"若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?"
david chou
"Democratization has been a barrier to unification only because the people of Taiwan have not been persuaded that abandoning autonomy is in their interests. Should public opinion in Taiwan shift to favor unification and Taiwan’s democratically elected officials declare that the time has come for union, Washington would be in no position to contradict them. Doing so would risk the enmity of the island’s people and threaten to undermine the very institutions Washington seeks to defend. In the 1990s, Richard Bush, chairman of the board and director of the American Institute in Taiwan, repeatedly asserted Washington’s respect for the public’s judgment of what would comprise a viable cross-strait solution. In February 2001, former president Clinton called for the “assent” of the people of Taiwan to any settlement. Rather than using democracy to prevent unification, the United States has made clear that it will accept the freely stated will of the people."
"Nevertheless, U.S. officials must think about Taiwan’s future in terms unlike those that have framed the issue for the last five decades. Washington must consider peaceful unification of Taiwan with China as a possibility and examine what that would mean for U.S. national interests and the stability of East Asia from its own perspective; it must also consider in practical terms what, if anything, the United States could do to stop this eventuality, if it wished."
==========================
Shirley Kan: China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One China” Policy—Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
March 12, 2001 – January 5, 2015
https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/RL30341.html
KMT-CPC Joint Statement of 2005 on "Peaceful Development"
April 29, 2005205
If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?
By Nancy Bernkopf Tucker
Nancy Bernkopf Tucker is professor of history at Georgetown University and the Georgetown School of Foreign Service.
Copyright © 2002 by The Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology The Washington Quarterly • 25:3 pp. 15–28.
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SUMMER 2002
https://ciaotest.cc.columbia.edu/olj/twq/sum2002/twq_sum2002o.pdf
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If Taiwan chooses unification with China, are U.S. interests jeopardized? Until now, U.S. policy has assumed that unification would occur only through forcible action on Beijing’s part. U.S. officials, not anticipating a day when peaceful negotiations could bridge the huge gulf between the two parties, have not planned for that possibility. Confronted with the danger that cross-strait antagonism could burst into war, U.S. diplomats, statesmen, and scholars have been the loudest and most consistent supporters of dialogue across the Taiwan Strait, asserting that, as long as the process is peaceful, Washington is indifferent to the outcome.
Yet, conditions across the strait have been changing. A growing tide of Taiwan investment in China has raised questions about its political consequences, suggesting that some version of unification actually could materialize—not immediately, but not too far off either. For Washington, this development would mean an entirely new array of economic, political, and strategic forces in East Asia, as Taiwan and China, as well as Japan, adjust to a different reality. The agnosticism of U.S. policy has been in large part a result of not examining a future that appeared infinitely remote. Now that circumstances are changing, can Washington’s detachment be sustained? Should it?
What Has Changed in Taiwan
Developments in Taiwan during the last decade have produced radically contradictory impulses that are pulling Taiwan and China apart at the same time as they are being drawn irresistibly together. How this dilemma will be
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[China’s model of ‘one country, two systems’ does not provide a viable roadmap.]
resolved—whether through the prolongation of an uneasy and fluid status quo, a creative compromise, or capitulation to one set of priorities—worries those with interests in the island’s future.
The surging level of Taiwan investment in China is the single most compelling sign that unification might occur without war. This “mainland fever” threatens to drain the island of capital and jobs while making Taiwan’s prosperity contingent on the political relationship between Beijing and Taipei.
As Taiwan businesspeople become increasingly committed to their mainland operations, they exert pressure on Taiwan’s government to facilitate their ventures. This means calls for loosening financial restrictions; expediting the three links of direct transportation, communication, and trade; or even agitating for unification with China on China’s terms.
The economic ties between China and Taiwan have been strengthening for more than a decade, but recently have multiplied and deepened. According to Taiwan’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, more than three-quarters of Taiwan’s companies have an investment on the mainland, reaching some $60 billion in more than 50,000 ventures. Taiwan increasingly exploits mainland factories to supply both China’s domestic market and Taiwan’s international customers.1
Beijing hopes the lure of China’s great economic expansion will be an irresistible magnet for repossessing Taiwan. One exuberant mainland official interviewed in early 2002 declared, “Our economy is our best weapon. We won’t attack them. We will buy them. It’s very Chinese.”2 Indeed, in 2001, with the U.S. economy weak, Japan mired in long-term stagnation, and only modest domestic reform, Taiwan’s economy contracted for the first time in 50 years. Yet, even as the United States and the world recover from recession, opportunities in China will remain enticing.
In fact, Taiwan president Chen Shui-bian’s administration convened an Economic Development Advisory Council in late August 2001 to propose ways to reinvigorate internal development and exploit cross-strait contacts. Chen also jettisoned the “go slow, be patient” policy designed to limit Taiwan’s exposure to China and avoid strengthening the enemy. Beginning last November, businesses have been urged to pursue “active opening, effective management” across the strait, even if the result is taking more money and jobs to the mainland. Tsai Ing-wen, chairwoman of the Mainland Affairs Council, observed, “Mainland investment should be an integral part of our global expansion plan.” This approach requires Taiwan to keep ahead of
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China on the technology ladder and to utilize this competition to force rapid modernization of Taiwan’s financial institutions, service sector, and research-based industries.3
Entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) promises to intensify cross-strait economic integration. Participation in the WTO will create incentives to maximize the speed and ease of transportation and communication, renewing pressure for use of the three links despite Taiwan’s security concerns and Beijing’s insistence on a “one China” pledge. WTO rules will also reduce trade and investment barriers and force greater bilateral interaction even if Beijing resists using multilateral dispute resolution mechanisms. At the same time, Taipei will have fewer ways to guard against Chinese initiatives that, although economic in substance, may have broad political purposes. Already Beijing has begun to push a Chinese Free Trade Area incorporating China, Hong Kong, and Macao. It seeks to add Taiwan by 2005.4 Moreover, Taiwan businesspeople will leap into new commitments on the mainland regardless of security implications.
Vigorous economic exchange has not only added to prosperity in Taiwan and China, it has also perhaps most remarkably led large numbers of Taiwan merchants and manufacturers to live on the mainland. Taiwan residents of enclaves in Shanghai and elsewhere surround themselves with Taiwan culture and food but live in China in far greater luxury than they could afford at home. Although political restrictions such as schoolbook censorship are increasing, enthusiasm for opportunities on the mainland remains strong. Not surprisingly, China sees these enterprising people as the vanguard of unification.
Simultaneously, other trends less favorable for unification have also been accelerating. After more than a decade of political and social transformation, the Taiwan public increasingly perceives itself as something other than simply Chinese. Beijing originally denied the potency of a political and cultural divide across the strait, insisting that all Taiwanese were Chinese and that that basic makeup could not be altered. Yet, the growth in prosperity, democracy, and opportunity on the island brought greater numbers of Taiwanese into the political system. Gradually, Taiwan history and geography invaded school curricula. Use of the Taiwanese language captured the public, particularly the political, arena. On the island, as on the mainland, shifts in attitudes, generations, and historical circumstances created a new Taiwan nationalism—a potent force for local unity based on a Taiwan identity.
Acceleration of this trend alarmed and angered Beijing. Thus in 2000, in a notorious effort to quicken the pace of unification—lest Taiwan’s Chinese roots become too attenuated—Beijing issued a White Paper. Timed for the eve of a Taiwan presidential election, the document warned that delay, as
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much as a declaration of independence, could mean war. China aroused an angry backlash and failed to make rapid unification more imaginable.
Once celebrated equally on both sides of the strait, the idea of one China no longer commands unquestioned agreement in Taiwan. Presently, the vast majority of the people prefer an open-ended status quo. Whether the public might find some formula for union with the mainland palatable neither Beijing, Washington, nor Taipei knows. China’s model of “one country, two systems,” however, clearly does not provide a viable roadmap.
Thus, Taiwan today is caught in a contradiction between its economic and political priorities. Economic dependence on and integration with China—the changing perceptions of the island’s needs and interests—may make unification desirable or at least necessary for Taiwan. Future prosperity on the island clearly appears linked to the mainland. Whether effective exploitation of the China market demands that Taiwan be a part of China is unclear. Moreover, as integration progresses, disrupting ties that bind mainland businesses to Taiwan in order to serve political goals becomes more difficult for Beijing. Finally, the Taiwan settlers in China seem to symbolize the future of relations across the strait, but their significance may be more complex than their numbers suggest. If they are largely mainlander in background or pro-mainland in their political sympathies, then their choice to live in China is not so startling, and by doing so they further reduce the declining population in Taiwan of Taiwanese eager for unification.
What Has Changed in China
This country has spent the last decade expanding economically and transforming militarily, raising the stakes for good Sino-U.S. relations by enhancing Beijing’s power and influence, while sharpening the focus on Taiwan as a source of tension between Washington and Beijing. The recovery by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 symbolized triumph over centuries of Western imperialism. It also reaffirmed the belief of China’s leaders that they should be able to retrieve Taiwan and eliminate its challenge to the central government’s legitimacy by applying Deng Xiaoping’s “one country, two systems” formula.
Beijing unsurprisingly sees evidence everywhere that Washington has been maneuvering to keep Taiwan separate from the PRC, regardless of the integrative forces of trade and investment or the views of the Chinese people living on the mainland and in Taiwan. Among the most obvious hallmarks of this U.S. policy, many Chinese critics charge, is Washington’s escalation in military support for Taiwan—a concrete manifestation of the foolhardy U.S. policy that will lead to armed confrontation with Beijing.
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[Would unification without war solve or exacerbate the U.S. security dilemma in Asia?]
Beijing firmly believes that U.S. maneuvering for the division of Taiwan from China began during the Chinese civil war and has rarely been interrupted since then. Concessions on Taiwan by President Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger in 1971 raised Chinese hopes that, with China’s formal recognition, Taipei would be isolated and collapse. It did not, and Beijing has blamed the United States. Whether through arms sales or democratization, Washington has allegedly given Taiwan the tools to prevent unification.
In recent years, China’s economic boom has given Beijing the resources to sharpen both its seductive and coercive strategies for recovering the island. Burgeoning economic integration between China and Taiwan raised Beijing’s optimism that it will not be necessary to use force to compel unification. Chinese officials have offered special access, tax incentives, and other inducements for Taiwan businesspeople. As with Hong Kong, Taiwan industrialists and financial moguls have been promised privilege and political power in a Greater China.
More immediately, Beijing has sought to aggravate and utilize Taiwan’s economic and political weakness. Since Chen’s election to the Taiwan presidency in 2000, Beijing has followed a cautious approach. Dispensing with incendiary polemics, it has largely ignored Chen and sought to split the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), utilizing a united front strategy, courting prominent figures from the opposition, and generally encouraging obstructionism to prevent Chen from being reelected in 2004.
Beijing also has moderated its position rhetorically, presenting increasingly reasonable terms for dialogue and compromise. Qian Qichen, China’s vice premier, reformulated Beijing’s one China policy and came to the United States in early 2001 to deliver the message personally to President George W. Bush’s new administration. As a Chinese official who handles Taiwan affairs noted, “Once we said we would liberate Taiwan, then we said Taiwan was just a province of China, now we are saying Taiwan can be our equal. For the mainland to make these kinds of adjustments in policy is not an easy thing.”5 In the end, Beijing hopes to demonstrate that the only way Taiwan can remain prosperous, stable, and at peace is as part of China.
Of course, a coercive arm of Beijing’s strategy remains as well, which although less innovative and of far longer standing, has taken on a new dimension because of China’s rising prosperity. Indeed, Chinese leaders long postponed military modernization, recognizing that the country needed many fundamental improvements before it began to dedicate resources to weapons
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acquisition. Beginning in the early 1990s, however, China’s military spending began to rise meaningfully.
Beijing has focused on amassing the strength to prevail in a Taiwan recovery scenario. This effort has not involved assembling a huge armada, but rather developing and deploying capabilities that would allow China to overcome Taiwan’s defenses without an invasion and to fend off U.S. intervention. Central to this plan has been the anticipated use of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles placed along China’s coast opposite Taiwan for purposes of intimidation and, if necessary, to destroy airfields, electric power grids, and industrial plants, as well as to terrorize the population. In 1995 and 1996, Beijing demonstrated its willingness to use these missiles, firing several toward Taiwan to punish then-President Lee Teng-hui for traveling to the United States and to threaten Taiwan’s citizens while aiming to weaken Lee politically in the process.
To China’s surprise, an often-indecisive President Bill Clinton sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the vicinity. Although U.S. ships did not directly intrude, the message proved clear and perhaps stronger than intended. Since then, Beijing has believed that Washington, regardless of its unwillingness to make a firm rhetorical commitment, intends to use its superior military forces to defend Taiwan. As a result, Beijing has accelerated its missile buildup to overwhelm Taiwan and to force its surrender before the United States can interfere.
Beijing understands that, if it uses force to compel unification, its hope for “constructive and cooperative” relations with Washington, as Presidents Jiang Zemin and Bush characterized them in Shanghai in 2001, will have been shattered.6 Beijing is prepared to make this sacrifice, however, and may believe it is unavoidable. To China’s leadership, the trend lines leading Washington to a more aggressive policy of separating Taiwan from the PRC have long been clear. U.S. actions to block “liberation” would confirm China’s forebodings about Washington’s views and not come as an unanticipated shock.
Implications
Today, the strategic imperative of not going to war with China remains paramount for the United States, but the correct path for doing so does not appear identical to everyone in Washington. The question is not simply how dangerous China is to the United States militarily but how much of a threat it poses in the specific context of cross-strait relations and, more critically, how broadly the concept of security should be defined when thinking about the triangular relationship among the United States, Taiwan, and China. The problem under consideration here, however, is not whether China has
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[Unification could lead to a more significant projection of Chinese naval and air power]
the capacity to invade Taiwan, not whether Taiwan would fight or surrender, not even whether the United States would intervene. The issue is, if Taiwan opted for unification with China without war, would this solve or exacerbate the U.S. security dilemma in Asia.
Although some analysts in the Pentagon and the think-tank community expended considerable energy in the 1990s warning about the danger of a rising China, they remain a minority. The China threat continues to be a potential peril, not a current hazard. A strong and assertive China, even if democratic, would complicate Washington’s diplomatic and security calculations, impinging on its position and alliances in East Asia. A strong China not friendly to the United States poses a more serious long-term problem.
The alleged threat advanced by the “rise” of China grows out of China’s anti-Americanism and yearning for regional hegemony. As a hungry, non–status quo power, China could seek to circumscribe U.S. influence in Asia, displace U.S. forces, and seduce or coerce U.S. allies. Anxious to break free of a de facto military encirclement established during the Cold War, China seeks to build a stronger, modern military and develop asymmetrical warfare technologies, occasionally evading bilateral proliferation agreements and international control regimes. Some in the United States who fear China characterize themselves as the “Blue Team” to differentiate themselves from a “Red Team” of alleged “panda huggers” who, they say, dominate government and the community of U.S.-China specialists. Concern about a future security challenge involving China, however, does not require enlisting in a team of any color. A more powerful China will inevitably be more assertive about its interests regardless of whether they are compatible with those of the United States.
In practical terms, concern about a future threat from China encompasses the strategic advantages that unification with Taiwan would bring to Beijing. Probably more significant than any other factor, by eliminating China’s needs to build toward a hostile takeover of Taiwan, to protect itself from Taiwan, and to plan for a potential conflict with the United States over Taiwan, unification could release a significant percentage of China’s resources. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would be free to change its priorities, redeploy its forces, and reconceptualize its strategic objectives. For Washington, this change means a less predictable, more flexible, and potentially less-burdened opponent, though one still noted for its lack of transparency.
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[Enhancing Beijing’s maritime security would probably alarm Japanese military planners.]
Beijing’s recovery of Taiwan could in fact lead to a more significant projection of Chinese naval and air power beyond coastal waters. With the continuing need to manage a maritime frontier that includes disputed interests in the South China Sea, China might be tempted to contest the U.S. military presence in the region and strive for greater force-projection capabilities. Although China has pledged that Taiwan under “one country, two systems” will retain its own autonomous military and that the PLA will not station units on the island, no absolute guarantees are protecting crucial sea lanes carrying oil and other sensitive goods past Taiwan. Commercial channels from the South China Sea do not generally pass through the Taiwan Strait but do parallel the east coast of Taiwan, coming as close as 75 nautical miles, as ships travel north toward Japan, Korea, and Russia. These transportation routes would be more vulnerable to interruption by China if Taiwan were under Beijing’s control.7
Indeed, China has at times been less than scrupulous about respecting international waters. Angered by Canberra’s support for Washington in the EP-3 spy plane crisis in 2001, China harassed an Australian naval flotilla, claiming it had intruded into Chinese waters as it sailed through the Taiwan Strait, even though the strait is an international waterway under the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention.8 As former U.S. ambassador to China James R. Lilley has noted, Taiwan “is the cork in China’s bottle.” China’s reclamation of Taiwan would “end what China feels to be a blockade on its abilities to control its surrounding seas.” With Taiwan in mainland hands, Lilley observes, Beijing could diminish the potential vulnerability it feels because “as much as 50 percent of China’s economy depends on foreign trade, about 90 percent of which is transported by ship.”9
In addition, the enhancement of Beijing’s maritime security would almost certainly alarm Japanese military planners. A Chinese presence along Japan’s shipping routes and abutting its Ryukyu island chain would risk giving Beijing an opportunity to “strangle the world’s second-largest economy.”10 Further, China would gain greater proximity to disputed oil and natural gas fields in the Senkaku/Diaoyutai area. During the 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, when Tokyo and Washington were revising their defense agreements to clarify mutual obligations, China’s aggressive use of missiles led the normally cautious Japanese to agree to a tougher set of commitments than first intended. Tokyo sought to make clear to Beijing that neither intimidating Taiwan nor disturbing the peace in areas around Japan was acceptable.
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If Taiwan was unified with China, the geostrategic impact could be significant for Sino-Japanese relations and the U.S. role in Japan as well. The resolution of this dangerous stalemate might relieve Tokyo’s fears about Beijing because China’s irredentist claims would have been satisfied. Japan might accordingly be less tolerant of U.S. bases on its soil. Unification could also leave Japan apprehensive, however, and even more determined to revise its constitution, expand its military, and preserve its U.S. alliance.
The U.S. strategic loss in the intelligence arena would amplify any security breach caused by unification. Although Washington discontinued sabotage operations in China and ceased using Taiwan as a base for aerial reconnaissance when it recognized the PRC, this self-denial did not cover other collection programs it conducts from Taiwan. Surrendering extensive listening posts and ending cooperation in evaluating human intelligence would handicap U.S. information gathering and defense efforts.
Economic integration and unification may also have an impact on the transfer of dual use and military technology to Taiwan. As manufacturers move civilian industrial production to the mainland and Taiwan’s economic dependence on China grows, suspicions have arisen that confidential proprietary information has begun to leak. If this is true and were to encompass sophisticated U.S. arms sold to Taiwan, it could be dangerous to us. Some journalists and members of Congress have called for protecting this equipment either by ending sales or disabling weapons already sold. Critics could use massive past transfers as a pretext to block unification. Beijing has declared that its “one country, two systems” framework would mean, as in Hong Kong, that no transfers of equipment or technology would occur. Once Taiwan has been recovered, however, incentives for Beijing to honor such pledges might vanish.
Since Bush became president, the clearest indicator of the strategic worldview of an influential portion of his administration has been the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) assembled by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. The QDR has indirectly emphasized the potential danger of a rising China and the importance of critical friends and allies in Northeast and littoral East Asia, which includes Taiwan. Examining the QDR view of U.S. national interests, Rear Adm. Michael A. McDevitt (Ret.) of the Center for Naval Analysis asserted that, although the QDR does not say so explicitly, “[t]his translates into a call for a … capability that is able to defeat China’s short- and medium-range ballistic missile force, … deal with China’s large submarine force, … maintain air superiority over the maritime approaches to Japan and Taiwan, and … strengthen deterrence across the Taiwan Strait by being able to hold at-risk targets of importance in China.”11 The events of September 11 in many ways have altered U.S. threat perceptions, but they have not lessened the Pentagon’s
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concern about Beijing’s avowed policy to use force if it tires of waiting for Taiwan to begin discussions leading to unification.
Manifestly, if China ultimately intends to drive the United States out of the western Pacific rather than coexist with it, then anything that helps China grow stronger, including unification with Taiwan, would not be in U.S. interests. Although one can find voices calling for China to act preemptively, concluding that this action is Beijing’s goal would be premature today. Taiwan’s contribution to a China that actually had become a “strategic competitor” would be as much economic and technological as military. The Chinese Free Trade Area just approved by Beijing is envisioned, once it incorporates Taiwan, to create the fourth-largest economic entity in the world after the United States, Japan, and Germany. Taiwan as part of China might hope to moderate China’s values and institutions, but it could also strengthen a China whose values had not changed.
Yet, despite the potentially negative implications of peaceful unification, one benefit is overriding. The eradication of this flashpoint would instantly and overwhelmingly reduce friction and the risk of accidental clashes between Washington and Beijing. Unification would unquestionably affect some U.S. interests adversely, but not nearly as much as would war between China and the United States.
Options for Obstructing Unification
Should Taiwan decide to pursue unification with China, the United States has few viable options to prevent it. Although Beijing argues that Washington has manipulated Taipei for decades to block unification, considering the inevitable disputes within the U.S. government and among Americans generally over whether unification would be in the U.S. national interest, the United States would have difficulty arriving at a coherent policy on the issue.
Beijing pinpoints two policies as crucial to Taiwan’s disinterest in unification. It argues in the 2000 Defense White Paper and elsewhere that Washington has utilized sales of advanced weapons to Taiwan explicitly to prevent unification. Far from giving Taipei the courage to negotiate with Beijing, as the United States maintains, Beijing believes that these sales have reduced any incentive for Taiwan to compromise or even to talk.
Similarly, Beijing has denounced the democratization of Taiwan and the U.S. role in that process as a scheme to delay unification. China’s Communist leaders have never believed that the people of Taiwan would voluntarily separate themselves from China and follow a different road. Only a self-interested cabal led by someone such as Chen or Lee could ignore China’s great strides since 1949 and move in a separatist direction.
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[One benefit is overriding: eliminating Taiwan as a flashpoint.]
Contrary to Beijing’s assumptions, however, neither democratization nor arms sales would be effective tools to stop peaceful unification. Arms sales have been important as Taiwan has sought to preserve its autonomy under threat of attack from China. If Taiwan seeks unification willingly and trusts China to negotiate a mutually beneficial association, then Taipei would have no further need for arms purchases, and Washington would have no leverage. Beijing has more or less acknowledged the point by suggesting it would accept U.S. arms sales after unification because those weapons would no longer be aimed at China. Thus, if Taiwan wanted to seek unification, a threat to end arms sales would not stop it.
Democratization has been a barrier to unification only because the people of Taiwan have not been persuaded that abandoning autonomy is in their interests. Should public opinion in Taiwan shift to favor unification and Taiwan’s democratically elected officials declare that the time has come for union, Washington would be in no position to contradict them. Doing so would risk the enmity of the island’s people and threaten to undermine the very institutions Washington seeks to defend. In the 1990s, Richard Bush, chairman of the board and director of the American Institute in Taiwan, repeatedly asserted Washington’s respect for the public’s judgment of what would comprise a viable cross-strait solution. In February 2001, former president Clinton called for the “assent” of the people of Taiwan to any settlement. Rather than using democracy to prevent unification, the United States has made clear that it will accept the freely stated will of the people.
Time to Plan for All Contingencies
No one can keep economic integration from rushing forward and dismantling geographic and man-made barriers to the creation of an open economic zone called Greater China. For the moment, economic integration has brought a degree of quiet to the strait, encouraging China’s leaders to relax and trust the power of money to accomplish what military force and political wiles have been unable to achieve.
Unification is not imminent or inevitable. Chen and the DPP will certainly not renounce their independence aspirations, and the people of Taiwan have clearly indicated their preference to maintain some form of the status quo into the indefinite future. Meanwhile, conditions for Taiwan businesspeople on the mainland—where Communist Party cells have been
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[The U.S. has few viable options to prevent unification, should Taiwan decide to pursue it.]
placed in Taiwan enterprises and Taiwan firms judged supportive of independence have been intimidated—serve as reminders that unification would severely test the resilience of Taiwan’s system and its people.
Nevertheless, U.S. officials must think about Taiwan’s future in terms unlike those that have framed the issue for the last five decades. Washington must consider peaceful unification of Taiwan with China as a possibility and examine what that would mean for U.S. national interests and the stability of East Asia from its own perspective; it must also consider in practical terms what, if anything, the United States could do to stop this eventuality, if it wished.
If the United States tried to prevent peaceful unification based on an assumption that unification would not be in the U.S. interest or that Taiwan’s actions were involuntary, the United States would face an immediate risk of war and the certainty of international opprobrium. The global community would view protests from Washington that Taipei had been coerced or had sold out—a victim of greedy business interests colluding with mainlanders to trample on the popular will—with great skepticism. Whereas many countries have cultivated economic relations with Taiwan, they have minimal political ties and no contractual or traditional security role. Under the duress of a crisis, they would be unlikely to interfere in a complex political confrontation.
In Taiwan, despite growing integration with and dependence on China, the public appears to believe it can foster a mutually profitable business environment without political entanglement. If the balance shifts, however, and reconciliation proves possible without capitulation to Beijing’s demands, including some truly equal power-sharing arrangement, peace could trump the perpetual stress of the status quo. Any prediction is difficult. The public would have to be persuaded to trust the officials who represent them, and the terms would have to be utterly transparent. U.S. opposition to a popular arrangement would come as a shock, alienating the island from its erstwhile patron and jeopardizing future relations.
Finally, would the American people tolerate any interference? A common belief is that, in the event of an unprovoked attack by China, Congress, supported by the public, would favor defending Taiwan. Although some analysts are skeptical, appeals to defend democratic states against aggressors have succeeded in the past. Yet, if confronted with a peaceful solution to a distant and little-understood problem, even one involving unification with a communist
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state, Americans would most likely opt for peace. A “Who lost Taiwan?” debate reminiscent of the partisan mudslinging surrounding China’s fall in 1949 might animate Congress, but its impact on the public is far less certain.
Paradoxically, the U.S. government has been the party most often wanting to see dialogue across the strait. Washington has pushed, sometimes insistently, for negotiation even when neither Beijing nor Taipei wanted to talk. Most recently, that impulse has subsided as the Bush administration has publicly sympathized with the idea that talks, if they happen, should be completely flexible. Thus, Washington has firmly supported Taipei’s position that the one China principle must not be a precondition to dialogue.12
Ultimately, this policy reflects U.S. national interests at stake in the confrontation across the Taiwan Strait, the most important being peace and freedom. The United States rightly remains opposed to the use of force to unify China. So long as unification can only be achieved through coercion, Washington should and will prevent the success of an unprovoked attack. Further, Washington’s commitment to Taiwan’s democracy means respect for the choices made by Taiwan’s people. They have so far sought nothing more than affirmation of their political autonomy, even in the face of rapid economic integration with mainland China. The U.S. abandonment of agnosticism to dictate an answer, whether unification or independence, would be a great betrayal as well as a dangerous gamble after all these decades of stalemate, struggle, risk, and reform. The United States has much at stake in the Taiwan Strait. Washington would not serve its strategic interests, secure the goodwill of Taiwan’s people, or win the hearts and minds of the mainland Chinese by trying to impose a solution to the Taiwan Strait dilemma.
Notes
1. John Pomfret, “In Its Own Neighborhood, China Emerges as a Leader,” Washington Post, October 18, 2001, p. A27; Mark Landler, “Taiwan Lifts Restrictions on Investment in China,” New York Times, November 8, 2001, sec. A, p. 3; Michelle Hsu, “IT Producers Allowed to Invest More Cross-Strait,” Chinapost.com.tw, December 1, 2001.
2. John Pomfret, “China Sees Interests Tied to U.S.,” Washington Post, February 2, 2002, p. A18; “Improved Cross-Strait Relations: Key to Getting Taiwan Economy Out of Predicament,” People’s Daily, November 10, 2001; James Kynge and Richard McGregor, “Emboldened China Hits at Taiwan Slowing Economy,” Financial Times, October 18, 2001.
3. “MAC Announces End to ‘Go Slow, Be Patient’ Policy,” Chinapost.com.tw, November 8, 2001.
4. Ching Cheong, “China FTA Could Be Engine of Growth for Asia,” Straits Times (Singapore), December 10, 2001. Americans concerned about Taiwan’s economic dependence on China have proposed a U.S.-Taiwan free-trade agreement. William Kristol, “Embrace Taiwan,” Washington Post, December 4, 2001, p. A25. Also see Karen M. Sutter, “WTO and the Taiwan Strait: New Considerations for Business,” China Business Review (January–February 2002): 28–33.
5. John Pomfret, “Beijing Signals New Flexibility on Taiwan,” Washington Post, January 5, 2001, p. A1.
6. 6. Philip P. Pan and Mike Allen, “U.S., China Agree on Little but Need to Fight Terrorism,” Washington Post, October 20, 2001, p. A1.
7. John Pomfret, “China’s Military Takes a Hard Look at U.S.,” International Herald Tribune, November 16, 2000.
8. David Rennie and Geoffrey Lee Martin, “Chinese Challenge Australian Navy Flotilla,” Daily Telegraph (London), April 28, 2001, p. 22.
9. John Pomfret, “Neighborhood,” Washington Post, October 18, 2001, p. A27; Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2001), p. 63.
10. Doug Struck and Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “Nations across Asia Keep Watch on China,” Washington Post, October 19, 2001, p. A23.
11. Rear Adm. Michael A. McDevitt (Ret.), “The Quadrennial Defense Review and East Asia,” PacNet Newsletter no. 43 (October 26, 2001), www.csis.org/pacfor/ pac0143.htm (accessed April 8, 2002).
alle...@timebyte.com
若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?"
==>
理論上，美國「很難公開反對」. 但現實上，美國「幾乎不會樂見」
Allen Kuo
[Allen Kuo]
若台灣選擇與中國進行所謂的和平統一, 美國會接受嗎?
[ChatGPT]
這個問題沒有一個簡單的「會 / 不會」，但可以從美國一貫的政策與戰略利益來看，大致輪廓是清楚的。
1️⃣ 美國的官方立場（關鍵前提）
美國長期遵循的是基於 Taiwan Relations Act、One China Policy 與「六項保證」的政策框架。
核心原則是：
不支持台灣獨立（官方表述）
反對任何一方單方面改變現狀
強調「和平」與「台灣人民意願」
👉 關鍵一句話：
如果發生改變，必須是和平且經由台灣人民同意。
2️⃣ 如果是「真正的和平統一」，美國理論上會怎麼看？
如果滿足以下條件：
沒有軍事威脅或脅迫
是台灣內部自由、民主程序決定（例如公投）
台灣社會多數真實支持
👉 理論上，美國「很難公開反對」
原因：
美國的政策是「不支持強迫改變現狀」，但不否認和平選擇
若完全符合民主自決，美國直接否定會違背自身價值
3️⃣ 但現實上，美國「幾乎不會樂見」
即使是和平統一，美國仍會高度警惕，甚至實際上不希望發生，原因在於戰略層面：
🔹 地緣戰略影響
台灣位於「第一島鏈」核心：
影響美軍在西太平洋的防線
涉及 South China Sea 與西太平洋控制權
若由中國控制，美國在亞太的軍事存在會被削弱
🔹 科技與產業安全
台灣擁有關鍵產業，例如：
TSMC（全球最重要晶片代工）
如果整合進中國體系，美國會擔心：
高端技術外流
供應鏈被戰略對手掌控
🔹 國際秩序與盟友信任
若台灣最終被中國吸收，即使是和平形式，也會讓：
日本、韓國、菲律賓等盟友質疑美國安全承諾
影響美國在亞洲的影響力與信譽
4️⃣ 最關鍵的現實問題：是否「真的自願」？
這是整個問題的核心。
美國與多數西方國家普遍認為：
👉 在以下情況下，「和平統一」很難被視為完全自願：
長期軍事威嚇
經濟壓力或滲透
資訊戰與政治影響
因此即使表面是和平：
➡️ 美國可能仍會質疑其「自由選擇」的真實性
5️⃣ 總結（精簡版）
理論上：
若完全和平且由台灣人民自由決定
→ 美國「可能接受，但不會支持」
實際上：
美國大概率：
不樂見
會設法影響或延緩
甚至間接阻止
👉 關鍵不是「和平」兩字，而是：
是否真的自由、是否符合美國戰略利益
--
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david chou
raysc...@gmail.com
美國政府應該不會公開反對<台灣住民自決>選擇和平統一.
就算他明知他跟伊朗和平談判成功的机會很小一樣.
問題是 美中台三方現在政府 都願意讓台灣人民有自由公平地公投選擇台灣前途的机會嗎?
<自由公平地公投> 絕不是密室談判定案.
Raymond
From: david chou <davidch...@yahoo.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2026 5:25 AM
To: bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [BATA] "若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?"
"若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?" 24年前,當時還在世的美國台海事務學者(外交史學家)唐耐心就這樣問 (III)
1
我在本欄第一則Post說:
"現在一干紅統化國民黨的領導人,包括現任主席.副主席季某.連戰的人馬(如副主席張榮恭.連的兒子連勝文)今天就要前往支那,又要搞 "和平之旅", 這次準備要與支共搞所謂的 "和平架構", 以為他們在2028年奪取政權後簽署 "和平協議" 鋪路."
投奔北京的鄭貴妃已向習大單于提出了 "建構兩岸關係和平發展制度化，逐步達成和平框架" 這樣的主張, 顯然他們在今後的兩年, 就會舉行數次的會議或會談, 把他們所謂的 "和平框架" 建立起來. [Appendix I]
2
美國國務院對Xi-Cheng Meeting的初步反應已見諸一則Reuters的報導 [Appendix II] [國務院或白宮發言人的官方回應, 下週才會出現]:
The United States said meaningful cross-strait exchange should focus on dialogue between "Beijing's leadership and Taiwan's democratically elected authorities without preconditions," while also including all other political parties in Taiwan.
"We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side," a U.S. State Department spokesperson said, urging Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic and economic pressure against Taiwan.
華府很難對會危害美國在台灣的安全.戰略.政治.經濟利益的Xi-Cheng Meeting及其達成的協議公開且直接表示反對. 關於這個, 在二十幾年前, Nancy B. Tucker就已經告訴了我們, 只是除了我還有其他少數台灣人與台美人知道且會注意外, 其他人都不知道, 也不再乎.
但若任此事這樣繼續下去, 我台灣族人與台派除了亡國滅種, 不會有其他的結局.
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
==================================
Appendix I
鄭貴妃致詞全文
鄭習會》沒當面提中華民國 國民黨公開鄭麗文談話全文 | 政治 | Newtalk新聞
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尊敬的習近平總書記和各位領導，大家好：
今天，貴、我兩黨領導人得以在時隔十年之後共聚一堂進行交流。此時此刻，我深刻感受到，全球關切的目光，以及歷史所交付的重責大任，都落在我們在座每一位的身上。當前，我們所共同面對的，是一個高度動盪不安的時代，但也是一個充滿希望的時代；是一個二次世界大戰以來衝突最為蔓延的時代，但也可能是一個各方在痛定思痛之後決心重建和平的時代。台海兩岸關係何去何從，是我們共同面臨的問題。
無可否認，國共兩黨在超過一世紀的互動中，充滿了起伏轉折，但我們彼此所共同追求的，從來都是如何使得中華民族能夠從衰敗走向復興。自從 2005年本黨連戰主席的和平之旅破冰之後，兩黨就以前瞻性的歷史視野，站在民族與時代的高度，致力於推動兩岸和解與和平發展。
事實上，兩岸的和平與和解，應該只是貴、我兩黨攜手努力的起點，我們對於兩岸人民、炎黃子孫，都擁有更大的責任與使命。因此，「中華民族偉大復興」是兩岸人民的共同復興，是中華文明精神的再度覺醒與光大，更是悲天憫人的大同世界胸懷，是對於世界和平與人類進步的積極貢獻。麗文深信，這樣的「振興中華」之道，一定能感召人心、引領時代，也才是兩岸的共享價值也是共同責任。
大陸的發展，在習總書記領導下，不但實現了完全脫貧，建成全面小康社會，成就非凡，而且持續騰飛。十五五規劃剛剛開局，必將再上新台階，值得期待。兩岸人民雖生活在不同的制度中，但我們會相互尊重，也要相向而行。麗文相信，和平是兩岸共享的道德與價值，雙方應超越政治對抗，共同籌思與建構兩岸雙贏共榮的「命運共同體」，尋求一套防止及避免戰爭制度性的解決方案，使台海成為世界和平解決衝突的典範。
而且，儘管世界越走越極端，甚至一些人類共享的價值逐漸被摒棄，但我們會共同堅守人類共享的永續理念，在新能源、疾病防治、人工智慧倫理與應用等領域攜手合作，以科技服務人類福祉，推動世界永續發展。
希望在貴、我兩黨奮鬥不懈的努力之下，台灣海峽將不再成為潛在衝突的焦點，更不會成為外力介入的棋盤。台海將是一條連結親情、文明與希望的海峽，是兩岸中國人共同守護和平的象徵。我們將向世界昭示，共享中華文明的兩岸人民，有最高的智慧化解艱難的分歧，有極大的慈悲為人類和平與發展做出關鍵的貢獻。貴、我兩黨應共同建設中華民族現代文明，為人類文明融合與繁榮樹立典範。
麗文期待國共兩黨共同推動兩岸和平的制度化，在堅持九二共識、反對台獨的共同政治基礎上，兩岸應進一步籌劃與建構具制度性與可持續性的對話與合作機制，使兩岸和平發展走向不可逆轉，從根本上消除所有的衝突誘因。攜手啟動「中華文明復興工程」：以中華文化為基礎，以和合共生為核心，兩岸共同研究並推動各類有助於消弭爭端、創造和平的制度與倡議，並將成功經驗轉化為可供全球衝突地區借鏡的典範。
因此，當前我們雙方至少有三個可以共同努力的方向：
一、致力維護中華歷史、弘揚中華文化：
絕大多數台灣人的祖先，都是唐山過台灣，姓中國姓、講中國話、過中國節、拜中國神。幾百年來，不同的時間從大陸各地遷移到台灣的移民，不斷豐富台灣社會的中華文化內涵。中華文化一直是台灣社會的基因，實踐在台灣人的生活當中。
許多台灣先人墓碑上，都刻著來自大陸的發源地，例如河南穎川、或者福建省的各個地方等等。台灣各地遍布的宮廟所供奉的神明如軒轅、伏羲、神農、關公、媽祖等，還有保生大帝、開漳聖王、清水祖師、三山國王等，都源自大陸。
因此，兩岸人民同為炎黃子孫、同屬中華民族，都受中華文化薰陶，都是一家人。在近代歷史上基於中國人的立場，有守護家園、反對外敵入侵的共同經歷。兩岸透過不斷宣揚這些共同淵源，強化大陸和台灣同屬一個民族、共享一個文化，共同傳承歷史記憶，兩岸就沒有化解不了的分歧，沒有擱不下的羈絆，才能夠推進歷史。
二、致力增進共同福祉、推動交流合作：
2005 年，國共兩黨達成五項共同願景，開創了兩岸關係和平發展的黃金時期。自 2006起，兩黨智庫合作舉辦了十一屆的兩岸論壇，提出了一百數十項共同意見，促進兩岸經貿文化交流合作。國民黨執政八年期間，兩岸簽署了23項協議，至今仍持續造福兩岸民生。今年二月，兩黨智庫恢復舉辦時隔十年的兩岸論壇，達成十五項共同意見，盼能重新引領推進兩岸互利融合的民意。
兩岸應該在既有成果的基礎上，積極促進民間基層在經貿、文化、青年等各個領域、各個層面交流合作，不斷累積善意、增進相互了解。兩岸人民多走動、多交朋友，讓兩岸產業加強對接並提升利益。透過持續增進雙方共同福祉，就是兩岸關係和平發展最堅實的保障。
台商台胞是兩岸交流合作的重要推手，是兩岸人民彼此理解的橋樑，是兩岸關係和平發展最重要的支持力量和監督力量。中國國民黨一向關心在大陸台商台胞的生活福祉和權益保障，麗文期待也相信未來大陸對台商台胞的權益保障，一定會更加完善。
三、致力邁向美好兩岸、強化民生樂利：
當前人類社會處在史上最富裕的階段，但也是發展和分配最不平均的時代。目前世界地緣格局愈發動盪，全球經濟不確定性隨之升高。兩岸擁有先進的科技且享受便利的生活，可是面臨的困難和挑戰，應該也是前所未有的。麗文相信，任何艱難險阻，都阻擋不了兩岸人民攜手追求美好生活的決心。
兩岸因為在地緣環境、社會型態、文化風俗、產業結構等各方面的親近性，在面對氣候變遷、能源安全、科技治理、人口老化等現代化發展的問題時，經驗和優勢都能夠互補互利。希望兩岸能夠在節能減碳、防災減災、醫療康養、人工智慧等幾個前瞻性領域持續加強交流合作，共同打造未來願景，必將有助於完善人類命運共同體。
當代兩岸的年輕人，是中華民族歷史上，受教育程度最高、對世界認識最深最廣、活動力和創造力最強、最知道如何運用和平發展揮灑所長的一代。兩岸的希望在青年，應該鼓勵青年朋友多交流，探索人生課題和發展願景，合作邁向未來。兩岸青年彼此欣賞、相互砥礪，一起成長，這樣兩岸關係才會不斷地正向發展，可長可久。
麗文此行以「兩岸和平，造福民生」自我期許，藉此提出以下五點主張：
一、推動兩岸關係和平發展：
兩岸關係和平發展符合兩岸人民共同願望，符合中華民族整體利益，必須堅定推動。和平與發展是人類基本需求，海峽兩岸更不應相互對立，而需和諧相處。兩岸雙方、國共兩黨都有責任弘揚中華文化，以交流促進和平，以合作提升發展，建構兩岸關係和平發展制度化，逐步達成和平框架。
二、謀求恢復兩岸協商機制：
兩岸協商與聯繫機制，曾對雙方和平與發展發揮不可或缺的功能，應當恢復。
兩岸各自的法律法規都規範雙方不是國與國的關係。1992 年兩岸雙方授權機構達成各自以口頭聲明方式表達堅持一個中國原則的共識，同時求同存異，成為兩岸協商與聯繫機制的政治基礎。歷史事實不容否認，應在此基礎上恢復協商機制，堆疊善意循環。
三、維護台海和平穩定，增進兩岸互惠互利：
和平穩定的台海為區域各方期待，互惠互利的兩岸為雙方民意企盼，兩者相輔相成。兩岸雙方的相關規定和國際現實都體現了一個中國。兩岸應在此規定和現實下相互協作，處理分歧，磋商化解對立狀態，為區域安全做出貢獻。兩岸三通及減免關稅等經濟合作 23項協議，促進了共同發展、共同繁榮，有目共睹，獲兩岸各界肯定，應在堅持共同政治基礎上持續推廣實惠實利，增強兩岸和平的民意支撐。
四、在政治互信中增進台灣國際活動空間：
台灣曾在九二共識的基礎上，以適當方式參與世界衛生大會、國際民航組織大會，但是得而復失。未來兩岸在重建政治互信後，應促成臺灣重返世界衛生大會、國際民航組織大會，以及探索台灣參與國際刑警組織大會等。區域經濟整合攸關台灣經濟發展，兩岸經濟合作可和台灣參與區域經濟整合相互促進，兩岸得探索臺灣加入區域全面經濟夥伴協定及跨太平洋夥伴全面進步協定。
五、持續發揮國共兩黨溝通平台功能：
國共兩黨溝通平台始終是兩岸關係和平發展、台海和平穩定的正道力量，應當持續發揮功能。兩黨平台的機制，包括高層對話、智庫論壇、青年交流、基層交流、台商保障等，都曾引領及協助開創兩岸關係，當前與未來都應再藉這個平台，不斷策勵兩岸各個領域、各個層面的交流合作、溝通研商，為台海開太平，為民生增福祉。
最後，再次感謝中共中央和習總書記的邀請。交往交流本來就應該要有來有往，麗文衷心期盼將來有一天，有機會讓我當主人，在台灣歡迎習總書記和在座各位。謝謝大家！
Appendix II
China will not tolerate independence for Taiwan, Xi tells island's opposition leader
By Liz Lee
April 10, 2026 11:07 AM GMT+8
Updated April 11, 2026
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/chinas-xi-meets-taiwan-opposition-leader-beijing-state-media-says-2026-04-10/
· Summary
· Taiwan opposition leader Cheng in China for 'peace' mission
· Cheng meets China's Xi at Great Hall of the People
· Only Taiwan's people can decide their future, government says
· China refuses to talk to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te
BEIJING, April 10 (Reuters) - China will "absolutely not tolerate" independence for Taiwan, which is the chief culprit in undermining peace in the Taiwan Strait, President Xi Jinping told the island's opposition leader on Friday, calling for efforts to advance "reunification".
Cheng Li-wun, chairwoman of Taiwan's largest opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), is in China on what she has called a peace mission to reduce tensions at a time when Beijing has stepped up military pressure against the island it claims as its territory.
Meeting in the Great Hall of the People, Xi told Cheng that today's world was not entirely at peace, and peace was precious.
"Compatriots on both sides of the strait are all Chinese - people of one family who want peace, development, exchange, and cooperation," he said, in comments carried by Taiwan television stations.
'ONE CHINA'
Both sides of the strait belong to "one China", Xi added, according to a separate state media readout.
"When the family is harmonious, all things will prosper," he said. "Taiwan independence is the chief culprit in undermining peace in the Taiwan Strait - we will absolutely not tolerate or condone it."
Xi also mentioned the thorny subject of union between China and Taiwan, which has long been Beijing's goal but which Taiwan's government rejects.
The KMT and Communist Party must "join hands to create a bright future of the motherland's reunification and national rejuvenation," he said.
China refuses to talk to Taiwan President Lai Ching-te, saying he is a "separatist".
Speaking to reporters in Taipei late on Friday, Taiwan's top China policymaker, Chiu Chui-cheng, said only Taiwan's people could decide their future and China should engage with Taipei's democratically elected and legitimate government.
"The Chinese communists are deliberately creating the false impression that Taiwan is an internal affair of China," he added.
The then-KMT-led Republic of China government fled to Taiwan in 1949 after losing a civil war with Mao Zedong's communists, who founded the People's Republic of China. To this day, neither government formally recognises the other.
The modern KMT favours closer diplomatic and economic ties with Beijing than the ruling Democratic Progressive Party.
The United States said meaningful cross-strait exchange should focus on dialogue between "Beijing's leadership and Taiwan's democratically elected authorities without preconditions," while also including all other political parties in Taiwan.
"We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side," a U.S. State Department spokesperson said, urging Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic and economic pressure against Taiwan.
Beijing regularly calls Taiwan the most sensitive and important issue between it and the United States. Washington does not have formal ties with Taiwan, but is the island's closest backer and main source of arms.
'CHESSBOARD'
Cheng told Xi that mutually beneficial cross-strait relations were what the public on both sides longed for, and that interactions and exchanges should be reciprocal.
"I, Li-wun, sincerely hope that one day in the future, I will have the opportunity to be the host and welcome General Secretary Xi and all of you here present in Taiwan," she added, using Xi's title as head of the Communist Party.
Cheng said she hoped that through the efforts of both parties, the Taiwan Strait would no longer be a focal point of potential conflict, and would certainly not become a "chessboard for outside forces to intervene in".
Speaking later to reporters in Beijing, Cheng said Xi had told her that China respected Taiwan's different social system and choice of lifestyle.
"But he also hopes that Taiwan will be able to affirm and acknowledge the development achievements of the mainland," she said.
Reporting by Liz Lee; Writing and additional reporting by Ben Blanchard in Taipei and Michael Martina in Washington; Editing by Himani Sarkar, Lincoln Feast and Alex Richardson
david chou
"We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side," a U.S. State Department spokesperson said, urging Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic and economic pressure against Taiwan.
華府很難對會危害美國在台灣的安全.戰略.政治.經濟利益的Xi-Cheng Meeting及其達成的協議公開且直接表示反對. 關於這個, 在二十幾年前, Nancy B. Tucker就已經告訴了我們, 只是除了我還有其他少數台灣人與台美人知道且會注意外, 其他人都不知道, 也不再乎.
alle...@timebyte.com
[Raymond] 問題是 美中台三方現在政府 都願意讓台灣人民有自由公平地公投選擇台灣前途的机會嗎?
==>
台灣人完全沒有統獨公投的機會啦!
- 中華民國流亡政府不會這麼好康給你台灣人民有統獨公投的機會. 光是一個蔡萊爾就可以沒收全民公投了, 其他免談.
- 我(美)國也不會這麼好心給你台灣人民有統獨公投的機會. 不要忘了軍事佔領下的人民, 是不能自發性地公投選擇前途.
(不要忘了, 我國從未宣布二戰後對台的軍事佔領已經結束).
- 中共國更不可能給你台灣人民有統獨公投的機會. 這是分裂祖國呀, 飛彈就打下來了!
以上可見台灣人完全沒有統獨公投的機會. 而沒有經過台灣人民統獨公投的統一, 就不算和平統一.
Allen Kuo
From: bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com <bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of raysc...@gmail.com
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2026 9:07 AM
To: 'david chou' <davidch...@yahoo.com>; bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com
Cc: 'Allen Kuo' <alle...@timebyte.com>; 'Dr. JC Fann' <tf30...@gmail.com>; 'Douglas Chiang' <douglas...@gmail.com>; 'John 2 Hsieh' <jckh...@gmail.com>; 'John Chou' <johnc...@gmail.com>; 'Seashon Chen' <200...@gmail.com>; 'Dr. Michael Yeun' <drmich...@gmail.com>; 'Ting-Kuei Tsay' <aqui...@gmail.com>; 'Chilly Chen' <b0983...@gmail.com>; 'Ted Lau' <tedl...@gmail.com>; 'Stephenlin0314' <stephen...@gmail.com>; 'Tek-Khiam Chia' <tekk...@gmail.com>; 'Hwan Lin' <hwa...@gmail.com>; 'Michael Richardson' <richards...@gmail.com>; 'Sim Kiantek' <d11...@ms27.hinet.net>; 'Shan Ju Lin' <shan...@gmail.com>; 'RWH (Taipei' <rwh.m...@gmail.com>; 'Carmen Lin' <chgosp...@yahoo.com>; '邱律師' <chi...@ms15.hinet.net>; '蔡 明法主委' <niec...@yahoo.com>; 'Chi-yuan Tsai' <yuan...@gate.sinica.edu.tw>
Subject: RE: [BATA] "若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?"
美國政府應該不會公開反對<台灣住民自決>選擇和平統一.
就算他明知他跟伊朗和平談判成功的机會很小一樣.
問題是 美中台三方現在政府 都願意讓台灣人民有自由公平地公投選擇台灣前途的机會嗎?
<自由公平地公投> 絕不是密室談判定案.
Raymond
From: david chou <mailto:davidch...@yahoo.com>
Sent: Sunday, April 12, 2026 5:25 AM
To: mailto:bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: [BATA] "若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?"
"若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?" 24年前,當時還在世的美國台海事務學者(外交史學家)唐耐心就這樣問 (III)
1
我在本欄第一則Post說:
"現在一干紅統化國民黨的領導人,包括現任主席.副主席季某.連戰的人馬(如副主席張榮恭.連的兒子連勝文)今天就要前往支那,又要搞 "和平之旅", 這次準備要與支共搞所謂的 "和平架構", 以為他們在2028年奪取政權後簽署 "和平協議" 鋪路."
投奔北京的鄭貴妃已向習大單于提出了 "建構兩岸關係和平發展制度化，逐步達成和平框架" 這樣的主張, 顯然他們在今後的兩年, 就會舉行數次的會議或會談, 把他們所謂的 "和平框架" 建立起來. [Appendix I]
2
美國國務院對Xi-Cheng Meeting的初步反應已見諸一則Reuters的報導 [Appendix II] [國務院或白宮發言人的官方回應, 下週才會出現]:
The United States said meaningful cross-strait exchange should focus on dialogue between "Beijing's leadership and Taiwan's democratically elected authorities without preconditions," while also including all other political parties in Taiwan.
"We oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo from either side," a U.S. State Department spokesperson said, urging Beijing to cease its military, diplomatic and economic pressure against Taiwan.
華府很難對會危害美國在台灣的安全.戰略.政治.經濟利益的Xi-Cheng Meeting及其達成的協議公開且直接表示反對. 關於這個, 在二十幾年前, Nancy B. Tucker就已經告訴了我們, 只是除了我還有其他少數台灣人與台美人知道且會注意外, 其他人都不知道, 也不再乎.
但若任此事這樣繼續下去, 我台灣族人與台派除了亡國滅種, 不會有其他的結局.
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
==================================
Appendix I
鄭貴妃致詞全文
From: 'david chou' via Bay Area Taiwanese American <mailto:bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com>
Sent: Monday, April 6, 2026 6:51 PM
To: BATA Group <mailto:bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com>
Cc: Raymond Chuang <mailto:raysc...@gmail.com>; Dr. JC Fann <mailto:tf30...@gmail.com>; Douglas Chiang <mailto:douglas...@gmail.com>; John 2 Hsieh <mailto:jckh...@gmail.com>; Seashon Chen <mailto:200...@gmail.com>; John Chou <mailto:johnc...@gmail.com>; Dr. Michael Yeun <mailto:drmich...@gmail.com>; Allen Kuo <mailto:alle...@timebyte.com>; Ting-Kuei Tsay <mailto:aqui...@gmail.com>; Chilly Chen <mailto:b0983...@gmail.com>; Ted Lau <mailto:tedl...@gmail.com>; Stephenlin0314 <mailto:stephen...@gmail.com>; Tek-Khiam Chia <mailto:tekk...@gmail.com>; Hwan Lin <mailto:hwa...@gmail.com>; Michael Richardson <mailto:richards...@gmail.com>; Sim Kiantek <mailto:d11...@ms27.hinet.net>; Shan Ju Lin <mailto:shan...@gmail.com>; Carmen Lin <mailto:chgosp...@yahoo.com>; 邱律師 <mailto:chi...@ms15.hinet.net>; Kuochih Hong <mailto:kuoh...@yahoo.com>; 蔡 明法主委 <mailto:niec...@yahoo.com>; Chi-yuan Tsai <mailto:yuan...@gate.sinica.edu.tw>; RWH (Taipei <mailto:rwh.m...@gmail.com>
11. Rear Adm. Michael A. McDevitt (Ret.), “The Quadrennial Defense Review and East Asia,” PacNet Newsletter no. 43 (October 26, 2001), http://www.csis.org/pacfor/ pac0143.htm (accessed April 8, 2002).
12. “U.S. Official Supports Cross-Strait Dialogue with No Preconditions,” Central News Agency (Taiwan), June 22, 2001.
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david chou
"若台灣選擇與支那進行所謂的和平統一,美國應該在乎嗎?" 24年前,當時還在世的美國台海事務學者(外交史學家)唐耐心就這樣問 (IV)
問題是 美中台三方現在政府 都願意讓台灣人民有自由公平地公投選擇台灣前途的机會嗎?
<自由公平地公投> 絕不是密室談判定案.
[Raymond:] 問題是 美中台三方現在政府 都願意讓台灣人民有自由公平地公投選擇台灣前途的机會嗎?
[Mr. Allen Kuo:]
台灣人完全沒有統獨公投的機會啦!
1. 中華民國流亡政府不會這麼好康給你台灣人民有統獨公投的機會. 光是一個蔡萊爾就可以沒收全民公投了, 其他免談.
2. 我(美)國也不會這麼好心給你台灣人民有統獨公投的機會. 不要忘了軍事佔領下的人民, 是不能自發性地公投選擇前途.
(不要忘了, 我國從未宣布二戰後對台的軍事佔領已經結束).
1. 中共國更不可能給你台灣人民有統獨公投的機會. 這是分裂祖國呀, 飛彈就打下來了!
以上可見台灣人完全沒有統獨公投的機會. 而沒有經過台灣人民統獨公投的統一, 就不算和平統一.
如要查看這個討論，請前往 https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bay-area-taiwanese-american/000001dccaae%24ae4267a0%240ac736e0%24%40timebyte.com。