that his job in the 1990s was “reverse engineering” U.S. semiconductors—the process of inferring design and manufacturing processes from a finished product in order to steal them. (Ironically, I was then on a junket to Taiwan funded by its government, which today vociferously denies claims of theft.)
Those close to Trump also know him to pay attention to how much a government spends on defense. It is possible that Trump knows that Lai has promised to increase Taiwanese defense spending 3% of national output. It is more likely that he knows that Taiwan actually spends less than this amount and at one point was set to decrease military spending this year.
Taiwan’s annual defense expenditure is only about $20 billion. For comparison, often-threatened Israel, with less than half of Taiwan’s population, spends more than twice what Taiwan spends on defense. Trump and his top policy appointee at the Defense Department, Bridge Colby, have both suggested Taiwan should be spending about 10% of its gross domestic product on defense, bringing it closer to Israel’s historical norm. A debate about whether or not this is the right amount seems never to occur. From Washington’s vantage, Taipei is making claims it will increase spending modestly and then failing to meet those modest goals.
Trump officials who focus on Taiwanese politics may understand and even have some sympathy for Lai given that he faces a legislature controlled by his political opposition. But any hope that Lai could improve the situation just failed in spectacular form. Lai’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) attempted in July to recall 24 opposition Kuomintang (KMT) members of the legislature. The DPP failed in each case—a public rebuke unprecedented in Taiwanese political history. While DPP officials blame grassroots activists for starting the recall effort, it was advocated and managed in part by Lin Yu-chang, the party’s since-resigned secretary general, and Ker Chien-Ming, the party’s legislative caucus whip.
The failure underscores a perception that Lai and his DPP are in trouble with the electorate and unable to address basic voter concerns, hoping instead that sounding hawkish on China and the opposition KMT’s dubious business ties to China and soft-on-Beijing reputation will sustain the DPP.
Absent is any real debate within the DPP about critical issues for business, such as immigration liberalization for temporary residents, over-regulation of banks and insurance companies, and the cost of energy. Taiwan has extraordinary tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade to keep out American agriculture. It also curbs investments from Chinese, even when such inbound capital flows could come with no strings attached. Taiwan failed to attract virtually any of the capital fleeing from Hong Kong after Beijing effectively ended the rule of law there in 2020; Singapore has been the primary beneficiary.
Americans trying to live or do business in Taiwan face multiple nuisances. Despite any official ban, expats report great difficulty opening Taiwanese bank accounts without a Taiwanese spouse and even then only with significant delay and hassle. Credit is difficult to obtain for highly creditworthy Americans.
To appease environmentalists, the DPP shut down the country’s nuclear power plant and must subsidize increasingly expensive electricity for consumers. Its government-run power company lost a tidy $13 billion last year. Some DPP officials see a silver lining to Taiwan’s newfound, nuclear-free dependence on foreign energy imports. They believe that imports of U.S.-produced natural gas will decrease much of the $74 billion trade-in-goods deficit the United States has with Taiwan—Washington’s sixth-largest deficit. However, gas imports will not rectify this situation substantially: what Trump officials see is a DPP-led government beholden to lefty cultural issues like denuclearization and transgenderism, indifferent to U.S. business, unserious about defense, and unwilling to close a trade deficit.
Taipei is aware of its trouble with Trump. But efforts to change the dynamic are ineffective to the extent they exist at all. In May, Taiwan’s representative office in Washington hired Ballard Partners at a rate of $60,000-per-month for “strategic advocacy and government relations.” At first glance, it might seem wise to hire the Trump-friendly lobbying firm that recently employed Attorney General Pam Bondi, among many others associated with Trump. The reality is that this facile act is insulting to those who have sought to help Taiwan in Washington inside and outside of government. As they see it, the DPP had a long record of playing footsie with fellow lefties among the Obama and Biden crowd and taking for granted Republican support. Then, once it realized there is an ascendant New Right in American politics that is largely indifferent to Taiwan, Taipei decided to throw a bone to some lobbyists it read somewhere are in Trump’s good graces. (Incidentally, there are rumors aplenty that Ballard has worn out at least some of its welcome among top Trump allies and appointees.)
And therein lies the true crux of Taiwan’s loss of Trump—and why the decayed state will outlast any eventual trade deal. It isn’t just diplomatic slights of Trump, inadequate defense and misleading promises, doubts about whether Taiwan will fight, the theft of U.S. intellectual property, celebrating what is in effect an Olympic gold medal in domestic abuse, indulging other woke passions, and anti-business practices. It is the failure even to seriously attempt to address any of these issues and an inability to understand and relate to the New Right in America. This deficiency cannot be rectified easily by throwing some money at a lobbying firm that may or may not be influential over Trump and inviting more irrelevant former officials to come to Taiwan to be feted, deposit invariably sanguine and pollyannish views about U.S.-Taiwan relations, and receive a sash from the president.
Trump has effectively brought down the curtain on the globalist, post-Cold War era. A new world order is taking shape—one that almost none of the elite foreign policy and economic experts predicted or understand. It has many actors and moving parts around the world, but at its heart is a New Right in America that won’t win every election, but is ascendant and will be a political force with which to reckon not only for the rest of the Trump administration and any Republican successor, but for many years to come. It is with this very different environment that Taiwan must grapple—likely with its own revised form of politics yet to be revealed.
Christian Whiton was a State Department senior advisor in the second Bush and first Trump administrations. He advised the Secretary of State and other senior officials about public affairs and East Asia matters. He is a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a principal at Rockies Aria LLC, a public affairs and government relations firm. He previously worked for KPMG LLP, Fidelity Investments, and Oppenheimer & Co. He is the author of “Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War” and edits “Capitalist Notes” on Substack. He has appeared on Fox Business, Fox News, BBC, CNBC, Newsmax, NHK, Sky News Australia, and numerous other outlets. Mr. Whiton has a BA from Tulane University and an MBA from the University of California, Los Angeles.
Share Capitalist Notes by Christian Whiton
Correction: A previous version of this the post listed 12 recall elections, which has been corrected to 24 elections.
Appendix II
Taiwan Will Fight China in a War For Its Freedom
Taiwan can hold out, given it has the both the political will and military means to fight for its freedom.
August 6, 2021
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/taiwan-will-fight-china-war-its-freedom-191353
Yes, Taiwan will fight.
Donald Trump was never pro-Taiwan. What I mean by that is that he never saw the nation as an asset in our struggle with China.
Some believe that Taiwan is a liability for America. They fear that China will inevitably swallow the democratic island of 24 million people by force, and that while the United States should try to deter such a calamity, there is no need to risk World War III by fighting the Chinese over an island in their backyard.
The pro-Taiwan camp differs. It holds that Taiwan puts the lie to the entire reason for existence of the Chinese Community Party (CCP). The CCP says the Chinese people need the iron fist of the Party to stave off the chaos and the humiliation at the hands of foreigners that marked China’s chaotic modern history. In Taiwan, ethnically Chinese people live in freedom, govern themselves democratically, and have the rule of law. They’re also better off economically: according to the Central Intelligence Agency, Taiwan has a per capita income of $24,502, compared to $16,117 for China.
To put it another way, the pro-Taiwan crowd sees the country as an invaluable political warfare tool in the Free World’s struggle with Beijing. Knowledge of Taiwan’s success is one of several factors eroding support for the CCP, and the CCP knows it.
But Trump didn’t. To his credit, he eventually had some political appointees beneath him who were very pro-Taiwan. This feature may have been unintentional, given Trump’s galactic incompetence with personnel—an eighth wonder of the world. But it worked out for Taiwan. Trump’s secretary of state, Mike Pompeo, gave strong verbal support to Taiwan, approved several arms packages for the country, including new F-16 fighters, and sent his under secretary to visit the nation. He also dropped pointless and insulting curbs on diplomatic engagement with Taiwan that had often led U.S. and Taiwanese officials to meet in coffee shops. Pompeo was also tougher on China than any secretary of state since John Foster Dulles, if not ever. Pompeo heralded an end to “blind engagement” of Beijing and condemned China’s military aggression and human rights abuses.
But the rub for Trump was a belief that Taiwan wouldn’t fight in a war, at least not for long. An interesting feature of Washington’s feckless national security establishment has been a stark shift in views on China, from a belief that its threat to Taiwan was overblown to an assumption that it will eventually conquer the island. In part because of a lack of communication between top levels of both nations’ militaries (in contravention of law), and thanks to decades of pre-Trump neglect of getting adequate U.S.-made arms to Taiwan, there is a view that the country would fold rapidly in a conflict with China. If we wake up one Sunday to learn that China has plastered Taiwan with hundreds of conventional missiles, with paratroopers presumably on the way, and the Chinese navy dominating the Taiwan Strait, will the Taiwanese even hold out long enough for Washington to marshal its too-few ships and aircraft in the Pacific for a fight?
I think they will.
First, there is the political angle. While the Free World lost Hong Kong to the CCP, its people, who struggle on through more subdued means, did not lose their freedom in vain. Supposedly concerned only about money, the people of Hong Kong, through protest and resistance, showed that free ethnically Chinese people will not surrender their freedom without a fight. While this now seems obvious, it was in doubt before Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement in 2014 and much broader protests of 2019 and 2020. This sentiment was echoed on Taiwan, where the tough-on-Beijing ruling party and president achieved resounding success in 2020 elections and relegated to a fringe the old voices that still entertained union with China under the CCP.
Then there is the military angle. Under Trump, officials at the State Department, National Security Council, and Pentagon accelerated quick, simpler arms sales to Taipei, which in turn increased its defense spending. They set aside costly options like the F-35 fighter, and instead moved pragmatic aircraft and other weapons like tanks, drones, missiles, and missile-defense systems to the country—all paid for by Taiwan. Just this week, the Biden administration continued the trend by notifying Congress it intended to export M109 self-propelled howitzers to Taiwan. The country is developing its own electric submarine, which could help the U.S. Navy and Air Force sink a Chinese invasion force.
Taiwan can hold out, given it has the both the political will and military means to fight for its freedom. Beijing likely suspects this, and should understand that the risks it would face in attacking Taiwan are too great, especially since failure would destabilize the Chinese government.
Appendix III
Why Taiwan Is America’s Best Asset Against China
June 4, 2019
By: Christian Whiton
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/why-taiwan-americas-best-asset-against-china-61062
Notwithstanding Washington drama and parlor games, the biggest story of the decade is that America’s response to China’s economic and military aggression has changed dramatically. With bipartisan support in Congress, President Donald Trump has moved forcefully to toughen allied solidarity in the Pacific and to resist Chinese economic warfare. But Washington has overlooked one key asset in this fight—Taiwan—and often instead mistook it for a liability. This distinction is fundamentally important as we ponder the durability of the Chinese Communist Party amid an economic slowdown and as the world marks the thirtieth anniversary of the Tiananmen Square Massacre this week.
The island nation of twenty-four million free people is frequently threatened by China with reunification—a euphemism for military invasion and conquest, and an end to the de facto political independence that Taiwan has enjoyed since 1949. The United States doesn’t have a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan, but it is bound by a 1979 law to sell it the arms it needs for its defense—a standard previous U.S. administrations have usually failed to meet.
Previous U.S. messaging has also been dubious. For example, in 2004, Secretary of State Colin Powell went to Beijing and asserted that Taiwan wasn’t a sovereign nation. Additionally, Powell said the United States sought the “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan and China. In other words, leave your freedom at the door.
Armchair experts who have skimmed the Wikipedia entry on Chinese culture observe that Beijing’s rulers cannot afford to “lose face,” which would occur if Taiwan were to declare independence formally. Fair enough, but this sentiment is frequently extended radically to areas where Taiwan is left unable to secure its national interests.
Every year, China enhances its offensive military posture against Taiwan. Beijing also picks off more of the handful of remaining minor nations that have formal relations with Taiwan instead of China. This is important to note because official foreign relations are necessary for Taiwanese leaders to visit America (seldom Washington, DC) under the artifice of a “transit stop” on their way to state visits elsewhere.
Moreover, China prevents Taiwan from entering multilateral forums like the World Health Organization, and Taiwan’s status as something other than a real country often prevents it from securing trade deals with other nations or economic blocs like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. On top of that, experts dismiss Taiwan’s protestations and efforts to rectify these problems as dangerously provocative toward China.
Past U.S. presidents of both parties have effectively adopted what Bill Clinton’s top Asia policy official called “strategic ambiguity.” When Chinese officials asked Joseph Nye what the United States would do if they attacked Taiwan, he said, “We don’t know and you don’t know. It would depend on the circumstances.” An endless academic debate over whether to make formal our implicit likelihood to come to Taiwan’s defense—and whether this would increase or decrease the chances of peace or create a moral hazard—has led nowhere.
It’s time to change the premise of the debate. Even without formally dispensing with the fiction of our forty-year-old “One-China Policy,” which supposes there is only one China and that Taiwan is a part of it, American policymakers can take a very different view of Taiwan that serves U.S. Interests.
Most fundamentally, Washington should see Taiwan as a free society that puts the lie to the Chinese Communist Party’s ultimate claim of legitimacy. Throughout its seventy years of rule, the Party has justified its totalitarianism on the basis that any other form of government would lead to chaos and corruption—features that marked much of China’s history and which some historians blame for why greatness and global power have eluded the world’s most populous nation.
Taiwan is a living rebuke of this fiction. It shows that an ethnically Chinese-majority country can achieve stability and prosperity through democracy and the rule of law. Since Taiwan evolved into a full democracy in 1996, it has had three peaceful changes of power between political parties and its per capita income has grown to more than $50,000—now ranked twenty-eighth in the world. Furthermore, Taipei has achieved this despite persistent threats and intimidation from Beijing.
Also, Taiwan elected the first woman head of state in Asia who was not the relative or spouse of a previous president. It has grown from an impoverished low-tech manufacturing center to a diversified economy and creative society. Last month it became the first Asian country to legalize gay marriage, and unlike the United States, did so through a vote of its national legislature. Taiwan also protects the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, whereas China may have as many as three million Muslims in political reeducation camps at the present time.
Democratization has allowed Taiwanese to develop a pro-Taiwan identity that no longer rests on a thin, race-based notion of ethnicity. In addition, like most democracies, Taiwan seeks peace with its neighbors.
Every time that Chinese officials rationalize or justify the subservience of law to the whims of the Party, every time they lock someone up for having the wrong views or worshipping the wrong God, every time they run over protesters with tanks in the name of social harmony, every time they threaten their neighbors with military force, Taiwan stands as an example of a different and better way for ethnically Chinese citizens to govern themselves.
In the free world’s long competition with China’s government, America should put Taiwan in the spotlight, not treat it like a liability. It represents the future everyone should want for China—a future that would be marked by collaboration rather than confrontation with America and the rest of the free world.
For starters, Washington should put an end to infantile diplomatic insults to Taiwan, like prohibiting Taiwanese exchange cadets at U.S. service academies from wearing their uniforms, and not allowing Taiwanese diplomats to come to important meetings at the White House, State Department, and Pentagon. America should call its respective embassies and ambassadors what they are instead of the stepchild legation known as the “American Institute in Taiwan,” and get rid of its useless domestic outpost in Arlington, Virginia. Consider the advanced talks Washington has held with Iran and North Korea—countries with which America does not have formal diplomatic relations. Surely the United States can afford the same courtesy to a democratic friend.
Policymakers should also implement congressional legislation that calls for exchanges of senior members of each country’s government, including military flag officers. The forced estrangement of the U.S. and Taiwanese militaries is dangerous and leaves an obvious force-multiplier against Beijing gathering dust on a shelf—what is needed is a joint command like the ones America has with Japan and South Korea.
Finally, Washington should negotiate a formal trade agreement with Taiwan. This too can be a model for China, considering it could include all of the intellectual property protections and other provisions to which Beijing has balked at agreeing.
None of this amounts to a “regime change” policy toward China per se. But it would reprise the nonviolent cultural warfare America waged against the Soviet Union even as Washington negotiated at times with Moscow during the Cold War. Spotlighting the benefits of an alternative to your opponent’s political system can be smart statecraft. In America’s long contest with China’s government, Washington should do so whenever practicable.
Christian Whiton was a State Department deputy special envoy from 2003 to 2009. He serves as a senior fellow at the Center for the National Interest and the author of Smart Power: Between Diplomacy and War.
david chou
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間(II)
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間(II)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
[本欄本來已結束, 但還不能結束]
1
Christian Whiton把第二任的老川在 "關稅與迫使台灣的半導體產業連根拔起且搬到美國去生產等議題對台灣的不友善" 視為台灣民進黨政府對川普政府的外交的失敗, 而這個失敗 "可歸責於Bikhim", 他對於Bikhim被譽為 "one of Washington, DC’s most influential ambassadors” 很不以為然, 他說:
"An unsourced claim about Hsiao by Taiwan’s president’s office saying she was “…named in international media as one of Washington, DC’s most influential ambassadors” is plainly ludicrous."
https://capitalistnotes.substack.com/p/how-taiwan-lost-trump?triedRedirect=true================================
Appendix I
One of the Most Influential Ambassadors in Washington Isn’t One
Taiwan’s representative, Bi-khim Hsiao, calls herself a “cat warrior” walking a delicate diplomatic line. China calls her a troublemaker who could trigger a war.
[Bi-khim Hsiao, Taiwan’s senior diplomat to the United States, is known as the Taipei economic and cultural representative.Credit...Valerie Plesch for The New York Times]
Published Jan. 21, 2023 Updated Jan. 22, 2023
|
|
WASHINGTON — She is among the most influential foreign ambassadors in Washington, but she’s technically not an ambassador. She works from a grand estate, but cannot live there. Simply flying her flag could cause a diplomatic incident.
This is life in the gray zone for Taiwan’s senior diplomat in the United States, Bi-khim Hsiao, who enjoys powerful insider access but endures a peculiar outsider status.
She speaks almost daily with senior Biden administration officials and is wired into leaders of both parties in Congress. “Taiwan has one of the most effective diplomatic representations in Washington of any country,” said John R. Bolton, a former national security adviser in the Trump White House.
And yet because the United States does not officially recognize Taiwan as an independent country, Ms. Hsiao does not work under the graceful title of ambassador. Instead, she is the Taipei economic and cultural representative. Instead of an embassy, her office is known as the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office, or TECRO.
Those unwieldy phrases are an outgrowth of America’s 1979 “one China policy,” under which the United States agreed to shift its recognition from Taipei to Beijing as the legitimate government of China and promised not to formally recognize Taiwan as a sovereign nation. China considers Taiwan an illegal breakaway province.
The result is one of official Washington’s more contorted diplomatic customs, and one that increasingly amounts to a fiction as Beijing’s growing threats of forcibly reclaiming Taiwan drive Washington and Taipei closer politically, economically and militarily.
Chinese officials watch closely for any deviations from the policy, studying the nature and location of interactions between U.S. and Taiwanese officials to see whether America might be treating Taiwan more like an independent country.
In an interview at Taiwan’s Twin Oaks estate, a sumptuous compound in the heart of Washington, Ms. Hsiao acknowledged her difficult balancing act. In a play on the “wolf warrior” label for China’s new breed of aggressive diplomats, she called herself a “cat warrior.”
“Cats can tread on tight ropes and, you know, balance themselves in very nimble and flexible ways,” she said.
Ms. Hsiao has a quiet, reserved manner, but Beijing sees her as a dangerous agitator. When Speaker Nancy Pelosi made a high-profile trip to Taipei in August, China accused Ms. Hsiao of engineering the visit, which prompted Chinese military exercises and pushed U.S.-China tensions to dangerous new extremes.
A Chinese government spokesman condemned her as “a pawn of the foreign anti-China forces” who was “pushing Taiwan compatriots into a dangerous abyss,” according to Beijing’s China Daily newspaper.
Even as it draws closer to Taiwan, the United States treats its relationship with Taiwan’s representatives carefully. The State Department issues special red-and-blue license plates to diplomats in Washington, but the ones Ms. Hsiao and her colleagues are granted carry slightly different markings, omitting the word “diplomat.” When Taiwanese officials visit Washington, Biden administration officials meet them not at the White House or State Department, but at the Rosslyn, Va., offices of something called the American Institute in Taiwan — an organization created, funded and staffed by the U.S. government to serve as a middleman. Official letters between the two governments are also passed through the institute.
The U.S. government also prevents Ms. Hsiao from living at Twin Oaks, the 18-acre Washington estate that served as the Taiwanese ambassador’s official residence until the United States, following President Richard Nixon’s historic outreach to Beijing, ended official ties with Taipei. Now it, too, operates under a murky status, with Ms. Hsiao hosting formal events usually devoid of official national symbols. When a predecessor raised Taiwan’s flag there in 2015, a State Department spokeswoman publicly rebuked the act.
Such concerns might seem to pale in comparison with the major arms sales the Biden administration has approved for Taiwan. In December, President Biden signed a defense-spending bill that authorized up to $10 billion in military aid for Taiwan over the next five years. But earlier last year, the White House pressed Congress to drop Senate-approved language modifying TECRO’s name to the Taiwan Representative Office. The difference was enough to prompt a formal protest from China’s Embassy in Washington.
At the center of it all is Ms. Hsiao, 51. Raised in Taiwan by an American mother and a Taiwanese father who was a Presbyterian minister, Ms. Hsiao moved to Montclair, N.J., in her teens and attended Oberlin College before earning a master’s degree in political science from Columbia University.
[The U.S. government prevents Ms. Hsiao from living at Twin Oaks, the 18-acre Washington estate that once served as the Taiwanese ambassador’s official residence.Credit...Valerie Plesch for The New York Times]
She draws much of her influence from her close relationship with Taiwan’s president, Tsai Ing-wen, who represents Taiwan’s pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party, and for whom she once served as spokeswoman. In addition, Ms. Hsiao counts Mr. Bolton and Mr. Biden’s top National Security Council official for Asia, Kurt Campbell, as decades-long friends.
For years, U.S. officials prohibited Ms. Hsiao’s predecessors from visiting the White House and the State Department. Such guidelines have relaxed over time, and she now pays regular, if discreet, visits to the West Wing and Foggy Bottom.
She is an undisguised regular on Capitol Hill, as when she sat next to Kevin McCarthy, then the House Republican leader, last summer for a livestreamed discussion by his caucus’s China Task Force. “She really does have the confidence of people here in Washington,” said Bonnie Glaser, a China expert with the German Marshall Fund who has also known Ms. Hsiao for many years.
Seated in an elegant reception hall at Twin Oaks, with a grand piano and floor-to-ceiling windows overlooking a rolling lawn, Ms. Hsiao described her position as “legally unofficial.”
For that, she blames Beijing. “The Taiwanese resent not only being bullied, but we resent being told that we cannot have any friends,” she said.
It helps, Ms. Hsiao said, that appreciation in Washington has grown “for Taiwan as a democracy, as a force for good, and as a true partner of the United States.” At the same time, she said, the threat from a Chinese government that talks of absorbing Taiwan weighs heavily.
“For me, it’s more than a job,” Ms. Hsiao said. “It’s about survival. It’s about survival for Taiwan.”
Officially, Ms. Hsiao is based in TECRO’s drab office building, across the street from a McDonald’s in suburban Washington. But she conducts much of her official business at Twin Oaks.
[Ms. Hsiao regularly hosts key members of Congress and former U.S. officials. Credit...Valerie Plesch for The New York Times]
The property has a story of its own. Its neo-Georgian mansion was built in 1888 as a summer home for Gardiner Greene Hubbard, founder of the National Geographic Society. In the late 1930s, it became the Chinese ambassador’s official residence.
When China’s nationalist leaders fled to Taiwan after China’s 1949 Communist revolution, they kept control of the property. Madame Chiang Kai-shek, the glamorous wife of Taiwan’s founder, stayed there during her visits to Washington to build support for the fledgling nation, which the anti-Communist United States recognized as China’s only legitimate government.
Then Nixon took his famous trip to China in a Cold War gambit to split Beijing from Moscow. China’s price for normal relations with the United States came with a condition: No more recognition of Taiwan. By 1979, the Carter administration had enshrined the “one China” policy, choosing Beijing over Taipei.
To many Taiwanese, it was a betrayal.
“We didn’t think it would end this way,” Taiwan’s last official ambassador to the United States, James C.H. Shen, told a New York Times reporter in the mansion's reception hall before his final trip home in December 1978, as embassy aides wept.
To keep Twin Oaks from the communists, Taiwanese officials sold the property for a token price to a conservative foundation co-founded by Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. After Congress passed legal protections to ensure that China could not seize the estate, the foundation returned it to Taiwan.
But the State Department imposed conditions to make clear to Beijing that Taiwan was not re-establishing its diplomatic presence. The estate could not be used as a residence, and Taiwan’s flag could not fly over its grounds. A sign at the gate reads only “Twin Oaks,” with no mention of Taiwan.
Today, Twin Oaks is a D.C. power scene. Ms. Hsiao regularly hosts key members of Congress and former U.S. officials. Former Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has dropped by, as has Mr. Bolton. In September she threw a “Delaware Night,” featuring politicians from Mr. Biden’s adopted home state.
Her main annual event is Taiwan’s national day, which hundreds of guests attended last year on Oct. 10, eating, drinking and taking selfies next to an ice sculpture of Taipei 101, the tallest building in Taiwan. They included members of Congress, foreign dignitaries and several former U.S. officials, among them the Trump administration’s top State Department official for arms sales.
Notably absent was anyone from the Biden administration. For years, executive branch officials were prohibited from visiting Twin Oaks under State Department guidelines that Mr. Biden relaxed. But senior officials are discouraged from attending events, like Taiwan’s national day, with any whiff of sovereignty.
Many other informal restrictions have fallen away. U.S. officials used to meet with Taiwanese counterparts in neutral locations like hotels or the American Institute in Taiwan’s Washington-area offices, across the Potomac River in Virginia.
Mr. Bolton recalls meeting with a visiting official from Taipei during the Trump years — not in his West Wing office but in a White House annex. The Chinese Embassy complained anyway. “I’m accommodating enough not to meet with him in my own office,” Mr. Bolton said. “The Chinese wanted me to go to Lafayette Park,” outside the White House.
But Ms. Glaser of the German Marshall Fund warns that symbolic victories may not be worth the cost of provoking China. “I support the administration’s approach, which is to really focus on doing things that meaningfully strengthen Taiwan’s security,” she said.
Others say it’s time to stop letting China dictate such details.
“People say, don’t put symbolism over substance. But the bottom line is, this is a fight over symbolism,” said Dan Blumenthal, a China expert with the conservative American Enterprise Institute. “The Chinese are trying to wipe the idea that there is a government of Taiwan off the map, and they are doing that by going after the symbols of Taiwan’s existence and legitimacy.”
Ms. Hsiao admits being frustrated over the continued tiptoeing around her formal title and who can attend what meeting in which place. But she says she understands the U.S. position.
“We don’t at all blame the United States,” she added. “We blame the bully that’s threatening everyone, that is creating such conditions.”
Eric Lipton contributed reporting from Simi Valley, Calif., and Ana Swanson and Edward Wong from Washington, D.C.
Michael Crowley is a diplomatic correspondent in the Washington bureau. He joined The Times in 2019 as a White House correspondent in the Trump administration and has filed from dozens of countries. More about Michael Crowley
A version of this article appears in print on Jan. 22, 2023, Section A, Page 8 of the New York edition with the headline: Taiwan’s Top Representative to America Treads a Diplomatic Tightrope.
With Record Military Incursions, China Warns Taiwan and the U.S.
Dec. 26, 2022
|
|
How Taiwan’s ‘Adorable’ and Ambitious Diplomacy Aims to Keep the Island Safe
david chou
GTI的顧問Joe Bosco認為川普沒讓William過境紐約一事可能與Elbridge Colby有關
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
GTI的顧問Joe Bosco認為川普沒讓William過境紐約一事可能與Elbridge Colby有關
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
台美人在華盛頓設立的國安與外交智庫The Global Taiwan Institute (GTI)的顧問Joseph Bosco日前在國會山莊報(The Hill) 發表一篇文章, 他認為 "the Trump team’s decision not to allow Lai to make a New York stopover during his planned trip to South America" 一事可能與國防部的Elbridge Colby有關. 他說:
|
===============================
Appendix
The ‘Art of the Deal’ author keeps getting out-negotiated by Putin and Xi
by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor
08/05/25 3:00 PM ET
Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.
Fool me over and over? I might as well surrender.
Back in the day, even before he took office for the first time in 2017, President-elect Trump sent a clear message to Communist China and the world that he was not one to be hindered by convention or well-established protocols that no longer made sense — at least to him.
Thus, when he received a congratulatory telephone call from Taiwan’s then-president Tsai Ing-wen, herself only in office for eight months, he accepted it routinely and graciously, like any of the other good wishes received from world leaders. He dismissed the cautions from his advisers that, ever since President Jimmy Carter broke off diplomatic relations in 1979 with the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name), high-ranking American officials simply do not have direct contact with Taiwanese counterparts. He brusquely told those with the raised eyebrows that he would speak with anyone he chose to.
His refreshing message of defiance gave hope to Taiwanese and their supporters in the U.S. and around the world. The new sheriff in town, it seemed, would do a lot less diplomatic pussyfooting regarding Beijing’s supposed sensitivities about all things Taiwan. tariff effects
For the next four years, Trump was supported in his more direct approach — toward both Taiwan and China — by a superb national security team of truth-telling China “hawks.” These included Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, successive National Security Advisors John Bolton and Robert O’Brien, their deputy Matt Pottinger, Assistant Secretary Randy Shriver, and a range of other mid-level foreign policy and national security officials who shared clear-eyed views about the manifold threats posed by the regime of the Chinese Communist Party.
After his second election, the new incoming Trump administration did not announce a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s new president, William Lai Ching-te — either because Lai had been advised by U.S. officials not to initiate one and thereby irritate China, or because (less likely) the call occurred but was not publicized.
A less ambiguous explanation pertains to the Trump team’s decision not to allow Lai to make a New York stopover during his planned trip to South America, now canceled by the embarrassed Taiwanese president. Trump’s rejection of Lai’s brief pass-though visit breaks several years of U.S. tradition, a favorite Trump practice. But this disruption, instead of advancing Taiwan’s short-term advantage and America’s long-term interest, represents a significant step backward in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
It was clearly taken to set the stage for Trump-Xi trade talks and Trump’s hoped-for visit to Beijing. There may be an even more sinister explanation for cancellation of Lai’s travel. Purely conjectural at this point is the possibility that intelligence sources detected a Chinese threat against Lai and recommended a prudent cancellation of his travel, with public reports from both the U.S. and Taiwan sides providing a convenient cover story.
Even the most innocent explanation of Lai’s aborted stopover is an inauspicious indication of how Trump will calculate his balancing of U.S. interests between China and Taiwan. It may also reflect the role of Trump’s undersecretary of policy at the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby, who long opposed the Biden administration’s flow of arms to Ukraine as a diversion of resources Taiwan needs to deter or defend against Chinese aggression.
|
At his confirmation hearing, Colby said that Taiwan is “important” to U.S. interests, but “not existential.” It is a new and cramped understanding of U.S. interests which depend heavily on the international perception of U.S. credibility and its incalculable value in reassuring allies and deterring adversaries.
|
The danger of diminished credibility was demonstrated with Biden’s disastrous abandonment of Afghanistan, which was followed within months by Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The harm to America’s reputation was only partially undone by Trump’s dramatic strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities last month. But doubts about U.S. credibility remain because the Iran operation, while hardly a pinprick like so many prior military strikes, may have been a one-off, not to be repeated, and Iran defiantly continues restoring and advancing its nuclear program.
The dangerous Taiwan analogue would be, for example, a Chinese seizure of Quemoy or some other Taiwanese island, or a Chinese blockade, followed by a largely symbolic U.S. military strike that fails to convince Beijing to back off.
Washington’s dilemma then would be whether to escalate the kinetics and risk derailing the trade talks and Trump’s Beijing visit, or to accept the new status quo. It illustrates the increased leverage Trump has foolishly granted Xi and the erosion of diplomatic standing he has gratuitously inflicted on Taiwan. China has its own cards to play, of course, including withholding rare-earth minerals critically-needed by the U.S. defense industry. The U.S. cannot afford to buckle under those pressures without further eroding overall security credibility.
Trump only recently acknowledged that he was frequently taken in by Putin’s empty promises about ending the war in Ukraine — just as he strongly implied in 2019 that Xi had deceived him about the nature and origins of COVID. Yet, in both cases, he returned time and again to placing his trust in the dictators’ words and relying on their nonexistent good faith.
Worse, the converse of his credulity with America’s authoritarian adversaries is reflected in his apparent contempt for our democratic friends and allies in Ukraine and Taiwan. While Trump’s recent comments indicate he may have finally seen the light on Putin, his pursuit of a trade deal and quest for a China invitation suggest another double-win for China. China has managed to achieve these so-called win-wins during every U.S. presidential trip since Richard Nixon’s. In exchange for allowing a Trump visit this time, Beijing will extract added U.S. concessions during the trade talks–beyond, e.g., Trump’s “flexibility on Tik-Tok, at the same time it benefits from U.S. deference to China on Taiwan.
The only way Trump can restore America’s lost credibility and deter a tragic miscalculation by China is to declare clearly and publicly that he will commit all the military force necessary to defend Taiwan.
Joseph A. Bosco served as China country director in the office of the secretary of defense,2005-2006. He is a member of the advisory board of the Vandenberg Coalition and the Global Taiwan Institute.
david chou
被支那鬼子與在台支那鬼子內外威迫與夾殺的可憐台灣族人還算走運, 我們還有被川普團隊重用的Elbridge Colby在主導美國的國防戰略與政策
被支那鬼子與在台支那鬼子內外威迫與夾殺的可憐台灣族人還算走運, 我們還有被川普團隊重用的Elbridge Colby在主導美國的國防戰略與政策
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
1
被支那鬼子與在台支那鬼子內外威迫與夾殺的可憐台灣族人還算走運, 我們還有被川普團隊重用的Elbridge Colby在主導美國的國防戰略與政策, 倘若老川信任與重用的是Michael Anton這類的白目與短視策士, 那台灣人就死定了, 而大美帝國也就完了.
我為鄉親們摘錄幾段美國參議院為Elbridge Colby舉辦Confirmation Hearing時Colby的Testimony, 讓大家知道他所認知與定義的以及他要捍衛的美國在台灣的利益.
“we have to have the military capabilities in Asia or relevant to Asia to be able to conduct a local defense of Taiwan at a cost and level of risk that the American people are prepared to tolerate.”
=======================
Appendix
United states senate committee on armed services To consider the nomination of Mr. Elbridge A. Colby to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Date: Tuesday, March 4, 2025
Time: 09:30am
Location: Room SD-106 Dirksen Senate Office Building
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/30425fulltranscript.pdf
So, Mr. Colby, I will let you respond to that. But specifically, can the United States enjoy a golden age for America with increasing prosperity for our citizens in this century if we fail to deter China and Taiwan, or worse yet, lose that war?
Mr. Colby: Well, thanks, Senator. Losing Taiwan, Taiwan's fall would be a disaster for American interests. The underlying logic behind my position is that the military balance vis-à-vis China, as you, sir, and your fellow Committee members have amply and eloquently pointed out, has deteriorated dramatically. What I have been trying to shoot a signal flare over is that it is vital for us to focus and enable our own forces for an effective and reasonable defense of Taiwan, and for the Taiwanese, as well as the Japanese, to do more. So my position in terms of the value of Taiwan is consistent, but what I am very fearful of, Senator -- and I think this is agreed across Administrations of both parties -- is that, you know, the military balance has declined. So I am trying to avoid a situation in which, because we are not adequately prepared, we get in a situation -- the analogy I like to use is Winston Churchill in 1940 wanting to send Spitfires and Hurricanes to the Battle of France, but Marshall Dowding saying, if we do that, we are not going to be prepared to be able to defend the Home Islands.
[skip]
Senator Reed: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Colby, you have advocated reduction in support for Ukraine, which you characterize as a distraction from Taiwan. Yet former CIA Director Bill Burns, one of the most astute commentators about Russia, former Ambassador, CIA Director, stated that no one is watching U.S. support for Ukraine more closely than Chinese leaders. And, quote, "One of the surest ways to rekindle Chinese perceptions of American fecklessness and stoke Chinese aggressiveness would be to abandon support for Ukraine." So what message are the President's actions sending?
david chou
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間(III)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
Appendix
Skyline Capitol Rallies Taiwan’s Allies
Wed., May 8, 2024
By Kevin McCauley
|
|
https://www.odwyerpr.com/story/public/21228/2024-05-08/skyline-capitol-rallies-taiwans-allies.html
Skyline Capitol, the firm of former Utah Republican Congressman Chris Stewart, has inked a one-year deal to represent the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US.
The firm is to rally public and private sector allies of the US/Taiwan relationship.
Skyline will work to “strengthen relations between TECRO and those deemed potential insiders should the Republican Party win the White House or Congress this fall,” according to its contract.
The shop will work to ensure that the interests of the US and Taiwan “remain anchored in both economic and security relations” though “political winds may make that more difficult in the future.”
Skyline will also connect TECRO officials with the people who influence the US Depts. of Defense, State and Treasury.
Skyline’s Christian Whiton, who was senior advisor for strategic communications at the State Dept during the Trump administration, handles the TECRO effort.
david chou
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間(IV)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
Appendix
Skyline Capitol Rallies Taiwan’s Allies
Wed., May 8, 2024
By Kevin McCauley
|
https://www.odwyerpr.com/story/public/21228/2024-05-08/skyline-capitol-rallies-taiwans-allies.html
Skyline Capitol, the firm of former Utah Republican Congressman Chris Stewart, has inked a one-year deal to represent the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the US.
The firm is to rally public and private sector allies of the US/Taiwan relationship.
Skyline will work to “strengthen relations between TECRO and those deemed potential insiders should the Republican Party win the White House or Congress this fall,” according to its contract.
The shop will work to ensure that the interests of the US and Taiwan “remain anchored in both economic and security relations” though “political winds may make that more difficult in the future.”
Skyline will also connect TECRO officials with the people who influence the US Depts. of Defense, State and Treasury.
That effort will be “complemented with a media strategy that focuses on placing op-eds and interviews to advance the client’s goals and talking points.”
Skyline’s Christian Whiton, who was senior advisor for strategic communications at the State Dept during the Trump administration, handles the TECRO effort.
david chou
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
3／3／2025, 有美國軍方背景的美國訪問學者Guermantes Lailari在The Taipei Times 與自由時報發表 "Guermantes Lailari On Taiwan: Keeping Taiwan Safe: Best Possible Options" (Guermantes Lailari On Taiwan: Keeping Taiwan Safe: Best Possible Options - Taipei Times) 一文, 呼籲與建議台灣人民可將 "台灣成為美國的自由結盟邦"／"台灣成為美國的領地"
／"台灣成為美國的一州" 三個方案列入考量, 之後, 自由時報的社論／若干電台的節目主持人／若干台灣意見領袖也提醒台灣人民及讀者注意Guermantes "台灣成為美國一州" 這項建議.
|
由於許多台灣與台美的Elites與普羅大眾尚未能跟上台灣建州運動的Leaders & Supporters與Guermantes的腳步, 以至於我台灣族人與台美族人至今都還在
This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
---
這是 Google 網路論壇針對「Bay Area Taiwanese American」群組發送的訂閱通知郵件。
如要取消訂閱這個群組並停止接收來自這個群組的郵件，請傳送電子郵件到 bay-area-taiwanese-...@googlegroups.com。
如要查看這個討論，請前往 https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bay-area-taiwanese-american/955239524.3655520.1754737466711%40mail.yahoo.com。
david chou
日前批評與指控民進黨政府與Bikhim對美外交工作失敗與不力[指無法或沒有接觸與爭取到Republican New-Right的支持]的Christian Whiton日昨為文為台灣與台灣人獻策(I)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
日前批評與指控民進黨政府與Bikhim對美外交工作失敗與不力 [指無法或沒有接觸與爭取到Republican New-Right的支持] 的Christian Whiton日昨為文 [Appendix], 為台灣與台灣人獻策.
鄉親們可先讀Christian的文章, 稍後, 我再來做些評論或回應.What Taiwan Should Do
Recommendations from a longtime supporter of Taiwan
Author Christian Whiton
Published date Aug 12, 2025
https://dominotheory.com/what-taiwan-should-do/
A KMT supporter waves Taiwan’s flag during a rally against the recall elections in front of the Presidential Office in Taipei on July 25. (Photo: I-Hwa Cheng/AFP)
Last week, Domino Theory published an article I wrote titled “How Trump Lost Taiwan.” It attracted unexpected attention in Taiwan and Washington for its criticism of Taipei’s left-leaning government.
Some commentators praised the piece, such as Sona Eyambe. In a video that had 433,000 views by Monday, he noted that my criticism was coming from a longtime supporter of Taiwan and warranted consideration. Among critical outlets, the Taipei Times ran three pieces in opposition, mostly questioning my assertions and personal relevance, but none offering a solution to the problems I identified.
Some friends suggested I should go beyond detailing the evolution of Taiwan’s problems in Washington to outlining possible solutions:
Start with national defense, the first responsibility of any national government. Taiwan should establish a clear concept of Taiwanese independent self-defense. Declare that while Taiwan hopes for allied help in the event of war or blockade, its doctrine is now to fight indefinitely with its own resources if necessary. Follow the model of Israel and say that a Taiwanese president will never ask an American president to sacrifice American lives in Taiwan.
Move the military discussion away from the portion of national economic output spent on defense and focus instead on capabilities that the Taiwanese and American public can understand.
Field the world’s most advanced drone-centric military. A colleague of mine pointed out that Taiwan may have more military drones than the United States. This is believable because the U.S. military’s procurement deficiencies and slowness at updating doctrine are widely known and horrific.
Taiwan should develop this automated drone capability to an extreme, adapting the lessons of the Ukraine War and its lethal marriage of high-tech sensors and distributed networks with relatively low-tech drones, both on land and at sea. Offer to sell the technology in a variety of weapons packages to other countries throughout the Pacific as an efficient way to rapidly bolster defenses against China.
Launch an independent satellite network for peacetime communications and surveillance and wartime command and control of the military. Taiwan is right not to trust SpaceX and its CEO, Elon Musk. Who would trust a man with a car factory in China? The cost of building and launching satellites into low-Earth orbit has dropped significantly in recent years. Taiwan can afford its own satellite constellation with technology easily licensed from U.S. companies. Otherwise, rapid Chinese destruction of undersea communications cables in a crisis will leave us talking by ham radio.
Allow for a militia and defense in depth. While degrading a Chinese invasion at sea or in the air would be crucial to Taiwan’s survival, it is unlikely an invasion could be stopped at the water’s edge. A Chinese invasion would look not like D-Day, but more like the Battle of Dunkirk in reverse: thousands of modest-sized boats and planes each carrying small units of Chinese.
Taiwan should prepare and publicly debate plans to fight throughout the island, even after declaring Taipei and other metropolises as “open cities” to try to prevent their destruction. There is a group of men not currently in the military who are practicing combat tactics with air guns to be able to hopefully use real weapons and aid in defense in war. These patriotically inclined volunteers should be incorporated into a Swiss-like militia, with proper training in weapons, tactics, logistics, command, medicine and other components of an organized military. Taiwan should liberalize its gun laws, especially for qualified militias to keep weapons in dispersed armories.
One of the more common critiques of my article was that I was wrong about Taiwan’s poor political support in Donald Trump’s Washington. Some specifically pointed to bipartisan congressional support, which I also doubt. Each April, I roll my eyes at the annual homages to the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which purports to require the U.S. executive branch to sell Taiwan the arms it needs for its defense. There is now a 46-year history of the executive branch not complying with the law. This is not surprising given the U.S. Constitution gives the president of the United States near-plenary power to set foreign policy and control military sales as part of his authority as commander in chief.
I don’t foresee change. But maybe I am wrong about Taiwan’s support in Congress. Taiwan could apply a test and see what happens.
Taiwan should insist that its “friends” in the U.S. Congress do something meaningful for Taiwan. People in Washington joke that the Congressional Taiwan Caucus is one of the largest and its members take no steps related to Taiwan other than joining the Caucus. First, ask these friends to force the executive branch to deliver all of the weapons Taiwan has already purchased. Grok estimates the backlog of arms bought but not delivered to be $21.5 billion. Trump loves big foreign purchases of U.S. weapons. Make him an offer he can’t refuse: Deliver the overdue goods and Taiwan will up the purchase to a total of $40 billion to be delivered before he leaves office.
Next, ask these friends to pass into law via the annual National Defense Authorization Act a requirement that Taiwan be allowed to participate in the biennial U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific military exercise (RIMPAC) and that China be permanently excluded. This should be a no-brainer; why else hold the exercise or have huge allied militaries in the Pacific?
Furthermore, Taiwan should ask its friends to write into that law that the Department of Defense should encourage RIMPAC “secretariats” in each participating country while requiring ones to be established in the United States, Japan, the Philippines and Taiwan with the consent of their governments. The official reason will be to engage in persistent, year-round planning for the complex exercise. The unofficial reason will be to create a mechanism for military cooperation in time of crisis.
There will never be an equivalent to the NATO alliance in the Pacific, but this secretariat would be a back-door avenue to one important part of an alliance: a joint military command on standby that can effectuate “force multiplication” in time of war. There would be no treaty and no explicit or even tacit mutual defense requirement by the members, but military leaders would at least have the ability to operate jointly with Taiwanese forces if leaders of the countries involved so direct during a crisis. It would give them options, not obligations.
Next, return the money given by the U.S. government to Taiwan in recent years. Literally add up the amount and drop a check in the mail to the U.S. Treasury — which helpfully has a post office box for “gifts.” For decades, Taiwan has funded its own defense. In recent years, war hawks in Congress like Senator Lindsey Graham added funds for Taiwan to spending bills without Taiwan’s request. This has done more harm than good. For what is a relatively small amount in defense terms, Taiwan gave up the power of telling Americans it was a rare ally that didn’t need or want American dollars. It can get this important distinction back.
Redefine Taiwan as Taiwan. Without declaring formal independence, Taiwan should continue to evolve an independent identity that its own people and foreigners can grasp. That identity will always have some roots in China in the same manner that America’s will always have some roots in England. But any political lineage should be severed. Taiwanese should remove the portrait of Sun Yat-sen from the Legislative Yuan and from Taiwanese currency. The Chiang Kai-shek Memorial should be recast as a museum to those who brought about real democracy in Taiwan from the 1980s onward with Chiang’s statue moved elsewhere.
Rename Taoyuan Airport after Lee Teng-hui. Taiwanese companies like China Airlines and China Steel should be implored to change their names to something else. Taiwan should send the pieces of art removed from China during the Chinese Civil War back to China. All of this would ease confusion about whether Taiwan is a culture in its own right and a de facto separate country that intends to remain such at any cost. Just as conquistador Hernan Cortes burned his ships in Mexico in 1519 to eliminate the concept of returning to Spain in the minds of his men, Taiwan should intellectually sever itself from the Republic of China concept.
Next, Taiwan should change its image from a floating semiconductor factor to a much more fulsome bastion of economic freedom and power. Comprehensive reform and deregulation of the banking and insurance industries will spur domestic growth and attract foreign capital. Taiwan should welcome funds from Chinese nationals provided they do not result in control of a company receiving the investment or any transfer of technology. Be more like Singapore or Dubai. Financial power and foreign investment will give foreign governments and institutions reasons to discourage China from attacking. Free people elsewhere will be more inclined to stand up for a true symbol of freedom — and that symbol might be seen as useful to Americans hoping China itself chooses freedom one day.
In the wake of failed globalist institutions and arrangements like the World Trade Organization and the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Taiwan could launch an economically focused grouping of governments and institutions. This grouping would recognize that the era of growth by attracting manufacturing capabilities and jobs from the United States and relying on export-driven economic activity is over. Free-market, pro-capitalist domestic economic reforms will hold the key for what used to be called the Asian tiger economies to regain their high levels of growth. The point of the group would be to give those involved the political and intellectual cover necessary to make difficult but important domestic reforms. Taiwan could open a gathering with a plan to lower the cost of energy (and therefore the cost of just about everything from food to housing) by building modular nuclear reactors around the country.
Allow Taiwan’s currency to appreciate and then peg it to the U.S. dollar. Strengthening the currency will ease inflation by lowering the cost of imported goods and services. This will improve the quality of life for Taiwanese and lower Taiwan’s trade deficit with America. Pegging the New Taiwan dollar to the U.S. dollar will remove currency risk and further enable growth in finance and trade.
Finally, increase ties with Americans and other natural allies by making life easier for them if they want to live and work in Taiwan. Americans and Japanese should get automatic long-term work visas upon request. Citizens of poorer countries like the Philippines may need to face a quota, but it should be a generous one. Taiwan should create reasonable paths to citizenship for long-term economic migrants who are committed to the nation. Taiwanese banks should start using U.S. FICO scores and other measures of creditworthiness to ease access to credit for Americans who want to live or do business in Taiwan.
The net result of these reforms would be to dispense with theatrics and what has repeatedly proven to be ineffective, to embrace reality even when painful, and to get on with Taiwan’s future would not be decided in Washington or Beijing. It would be decided in Taiwan.
david chou
日前批評與指控民進黨政府與Bikhim對美外交工作失敗與不力[指無法或沒有接觸與爭取到Republican New-Right的支持]的Christian Whiton日昨為文為台灣與台灣人獻策(II)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
雖然老川這個人很白目, 我的意思是老川雖然有心不讓北京流氓政權與支那邪惡帝國挑戰與顛覆大美帝國的世界與亞太霸權的野望或企圖得逞, 因而要其執政團隊對 "支那製造2025的計劃" 進行打擊以及執行在軍事上要嚇阻支那進犯台灣與進行領土擴張, 但是卻不知道要在經貿上要扶植台灣, 至少在關稅政策上不要比對日本及南韓還要苛刻, 讓親美的台派政權 & 台派 [特別是建州派] 能對台灣人民有交代, 也能讓在台灣的共匪與台奸沒有煽起台灣人民仇美反美的情緒的柴火與藉口, 可惜老川與他的團隊很白目, 智慮不及此, 在關稅上惡搞與胡整, 讓親美的台派政權與台派丟臉與下不了台, 如此一來, 親美的台派將無法持續執政, 而美國也終將失去台灣.
雖然Christian無法完成替台灣來遊說川普團隊與new right的任務, 但William政權卻在一年後就把Christian解約, 這也實在做得太急促與粗糙, 沒有顧及到他與他的師兄Stephen Yates的面子與感受, 這就難怪他會反彈.
對Christian的工作 "沒有績效, 不符期待" 一事, 我不會怪Christian, 因為老川與new right都是難搞的怪老子與小怪老子, 連上帝也對他們莫可奈何, 憑什麼一個小小的christiAn可以搞定他們？
不過, 有一件事我對christian是有意見的. 你既然是 "a longtime supporter of taiwan", 那你當然就是支持台派與台派政權, 也就是說, 不管他們或它們是左派或右派, 你都要支持. 親美的建州派與David chou就是與所有願意親台護台的美國人與美國黨派都友好與親善, 不管他們與它們是左派還是右派, 不管他們與它們是Woke派或是反woke派, 也不管是他們或她們男是女還是LGBTQ.
[to be continued]
david choufounderformosa statehood movement
在 2025年8月14日 星期四 下午01:23:03 [GMT+8]， 'david chou' via Bay Area Taiwanese American<bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com> 寫道：
日前批評與指控民進黨政府與Bikhim對美外交工作失敗與不力[指無法或沒有接觸與爭取到Republican New-Right的支持]的Christian Whiton日昨為文為台灣與台灣人獻策(I)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
日前批評與指控民進黨政府與Bikhim對美外交工作失敗與不力 [指無法或沒有接觸與爭取到Republican New-Right的支持] 的Christian Whiton日昨為文 [Appendix], 為台灣與台灣人獻策.
鄉親們可先讀Christian的文章, 稍後, 我再來做些評論或回應.
從他這篇獻策文看來, 身為右派且厭惡左派的Christian顯然支持台灣獨立 [他毫不避諱地 called himself "a longtime supporter of Taiwan", 因為他是支持台灣獨立的Stephen Yates(葉望輝)的師弟], 也鼓勵台灣人與台派政權採行他建議的 "有獨立之實, 但無獨立之名" 的一些措施 [類似黃信介的 "台獨可做不可說"], 但他也很務實, 了解台灣人與台灣獨派所面臨的內外制約與所面臨的支那威脅, 因此, 不鼓勵台灣現在宣佈台灣獨立或正式獨立建國.
[to be continued]
(an organization calling for Taiwan's political association with, or incorporation into, the United States)1首頁 | twterritory
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
1首頁 | twterritory
|
|
|
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間(IV)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
[這幾天, BATA群組有些異常, 包括Allen Kuo及其他active freelancers的 posts大部分都被送進垃圾箱. 我寫了五六篇與Elbridge Colby & Christian Whiton有關的文章, 只有一篇正常地出現, 一篇被掃入垃圾堆, 其餘的就都不見了, 只存在於我的寄件備份匣.]
我今天再寫一篇與 "Christian Whiton事件" 有關的post, 以便收尾.
"Christian Whiton事件" 不是芝麻小事 [當年Heritage Foundaton屈從於馬娘的淫威, 把執行阿扁政府的委託案的John J. Tkacik, Jr. 掃地出門, 這個事件也不是雞毛蒜皮事], 因為它牽涉了台灣人的政權在美國的遊說活動/ 台美關係/ William-Bikhim Administration/ Bikhim/ TIW, 也因此, 我必須多方了解, 尋求真相.
經過幾天的了解與研究, 我發現Christian很顯然是沉不住氣, 因而壞了大事, 他因毛燥而圖一時之快, 對自己的職業生涯有害, 也會讓Chris Stewart與Stephen Yates陷入尷尬, 因為他們都得維持與DPP政權/ 台派/ 獨派的關係.
"Christian Whiton事件" 發生後, 要看或喜歡看DPP政權/ Bikhim笑話的人/ 黨派/ 政權都撿到槍, 都喜形於色.
2
我們若檢視Skyline capitol與台灣駐美代表處 (TACRO)的契約內容 [見Appendix, 這即是TACRO要Christian執行與完成的工作任務], 就知道他沒有完成契約所指定的任務, 換言之, 他並沒有為 William-Bikhim Administration在華盛頓建立與Trump-Vance Administration良好或有效的溝通管道或關係 [正是因為Bikhim與她的繼任者俞大使無法與donald trump & New right & MAGA派 & America first派建立良好與有效的溝通管道, 所以才找了Christian來幫忙, 但是Christian沒有完成任務, 因而Tacro沒有與Skyline capitol續約, 而與Ballard partners簽約, 這就引起了Christian的不快.
Christian 指責 "Bikhim對Trump團隊 & New Right工作失敗", 這其實也正是他的失敗, 如今, 他把dpp政權 "對川普政府工作的失敗" 全部歸咎於BIKHIM, 這是很可議的.
看起來, Christian可能因為TECRO沒有續約, 而與TECRO及Bikhim發生不快.
TECRO與Skyline Capitol為什麼沒有續約? 沒有續約是否Bikhim做的決定? 看起來, Christian是認為此事與Bikhim有關, 否則他不會對Bikhim生這麼大的氣.
3
本欄今天結束.
=======================
Appendix
United states senate committee on armed services To consider the nomination of Mr. Elbridge A. Colby to be Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Date: Tuesday, March 4, 2025
Time: 09:30am
Location: Room SD-106 Dirksen Senate Office Building
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/30425fulltranscript.pdf
Chairman Wicker: Thank you. Mr. Colby, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I have appreciated what I view as your clear articulation of the core U.S. interest in Taiwan, which are too infrequently discussed in the public here in America. As you wrote in American Compass last year, quote, "Nothing that could happen abroad is more plausibly and gravely threatening to Americans than China invading Taiwan," unquote. Your 2022 article at Stanford has about as good a one-paragraph summary of our interest in Taiwan as I have seen, yet in November of last year, some people believe your position may have taken a marked turn as you wrote, quote, "America has a strong interest in defending Taiwan, but Americans could survive without it."
So, Mr. Colby, I will let you respond to that. But specifically, can the United States enjoy a golden age for America with increasing prosperity for our citizens in this century if we fail to deter China and Taiwan, or worse yet, lose that war?
Mr. Colby: Well, thanks, Senator. Losing Taiwan, Taiwan's fall would be a disaster for American interests. The underlying logic behind my position is that the military balance vis-à-vis China, as you, sir, and your fellow Committee members have amply and eloquently pointed out, has deteriorated dramatically. What I have been trying to shoot a signal flare over is that it is vital for us to focus and enable our own forces for an effective and reasonable defense of Taiwan, and for the Taiwanese, as well as the Japanese, to do more. So my position in terms of the value of Taiwan is consistent, but what I am very fearful of, Senator -- and I think this is agreed across Administrations of both parties -- is that, you know, the military balance has declined. So I am trying to avoid a situation in which, because we are not adequately prepared, we get in a situation -- the analogy I like to use is Winston Churchill in 1940 wanting to send Spitfires and Hurricanes to the Battle of France, but Marshall Dowding saying, if we do that, we are not going to be prepared to be able to defend the Home Islands.
[skip]
Senator Reed: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And, Mr. Colby, you have advocated reduction in support for Ukraine, which you characterize as a distraction from Taiwan. Yet former CIA Director Bill Burns, one of the most astute commentators about Russia, former Ambassador, CIA Director, stated that no one is watching U.S. support for Ukraine more closely than Chinese leaders. And, quote, "One of the surest ways to rekindle Chinese perceptions of American fecklessness and stoke Chinese aggressiveness would be to abandon support for Ukraine." So what message are the President's actions sending?
Mr. Colby: Well, Senator, I would say a couple things. One, my arguments about Ukraine have been based on the need for strategic prioritization. I don't contest the fact that the Chinese are looking at what we are doing in Ukraine at all. But fundamentally, Senator, in my view -- and I think it should be of particular interest to this Committee, sir -- is that we have to have the military capabilities in Asia or relevant to Asia to be able to conduct a local defense of Taiwan at a cost and level of risk that the American people are prepared to tolerate. And that has been my main focus.
在 2025年8月8日 星期五 上午10:29:54 [GMT+8]， david chou<davidch...@yahoo.com> 寫道：
GTI的顧問Joe Bosco認為川普沒讓William過境紐約一事可能與Elbridge Colby有關
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (III)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
1
台美人在華盛頓設立的國安與外交智庫The Global Taiwan Institute (GTI)的顧問Joseph Bosco日前在國會山莊報(The Hill) 發表一篇文章, 他認為 "the Trump team’s decision not to allow Lai to make a New York stopover during his planned trip to South America" 一事可能與國防部的Elbridge Colby有關. 他說:
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
Why Protecting Taiwan Really Matters to the U.S.
Elbridge A. Colby
Defending far-off Taiwan and our allies seems to many like yet another foolish military misadventure for our cou...
|
|
|
3
很遺憾,我發起的台灣建州運動至今還無法讓台灣加入美國, 成為美國的Territory.若台灣是美國的領地或一州或領土, 支那鬼子絕不敢覬覦或欺凌或威脅或侵略台灣, 而一旦支那鬼子對台灣動武時, 美國也必對支那宣戰, 如同當年日本奇襲美國的夏威夷領地一樣.台灣建州運動的實力與影響力至今也尚未達到可以讓華盛頓來把台灣視為美國領地,且願以舉國之力拼死拼活地加以保護的程度.我的台灣與台美鄉親還得與我一起繼續努力.
===============================
Appendix
The ‘Art of the Deal’ author keeps getting out-negotiated by Putin and Xi
by Joseph Bosco, opinion contributor
08/05/25 3:00 PM ET
https://thehill.com/opinion/national-security/5435517-the-art-of-the-deal-author-keeps-getting-out-negotiated-by-putin-and-xi/
Fool me once, shame on you; fool me twice, shame on me.
Fool me over and over? I might as well surrender.
Back in the day, even before he took office for the first time in 2017, President-elect Trump sent a clear message to Communist China and the world that he was not one to be hindered by convention or well-established protocols that no longer made sense — at least to him.
Thus, when he received a congratulatory telephone call from Taiwan’s then-president Tsai Ing-wen, herself only in office for eight months, he accepted it routinely and graciously, like any of the other good wishes received from world leaders. He dismissed the cautions from his advisers that, ever since President Jimmy Carter broke off diplomatic relations in 1979 with the Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name), high-ranking American officials simply do not have direct contact with Taiwanese counterparts. He brusquely told those with the raised eyebrows that he would speak with anyone he chose to.
His refreshing message of defiance gave hope to Taiwanese and their supporters in the U.S. and around the world. The new sheriff in town, it seemed, would do a lot less diplomatic pussyfooting regarding Beijing’s supposed sensitivities about all things Taiwan. tariff effects
For the next four years, Trump was supported in his more direct approach — toward both Taiwan and China — by a superb national security team of truth-telling China “hawks.” These included Vice President Mike Pence, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo, successive National Security Advisors John Bolton and Robert O’Brien, their deputy Matt Pottinger, Assistant Secretary Randy Shriver, and a range of other mid-level foreign policy and national security officials who shared clear-eyed views about the manifold threats posed by the regime of the Chinese Communist Party.
After his second election, the new incoming Trump administration did not announce a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s new president, William Lai Ching-te — either because Lai had been advised by U.S. officials not to initiate one and thereby irritate China, or because (less likely) the call occurred but was not publicized.
A less ambiguous explanation pertains to the Trump team’s decision not to allow Lai to make a New York stopover during his planned trip to South America, now canceled by the embarrassed Taiwanese president. Trump’s rejection of Lai’s brief pass-though visit breaks several years of U.S. tradition, a favorite Trump practice. But this disruption, instead of advancing Taiwan’s short-term advantage and America’s long-term interest, represents a significant step backward in the U.S.-Taiwan relationship.
It was clearly taken to set the stage for Trump-Xi trade talks and Trump’s hoped-for visit to Beijing. There may be an even more sinister explanation for cancellation of Lai’s travel. Purely conjectural at this point is the possibility that intelligence sources detected a Chinese threat against Lai and recommended a prudent cancellation of his travel, with public reports from both the U.S. and Taiwan sides providing a convenient cover story.
Even the most innocent explanation of Lai’s aborted stopover is an inauspicious indication of how Trump will calculate his balancing of U.S. interests between China and Taiwan. It may also reflect the role of Trump’s undersecretary of policy at the Pentagon, Elbridge Colby, who long opposed the Biden administration’s flow of arms to Ukraine as a diversion of resources Taiwan needs to deter or defend against Chinese aggression.
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
Morgan Phillips
The U.S. halts Patriot missile shipments to Ukraine during global review of military aid priorities, sparking de...
|
|
|
At his confirmation hearing, Colby said that Taiwan is “important” to U.S. interests, but “not existential.” It is a new and cramped understanding of U.S. interests which depend heavily on the international perception of U.S. credibility and its incalculable value in reassuring allies and deterring adversaries.
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
"Taiwan is important to the United States, but it is not an existential ...
"Taiwan is important to the United States, but it is not an existential interest." On the 4th, U.S. President Do...
|
|
|
The danger of diminished credibility was demonstrated with Biden’s disastrous abandonment of Afghanistan, which was followed within months by Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. The harm to America’s reputation was only partially undone by Trump’s dramatic strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities last month. But doubts about U.S. credibility remain because the Iran operation, while hardly a pinprick like so many prior military strikes, may have been a one-off, not to be repeated, and Iran defiantly continues restoring and advancing its nuclear program.
The dangerous Taiwan analogue would be, for example, a Chinese seizure of Quemoy or some other Taiwanese island, or a Chinese blockade, followed by a largely symbolic U.S. military strike that fails to convince Beijing to back off.
Washington’s dilemma then would be whether to escalate the kinetics and risk derailing the trade talks and Trump’s Beijing visit, or to accept the new status quo. It illustrates the increased leverage Trump has foolishly granted Xi and the erosion of diplomatic standing he has gratuitously inflicted on Taiwan. China has its own cards to play, of course, including withholding rare-earth minerals critically-needed by the U.S. defense industry. The U.S. cannot afford to buckle under those pressures without further eroding overall security credibility.
Trump only recently acknowledged that he was frequently taken in by Putin’s empty promises about ending the war in Ukraine — just as he strongly implied in 2019 that Xi had deceived him about the nature and origins of COVID. Yet, in both cases, he returned time and again to placing his trust in the dictators’ words and relying on their nonexistent good faith.
Worse, the converse of his credulity with America’s authoritarian adversaries is reflected in his apparent contempt for our democratic friends and allies in Ukraine and Taiwan. While Trump’s recent comments indicate he may have finally seen the light on Putin, his pursuit of a trade deal and quest for a China invitation suggest another double-win for China. China has managed to achieve these so-called win-wins during every U.S. presidential trip since Richard Nixon’s. In exchange for allowing a Trump visit this time, Beijing will extract added U.S. concessions during the trade talks–beyond, e.g., Trump’s “flexibility on Tik-Tok, at the same time it benefits from U.S. deference to China on Taiwan.
To borrow Trump’s assessment of most of his predecessors, this is the way to Make America “Stupid” Again.
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
|
|
|
The only way Trump can restore America’s lost credibility and deter a tragic miscalculation by China is to declare clearly and publicly that he will commit all the military force necessary to defend Taiwan.
Joseph A. Bosco served as China country director in the office of the secretary of defense,2005-2006. He is a member of the advisory board of the Vandenberg Coalition and the Global Taiwan Institute.
在 2025年8月7日 星期四 下午06:07:30 [GMT+8]， david chou<davidch...@yahoo.com> 寫道：
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間(II)
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25
[本欄本來已結束, 但還不能結束]
1
Christian Whiton把第二任的老川在 "關稅與迫使台灣的半導體產業連根拔起且搬到美國去生產等議題對台灣的不友善" 視為台灣民進黨政府對川普政府的外交的失敗, 而這個失敗 "可歸責於Bikhim", 他對於Bikhim被譽為 "one of Washington, DC’s most influential ambassadors” 很不以為然, 他說:
"An unsourced claim about Hsiao by Taiwan’s president’s office saying she was “…named in international media as one of Washington, DC’s most influential ambassadors” is plainly ludicrous."
Bikhim在駐美期間, 代表台灣與民進黨政府對美國與Old Joe政府做外交工作, 獲若干親民主黨的但被Old Donald討厭的傳統主流媒體譽為 "one of Washington, DC’s most influential ambassadors”, 而非她以此自居或沾沾自喜, Christian以此批評Bikhim, 實在有失厚道.
關於Bikhim被美國媒體讚譽一事, 我過去在BATA群組提過, 我還以Old Donald很討厭的New York Times的一篇報導為例, 我現在再把它張貼在附錄[Appendix I].
2
Bikhim在對美國做外交工作時, 她當然也一樣會對Republicans做工作, 特別是那些友台護台的傳統Republicans. 她會不會想接觸及說服及爭取Old Donald & New Right & Trumpian Republicans, 當然想, 不過, 我相信有一些較為極端的右派Lunatics, 如Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, Bikhim一定見不到, 更別說要爭取他們的支持了.
3
Christian的文章發表後, Bonnie Glaser在 X 為Bikhim說話:
https://x.com/BonnieGlaser/status/1952853758406234385
Bonnie Glaser / 葛來儀@BonnieGlaser
First, Whitson claims Lai should have attempted to call Trump after he was reelected as his predecessor Tsai Ing-wen did. He fails to point out, however, that in April 2017 when asked by a journalist whether he would take a second phone call from Tsai... 2/x
Trump said he would have to check with Xi Jinping first. Lai learned a lesson; he understood the risks and made the right choice. He sent a congratulatory message and dispatched a delegation to the inauguration ceremony led by the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan. 3/x
Second, Whitson states that “most analysts believe that Lai defers” to his VP Bi-khim Hsiao on policy toward the United States.” I can say with confidence that Lai’s policy toward the US is very much his own. 4/x
Third, Whitson’s charge that Hsiao and the DPP are “lefties” that supported Obama and Biden while ignoring Republicans would likely be challenged by most of Taiwan’s friends in Congress and elsewhere. 5/x
As Taiwan’s rep in DC, Hsiao spent as much time with Republican members of Congress as she did with what Whitson calls the “human rights industrial complex. Taiwan has a long history of friendships with both Democrats and Republicans. 6/x
Fourth, regarding the 20% provisional tariff on Taiwan (down from 32%) and the fact that those levies are higher than those applied to Japan, South Korea, and Europe, it’s no secret that the investments pledged by those countries will probably never reach those levels. 7/x
TSMC’s promised investment of $165 bn represents the largest foreign direct investment in U.S. history, and is strengthening the US semiconductor ecosystem. They are about to close a record deal with Alaska for 6 million tons of LNG. I’d say Taiwan isn’t being treated fairly.
Fifth, Whitson criticizes Taiwan for curbing investment from China, but restrictions on China are understandable given Taiwan’s security concerns. Taiwan may have failed to attract the bulk of capital fleeing from Hong Kong, but has benefited from a surge in FDI from Europe. 9/x
Finally, I agree Taipei hasn’t yet figured out a strategy to manage ties with the 2nd Trump admin. But nothing Taiwan does will change the fact that Trump is focused on reaching a deal with China. I hope that Taiwan’s interests aren’t damaged in the process. 11/x
4
我認為, 老川很牛B, 他打定要對台灣課高關稅, 執意要迫使台灣的半導體產業連根拔起且移到美國本土去, 所以任誰去遊說, 也不為所動, 包括Christian去遊說, 也沒用. 所以, 我認為, 他把William-Bikhim Administration "對Old Donald Administration外交的失敗" 歸咎於 "Bikhim對美外交的失敗", 是言過其實.
================================
Appendix I
One of the Most Influential Ambassadors in Washington Isn’t One
Taiwan’s representative, Bi-khim Hsiao, calls herself a “cat warrior” walking a delicate diplomatic line. China calls her a troublemaker who could trigger a war.
[Bi-khim Hsiao, Taiwan’s senior diplomat to the United States, is known as the Taipei economic and cultural representative.Credit...Valerie Plesch for The New York Times]
By Michael Crowley
Published Jan. 21, 2023 Updated Jan. 22, 2023
阅读简体中文版閱讀繁體中文版
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
儘管蕭美琴是華盛頓最有影響力的外國使節之一，其正式身份並非大使。她身處灰色地帶，自稱「戰貓」，與拜登政府高級官員及國會議員密切聯繫，被北京視為危險的煽動者。
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
Even as China’s threats on reunification grow more pointed, most recently at the Communist Party congress, Taiwa...
|
|
|
|
|
|
| | |
|
|
|
| |
How Taiwan’s ‘Adorable’ and Ambitious Diplomacy Aims to Keep the Island ...
Even as China’s threats on reunification grow more pointed, most recently at the Communist Party congress, Taiwa...
|
|
|
How Taiwan’s ‘Adorable’ and Ambitious Diplomacy Aims to Keep the Island Safe
Oct. 20, 2022
在 2025年8月6日 星期三 下午07:24:50 [GMT+8]， david chou<davidch...@yahoo.com> 寫道：
對美外交仙女Bikhim被Christian Whiton貶謫回人間
美國的國安事務界/ 各國的戰略研究界/ 台灣與支那的國安事務界都很關注美國戰略才子Elbridge Colby的戰略/思想/言論/行動 (II)
David Chou (周威霖) BATA專欄 (73) 7/19/25