2026 National Defense Strategy非機密版本公佈後的追蹤
david chou
12026 National Defense Strategy非機密版本公佈後的追蹤(I)我今天開新欄, 旨在update舊欄--- "2025 National Defense Strategy將於下月公布, 但有機會參贊機要的軍事家Toshi Yoshihara已透露了兩個很重大的訊息".2我在舊欄說:"由於非機密版的2026 National Defense Strategy完全沒有提到台灣, 這引起美國親台鷹派的憂慮, 也引起各方的好奇, 包括Politico在內的媒體.專家.觀察家, 都想來解決這個謎."33月3日, 參議院軍事委員會舉辦一項聽證會 [標題是: "To Receive an Update on the National Defense Strategy"], 邀請 "2026 National Defense Strategy"這份文件的起草人Elbridge Colby來作證. Elbridge先present他的書面證詞 [Appendix], 之後, 再接受參議員的質詢.[to be continued]David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement=========================AppendixOpen/Closed: [Hearing title] To receive an update on the National Defense Strategy
Date: Tuesday, March 3, 2026
Time: 09:30am
Location: SH-216 Hart Senate Office Building
Statement of The Honorable Elbridge Colby, Under Secretary of War for Policy
2026 National Defense Strategy
Senate Armed Services Committee
March 3, 2026
https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/colby_opening_statement.pdf
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Reed, thank you for the opportunity to appear before the distinguished members of this committee to testify on the Department of War’s 2026 National Defense Strategy.
The animating purpose of this Strategy was to put into reality the logic of President Trump’s common sense, America first, peace through strength approach. At its heart, as detailed in the 2025 National Security Strategy, this approach is channeled through the principle of flexible realism: that is, the effort to practically and realistically advance and protect the concrete interests of regular Americans. The core of a strategy, as the NSS eloquently describes, is to evaluate, sort, and prioritize. Needless to say, this is of special importance in the realm of war and peace. The heavy responsibility of effectively doing so motivated our work at the Department to produce the 2026 NDS, and we believe under Secretary Hegseth’s leadership that we have done so.
Under President Trump’s leadership, and with your support in Congress, the American military is, and will be, the world’s finest, an unmatched fighting force that has impressively demonstrated its prowess in recent months in Operations MIDNIGHT HAMMER and ABSOLUTE RESOLVE.
At the same time, we recognize that, as Secretary Hegseth has aptly put it, we cannot do everything, everywhere all the time. This is, of course, a practical reality. The American military, while without peer, is not infinite in its application and resources. Potential opponents have been building their strength and capabilities and it is not fair, just, or sustainable to ask the American people to bear burdens that are inequitably distributed with those of our allies and partners.
As a result, we must prioritize. And this Strategy does so. It does not do so in a way that is pinched or hesitant. Instead, it does so in a way that prudently, practically navigates between two unreasonable extremes: on the one hand an isolationism that pretends we can retreat from the world and that a favorable stability will emerge, and on the other hand an unfettered use of military force for overly expansive ends that would drain the American people’s will and resources in unnecessary and overly ambitious conflict. This Strategy, rather, prudently adopts a middle course that will actually put us on a far firmer, more successful, and thus more lasting course than either of these extreme alternatives.
In particular, the NDS does so by intelligently and strategically allocating our resources and that of our incredible armed forces towards the priorities that most affect regular Americans and where our efforts are most material and necessary to achieve American interests in the world. This is a reflection of common sense, America First thinking.
As a deduction, the Strategy is built on four pillars.
First, it restores, after decades of neglect by some administrations, the military’s role in securing our Homeland and ensuring our key interests in our native hemisphere are protected. This is critical for regular Americans because we must ensure that we are directly protected and secure in our own home area. While the military is only a part of this effort, and often far from the leading element, it does play a critical role that will be enduring.
Second, the Strategy focuses our military effort on ensuring the preservation of a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific, the world’s largest market area. America’s interests there are real and significant because of the scale of that market. At the same time, our interests are not limitless. We do not need to dominate that region, rather, we only need to prevent that vast and dynamic region from being dominated so that we can trade and interact with it on fair and reasonable terms for regular Americans.
As a result, our Strategy there is to deter China through strength, not confrontation. We understand that China is a very powerful country that is undertaking an extraordinary military buildup. That is a simple fact. At the same time we are clear that we do not seek conflict with China. To the contrary, we seek to avoid it. We make clear that our interests with respect to China are scoped and reasonable – we do not seek to strangle China nor compel a change in its form of government. Rather, we seek to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of the Indo-Pacific.
In particular, this requires – as the NSS clearly states – being able to deny the feasibility of successful aggression along the first island chain. Because of its significance and the central importance of the military role in meeting this requirement, meeting this standard of an effective denial defense along the first island chain is the primary focus of the U.S. armed forces. At the same time, ensuring our forces can pace to this challenging standard will ensure that the Department can always offer the President the operational flexibility and agility required for other objectives, especially the ability to launch decisive operations against targets anywhere – including directly from the U.S. Homeland.
It is critical to emphasize here that our Strategy is well aligned not only with the interests of our allies in the Indo-Pacific, but many other countries as well that are not formally our allies. These states seek to preserve their autonomy and thus their ability to chart their own national futures on their own terms. This too is our goal, as Secretary Hegseth eloquently laid out last year at the Shangri-La Forum, and our military focus, alongside the efforts of our allies and partners, is designed to uphold that ability.
Third, we recognize clearly that there are other real threats around the world that imperil our allies and indeed our own interests directly. We do not neglect that. To the contrary, we see it clearly. But we also understand that we need to allocate our own resources realistically and prudently and that we must account for our allies and partners’ ability and will to meet those challenges as well. This is why the Strategy so strongly emphasizes burden sharing, which is its third pillar.
The logic here is to encourage, enable, and wherever necessary press our allies and partners in other theaters to take primary responsibility for their conventional defense. This makes sense because, as is so often pointed out, we are allies with many of the world’s largest and most advanced economies. As a result, we have an alliance network that has tremendous latent military power.
Unfortunately, over the last generation – partially due to our own permissiveness and perhaps even hubris on this point – many of our allies have functionally demilitarized. This is untenable and unreasonable – and our allies know it and are moving rapidly and substantially to step up. They are no longer, because of President Trump’s leadership, “fighting the scenario.” Rather, they have now accepted they must step up and are beginning quickly to do so.
As a result, our approach has adapted to one of “let’s get down to business.” In Europe, we are urging our allies to move to a model of NATO, 3.0, in which wealthy European allies take the lead for the conventional defense of European NATO. On the Korean Peninsula, we are urging our South Korean ally to do the same vis a vis North Korea. And the good news, distinguished members, is that this is working. Our allies are indeed stepping up along these lines. Now the issue is helping them do so and making this transition as rapidly and effectively as possible.
In other regions, we are also urging and seeing progress with our allies. Along the first island chain, with countries like Japan and Australia, we are urging these wealthy and capable allies to do their part for collective defense, as the NSS urges. In the Western Hemisphere, we are working with many like-minded countries in the region to address shared threats to our prosperity and well-being. In the Middle East, we are working with our model ally Israel and other regional partners to address the threat of Iran and terrorism.
The final pillar of the Strategy is to supercharge the defense industrial base. The NSS and NDS both call for a national mobilization of our industrial capacity to arm both our own forces and those of our allies and partners. As you on this Committee know so well, this is vital because we must be able to arm our own forces and those of our allies and partners with the best weaponry quickly, at scale, and at a reasonable price. We are seeing tremendous progress on this front thanks to President Trump, Secretary Hegseth, and Deputy Secretary Feinberg’s efforts as well as your support and leadership in Congress, but this will be a critical area of focus in the coming years.
In closing, this Strategy promises under President Trump’s leadership to put our country, and our allies and partners, on the path to lasting security. In just a few years, we can expect the war fighting ethos to have been restored in our armed forces and for them to be armed with the most modern effective weaponry at scale. We can expect our wealthy allies and partners around the world to have stepped up to do their part for collective defense and their own security. We can expect our potential opponents to see the peerlessly formidable armed forces of the United States and the highly capable forces of our allies and partners together, and to conclude that peace and restraint is the better course for them. Thus, we can very much reasonably hope for a decent peace for Americans, for our allies, and – for that matter – for our potential opponents. This is a very good future to which we can reasonably aspire.
At the same time, however, we at the Department of War know that we cannot take this future for granted. To the contrary, we will hope for the best but prepare for the worst. We will ensure that our armed forces are as ready as they can possibly be in line with the priorities outlined. Should our potential opponents spurn this reasonable offer, Members of the Committee, your support in ensuring that our forces are ready will be absolutely vital.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
david chou
12026 National Defense Strategy非機密版本公佈後的追蹤(II)我今天先不引用聽證會的記錄, 先使用USNI的報導.報導指出, 親台的參院軍事委員會主席Sen. Roger Wicker在聽證會中, 對非機密版的2026 National Defense Strategy只提第一島鏈的保衛, 但沒特別提台灣一事感到不安, 因此, 他對此表示關切:
2
老Wicker這一問, 當然是替台灣人與台灣人政權問的, Elbridge據實回答, 也算是對力挺他的老Wicker的回報.
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Appendix
Pentagon Official Defends New National Defense Strategy’s ‘Flexible Realism’ in Senate Hearing
March 3, 2026 6:18 PM - Updated: March 3, 2026 9:52 PM
The author of the Pentagon’s latest National Defense Strategy defended the blueprint against bipartisan criticism during a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing on Tuesday.
Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby appeared before the panel to field questions on the Trump administration’s strategic outlook that has placed defending the U.S. homeland as the top priority for the Pentagon while deterring China slipped to the second-most important focus for the military.
Colby described the NDS outlook as “flexible realism,” arguing that the U.S. military cannot operate everywhere, and the U.S. will need to make choices as to what it prioritizes and how it shares deterrence and defense responsibilities with allies and partners across the world.
“That is the effort to practically and realistically advance and protect the concrete interests of regular Americans,” Colby said in his opening statement. “The core of a strategy, as the [National Security Strategy] eloquently describes, is to evaluate, sort and prioritize.”
Since coming into office last year, President Donald Trump and administration officials across government agencies have argued that allies and partners across the world must spend more on defense and become more active participants in the alliances underpinning their partnerships.
Colby, who worked under the first Trump administration and also helped write the 2018 National Defense Strategy, described the new NDS as a middle road between isolationism and an aggressive use of military force around the globe. He emphasized that Americans have a stake in the Indo-Pacific due to America’s market share in the region and China’s ongoing military buildup.
“We make clear that our interests with respect to China are scoped and reasonable – we do not seek to strangle China nor compel a change in its form of government,” Colby said in his opening statement.
“Rather we seek to prevent China from becoming the hegemon of the Indo-Pacific. In particular, this requires – as the NSS clearly states – being able to deny the feasibility of successful aggression along the first island chain,” he continued. “Because of its significance and the central importance of the military role in meeting this requirement, meeting this standard of an effective denial defense along the first island chain is the primary focus of the U.S. armed forces.”
Top lawmakers on the Senate Armed Services Committee expressed concerns with how the NDS framed China and a potential conflict over Taiwan, the self-governing island that Beijing claims.
Sen. Roger Wicker (R-Miss.), the panel’s chairman, voiced unease that the Pentagon’s guidance on its top strategic concerns does not mention Taiwan. The NDS, which the Defense Department published in January, calls for a “denial defense” of the first island chain, a string of archipelagos that stretches from Okinawa, Japan, down through Taiwan and to the Philippines.
Experts define denial defense as making China believe it would lose in an attempt to seize Taiwan by force, a capability U.S. officials previously said President Xi Jinping wants the People’s Liberation Army to have by 2027.
“I don’t think anybody can mistake that … the focus of this strategy on preparing for a denial defense along the first island chain, that is elaborated on in the National Security Strategy, which includes a reference to Taiwan,” Colby told Wicker. “That has been very clear to all of our audiences.”
The National Security Strategy, which the White House published at the end of last year, says the Trump administration is committed to the “status quo in the Taiwan Strait,” and that deterring a war over Taiwan is in the U.S. interest due to the potential global economic impacts of a conflict in the region.
“Our approach is strong and clear, but quiet,” Colby added Tuesday. “We are really focused on delivering military hard power readiness, not only to our own forces, but to our allies and partners, and less focused on making significant rhetorical statements. That obviously is a topic of debate, as to whether that’s the right mix.”
Sen. Jack Reed (D-R.I), the committee’s ranking member, criticized what he described as a “partisan” tone in the NDS and wondered how the U.S. military would function under the strategy’s claim that the U.S. is not seeking to “dominate” Beijing.
“The contrast between how this document treats China and how it treats its allies is frankly dumbfounding,” Reed said in his opening statement. “The NDS takes a conciliatory posture towards Beijing, yet derides the nations that have stood alongside us for 80 years, describing our allies as more dependencies than partners.”
While the committee’s top lawmakers questioned Colby about the strategy’s position on China, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East was the focus for most lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. Republicans largely praised Trump for seeking to topple Iran’s theocratic government, while Democrats criticized him for not coming to Congress for approval to strike inside Iran and for providing varying reasons as to why the U.S. launched the attacks over the weekend.
The new NDS said the U.S. “obliterated Iran’s nuclear program” last year during Operation Midnight Hammer, in which U.S. forces struck three nuclear sites inside Iran.
The Defense Department “will empower regional allies and partners to take primary responsibility for deterring and defending against Iran and its proxies, including by strongly backing Israel’s efforts to defend itself; deepening cooperation with our Arabian Gulf partners; and enabling integration between Israel and our Arabian Gulf partners, building on President Trump’s historic initiative, the Abraham Accords,” reads the document.
Colby, who in previous years argued the U.S. should move away from engaging in conflicts in the Middle East to instead focus on countering China, told lawmakers it’s inaccurate to suggest the NDS did not account for Trump’s ability to use military force against Iran.
Asked by Reed about the military objectives for the ongoing Iran campaign, Colby reiterated the Trump administration’s position that the goal is to counter Iran’s missile capabilities that can strike U.S. bases and allies in the region, and to also neuter the Iranian navy.
“I do think those are scoped and reasonable objectives that can be attained,” Colby said.
david chou
12026 National Defense Strategy非機密版本公佈後的追蹤(II)
我前幾天開新欄, 旨在update舊欄--- "2025 National Defense Strategy將於下月公布, 但有機會參贊機要的軍事家Toshi Yoshihara已透露了兩個很重大的訊息".
2我在舊欄說:"由於非機密版的2026 National Defense Strategy完全沒有提到台灣, 這引起美國親台鷹派的憂慮, 也引起各方的好奇, 包括Politico在內的媒體.專家.觀察家, 都想來解決這個謎."3
親台灣與綠營台灣住民的Michael Mazza在 The Taipei Times與其姊姊報自由時報發表星期專論 [Appendix], 他也試圖要解這個謎, 他在這篇專論的起頭這樣說:
[to be continued]The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question.老川的2025 National Security Strategy, 把保衛台灣與保衛美國本土還有西半球都列為美國國防建設的優先事項, 但非機密版本的2026 National Defense Strategy只提第一島鏈的保衛, 卻隻字不提台灣, 我不認為這有什麼問題, 因為第一島鏈就包括了台灣.不過, 這引起了Michael的疑慮與不安, 他在專論的末段說:若Michael對Elbridge Colby的解讀與判斷正確, 那可就是台灣與綠營台灣人的末日.Colby’s remarks and the NDS, for which he was responsible, echo his earlier scholarship. “The strategy of denial does not require a domineering America,” he wrote in 2022. “It is not an argument for American hegemony,” but instead “it respects the due claims of other states.” China insists those due claims include ownership of Taiwan. If a decent peace is truly on offer, Taiwan will have to be on offer, too.
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
===========================
AppendixMichael Mazza On Taiwan: A decent peace for whom?
Mon, Mar 09, 2026 page 8
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2026/03/09/2003853480
The Donald Trump administration’s approach to China broadly, and to cross-Strait relations in particular, remains a conundrum. The 2025 US National Security Strategy prioritized the defense of Taiwan in a way that surprised some observers of the Trump administration: “Deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.” Two months later, Taiwan went entirely unmentioned in the US National Defense Strategy, as did military overmatch vis-a-vis China, giving renewed cause for concern. How to interpret these varying statements remains an open question.
In both documents, the Indo-Pacific is listed as a second priority behind homeland defense and the Western Hemisphere. This is natural and appropriate: the United States must secure its own backyard before tackling challenges further afield. But reading the NSS and NDS, one gets differing assessments of those more distant challenges, especially as they relate to China.
The NSS paints China as posing acute threats in both the economic and military domains and calls for “winning the economic and technological competition over the long term.” But even though it was the first Trump administration that officially reconceptualized America’s relationship with China as competitive, the NDS describes China as neither a threat nor a competitor. Indeed, the latter strategy document emphasizes seeking a “decent peace, on terms favorable to Americans but that China can also accept and live under.” Given that US and Chinese fundamental interests are in direct tension, this is an unrealistic goal. An unhappy modus vivendi might be possible; a happy one is not.
Still, the NDS does note the NSS’ direction to “build, posture, and sustain a strong denial defense along the” first island chain. In many ways, this is consistent with longstanding US defense strategy. The first island chain stretches from Japan in the north, through Taiwan, down to the Philippines in the south, and westward across the South China Sea’s southern littoral waters. Along with the Korean Peninsula, it has effectively served as the United States’ forward defense perimeter in the Indo-Pacific since the close of World War II. From the first island chain, home to several American allies and security partners, the United States can deny a hostile Asian hegemon easy access to the Pacific Ocean (and thus prevent hostile forces from approaching the homeland), secure Indo-Pacific sea lines of communication, and project power onto the Asian mainland if necessary.
Leaders in Taipei can rightly find reassurance in the NSS and NDS’ commitments to “denial defense along the first island chain.” Taiwan occupies key geography, as the NSS explains: “Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain [which includes US territory] and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters.” Since Douglas MacArthur identified Taiwan as an “unsinkable aircraft carrier,” US leaders have recognized the island’s strategic importance. That apparently has not changed.
Unfortunately, the Trump administration is abandoning other proven strategic conceptions. In his first public remarks after the NDS’ release, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Elbridge Colby announced that the Trump administration seeks “a favorable balance of power in which no state can impose its hegemony.” This would be a radical shift. In Colby’s telling, no longer is the United States opposed only to the emergence of a hostile hegemon in Asia, but also to its own hegemony as well. But it is precisely America’s distant, benign hegemony — a hegemony welcomed by most Asian states — that created the conditions for the region’s decades of sustained peace and growing prosperity. A balance of power in which no state can impose its hegemony is a recipe for instability: supposedly equitable balances tempt revisionists to try to overturn them.
Colby’s remarks and the NDS, for which he was responsible, echo his earlier scholarship. “The strategy of denial does not require a domineering America,” he wrote in 2022. “It is not an argument for American hegemony,” but instead “it respects the due claims of other states.” China insists those due claims include ownership of Taiwan. If a decent peace is truly on offer, Taiwan will have to be on offer, too.
Michael Mazza is senior director for research at the Institute for Indo-Pacific Security (formerly the Project 2049 Institute) and a senior non-resident fellow at the Global Taiwan Institute.
david chou
2026 National Defense Strategy非機密版本公佈後的追蹤(III)我現在使用參議院軍委會3月3日邀請Elbridge Colby在 "To Receive an Update on the National Defense Strategy" Hearing的記錄.軍委會主席Sen. Roger Wicker在他的Opening Statement之中, 提到他注意到Colby在他撰寫的非機密版本的2026 National Defense Strategy對 "支那威脅" 使用了不像以往那樣尖銳的語辭, 他也注意到Colby只提第一島鏈, 而沒提台灣, Roger對此提出了他的看法或解釋, 他的看法倒跟我差不多:"Another specific critique of the strategy is that, in effect, it obfuscates the threat posed by the Chinese Communist Party. And they are our pacing threat. Granted, Beijing remains the focal point. The strategy is clear in its focus on what it describes as the First Island Chain. This seems to be a way of talking about Taiwan without mentioning Taiwan. The unclassified NDS does not mention Taiwan at all, even though the National Security Strategy directly identifies it. This seems to be an example of what the NDS calls a strong but not necessarily confrontational - - "Strong but not necessarily confrontational posture toward Beijing.""
[to be continued]David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement
david chou
2026 National Defense Strategy非機密版本公佈後的追蹤(IV)既然軍委會邀請Colby來Hearing作證, 那親台護台的Sen. Wicker就得跟Colby問個清楚, 為什麼非機密版的2026 NDS隻字不提台灣? Sen. Wicker問道:
Colby回答:
"I don't think anybody can mistake that the focus of this strategy on preparing for a denial defense along the First Island Chain that is elaborated on the National Security Strategy, which includes a reference to Taiwan, that that has been very clear to all of our audiences."
"But our approach is really this strong and clear but quiet."
"I don't think anybody can doubt our focus on making sure that we support the NSS Presidential direction to have the ability to deny aggression along the First Island Chain."
Colby解釋說:他提的保衛第一島鏈, 當然就已包括了台灣.這句話出自Colby的口, Sen. Wicker才會放心.在2026 NDS出現後, 台灣的境內敵對勢力就在看我們台灣人與台派的笑話, 那群共匪與台奸說, 看吧, 川普不要你們了, 要出賣你們了, 我說, 既然2025 National Security Strategy都已明言要保衛台灣了, 那2026 NDS所指的第一島鏈保衛, 當然包括了台灣.現在連Colby自己都這樣說.[本欄今天結束]