北京支共流氓政權是否計劃何時要入侵台灣不是重點
david chou
2026 (U) ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY", 這份報告其中有一段很引我台灣人.台美人.境內外敵對勢力的注意:
[to be continued]
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March 2026
DIVERSE THREAT VECTORS
MILITARY
The risk of conflict is heightened by major power competition. Beijing and Moscow view Washington and its allies and partners as aggressors, and hostile toward their interests in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. They could respond with force should they determine there are critical threats to their core interests.
CYBER
Cyber actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to pose critical threats to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. These global cyber actors almost certainly will continue malicious cyber activities because they gain unmatched intelligence collection value and financial incentives from these operations. These cyber adversaries also have the ability to pre-position or execute disruptive and destructive attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure and other targets. They continue to pour resources into operations to compromise U.S. systems and core global IT resources.
China is the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks, while Russia poses a persistent, advanced cyber attack and foreign intelligence threat. Both countries are continuing their R&D and pre-positioning efforts to advance their premier cyber attack capabilities for use against the U.S.
REGIONAL CHALLENGES
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea view the U.S. as a strategic competitor and potential adversary, perceiving it as a threat to their respective interests and ambitions, and seek to counter and undermine U.S. influence and power through a range of diplomatic, economic, and military means. China aims to dominate its region and challenge Washington’s leadership, promote its own multilateral and economic influence, and strengthen its military while viewing the U.S. as its main strategic competitor. Russia continues to challenge U.S. interests and power, seeking to restore its influence in the former Soviet space, particularly Ukraine. Iran’s strategic position faces extreme challenges as it attempts to address potentially regime-threatening conflict and the ongoing risk of domestic unrest. For now, it retains the ability to project power in the region and to suppress internal threats to the regime’s hold on power. North Korea is committed to expanding its strategic weapons programs, including missiles and nuclear warheads, to solidify its deterrent capability. However, even in an era of major power competition, these powers will sometimes have common or overlapping interests where they can cooperate for mutual benefit, as we saw recently between the U.S. and China with the Busan Agreement.
Asia
China Strategic Overview
President Xi and his government aim to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. China will seek to increase its power and influence to shape its region and world events; create an environment favorable to Chinese interests; overcome perceived containment efforts by the U.S.; secure its freedom of movement at sea; reduce U.S. military presence and operations on its periphery; and fend off challenges to its reputation, legitimacy, and capabilities at home and abroad. China also sees benefits to and is prioritizing a productive, stable economic relationship with the U.S., as evinced by its approach to the Busan Agreement with the Trump administration.
Beijing has been deeply suspicious of Washington’s intentions and has long viewed the U.S. as pursuing a coordinated effort to contain China’s development and rise, undermine Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, and prevent the country from achieving its aims.
At the same time, Chinese leaders will seek to reduce tension with Washington when they believe that such efforts benefit Beijing, protect China’s core interests, and buy time to strengthen its position.
Beijing will continue to strengthen its conventional military capabilities and strategic forces, intensify competition in space, and sustain its industrial- and technologyintensive economic strategy to compete with U.S. economic power, making advances in the “Global South” in advanced manufacturing and the exportation of goods. China will likely continue working to maintain U.S. dependence on sectors such as critical minerals, energy storage systems, pharmaceutical ingredients, and UAVs, while accelerating efforts to reduce China’s dependence on the U.S. in sensitive or strategic areas, such as semiconductors and AI. In addition, China has shown its ability to compromise U.S. infrastructure through formidable cyber capabilities for both espionage and strategic advantage in the event of a conflict.
China’s engagement with Russia substantially strengthens Moscow’s ability to sustain the war in Ukraine and resist external pressure. China’s imports of Russian oil and natural gas provide key sources of revenue for Moscow, helping it weather international sanctions. China’s exports of dual-use goods and technology to Russia help sustain Moscow’s defense production while reducing its incentives to reach a cease-fire in Ukraine.
China–Taiwan
In 2026, Beijing probably will continue seeking to set the conditions for eventual unification with Taiwan short of conflict. China, despite its threat to use force to compel unification if necessary and to counter what it sees as a U.S. attempt to use Taiwan to undermine China’s rise, prefers to achieve unification without the use of force, if possible. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also continues to develop military plans and capabilities for attempting to achieve unification using military force if directed to do so.
The PLA probably is making steady but uneven progress on capabilities that it would use in any attempt to seize Taiwan and deter—and, if necessary, defeat—U.S. military intervention.At times, it has increased the scope, size, and pace of operations around Taiwan.
The IC assesses that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification. However, China publicly insists that unification with Taiwan is required to achieve its goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049—the 100th year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing almost certainly will consider a variety of factors in deciding whether and how to pursue military approaches to unification, including PLA readiness, the actions and politics of Taiwan, and whether or not the U.S. will militarily intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.
Chinese officials recognize that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be extremely challenging and carry a high risk of failure, especially in the event of U.S. Intervention.