Austin J. Dahmer任性的莠言(I)
幾名美國安事務界人士於2024年在 “X”張貼了幾則訊息, 其中一則 [發言人為Austin J. Dahmer, 日前被任命為負責戰略事務的國防部副助理部長, Elbridge Colby數年前就是擔任這個職務] 最近被支共在台同路人大加渲染與運用, 困擾了我台灣族人, 即便該則訊息並沒有反映美國國安事務界的主流觀點.
David現在依序把那幾則訊息 [第三則訊息原刊登在The Taipei Times] 轉貼出來, 供鄉親參閱, 我稍後再來稍加說明.
台灣人在台灣的安全利益當然是台灣人的最大關切 [不是與支共狼狽為奸的在台支那人與台奸的關切], 但因為美國在台灣也有安全的利益, 所以, Austin Dahmer 8/21/2024在 “X” 上的言論是不負責任的與任性的. 他說:
“At the same time, Taiwan is a very strong interest of the U.S. BUT IT IS NOT EXISTENTIAL FOR US. AMERICANS CAN CONTINUE TO BE SECURE, PROSPEROUS, AND FREE IF/WHEN TAIWAN FALLS. We are not going to break our spear defending Taiwan.”
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
Andrew Erickson 艾立信
@AndrewSErickson
Honored to publish with Gabe Collins & Matt Pottinger
! “The #Taiwan Catastrophe: What America—& the World—Would Lose If #China Took the Island” https://foreignaffairs.com/united-states/taiwan-catastrophe… Great to work with
!
The Taiwan Catastrophe
·
2/17/2024
https://x.com/austinjdahmer/status/1826243645588304164
I agree that defending Taiwan is vital interest. That’s why we should making “absolutely sure” we are getting that defense posture right before addressing other interests.
Those who contend to priotize China should advocate policies that “actually” priotize it.
By Elbridge Colby
5/11/2024
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/05/11/2003817679
With each passing day, the threat of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) assault on Taiwan grows. Whatever one’s view about the history, there is essentially no question that a PRC conquest of Taiwan would mark the end of the autonomy and freedom enjoyed by the island’s 23 million people. Simply put, the PRC threat to Taiwan is genuinely existential for a free, democratic and autonomous Taiwan.
Yet one might not know it from looking at Taiwan. For an island facing a threat so acute, lethal and imminent, Taiwan is showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses. This is incredibly dangerous because the fate of Taiwan depends on the military defensibility of the island. It will ultimately be military power that will deter and, if necessary, defeat a PRC invasion of Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will not be stopped by hashtags and good wishes from afar. Yet in August last year, Taiwan announced plans to spend just US$19 billion on defense — a measly 2.5 percent of the island’s GDP. While it is true that Taiwan has made some progress, for instance in adopting an asymmetric approach to its defense, its spending and pace of preparations have been woefully inadequate given the awing scale of China’s military buildup.
Even worse, there are concerns about how serious Taiwan really is about the threat. There are few visible indicators of a society preparing to repel an attack as one might see in, say, Israel. Indeed, Taiwanese leaders often appear more concerned about advertising their concern for the plight of others than about ensuring their own defenses, arguing, for example, that “the defense of Ukraine is also the defense of Taiwan.”
What might be causing Taiwan to be adopting this lackluster approach towards defense? Let’s examine the possibilities to see why they are all deeply unwise and ill-founded.
First, Taiwan may believe that it is already doing enough to protect its people and deter China. But let’s put things in context. China’s official defense budget is about 12 times more than what Taiwan spends. Some US government estimates put China’s actual defense spending at about $700 billion — about three times larger than the official figure. If true, Taiwan may be spending up to 37 times less on defense than the country that is threatening to absorb it by invasion. By these numbers alone, Taiwan’s current defense spending is not just imprudent. It is borderline suicidal.
Nor is Taiwan’s level of spending especially onerous. Americans, by contrast, spend 3.5 percent of their GDP on defense. Poland, which shares a border with Ukraine, spends almost 4 percent. Israel, which faces fewer existential threats than Taiwan, spent 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense in 2022 and well over 5 percent for much of the past two decades. Given the massive disparity in military power in the Taiwan Strait, spending 5 percent of its GDP on defense should be the floor for Taiwan. Indeed, if its security and autonomy are at stake, why not spend 10 percent?
Taiwan’s meager defense spending is doubly problematic because, despite progress in formally adopting an asymmetric strategy, the bulk of the spending still goes to big-ticket items like fighter jets and warships that are expensive and extremely vulnerable to PLA strikes. Taiwan still remains very much behind in the acquisition of asymmetric capabilities that can meaningfully deter and deny a Chinese invasion. The US must do everything in its power to get Taiwan these weapons as quickly as possible. Yet Taiwanese leaders themselves have undermined this effort by urging the US to send key weapons, industrial base attention, and money to Ukraine rather than Taiwan.
Second, Taiwan may be banking on the idea that China will not invade. But there’s a reason that it’s a truism that basing one’s strategy and defense posture on hope is unwise. For an island facing the very realistic prospect of conquest by a far stronger military, it is incredibly reckless — not least because China is very clearly preparing to invade Taiwan.
In case there was any doubt, CIA Director William Burns confirmed last year that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also said that Xi intends to unify Taiwan with China “on a much faster timeline” than previously anticipated. Meanwhile, China continues to develop, at historic speeds, the capabilities that would enable an invasion. Taiwanese defense strategy must be based on a full recognition of these realities, however unpleasant they might be. US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo recently said that “we must be ready now, next week, next month, and in the decades to come” and that China could strike with little warning. Leaders in Taipei must take this message to heart.
Third, Taiwan may be thinking that, regardless of its lackluster defense spending, the US can always be counted on to come to its rescue. It is true that Taiwan is a very important strategic interest to the US. It is not, however, an existential interest. America has a strong interest in defending Taiwan, but Americans could survive without it. Our leaders cannot and realistically will not ask the American people to sacrifice for Taiwan at a cost that would be intolerable to the US. And they are unlikely to ask America’s sons and daughters to fight and give more than the Taiwanese themselves are willing to. It would in fact be immoral to put our troops in harm’s way for Taiwan when Taiwanese leaders haven’t done their part to ensure our doing so would not be reckless and futile.
The fact is that Americans already face a myriad of challenges at home. And after two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans will undoubtedly be skeptical about entering into another costly, bloody war. Taipei must not take America’s commitment for granted but must work hard for it — not as a favor to Americans, but to make it more palatable for America to help defend Taiwan. In sum, Taiwan must dramatically increase its own defense spending, readiness and preparations if it is to stand a chance of deterring, let alone, defeating a Chinese invasion alongside American help.
Further — and crucially — if Taiwan does not get serious about its defense, then even if Americans do want to intervene, it may be a moot point. As Paparo recently testified, Taiwan’s ability to defend itself will have an outsized effect on our collective ability to defeat a Chinese invasion — or deter one in the first place. The opposite is also true. If Taipei fails to invest in the island’s defenses, then there may come a time when Taiwan is simply no longer defensible. At that point, America’s hands will be tied, and we will be forced to prepare to deny China’s hegemonic ambitions after Taiwan falls. To be clear, we very much do not want this outcome, but Taiwan’s lassitude is raising the risks we will be forced to confront this awful choice.
Taiwan is running out of time. It is on a knife’s edge in terms of its defensibility against a determined Chinese assault that Beijing is manifestly preparing for. Taiwan’s task is very challenging yet straightforward. Significantly increase your defense spending. Pursue every conceivable measure to strengthen the island’s defenses against invasion and blockade. Make the case to the world about why the defense of Taiwan is critical rather than engage in triple bank shot posturing about battles half a world away. Demand that production and deliveries of weapons needed for the island’s defense be prioritized over all else. And match your actions and rhetoric with the urgency the moment requires. Taiwan must change before it is too late. It is now or never.
Elbridge Colby is a principal at the Marathon Initiative. He led the development of the 2018 National Defense Strategy as US deputy assistant secretary of defense for strategy and force development. He is the author of The Strategy of Denial: American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict.
5/11/2024
Elbridge Colby
@ElbridgeColby
آ·
2024年5月11日
"Taiwan is running out of time. It is on a knife’s edge in terms of its defensibility against a Chinese assault that Beijing is preparing for. Taiwan’s task is very challenging yet straightforward. Significantly increase your defense spending..." https://taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/05/11/2003817679
4,378
Austin Dahmer
@austinjdahmer
If Taipei fails to invest in the island’s defenses, then there may come a time when Taiwan is simply no longer defensible. At that point, America’s hands will be tied, and we will be forced to prepare to deny China’s hegemonic ambitions after Taiwan falls.
8/21/2024
At the same time, Taiwan is a very strong interest of the U.S. BUT IT IS NOT EXISTENTIAL FOR US. AMERICANS CAN CONTINUE TO BE SECURE, PROSPEROUS, AND FREE IF/WHEN TAIWAN FALLS.
By Elbridge Colby
5/11/2024
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2024/05/11/2003817679
With each passing day, the threat of a People’s Republic of China (PRC) assault on Taiwan grows. Whatever one’s view about the history, there is essentially no question that a PRC conquest of Taiwan would mark the end of the autonomy and freedom enjoyed by the island’s 23 million people. Simply put, the PRC threat to Taiwan is genuinely existential for a free, democratic and autonomous Taiwan.
Yet one might not know it from looking at Taiwan. For an island facing a threat so acute, lethal and imminent, Taiwan is showing an alarming lack of urgency in dramatically strengthening its defenses. This is incredibly dangerous because the fate of Taiwan depends on the military defensibility of the island. It will ultimately be military power that will deter and, if necessary, defeat a PRC invasion of Taiwan. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) will not be stopped by hashtags and good wishes from afar. Yet in August last year [2023], Taiwan announced plans to spend just US$19 billion on defense — a measly 2.5 percent of the island’s GDP. While it is true that Taiwan has made some progress, for instance in adopting an asymmetric approach to its defense, its spending and pace of preparations have been woefully inadequate given the awing scale of China’s military buildup.
Even worse, there are concerns about how serious Taiwan really is about the threat. There are few visible indicators of a society preparing to repel an attack as one might see in, say, Israel. Indeed, Taiwanese leaders often appear more concerned about advertising their concern for the plight of others than about ensuring their own defenses, arguing, for example, that “the defense of Ukraine is also the defense of Taiwan.”
What might be causing Taiwan to be adopting this lackluster approach towards defense? Let’s examine the possibilities to see why they are all deeply unwise and ill-founded.
First, Taiwan may believe that it is already doing enough to protect its people and deter China. But let’s put things in context. China’s official defense budget is about 12 times more than what Taiwan spends. Some US government estimates put China’s actual defense spending at about $700 billion — about three times larger than the official figure. If true, Taiwan may be spending up to 37 times less on defense than the country that is threatening to absorb it by invasion. By these numbers alone, Taiwan’s current defense spending is not just imprudent. It is borderline suicidal.
Nor is Taiwan’s level of spending especially onerous. Americans, by contrast, spend 3.5 percent of their GDP on defense. Poland, which shares a border with Ukraine, spends almost 4 percent. Israel, which faces fewer existential threats than Taiwan, spent 4.5 percent of its GDP on defense in 2022 and well over 5 percent for much of the past two decades. Given the massive disparity in military power in the Taiwan Strait, spending 5 percent of its GDP on defense should be the floor for Taiwan. Indeed, if its security and autonomy are at stake, why not spend 10 percent?
Taiwan’s meager defense spending is doubly problematic because, despite progress in formally adopting an asymmetric strategy, the bulk of the spending still goes to big-ticket items like fighter jets and warships that are expensive and extremely vulnerable to PLA strikes. Taiwan still remains very much behind in the acquisition of asymmetric capabilities that can meaningfully deter and deny a Chinese invasion. The US must do everything in its power to get Taiwan these weapons as quickly as possible. Yet Taiwanese leaders themselves have undermined this effort by urging the US to send key weapons, industrial base attention, and money to Ukraine rather than Taiwan.
Second, Taiwan may be banking on the idea that China will not invade. But there’s a reason that it’s a truism that basing one’s strategy and defense posture on hope is unwise. For an island facing the very realistic prospect of conquest by a far stronger military, it is incredibly reckless — not least because China is very clearly preparing to invade Taiwan.
In case there was any doubt, CIA Director William Burns confirmed last year that Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) has ordered the PLA to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027. US Secretary of State Antony Blinken has also said that Xi intends to unify Taiwan with China “on a much faster timeline” than previously anticipated. Meanwhile, China continues to develop, at historic speeds, the capabilities that would enable an invasion. Taiwanese defense strategy must be based on a full recognition of these realities, however unpleasant they might be. US Indo-Pacific Commander Admiral Samuel Paparo recently said that “we must be ready now, next week, next month, and in the decades to come” and that China could strike with little warning. Leaders in Taipei must take this message to heart.
Third, Taiwan may be thinking that, regardless of its lackluster defense spending, the US can always be counted on to come to its rescue. It is true that Taiwan is a very important strategic interest to the US. It is not, however, an existential interest. America has a strong interest in defending Taiwan, but Americans could survive without it. Our leaders cannot and realistically will not ask the American people to sacrifice for Taiwan at a cost that would be intolerable to the US. And they are unlikely to ask America’s sons and daughters to fight and give more than the Taiwanese themselves are willing to. It would in fact be immoral to put our troops in harm’s way for Taiwan when Taiwanese leaders haven’t done their part to ensure our doing so would not be reckless and futile.
The fact is that Americans already face a myriad of challenges at home. And after two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan, Americans will undoubtedly be skeptical about entering into another costly, bloody war. Taipei must not take America’s commitment for granted but must work hard for it — not as a favor to Americans, but to make it more palatable for America to help defend Taiwan. In sum, Taiwan must dramatically increase its own defense spending, readiness and preparations if it is to stand a chance of deterring, let alone, defeating a Chinese invasion alongside American help.
Further — and crucially — if Taiwan does not get serious about its defense, then even if Americans do want to intervene, it may be a moot point. As Paparo recently testified, Taiwan’s ability to defend itself will have an outsized effect on our collective ability to defeat a Chinese invasion — or deter one in the first place. The opposite is also true. If Taipei fails to invest in the island’s defenses, then there may come a time when Taiwan is simply no longer defensible. At that point, America’s hands will be tied, and we will be forced to prepare to deny China’s hegemonic ambitions after Taiwan falls. To be clear, we very much do not want this outcome, but Taiwan’s lassitude is raising the risks we will be forced to confront this awful choice.
Taiwan is running out of time. It is on a knife’s edge in terms of its defensibility against a determined Chinese assault that Beijing is manifestly preparing for. Taiwan’s task is very challenging yet straightforward. Significantly increase your defense spending. Pursue every conceivable measure to strengthen the island’s defenses against invasion and blockade. Make the case to the world about why the defense of Taiwan is critical rather than engage in triple bank shot posturing about battles half a world away. Demand that production and deliveries of weapons needed for the island’s defense be prioritized over all else. And match your actions and rhetoric with the urgency the moment requires. Taiwan must change before it is too late. It is now or never.
Lithuania and Estonia pledge to meet Donald Trump’s 5% target on defence spending
EU states to boost military plans as they deal with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine
Richard Milne in Oslo and Marton Dunai in Budapest
Financial Times
1/27/2025
https://www.ft.com/content/a999f239-3104-419a-95dc-bf9c04242b2f
[Lithuanian soldiers in Vilnius. The country is establishing a division of land forces as well as being the host nation for a German brigade of about 5,000 people. © Oleg Nikishin/Getty Images Lithuania and Estonia pledge to meet Donald Trump’s 5% target on defence spending on x (opens in a new window) ]
[Lithuania and Estonia pledge to meet Donald Trump’s 5% target on defence spending on facebook (opens in a new window) Lithuania and Estonia pledge to meet Donald Trump’s 5% target on defence spending on linkedin (opens in a new window)]
Lithuania and Estonia have responded to “good and constructive pressure” from US President Donald Trump to become the first Nato countries to promise to spend more than 5 per cent of their GDP on defence in a drive to sharply increase military capabilities.
Kęstutis Budrys, Lithuania’s foreign minister, told the Financial Times that Europe was facing a “new era” after the Baltic state, which is next to Russia, said it would spend between 5 per cent and 6 per cent of its GDP on defence from next year until at least 2030. That is about double the current level.
“Of course, there’s pressure, and it’s good and constructive pressure from our strategic and biggest ally in Nato,” he said. “We cannot ignore those messages. But it’s not the sole reason . . . It is existential for us to have real war-fighting capabilities here.”
Estonian Prime Minister Kristen Michal responded to Lithuania’s pledge by saying his country would also target 5 per cent of GDP for defence spending, up from its current 3.7 per cent, which is itself ahead of US expenditure as a share of its economic output.
He said: “Our key security partner, under its new president, has sent a clear message: Nato defence spending must increase. We know our opponent, and I fully agree — our goal should be 5 per cent.”
Nato is set to increase its informal target for defence spending at its June summit from the current 2 per cent to 3 or 3.5 per cent as it responds to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, according to European officials. But Trump told allies he wanted 5 per cent, a figure now endorsed by several frontline Nato countries including Poland, which leads the alliance in spending at more than 4 per cent.
Out of Nato’s 32 members, 23 met the 2 per cent target last year as defence spending in Europe has gradually increased over the past decade since Russia’s annexation of Crimea. But there are notable stragglers such as Spain, Italy and Belgium, which all spent less than 1.5 per cent in 2024.
Worries exist across Europe about how to pay for the increased defence spending and whether people would accept it, particularly if it came at the expense of other public services.
Budrys said Lithuania would fund the sharp increase — up from 2.9 per cent — through government borrowing and what he hoped would be common European financial instruments for defence. Michal spoke of undefined “public sector cuts”.
But there is scepticism locally about how achievable that is. “They have no credible plan to get to 6 per cent,” said one opposition politician in Vilnius. “Borrowing that amount would mean rewriting the social contract.”
Lithuania is establishing a division of land forces — which typically consists of between 10,000 and 15,000 troops — as well as being the host nation for a German brigade of about 5,000 people.
“We lack many, many things from armour and fighting vehicles to ammunition, infrastructure and [rebuilding our] stockpiles,” said Budrys, adding that the new minimum for all of Nato should be more like 3 per cent even if his own country was going to spend 5 per cent to 6 per cent.
Other frontline Nato countries are also considering increasing their defence spending, albeit not to the level Trump demanded.
Romania, which shares the EU’s longest border with Ukraine, has been a bulwark of Nato’s eastern frontier with plans to create the alliance’s largest base at an airfield near the Black Sea. It has committed to paying about €6bn for a fleet of 32 new F-35 fighter jets, and various other weapons including three additional Patriot air defence systems costing €1bn.
Barna Tánczos, Romania’s new finance minister, said the government would maintain defence spending at a minimum of 2 per cent of GDP this year despite budgetary pressures. “I think there is a possibility to increase those expenditures further, especially as regards investments.
Romania has always been a reliable Nato partner and plans to remain one.” Recommended World Finland's president on Europe in a Trumpian world Romania has the highest budget deficit in the EU, reaching 8.6 per cent of GDP last year, and even optimistic government forecasts suggest it will remain at 7 per cent in 2025.
The government has frozen public wages and pensions at their previous nominal levels, despite inflation topping 5 per cent last year, and has rejected extrabudgetary items parliament requested in an attempt to save money.