支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論"
david chou
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (I)
"疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政, 將不利台灣與美國在歐洲與亞洲的盟國論" 起自美國本土, 很快就傳到日本與韓國與歐洲, 這引起各國的憂慮, 特別是烏克蘭.
"疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政, 將不利台灣與美國在歐洲與亞洲的盟國論" 也傳到台灣與支那, 但支共與其在台同路人把 "川普再執政, 將不利台灣與美國在歐洲與亞洲的盟國論" 渲染成 "川普再執政, 將棄台論". 那些支那畜牲在嚇唬台灣人, 並要賴清德政府投降老共, 不可親美/ 抗支/ 保台.
我現在先請鄉親們先閱讀兩則報導:
(1) China Says Trump Could Abandon Taiwan If He Wins US Election
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (I)
"疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政, 將不利台灣與美國在歐洲與亞洲的盟國論" 起自美國本土, 很快就傳到日本與韓國與歐洲, 這引起各國的憂慮, 特別是烏克蘭.
我現在先請鄉親們先閱讀兩則報導:
(1) China Says Trump Could Abandon Taiwan If He Wins US Election
- Taiwan might be a ‘discarded chess piece,’ China official says
- Trump earlier avoided a question on whether he’d help island
(2) China says Trump may leave Taiwan if he wins US election
Kyiv • UNN
31 January 2024, 05:10 PM
https://unn.ua/en/news/china-says-trump-may-leave-taiwan-if-he-wins-us-election
A Chinese official has said that Donald Trump's victory in the US presidential election could lead to the US leaving Taiwan. UNN writes about this with reference to Bloomberg.
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At a regular press briefing, Chen Binhua, a spokesman for the Beijing office that deals with issues related to the island, was asked a question related to Trump's interview. In it, Trump avoided a direct answer to the question of whether he, as president, would defend Taiwan if China attacked it.
The United States will always defend America first and foremost, and Taiwan can turn from a chess piece to a discarded one at any time
- Chen Binhua commented.
When asked by Bloomberg about Chen's remarks, a Trump campaign spokesman referred to comments he made as president in which he recognized that China was a security threat.
Bloomberg notes that China often says that the United States is not a reliable partner for Taiwan. This line is aimed at undermining the island's confidence that it can withstand a possible Chinese invasion. China has promised that it will one day take over the island of 23 million people, even by force if necessary.
Context
The United States has traditionally maintained a policy of strategic ambiguity, recognizing China's historical claims to sovereignty over Taiwan while maintaining only informal relations with Taipei and promising defense assistance. Nevertheless, President Joe Biden has repeatedly stated that the United States will defend Taiwan if it is attacked.
david chou
Appendix
Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China
Authors: James Carafano, Michael Pillsbury, Jeff Smith and Andrew Harding
March 28, 2023
Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China
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Foreword
These are not imagined sleights. This is the behavior of an adversary, not a competitor. A course correction is long overdue. To date, the U.S. government’s response has been inadequate.
Kevin Roberts, PhD, is President of The Heritage Foundation.
Executive Summary
Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China
While U.S. officials have been reluctant to frame the rivalry with China in these terms, their apprehension ignores a simple reality: China adopted a Cold War strategy against the U.S. long ago.
Summary of Key Recommendations
To protect the U.S. homeland, the U.S. must:
Ban CCP Lobbyists.
Ensure Reliable Semiconductor Supply Chains.
To diminish the CCP’s influence and hold it accountable, the U.S. must:
Expose CCP Influence Over U.S. Cultural Institutions.
To exercise global leadership, the U.S. must:
Diminish China’s Threat to Taiwan.
Conclusion
The measures outlined in this plan are comprehensive and ambitious. They will require coordinated action across multiple government agencies and Congress, state and local governments, and partner nations. Ultimately, however, China is foremost an Oval Office problem: The U.S. President must exercise leadership in directing a national plan, as the President’s predecessors did during World War II and the Cold War. The President must galvanize Congress to act.
Edited by James J. Carafano, PhD, Vice President of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy and E. W. Richardson Fellow at The Heritage Foundation; Andrew J. Harding, Research Assistant in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation; Michael Pillsbury, PhD, Senior Fellow for China Strategy in the Davis Institute; and Jeff M. Smith, Director of the Asian Studies Center.
Introduction: The New Cold War
Part I. The Foundation of the Plan
Part II. The Plan to Counter China
Part II of the plan examines dozens of fault lines in China–U.S. relations and offers recommendations for policy action. Topics are divided into five categories of collective action:
A. Protect the Homeland
B. Safeguard and Advance U.S. Prosperity
C. Reorient America’s Defense Posture
D. Diminish the CCP’s Influence and Hold It Accountable
E. Exercise Global Leadership
B. Safeguard and Advance U.S. Prosperity
Strengthen the U.S. Economy.
Ensure Reliable Semiconductor Supply Chains.
Issue: Semiconductors, also known as microchips, are omnipresent, critical to the function of every electronic device from smartphones to fighter jets. As a result, semiconductors are vital to U.S. national security and economic prosperity. Secure supply chains of critical goods are especially vital during war time and war mobilization, including in any potential conflict scenario in the Taiwan Strait. Yet, semiconductor supplies are vulnerable to disruption. The geographic distribution of critical semiconductor supply chains is heavily weighted toward East Asia. Taiwan alone accounts for a disproportionate share of global semiconductor manufacturing capacity: Taiwanese company TSMC fabricates 92 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductor chips, with South Korean company Samsung accounting for the remaining 8 percent.98
Katie Tarasov, “Inside TSMC, the Taiwanese Chipmaking Giant That’s Building a new plant in Phoenix,” CNBC, October 16, 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/10/16/tsmc-taiwanese-chipmaker-ramping-production-to-end-chip-shortage.html (accessed February 22, 2023).
The PRC, meanwhile, is investing considerable resources in expanding its own semiconductor production capabilities. Beijing’s Made in China 2025 plan sets goals for China to achieve 70 percent self-sufficiency in semiconductors by 2025, although to date Chinese companies have faced considerable challenges in realizing these ambitions. COVID-19-related disruptions demonstrated that fragile supply chains can threaten the resilience of many economic sectors. Although calls for more diversified and secure supply chains are increasingly bipartisan, effective solutions have been lacking. The Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) and Science Act passed in 2022, for example, fails to address this issue comprehensively.99
Dustin Carmack, “CHIPS Is a Missed Opportunity for Real Security,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, August 2, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/chips-missed-opportunity-real-security.
Action: The U.S. must ensure that developments in U.S. industrial policy address the national security and competitiveness shortcomings of the CHIPS and Science Act. The U.S. should increase American competitiveness by cutting red tape, removing regulatory burdens, reducing federal spending, reforming the tax code, and addressing delays at the federal, state, and local levels. In particular, the U.S. should remove punitive taxes on investments that expand the economy. Returning to allowing full and immediate expensing of R&D and capital expenditures would foster expanding opportunities to advance manufacturing and research and development in the U.S. In 2022, TSMC announced a new $40 billion investment to build a second semiconductor-chip plant in Arizona.100
Emma Kinery, “TSMC to Up Arizona Investment to $40 Billion with Second Semiconductor Chip plant,” CNBC, December 6, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/12/06/tsmc-to-up-arizona-investment-to-40-billion-with-second-semiconductor-chip-plant.html (accessed February 15, 2023).
Productive efforts such as this will be greatly facilitated by pursuing pro-growth tax reforms. An absence of reforms to remove burdensome and punitive taxation on investments and business operations will hinder any effort to stop offshoring of U.S. industrial capacity to China.
Implementation: Congress must eliminate security loopholes and add additional oversight mechanisms in the funding and execution of the CHIPS and Science Act. 101
Dustin Carmack, “With CHIPS on Table, Leave It to Congress to Drop Ball on Semiconductor Subsidies,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, July 22, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/technology/commentary/chips-table-leave-it-congress-drop-ball-semiconductor-subsidies.
Additional investments in counterintelligence education and capabilities will reduce insider threats and legal and illegal technology transfers that boost the PRC’s semiconductor industry. Congress should further improve the tax environment for capital investments for semiconductors where current recovery periods heavily disadvantage the construction of commercial infrastructure, such as chip fabricators. Pro-growth tax and regulatory reforms would incentivize semiconductor reshoring, encouraging companies to move manufacturing to the United States. Furthermore, Congress should instruct the Development Finance Corporation—an institution created ostensibly to promote strategic investments to counter the PRC—to prioritize foreign investment support in sensitive high-technology sectors where China is gaining ground, such as semiconductor supply chains.
Impact: Securing reliable semiconductor supply chains will mitigate a critical U.S. national security vulnerability and improve self-reliance and sustainability for strategic industries. It will prevent China from weaponizing semiconductor supply chains (as it did when it restricted rare-earth exports to Japan amid geopolitical tensions in 2010) and build resilience and flexibility in America’s industrial base while creating high-quality manufacturing jobs and facilities in the U.S.
Allies: The U.S. should pursue further bilateral and multilateral trade initiatives to enhance semiconductor supply-chain resilience. Encouraging allies and like-minded partners to harmonize export-control measures to deny the CCP advanced semiconductor technology with those of the United States should be a diplomatic priority. The U.S. government should further diversify the technology industrial base by pursuing arrangements with strategic partners, such as Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, and South Korea. Finally, Taiwanese firms should be encouraged to continue building more resilient industrial capacity and infrastructure, including through making new investments in semiconductor production capacity inside the United States.
C. Reorient America’s Defense Posture
Recalibrate America’s Defense Posture to Meet the China Threat.
Issue: China is building the capacity to diminish and overcome U.S. means of strategic and conventional deterrence.147
See, for example, Patty-Jane Geller, “China’s Nuclear Expansion and Its Implications for U.S. Strategy and Security,” Heritage Foundation Commentary, September 14, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/missile-defense/commentary/chinas-nuclear-expansion-and-its-implications-us-strategy-and-security.
If successful, China hopes to “win without fighting,” deterring the use of U.S. military force in the Indo–Pacific or, if necessary, prevailing in a conventional conflict, including in the Taiwan Strait.148
Brent Sadler, “One Year After Indo–Pacific Command’s Prediction About Taiwan, Where Do We Stand?” Heritage Foundation Commentary, March 10, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/one-year-after-indo-pacific-commands-prediction-about-taiwan-where-do-we-stand.
A regional conflict between China and the U.S. would be disastrous with significant human and economic costs, disrupting supply chains, the energy trade, and other critical economic activity. Deterring a regional conflict will require robust capability to operate in the maritime and air domains (subsurface, surface, and air) as well as conducting supporting operations in space and cyberspace and on land.
As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) rapidly modernizes, the U.S. Navy remains unprepared for protracted great-power conflict, with an aging fleet of fewer than 300 ships.149
On the U.S. Navy’s state of unpreparedness, see Wood, ed., 2023 Index of U.S. Military Strength, pp. 16 and 17. On the Navy’s aging warship problem, see Megan Eckstein, “Heritage Report: Aging Navy Fleet Complicates Tradeoff Between Buying New Ships, Fixing Old Ones,” U.S. Naval Institute News, October 4, 2018, https://news.usni.org/2018/10/04/heritage-foundation-index-aging-navy-fleet-complicates-tradeoff-between-spending-on-new-ships-maintaining-old-ones (accessed February 15, 2023).
The PLAN’s expanding fleet, by contrast, already exceeds 350 ships, even as the CCP enjoys an advantage over the U.S. in enlisting civilian or commercial vessels and its “maritime militia” for quasi military activities. As a result, the credibility of U.S. conventional deterrence in the Western Pacific is fading. This is not a problem that can be solved only by “pivoting to Asia.”150
See discussion in James Jay Carafano, “Getting a Game Plan for the Guardian of America’s Global Interests,” The National Interest, September 12, 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/getting-game-plan-guardian-america%E2%80%99s-global-interests-193480 (accessed February 15, 2023).
The preponderance of U.S. Navy assets, more than 70 percent by some estimates, are already positioned in the Indo–Pacific. However, U.S. Air Force assets, particularly fighter, bomber, and air-refueling squadrons remain in short supply in the region.
Action: China has an advantage in purchasing power parity and a robust defense industrial base.151
See Frederico Bartels, “China’s Defense Budget in Context: How Under-Reporting and Differing Standards and Economies Distort the Picture,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 225, March 25, 2020, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/SR225.pdf.
The U.S. must adopt a cost-imposing strategy that pairs significantly expanding asymmetric U.S. and allied naval and air capabilities with greater efforts to outcompete China economically. Preparing for regional contingencies and deterring China from taking provocative military actions will require additional warships, aircraft, and munitions, paired with an effective deterrence strategy. The U.S. will also require a more capable industrial base to enhance the U.S. naval fleet’s performance at sea, as well as increasing production of the F-35 and B-21 aircraft.
Implementation: The U.S. government must make it a priority to reduce the longest lead time for delivery, enhancing naval warfighting capacity through expanded shipbuilding. To leverage the savings inherent to making large block purchases and economies of scale, Congress should craft a Naval Act of 2023. This one-time legislation would authorize and appropriate the funds necessary for a large block purchase of naval assets for a total of $152.3 billion before anticipated savings.152
Brent D. Sadler, “A Modern Naval Act to Meet the Surging China Threat,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3732, October 24, 2022, pp. 5 and 6, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-10/BG3732.pdf.
Ships covered by this purchase would only be those with approved, stable designs and that are in production today at numbers already stipulated in the current approved Future Years Defense Program that runs through 2027.
Impact: Establishing a modern Naval Act would provide industry with the predictability to make needed infrastructure investments and increase the workforce, creating a virtuous cycle of follow-on effects in improving maintenance and repair capacity. As a discrete legislative act, it would draw attention to a vital national security priority while not competing directly with other military service budget needs. A modern Naval Act, echoing the nation’s historic success in preparing for war in the Pacific during World War II, would galvanize meaningful action.
Allies: Effective deterrence with an undersized U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force necessitates allied support and combined action as the U.S. rebuilds its naval and air forces. This will include greater access to each other’s shipyards for repairs and sustainment of deployed operations. At a minimum, other key allies in Pacific warfighting scenarios include Japan, and potentially the Philippines, as well as Pacific Island nations to secure critical transpacific sea and air lines of communication.
Restore Conventional Deterrence in the Indo–Pacific.
Issue: The unquestioned military advantage that the U.S. enjoyed in the Indo–Pacific for decades following World War II has atrophied significantly. Today, it is uncertain whether the U.S. military can present a credible conventional deterrent against the PLA in the near future. Indeed, there are growing concerns among U.S. defense planners and experts that the U.S. military may prove unprepared to win a regional conflict with the PRC, including a conflict over the Taiwan Strait. The next several years—before the U.S. delivers critical military platforms to Taiwan—present an elevated risk for the U.S. and Taiwan. Preparedness acts as the strongest deterrent against Chinese aggression, yet the PLA’s modernization has left U.S. forward-deployed and rotational forces potentially overmatched in the first island chain.
Action: The United States should immediately adopt and resource a strategy of deterrence by denial against the PLA.153
Mike Gallagher, “Battle Force 2025: A Plan to Defend Taiwan Within the Decade,” Foundation for Defense of Democracies, February 17, 2022, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2022/02/17/battle-force-2025/ (accessed February 15, 2023).
This will require disciplined prioritization, advantaging improvements to U.S. military capabilities in the Indo–Pacific over competing objectives in other theaters. This strategy must also account for the possibility that attempts to deter an invasion could fail, providing adequate resources and capabilities to sustain and win a longer-term conflict if necessary.
Implementation: The Administration and Congress should prioritize providing the U.S. Indo–Pacific Command with the funding and capabilities identified as requirements in the Commander’s annual independent assessment under the Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Additionally, the Pentagon should prioritize the Indo–Pacific for rotational deployments necessary to backfill any capabilities removed from the region, a need highlighted recently by congressional concern over the removal of F-15 squadrons from Okinawa.154
Bryant Harries, Stephen Losey, and Joe Gould, “Republicans Push Back on Okinawa F-15 Withdrawal,” Defense News, November 1, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/congress/2022/11/01/republicans-push-back-on-okinawa-f-15-withdrawal/ (accessed February 15, 2023).
The Pentagon and State Department should make the realization of a more distributed and resilient force posture a primary goal of U.S. foreign policy.
The Pentagon should accelerate efforts to expand basing in the Freely Associated States of the Pacific Islands, and the State Department should undertake a major effort to solidify America’s alliance with the Philippines, with the goal of regaining the ability to operate from the Philippines in a regional contingency, which will prove invaluable in any China conflict scenarios. To counter the PLA’s massive advantage in ground-based missiles,155
Marco Rubio et al., letter to The Honorable Lloyd Austin, July 20, 2022, https://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/5fe164ff-9745-49e1-b727-05e5d5ece8f0/A1894459F41C49ED976B27FF41D09818.07.20.22-rubio-letter-to-secdef-re-ground-based-missiles.pdf (accessed February 15, 2023).
The U.S. government must make determined efforts to develop and regionally deploy ballistic and cruise missiles formerly prohibited by the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.
Impact: Apart from reducing near-term risks of conflict, the decades of stability and peace in the Indo–Pacific underwritten by U.S. military strength not only served American and allied interests, but also helped China enrich to itself. Restoring conventional deterrence in the Indo–Pacific is the surest way to extend this peace dividend and avoid a PLA fait accompli over Taiwan, or any armed conflict with China, for that matter.
Allies: A more credible U.S. conventional deterrent would reassure U.S. partners and allies in the region. While allied forces cannot replace the need for the United States to implement a strategy of deterrence by denial, the U.S. should lean on allied capitals to complement and enhance this strategy, particularly through expanded access to local military and logistics facilities and through the hosting and deployment of ground-based missiles.
Urgently Increase Munition Production and Arm Taiwan.
Issue: Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has demonstrated that America’s defense industrial base is not currently capable of producing munitions at a sufficient rate or quantity. This failure is most concerning for Taiwan’s defense, as it has rendered the foreign military sales (FMS) process—the only mode of U.S. military support to Taiwan beyond training––unreliable. While successive Administrations have continued to announce high-profile sales to Taiwan, few of the capabilities that Taiwan has purchased in recent years have actually been delivered.162
Bryant Harris, “Document Reveals $14 Billion Backlog of US Defense Transfers to Taiwan,” Defense News, April 14, 2022, https://www.defensenews.com/pentagon/2022/04/14/pandemic-delays-spark-14-billion-backlog-of-us-defense-transfers-to-taiwan/ (accessed February 15, 2023).
Many of the most critical capabilities to defend against PLA aggression, such as Harpoon missiles, are still years away from delivery. Taiwan’s Harpoon purchase likely will not be fully delivered until at least 2029.
Action: The Administration must deliver critical munitions to Taiwan as soon as possible, as current delivery timelines stretch beyond when the PLA will reach a 2027 deadline reportedly set by General Secretary Xi to be prepared to wage a successful invasion of Taiwan. In the medium term and the long term, a whole-of-government effort will be necessary to revitalize the defense industrial base and ensure that the United States is able to produce munitions at the levels required for great-power competition.
Implementation: When the Administration sends capabilities that are backlogged for Taiwan to other places, it should be required to justify the decision to Congress with full transparency about the trade-offs to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. Suggestions that future military aid to Ukraine will not impact Taiwan163
Kathleen H. Hicks (@DepSecDef), “#America’s support to #Ukraine is in no way negatively affecting our ability to support #Taiwan. Lessons learned out of Ukraine will be critical to our ability to continue to support the Taiwan Relations Act—as well as our allies & partners. @AspenSecurity,” Twitter, December 15, 2022, https://twitter.com/DepSecDef/status/1603448093290250241 (accessed February 15, 2023).
Ignore the additional stresses on the defense industrial base and obscures the higher opportunity costs of arming Taiwan with depleted U.S. stocks. The executive branch should use the drawdown authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to arm Taiwan with critical munitions to fill the gap left until delayed FMS platforms are delivered.
Impact: Failure to deliver munitions that Taiwan has purchased undermines U.S. credibility as a defense partner and can heighten the threat of PLA aggression across the Taiwan Strait. Addressing the shortcomings of U.S. munitions productions with short-term and long-term solutions would help to repair the damage and enhance deterrence of the PLA.
david chou
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (III)
"疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政, 將不利台灣與美國在亞洲及歐洲的盟國論" 起於美國本土, 其中有一位是十分親台與護台的John Bolton, 他在川普第一個任內, 曾短暫擔任白宮國家安全顧問這個要職, 我現在請鄉親們閱讀一篇文章.
John Bolton Issues Dire Warning on What Exactly Another Trump Term Would Bring
January 31, 2024/12:33 a.m. ET
https://newrepublic.com/post/178563/john-bolton-warns-nightmare-scenarios-second-trump-term
The former Trump appointee is sounding the alarms about what could happen if Donald Trump returns to the White House.
Donald Trump’s former national security adviser has some chilling warnings about what could happen if the former president is elected back into office.
John Bolton laid out his terrifying predictions in the foreword to a new paperback edition of his book The Room Where It Happened, which comes out Tuesday.
“A mountain of facts demonstrates that Trump is unfit to be President,” Bolton wrote. “If his first four years were bad, a second four will be worse.”
“Trump really cares only about retribution for himself, and it will consume much of a second term.”
Bolton’s biggest concern is that Trump will drill down hard on isolationism. This could include pulling the United States out of NATO, cutting support to Ukraine as it battles the Russian invasion, and emboldening China to invade Taiwan. Trump could also seek to reunite with North Korean Leader Kim Jong Un or strike some sort of deal with Iran—no matter how bad—to prove his own negotiating skills.
“It is a close contest between Putin and Xi Jinping, who would be happiest to see Trump back in office,” Bolton said.
Bolton served as Trump’s national security adviser from 2018 to 2019. Since leaving the White House, Bolton has become an outspoken Trump critic, particularly regarding Trump’s indictment for hoarding classified documents.
When the indictment was announced in June, Bolton called the case “devastating” and said it should mark the “end of Donald Trump’s political career.” A few weeks later, Bolton said that any 2024 Republican presidential candidates who say Trump shouldn’t be prosecuted for keeping classified material don’t deserve to be president.
This stance is a surprise from Bolton, an Iraq War architect, radical nationalist, and neocon [neoconservative, 美國新保守派] who seemed all too happy to support Trump while the latter was in office. Trump’s campaign seized on this shift in position.
“For someone who professes to have such great disdain for President Trump, ‘Book Deal Bolton’ sure has found a way to grift off the relationship,” Trump campaign spokesman Jason Miller told Axios.
MAGA’s Ugly New “Civil War” Fantasy Should be Taken Seriously On some of the biggest stories of the moment, MAGA personalities are forcing the GOP into unbridgeable differences with Democrats.
david chou
"疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政, 將不利台灣與美國在亞洲及歐洲的盟國論" 的authors之一是亞太戰略與安全議題的專家Denny Roy, 我現在請鄉親們閱讀他寫的一篇文章. 他說:
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
=================
Taiwan’s unfortunate fate is that it will always be vulnerable to a sellout by the United States. This danger may be increasing. In that sense, Republican Party politicians who style themselves as China hawks and Taiwan supporters are backing the wrong presidential candidate in Donald Trump.
by Denny Roy
January 24, 2024
https://nationalinterest.org/feature/donald-trump-could-betray-taiwan-208829
Presumptive Republican Party presidential candidate Donald Trump’s latest statement about Taiwan is another indication that U.S. foreign policy could substantially change course if Trump, who famously sees foreign relations as economic transactions, wins a second term as the chief executive.
In an interview with Fox News on January 21, Trump declined to say whether or not he would order U.S. forces to intervene if China attacked Taiwan. With the interviewer having raised the topic of Taiwan, the next thing out of Trump’s mouth was an economic grievance: “Taiwan did take all of our chip business,” he said. “They took our business away. We should have stopped them.”Trump’s thinking calls into question the argument made by observers such as Harvard University international relations professor Stephen M. Walt that “U.S. policy toward China isn’t going to change very much no matter what the outcome is next November.” Walt notes that some official policy documents released during the Trump administration named China a challenger to American pre-eminence. The Biden administration similarly treats the U.S.-China relationship as defined by increasingly sharp competition.
Trump’s approaches to China and Taiwan, however, are atypical in the policy-making community and would bend U.S. policy toward an orientation substantially different from the approach that either of Trump’s main rivals, President Joe Biden or alternative Republican contender Nikki Haley, would likely pursue.
In addition to being transactional, Trump is uninterested in promoting or defending a liberal international order. He has always been unduly fixated on the trade deficit with China, saying less about either the geostrategic competition between China and America or the negative effect of Chinese global influence on international rules and norms.
Trump seems to think that addressing, if not actually fixing, the trade deficit makes the relationship right. At the signing ceremony for the “Phase One” deal in January 2020, Trump said he and his “very, very good friend” Xi Jinping were “righting the wrongs of the past and delivering a future of economic justice and security for American workers, farmers, and families.” Never mind that the preceding so-called “trade war” with China hurt Americans without significantly improving the systemic inequalities in the bilateral relationship and that China did not meet its commitments as part of the Phase One deal to buy more American-made goods.
Trump disdains America’s alliances, seeing allies as free riders and Washington as a sucker, paying the defense costs of states that are rich enough to defend themselves. He reportedly wanted Japan and Korea to increase their host nation support for U.S. bases fourfold and fivefold, respectively. He may have intended these demands as provocations that would lead to the abrogation of the alliances. If that is his agenda, we can expect it to resume in a second Trump term. Trump’s approach suggested he measures the value of alliances only in terms of financial profit and loss, not considering the indirect economic and security benefits of enhanced U.S. leadership in the region that stem from healthy alliance relationships.
Trump does not aspire to liberalize international politics, in contrast to recent U.S. presidents from both major parties who have extolled the advantages of promoting democratization abroad. On the contrary, Trump clearly admires authoritarian leaders, particularly Xi. Trump has frequently expressed admiration both for Xi personally and for his authoritarian governance methods, including during the COVID-19 Pandemic. During his campaign for another term as president, Trump has said Xi is “top of the line” and “brilliant,” adding proudly that “we had a great relationship.”
Therefore, It is unsurprising that Taiwan’s strategic and ideological value to the United States is not top of mind for Trump. Taiwan is the largest and most important piece of the “first island chain” that potentially hinders China’s ability to project power eastward into the Pacific Ocean. Japan, a close U.S. ally, considers the possibility of a PRC takeover of Taiwan as a dire security threat. Many U.S. security partners in the Asia-Pacific region would lose confidence in U.S. leadership if it failed to help defend Taiwan. As a consequence, some would likely decide to accommodate Beijing.
Taiwan is also an example of successful democratization under U.S. encouragement and a beacon of inspiration for Asian societies currently under authoritarian rule.
Nevertheless, the possibility of Washington sacrificing Taiwan in a deal with China that would benefit the United States financially would rise significantly under another Trump administration. John Bolton, Trump’s former national security advisor, described his boss more than once belittling Taiwan as relatively unimportant. Bolton said Trump compared the difference between China and Taiwan to the size differential between the large desk in the Oval Office and the point of a Sharpie pen.
At the same time, Trump has been known to brush aside U.S. national security concerns to reach an agreement with China. In April 2018, the U.S. government announced a ban on American companies selling components to Chinese telecom corporation ZTE, which had exported U.S. technology to North Korea and Iran in violation of trade sanctions. The ban nearly destroyed ZTE, but Trump reversed it in May 2018. Trump tweeted that he was working with Xi to get ZTE “back into business” because “Too many jobs in China [have been] lost.”
It's true that some of Trump’s advisors got the White House to characterize China as a systemic global rival during his first term. In a second term, however, Trump would be more experienced in the powers and functions of the presidency. He would also remember his disappointment with foreign policy professionals such as Bolton and former White House Chief of Staff John Kelly. Therefore, Trump 2.0 would likely rely more heavily on his own inclinations and de-emphasize professional expertise in the selection of his appointees.
Taiwan’s unfortunate fate is that it will always be vulnerable to a sellout by the United States. This danger may be increasing. In that sense, Republican Party politicians who style themselves as China hawks and Taiwan supporters are backing the wrong presidential candidate.
About the Author: Denny Roy
Denny Roy is a Senior Fellow at the East-West Center in Honolulu, specializing in Asia-Pacific strategic and security issues. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He is the author of Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security (Columbia University Press, 2013), The Pacific War and its Political Legacies (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2009), Taiwan: A Political History (Cornell University Press, 2003), and China’s Foreign Relations (Macmillan and Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), co-author of The Politics of Human Rights in Asia (Pluto Press, 2000), and editor of The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific Region (Macmillan, 1997). He has also written many articles for scholarly journals such as International Security, Survival, Asian Survey, Security Dialogue, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Armed Forces & Society, and Issues & Studies.
david chou
“The most effective way to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is to convince Beijing of U.S. military superiority and its strong commitment to defending Taiwan without changing Taiwan’s official status.”
//Secondly, the One China principle, or the One China policy, used to be the foundation - China called it 政治基础 (political foundation) of the US-China relations. Now, recently, the PLA [People's Liberation Army], I think correctly - Joe [Nye], correctly - PLA said "America is distorting and stretching beyond belief the one China principle". Right now, this week, House and Senate are discussing a proposal, with strong bipartisan support, to put American weapons and ammunition on Taiwan, to station them there permanently, then to set up a strategy group between the American Pentagon and Taiwan's military to do joint military planning, then to continue the American special forces troops already placed on Taiwan two years ago. This should not be happening. The One China policy or principle should not be violated. The Heritage Foundation recently published a study about a new Cold War with China. We explicitly said we support continuing the One China Policy, but our fellow conservative think tank Hudson Institute Henry used to visit - now it's been sanctioned - Hudson Institute's position, they sent 我们以前的国务卿 (our former Secretary of State) Pompeo, he flew to Taipei 两次 two times, proposed diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. This never happened in the last 50 years.//
===========================
Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China
Part II. The Plan to Counter China
E. Exercise Global Leadership
Diminish China’s Threat to Taiwan.
Issue: Nowhere else in the world do the interests of China and the United States collide as directly or dangerously as they do in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, the CCP has increased coercive military activities around the self-governing island, including live-fire military exercises, provocative missile testing, and encroachments into Taiwan’s EEZ. Since 2022, the PRC’s belligerence has reached new heights, conducting ballistic missile launches over Taiwan and conducting a mock blockade. If China’s stated goal of “reunification” with the island was to be realized, it would cement the PLA’s control of the Western Pacific, threaten critical interests of the U.S. and key allies, disrupt the global supply of semiconductors, and give the CCP unprecedented leverage over vital sea lines of communication and, therefore, the global economy. U.S. credibility among its regional allies and partners would be dealt a mortal blow, as would broader U.S. efforts to thwart China’s global ambitions.246
Dean Cheng, “Why Taiwan Matters to Beijing,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 3725, September 23, 2022, https://www.heritage.org/sites/default/files/2022-09/BG3725.pdf.
An armed conflict over Taiwan, whether the United States is directly involved or not, would be distinct from any conflict that generations of younger Americans have experienced, as it would inflict economic harm on every American household. Deterring the CCP’s aggression toward Taiwan must be an apex priority for U.S. foreign policy.
Action: The U.S. must deter China from any attempt to take Taiwan by force by expanding U.S. military capabilities in the Indo–Pacific and by providing robust political, diplomatic, and military aid to Taipei. The U.S. must demonstrate the resolve—and above all the capability—to support Taiwan against a Chinese invasion, up to and including direct U.S. military intervention. Further, the U.S. must work in partnership with the Taiwanese government to increase its own capacity to deter Chinese military adventurism and defend its territory. Finally, it must seek to persuade and incentivize Taipei to pursue the optimal strategies and military platforms necessary to defend the island.
Implementation: The U.S. government should push back on China’s efforts to distort the United States’ one-China policy and undermine the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. While avoiding any change in U.S. policy on the diplomatic status of Taiwan, the U.S. government should have a declaratory policy that unambiguously states its commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes across the Taiwan Strait while demonstrating the capacity to support the defense of Taiwan. In addition to providing robust military support as required by the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. should deepen economic ties with the island, including by negotiating a free trade agreement to help Taiwan gradually to become less dependent on its trade with China and open more business opportunities for U.S. companies.247
For additional constructive recommendations on support for Taiwan, see U.S.–China Economic and Security Review Commission, 2022 Report to Congress, pp. 734 and 735; McCaul, “China Task Force Report,” pp. 18 and 19; and Cheng and Carafano, “Responding to the China Challenge: Blueprint 2.0.”
Following the authorization of up to $10 billion of military aid to Taiwan over five years in the 2023 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act, the U.S. government must ensure that those funds are actually appropriated and are used to bolster Taiwan’s defense by focusing on those capabilities that are most likely to be effective.
Impact: The most effective way to prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan is to convince Beijing of U.S. military superiority and its strong commitment to defending Taiwan without changing Taiwan’s official status. This will secure a vital U.S. interest by denying China control of the first island chain and some of the world’s most vital sea and air lines of communication that sustain global trade and supply chains.
Allies: The more that Taiwan enjoys the diplomatic space and engagement commensurate with its economic and geopolitical clout, the more the CCP will fear the international consequences of any reckless military intervention. The United States, along with other democratic states, should therefore ensure that Taiwan’s diplomats can participate in discussions of relevant transnational issues. Taiwan should have meaningful participation at various international organizations, such as the International Civil Aviation Organization, the WHO, Interpol, and other entities that help to create and monitor international standards. The U.S. should also encourage other free nations to enhance their bilateral diplomatic and economic engagements with Taiwan, including establishing representative offices and free trade agreements where applicable. The Administration should set an example by accepting Taiwan’s long-standing request to update the name of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Relations Office to the Taiwan Representative Office.
Appendix II
Michael Pillsbury defends One China Policy in Beijing, slams Pompeo's proposal to formally recognize Taiwan
Donald Trump's "leading authority on China" lists recent U.S. provocations on Taiwan that "should not be happening" in a public CCG forum on Monday.
AND
October 23, 2023
https://www.pekingnology.com/p/michael-pillsbury-defends-one-china
The following is the transcript of Michael Pillsbury's speech at the 8th China Global Think Tank Innovation Forum in Beijing on Monday, October 23, 2023. The forum is co-organized by the Center for China and Globalization (CCG) and the Chinese People's Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC).
Michael Pillsbury is Senior Fellow for China Strategy at The Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank. Former U.S. President Donald Trump said Pillsbury was “The leading authority on China” in September 2018.
[BEGINS]
One of the worst crises in US-China relations happened when Joe Nye and I were in the Pentagon, 1995, 1996. China fired missiles over or near Taiwan. Very much upset our Secretary of Defense. And slowly, this crisis was healed or completed. And it resulted in the President Clinton going to visit China. And some cooperative agreements began.
So 有一个教训 the lesson I draw from that is even when we get into a US-China crisis, there's still optimistically, there's usually a way out. Sometimes it's the role of think tanks. I have been a fan and admirer of Henry [Huiyao Wang] and Mabel [Lu Miao] coming to America so often that they know the exact differences, the debate, between the different American, let's say, top ten think tanks.
One time I saw the schedule of Henry and Mabel visiting the US, I think it was 14 think tanks in 2 days, and you and your wife you knew exactly the differences between Hudson Institute, and Heritage, and Brookings, Carnegie. It's very impressive. I don't think we have an American, maybe Joe Nye had somebody at Harvard who can do this. But think tanks have a special role to be optimistic to identify the problems, but then try to think of solutions or at least a channel for dialogue. And Henry was a channel for dialogue with President Trump on the trade talks. People as economists at CCG, and Professor Chen [Wenling] here and others had specific ideas: China will agree to this in the trade talks, and not that. And this was outside regular channels, but very helpful.
Now I only have one or two points to make today. One is I'm deviating from the role of a think tank person to be optimistic. I'm relatively pessimistic that relations between US and China and our friends on both sides, Chinese friends, American friends - the situation is getting worse 越来越恶化. It's not a time for optimism. Some of the reasons are lack of communication. No Congressional delegation came here for four years until Chuck Schumer and his bipartisan delegation. By their account, there's a lot of argument going on. The meeting with Xi Jinping was not an optimistic meeting.
There were up to 50 channels in US-China relations between government departments until President Trump cut them all off - cut them all off, his first year. So you would think President Biden would restore all the channels. How many people think Biden restored all the channels that Trump cut off? Put your hand up? Biden at first restored no channels, and now it's roughly five. And there are very thin discussions between 部长, between cabinet ministers.
Secondly, the One China principle, or the One China policy, used to be the foundation - China called it 政治基础 (political foundation) of the US-China relations. Now, recently, the PLA [People's Liberation Army], I think correctly - Joe [Nye], correctly - PLA said "America is distorting and stretching beyond belief the one China principle". Right now, this week, House and Senate are discussing a proposal, with strong bipartisan support, to put American weapons and ammunition on Taiwan, to station them there permanently, then to set up a strategy group between the American Pentagon and Taiwan's military to do joint military planning, then to continue the American special forces troops already placed on Taiwan two years ago. This should not be happening. The One China policy or principle should not be violated. The Heritage Foundation recently published a study about a new Cold War with China. We explicitly said we support continuing the One China Policy, but our fellow conservative think tank Hudson Institute Henry used to visit - now it's been sanctioned - Hudson Institute's position, they sent 我们以前的国务卿 (our former Secretary of State) Pompeo, he flew to Taipei 两次 two times, proposed diplomatic recognition of Taiwan. This never happened in the last 50 years. So I can give you a long list. There's actually quite a long list. Both sides have 红线 red lines. Each side has been crossing these red lines in the last few years. So I hope I'm wrong. I hope all think tanks who came today will be optimistic and come up with some solutions. But just to make a list, Henry, of the conflicts, 我们必须避免的冲突 (the conflicts we have to avoid) we need a good list of what are the conflicts that think tanks could be innovative about. 我讲完了，谢谢，各位。 (I'm done talking, thank you.)
[ENDS]
Seashon Chen
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To Honorable Seniors,
Cognitive Warfare and Sense of Mission
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) defines cognitive warfare as an operation in which actors use information means to influence the perception, attitude, and even behavior of specific objects. Shape strategic environmental conditions that are favorable to the initiators. Another definition is that cognitive warfare is comprehensive influence warfare that combines multiple fields and various technologies and methods. Its goal is to influence the way an individual, group or country thinks about a certain issue, event or situation and puts it into practice to achieve its goals. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) used cognitive warfare to intervene in the 2024/01/13 presidential and legislative elections in Taiwan (ROC). There are hundreds of known illegal cases, involving thousands of people. The CCP used its affiliated Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) to successfully control Taiwan (ROC) Legislative Yuan with more than half of the seats and chairman and vice-chairman of the Legislative Yuan on (2024/02/01). When the Legislative Yuan convenes on February 23, the pro-communist political parties that recognize the 1992 Consensus and support one country, two systems will propose and vote on any bizarre, anti-democratic, and betrayal of Taiwan bills. This is really worrying. The strategy to counter cognitive warfare is to reveal the truth and spread the word. Although it is difficult to change the perceptions of some people whose political ideologies have been finalized, most people who have faith, humanity, rationality and a sense of mission will recognize falsehood and right from wrong and implement their correct actions. What normal and legitimate individuals and groups should be looking for in their hearts is not passion, but a sense of mission. What is a sense of mission? Purpose is the will or determination to do things right and well. That is what President Ronald Reagan said during his inauguration: In order to safeguard tomorrow, we must act today, with idealism and an aboveboard attitude, to build a strong and prosperous country. The key task of today’s cognitive warfare is to maintain information security and smooth flow, to block the intrusion of malicious software and websites, and to prevent the brainwashing of the people by the cult (Chinese Communist Party) and its inhumane materialism. Promote all love for humanity, freedom and democracy, and inspire the sense of mission of each person or group. The sense of mission is our spiritual leader and mentor. Obedience to the inner sense of mission can enable us to unswervingly complete tasks that benefit ourselves and others in various situations and environments.
Seashon Chen, Ph.D. Taiwan (Formosa) International Volunteers Regiment, 2024/02/03. |
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This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
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這是 Google 網路論壇針對「Bay Area Taiwanese American」群組發送的訂閱通知郵件。
如要取消訂閱這個群組並停止接收來自這個群組的郵件，請傳送電子郵件到 bay-area-taiwanese-...@googlegroups.com。
如要在網路上查看這項討論，請造訪 https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bay-area-taiwanese-american/530879207.4658940.1706921410833%40mail.yahoo.com。
david chou
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (V)
The Heritage Foundation
Project 2025 (Presidential Transition Project)
|
Section 2: The Common Defense
P. 91
4
Department of Defense
Christopher Miller
P. 92
DOD Policy
By far the most significant danger to Americans’ security, freedoms, and prosperity is China. China is by any measure the most powerful state in the world other than the United States itself. It apparently aspires to dominate Asia and then, from that position, become globally preeminent. If Beijing could achieve this goal, it could dramatically undermine America’s core interests, including by restricting
P. 93
U.S. access to the world’s most important market. Preventing this from happening must be the top priority for American foreign and defense policy.
Beijing presents a challenge to American interests across the domains of national power, but the military threat that it poses is especially acute and significant. China is undertaking a historic military buildup that includes increasing capability for power projection not only in its own region, but also far beyond as well as a dramatic expansion of its nuclear forces that could result in a nuclear force that matches or exceeds America’s own nuclear arsenal.
The most severe immediate threat that Beijing’s military poses, however, is to Taiwan and other U.S. allies along the first island chain in the Western Pacific. If China could subordinate Taiwan or allies like the Philippines, South Korea, and Japan, it could break apart any balancing coalition that is designed to prevent Beijing’s hegemony over Asia. Accordingly, the United States must ensure that China does not succeed. This requires a denial defense: the ability to make the subordination of Taiwan or other U.S. allies in Asia prohibitively difficult. Critically, the United States must be able to do this at a level of cost and risk that Americans are willing to bear given the relative importance of Taiwan to China and to the U.S.
The United States and its allies also face real threats from Russia, as evidenced by Vladimir Putin’s brutal war in Ukraine, as well as from Iran, North Korea, and transnational terrorism at a time when decades of ill-advised military operations in the Greater Middle East, the atrophy of our defense industrial base, the impact of sequestration, and effective disarmament by many U.S. allies have exacted a high toll on America’s military.
This is a grim landscape. The United States needs to deal with these threats forthrightly and with strength, but it also needs to be realistic. It cannot wish away these problems. Rather, it must confront them with a clear-eyed recognition of the need for choice, discipline, and adequate resources for defense. In this light, U.S. defense strategy must identify China unequivocally as the top priority for U.S. defense planning while modernizing and expanding the U.S. nuclear arsenal and sustaining an efficient and effective counterterrorism enterprise. U.S. allies must also step up, with some joining the United States in taking on China in Asia while others take more of a lead in dealing with threats from Russia in Europe, Iran, the Middle East, and North Korea. The reality is that achieving these goals will require more spending on defense, both by the United States and by its allies, as well as active support for reindustrialization and more support for allies’ productive capacity so that we can scale our freeworld efforts together.
Needed Reforms
Prioritize a denial defense against China. U.S. defense planning should focus on China and, in particular, the effective denial defense of Taiwan.
P. 94
This focus and priority for U.S. defense activities will deny China the first island chain.
1. Require that all U.S. defense efforts, from force planning to employment and posture, focus on ensuring the ability of American forces to prevail in the pacing scenario and deny China a fait accompli against Taiwan.
david chou
希望John的預言不會成真, 如果川普贏得第二個任期.
[to be continued]
Appendix
Bolton says Trump 'unfit' to be President in new memoir intro
By Arshad Mohammed and Steve Holland
January 30, 2024 10:34 PM GMT+8
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/bolton-excoriates-trump-fresh-introduction-his-memoir-2024-01-30/
[John Bolton, a former White House national security adviser, speaks to journalists at a forum in Taipei, Taiwan April 29, 2023. REUTERS/Ben Blanchard/File Photo ]
WASHINGTON, Jan 30 (Reuters) - Former U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton excoriated former President Donald Trump as an utterly self-interested man who would punish personal enemies and appease adversaries Russia and China in a new edition of his memoir released on Tuesday.
Bolton, who served in Trump's White House in 2018 and 2019, accused the Republican presidential frontrunner of having no political philosophy or coherent policy outlook. If re-elected, Trump could leave the NATO security alliance, curb support to Ukraine despite Russia's 2022 invasion, embolden China to blockade Taiwan and generally pursue isolationism, Bolton warned.
"Trump is unfit to be president," Bolton wrote in the new foreword to "The Room Where it Happened," his account of the 17 months he spent as Trump's national security adviser. "If his first four years were bad, a second four will be worse."
While Trump casts himself as the underdog's champion, once saying "for those who have been wronged and betrayed, I am your retribution," Bolton argues he is fundamentally self-regarding.
"Trump really cares only about retribution for himself, and it will consume much of a second term," he wrote in the forward to the paperback edition of his memoir, which painted a bleak picture of America during a second Trump term.
Trump senior advisor Jason Miller said: “For someone who professes to have such great disdain for President Trump, ‘Book Deal Bolton’ sure has found a way to grift off the relationship".
Bolton said before serving Trump he mistakenly believed the burdens of office would discipline the president. In the event, he found the former president consumed by self-interest.
"He cares almost exclusively about his own interests," Bolton writes, suggesting Trump would want to be surrounded by "a White House of serfs" to execute his orders unquestioningly.
He also makes a case that Trump, revered by the right for appointing Supreme Court justices who overturned the 1973 Roe v. Wade ruling that recognized women's constitutional right to abortion, may not pursue conservative policies if re-elected.
Bolton said Trump's inability to run for a third term under the U.S. Constitution means "the political constraints around him are much looser, and the real 'guardrail' of voter opinion will be minimized."
Bolton saves some of his harshest words for foreign policy, writing Trump sent an "isolationist virus" coursing through the Republican party and that "in no arena ... has the Trump aberration been more destructive than in national security."
He also argued Trump could withdraw from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a prospect likely to please Russian President Vladimir Putin, adding that "it is almost inevitable that a second-term Trump policy on Ukraine will favor Moscow."
Taiwan and others along China's periphery "face real peril in a second Trump term," Bolton adds, suggesting that the risks of China under President Xi Jinping manufacturing a crisis over Taiwan - perhaps by blockading the island - would rise.
"It is a close contest between Putin and Xi Jinping who would be happiest to see Trump back in office," he writes.
Reporting By Steve Holland in Washington and by by Arshad Mohammed in Saint Paul, Minn.; Writing by Arshad Mohammed; Editing by Michael Perry
david chou
The Heritage Foundation
Project 2025 (Presidential Transition Project)
|
|
Section 2: The Common Defense
P. 171
6
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Kiron K. Skinner
P. 176
Respond Vigorously to the Chinese Threat.
The State Department recently opened the Office of China Coordination, or “China House.” This office is intended to bring together experts inside and outside the State Department to coordinate U.S. government relations with China “and advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.” Whether China House will streamline U.S. government communication, consensus, and action on China policy—given the presence of other agencies with strong competing or adverse interests—remains to be seen. The unit is dependent on adequate and competent staff being assigned by other bureaus within the State Department.
Nonetheless, the concept is one a Republican Administration should support mutatis mutandis. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been “at war” with the U.S. for decades. Now that this reality has been accepted throughout the government, the State Department must be prepared to lead the U.S. diplomatic effort accordingly. The centralization of efforts in one place is critical to this end.
P. 179
The People’s Republic of China
The designs of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party, which runs the PRC, are serious and dangerous. This tyrannical country with a population of more than 1 billion people has the vision, resources, and patience to achieve its objectives. Protecting the United States from the PRC’s designs requires an unambiguous offensive-defensive mix, including protecting American citizens and their interests, as well as U.S. allies, from PRC attacks and abuse that undermine U.S. competitiveness, security, and prosperity.
The United States must have a cost-imposing strategic response to make Beijing’s aggression unaffordable, even as the American economy and U.S. power grow. This stance will require real, sustained, near-unprecedented U.S. growth; stronger partnerships; synchronized economic and security policies; and American energy independence—but above all, it will require a very honest perspective about the nature and designs of the PRC as more of a threat than a competitor. The next President should use the State Department and its array of resources to reassess and lead this effort, just as it did during the Cold War. The U.S. government needs an Article X for China, and it should be a presidential mandate. Along with the National Security Council, the State Department should draft an Article X, which should be a deeply philosophical look at the China challenge.
Many foreign policy professionals and national leaders, both in government and the private sector, are reluctant to take decisive action regarding China. Many are vested in an unshakable faith in the international system and global norms. They are so enamored with them they cannot brook any criticisms or reforms, let alone
P. 180
acknowledge their potential for being abused by the PRC. Others refuse to acknowledge Beijing’s malign activities and often pass off criticism as conspiracy theories.
For instance, many were quick to dismiss even the possibility that COVID-19 escaped from a Chinese research laboratory. The reality, however, is that the PRC’s actions often do sound like conspiracy theories—because they are conspiracies. In addition, some knowingly or not parrot the Communist line: Global leaders including President Joe Biden, have tried to normalize or even laud Chinese behavior. In some cases, these voices, like the global corporate giants BlackRock and Disney, directly benefit from doing business with Beijing.
On the other hand, others acknowledge the dangers posed by the PRC, but believe in a moderating approach to accommodate its rise, a policy of “compete where we must, but cooperate where we can,” including on issues like climate change. This strategy has demonstrably failed.
As with all global struggles with Communist and other tyrannical regimes, the issue should never be with the Chinese people but with the Communist dictatorship that oppresses them and threatens the well-being of nations across the globe.12 That said, the nature of Chinese power today is the product of history, ideology, and the institutions that have governed China during the course of five millennia, inherited by the present Chinese leaders from the preceding generations of the CCP. In short, the PRC challenge is rooted in China’s strategic culture and not just the Marxism–Leninism of the CCP, meaning that internal culture and civil society will never deliver a more normative nation. The PRC’s aggressive behavior can only be curbed through external pressure.
david chou
蕭美琴如此提醒 "台美國會議員聯誼會" 的成員是正確的. 不過, 我很懷疑這個 "US Caucus" 到底要如何運作, 因為親美/ 反支的DPP要 "抗支保台", 而假親美 & 真反美/ 疑美/ 和支/ 親支/ 舔共的支那國民黨則是要降共與投共的敗類, 雞兔同籠的聯誼會要如何運作, 實在很令人好奇.
2
「台美國會議員聯誼會」成立 蕭美琴：團結美國各界挺台力量
2024/02/24 05:30
「美國兩黨競爭激烈 台灣不能捲入」
〔記者陳政宇／台北報導〕立法院昨舉行「台美國會議員聯誼會」成立大會，副總統當選人蕭美琴昨以前會長的「學姊」身分參加。蕭美琴表示，對美外交工作非常重要的精神是，台灣千萬不能捲入美國兩黨競爭激烈過程，必須爭取美國不分黨派挺台灣，讓台美關係越來越強，她很高興看到聯誼會已具備跨黨派精神。
跨黨派73名立委加入
台美國會議員聯誼會共有七十三位跨黨派立委加入，採雙會長制，分別由民進黨立委王定宇、國民黨立委柯志恩擔任，立法院副院長江啟臣出任榮譽會長，民進黨立委蘇巧慧、國民黨立委葛如鈞和民眾黨立委張啓楷擔任副會長。
蕭美琴表示，她是以第九屆畢業生及第九屆台美國會聯誼會會長的身分而來，恭喜台美國會議員聯誼會成為立院最大的國會外交團體。蕭提醒，對美外交的重要精神，就是台灣千萬不能捲入美國兩黨競爭激烈過程，要用團結美國各界支持台灣的力量，讓台美關係愈來愈強，不要被任何政治干擾影響。
蕭美琴指出，美國對台政策基於「台灣關係法」、「六項保證」框架，對台灣不管是經濟繁榮、區域安全、和平穩定扮演重要角色，這也是台灣與美國在共同價值、利益上，同時努力的目標，而她永遠是大家未來推動外交最好的夥伴。
韓：美軍事、外交相挺 台灣安居樂業
立法院長韓國瑜也表示，對美工作是最重要的，感謝美國對台灣長期支持，雖然沒有正式外交關係，但美國在軍事、外交上堅定支持台灣，讓台灣安居樂業、發展經濟，培養下一代。
美國聯邦眾議院美中戰略競爭特別委員會主席蓋拉格廿二日率議員團訪台，韓國瑜談到，六位美國國會議員前來立院拜會時非常嚴肅，離開的時候笑哈哈，因為他說，「和外交部吃飯是黑白的，和立委吃飯是彩色的」，對國會議員最熱情接待的永遠是國會議員，六眾議員會心大笑，因為國會議員了解國會議員，有同理心，交朋友比較快，比較真誠，希望台美關係蓬勃發展，合作無間。
另，馬歇爾基金會主任葛來儀昨也率團赴民進黨中央黨部拜會蕭美琴。蕭席間提及台灣在國際組織的參與上時常遭受不公平的待遇，國際空間不斷遭受打壓。針對全世界所有國家所面臨的各項議題，台灣沒有貢獻的管道，這無益於解決全球的議題，台灣會持續透過各種方式與世界建立連結。
Appendix II
林中斌／川普政策 醞釀成型
聯合報／ 林中斌
2024-02-22 02:17
https://udn.com/news/story/7340/7784027
川普是災難！不只美國民主黨視他為夢魘，許多共和黨財團大老（如Charles Koch、Stanley Druckenmiller、Kenneth Griffin等）也設法另推前南卡州州長海莉（Nikki Haley）為總統候選人。
但一月兩次共和黨初選（Iowa & New Hampshire），川普得票由五十一％躍升至五十四點三％。紐約時報二月一日說，這些金主只好接受當頭大勢。十一月大選共和黨由川普出馬，應成定局。
川普若回任總統政策為何？
美國橫跨兩黨的前國防部長蓋茲（Robert Gates），見解超然銳利，在二月八日《外交事務》播客中說：「不可預測」是川普政策的特性。即使如此，川普若再進白宮，不同於他首任缺乏準備，其政策已在積極規畫中，名為「二○二五計畫」（Project 2025）。他決策不可預測性雖無法全免，但執政大方針已浮現。
美國保守智庫傳統基金會（Heritage Foundation）自二○二二年開始負責協調八十個保守組織著手勾勒川普未來施政藍圖。一般外傳的報導偏重其對政府組織幾乎是翻天覆地的衝擊—如廢除聯邦調查局、教育部、國土安全部，而忽略其對國防花費的批評與克制。目前拜登外交下烽火四起的局面將漸式微。蓋茲所說的「美國過度軍事化的外交」將開始轉變。
根據《國防新聞》二○二三年十二月報導，上次川普四年任內，國防經費連續增加兩年半，之後遞減。
川普二○一八年的國防經費是六千六百七十一億美元，二○一九年七千兩百六十八億美元，二○二○年七千六百一十八億美元，二○二一年七千五百三十五億美元。
川普任內的代理國防部長米勒（Christopher Miller）在「二○二五計畫」中寫道：「（美國）國防部是個問題嚴重的組織（deeply troubled institute）…政策瘋狂擺盪，執行計畫上紀律非常鬆散」。
米勒在去年二月出版的回憶錄中建議：美國應該裁減四十至五十％國防經費來「終止美國的冒險主義（筆者：應指各處開闢新戰場）並鑄造新的軍事工具以面對下一世紀的挑戰（筆者：應指人工智能、外太空、軟殺癱瘓戰等）」。
美國眾議院是審查政府經費的重鎮。川普在眾議院中的支持者哥羅門（Glenn Grothman）眾議員在去年七月強調國防部被會計稽查時遭遇的麻煩。這觀點和民主黨自由派的眾議員相同。意味若川普當選，克制國防經費有跨黨派的支持者。擔任眾議院國家安全委員會主席的哥羅門特別點出國防部連續六次稽查都沒通過。
他說：「美國國防經費超過中國、俄羅斯、印度、沙烏地阿拉伯、英國、德國、法國、南韓、日本、烏克蘭的總合。…美國人民辛苦賺每一塊錢，而國防部眼都不眨的成為揮霍那些錢的專家」。
一九八七年川普出書《交易的藝術》（The Art of the Deal）敘述他幫某寡婦請銀行免沒收房子，銀行不理。他威脅告銀行逼死寡婦丈夫，銀行退讓。川普說：「有時野蠻點反而奏效」。
今年二月四日，川普對福斯新聞說：他回白宮將對中國進口加六十％以上的關稅。無言的意涵是川普將與中國謀求利益交換，他將讓出國外地緣政治的利益，以獲取中國有利美國民生經濟的讓步。
美國盟友該有所準備。
david chou
[補正]
Appendix I
「台美國會議員聯誼會」成立 蕭美琴：團結美國各界挺台力量
2024/02/24 05:30
david chou
david chou
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (X)
我這幾天一直都在談The Heritage Foundation, 今天, TIW & William已分別接見了傳統基金會的訪問團.
說第二個任期的Old Donald會棄台賣台的人[包括支共/支帝與牠們的在台同路人], 多半就跟柯痞與韓痞那樣無厘頭 [不過, 我們也不能漠視John Bolton這類親台人士的善意警告, John他們可不是小丑, 不是無厘頭, 也不是居心叵測之人].
William說, "台灣面臨的挑戰仍然很多，不論是來自中國的直接威脅，或--------等，都非常需要國際社會的指教及支持，請「傳統基金會」持續協助。"
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
========================
Appendix
接見美智庫傳統基金會 賴清德重申：堅定捍衛和平現狀
自由時報
2024/02/26 12:25
https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/4589786
傳統基金會會長羅凱文（Kevin Roberts）率團訪問台灣, 訪團成員包括創辦人佛訥（Edwin J. Feulner, Jr.）博士 [他幾乎每年都會訪台, 他走訪台灣, 就像走灶腳]、副會長蔻薇（Victoria Coates）及資深政策顧問布拉克（Bryan Burack）等。
david chou
Hal Brands 是著名的 Bloomberg Opinion columnist 以及 the Henry Kissinger Distinguished Professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. 他在2/ 28/ 24在Bloomberg發表了一篇有關川普第二任政府對美日關係可能的影響 [這類的文章當紅], 他與其他多數的觀察家與評論家不同, 他並不悲觀, 不過, 他暗示, 日本的政治領袖要有靈巧的政治與外交手腕, 跟Shinzo Abe一樣.
但他對美台關係則比較悲觀, 跟跟其他多數的觀察家與評論家一樣. 他說:
//Officials in Washington and Tokyo are aware that they must urgently strengthen their defense posture — and spur Taiwan, Beijing’s most likely target, to rapidly enhance its own. But as new Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te, whom China despises, takes power the US must also avoid rhetorical or diplomatic missteps that unnecessarily drive up tensions. Trump, who tends to shoot from the hip, and seems to see Taiwan more as a bargaining chip than as a strategic partner, may well fail to get this balance right.//
=============
Appendix
Japan Isn’t Panicking About a Possible Trump Return
By Hal Brands
As former President Donald Trump rolls toward the Republican nomination, countries everywhere are preparing for what a Trump restoration might mean. Few have more at stake in the matter than Japan, which is on the front lines of a febrile region and has long sought security through its alliance with the US.
Japan, it is worth remembering, came through Trump’s first presidency in comparatively fine form. To be sure, Trump’s conduct — talking down US alliances, ditching the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal, veering between confrontation and appeasement with North Korea, and palling around with the world’s dictators — was often damaging or simply mystifying. There was also bilateral tension over trade and burden-sharing within the US-Japan alliance.
But thanks to Abe, who made an art of staying off Trump’s bad side, Tokyo avoided the high-profile blowups that tormented US allies in Europe. Abe also kept a modified TPP, with 11 members, alive after the US withdrawal. He even nudged the Trump administration to adopt two of his signature initiatives as pillars of US strategy in the region — the concept of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and the reinvigorating of a “democratic security diamond” linking America, Japan, Australia and India.
A common refrain in Tokyo — and other allied capitals — is that the margin for diplomatic error is shrinking as the dangers to international peace and stability grow. But whatever happens in America’s upcoming election, the quiet revolution in Japanese foreign policy will continue. Indeed, if Trump does complete his comeback, Japanese power will only become more critical to the fortunes of the free world.
david chou
支持Old Donald的Sen. William Hagerty [前美國駐日大使] 不認為川普是一名孤立主義者, 他認為世人都誤讀川普的 "America First Doctrine." 請鄉親們閱讀 "京都新聞" 一則報導的前三段:
KYODO NEWS - Mar 1, 2024 - 10:22
//Former U.S. President Donald Trump will not be an isolationist if he returns to the White House given his overriding goal is to strengthen his country, Sen. William Hagerty, a strong backer of the likely Republican nominee, suggested Thursday.
Hagerty, a Republican who served as U.S. Ambassador to Japan under Trump, said he talked to the former president last week about the importance of the relationship with Tokyo in maintaining stability in the Indo-Pacific, including in dealing with China and North Korea.
david chou
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (XI)
=========
U.S. allies in Indo-Pacific tremble at prospect of Trump return
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese, left, meets with Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. in Canberra on Feb. 29. The two countries are enhancing security cooperation. (AAP via Reuters)
HIROYUKI AKITA, Nikkei commentator
March 9, 2024 14:36 JST
TOKYO -- The U.S. presidential election is still eight months away but Western countries are trembling at the prospect of Donald Trump's return to power.
If Trump, who regards allies as burdens rather than assets, wins in November, basic assumptions about national security could radically change.
He would attempt to withdraw the U.S. from NATO. According to European diplomats, security officials are holding increasingly intense, closed-door discussions on possible measures that could be taken to deal with the potentially devastating security policy implications of a second Trump administration.
Asian allies of the U.S. are no less concerned about the potential shockwaves if Trump returns.
According to a memoir by Mark Esper, who served as defense secretary during the Trump administration, the president was fixated on the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea. He was talked out of taking the drastic action by close aides but decided to make it a "priority for the second term." As such, it is unclear how much he would allow U.S. forces to get involved in the event of a security crisis in Taiwan.
Against this backdrop, about 40 politicians, government officials, diplomats and journalists from the U.K. and Japan gathered in Odawara, near Tokyo, on Feb. 2-4 to discuss global affairs in private. The gathering was the annual meeting of the U.K.-Japan 21st Century Group.
The most heated discussions were on the U.S. presidential election. Participants from both Japan and the U.K. concurred that policymakers should swiftly map out responses to a Trump presidency.
The proposed measures during the meeting included three points: First, promptly rebuild connections not only with the Democratic Party but also with the Republican Party, where Trump is gaining influence. Second, reach out to other U.S. allies and like-minded countries to establish a network of diplomatic and security cooperation among middle powers. At the same time, many participants called to enhance their collective defense capabilities.
One notable trend emerging is the middle powers' move to step up their joint security cooperation. In the Indo-Pacific region, U.S. allies and friendly nations are already moving in this direction at a quickening pace.
For example, in August 2023, Japan and Australia signed a Reciprocal Access Agreement -- a bilateral defense arrangement that facilitates the movement of military personnel and equipment between two countries -- to make it easier for the armed forces of each nation to conduct joint training exercises, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations on each other's soil.
Japan and Australia have also started exploring ways to boost cooperation between their defense industries. In October 2023, Mitsubishi Electric signed a contract with the Australian Department of Defense for a joint development project of defense equipment. The project is focused on creating prototypes of alert and surveillance systems using laser technology intended for installation in fighter jets and vehicles. This is the first time a Japanese company has directly contracted with a foreign government in the defense field.
The Philippines, which faces military pressure from China in the South China Sea, is also expanding security cooperation beyond the U.S.
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. met with Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese on Feb. 29 and signed a memorandum of understanding to strengthen cooperation in maritime security and defense against cyberattacks. Last November, the armed forces of the Philippines and Australia conducted their first joint naval patrol in waters including the South China Sea.
In addition, this year, the Philippines plans to deploy land-based anti-ship missiles for the first time, supplied by India, which is increasingly wary of China's maritime expansion. Earlier this year, Indian military personnel visited the Philippines to instruct their counterparts on the operation and maintenance of the missile system.
A Philippine security official says Manila will expand defense cooperation not just with the U.S. but also with other friendly nations such as Japan, Australia, India and major European countries. A security expert based in Manila explained that the moves are designed to broaden the scope of security cooperation beyond the U.S., assuming that the nation may have to face the ramifications of a Trump comeback.
Republican presidential candidate and former U.S. President Donald Trump at a campaign rally in Richmond, Virginia on March 2. © Reuters
Unlike Europe, which has NATO, there is no multilateral security framework in the Indo-Pacific region. Bilateral alliances between the U.S. and Japan, Australia, South Korea and the Philippines have supported regional stability. But if Trump returns, the foundations of these vital alliances may be shaken to their cores.
The rush among these Indo-Pacific nations to beef up security cooperation is driven not only by the growing threat from the Chinese military but also by the urgent need to reduce the potential risks stemming from the possibility of an unpredictable and erratic Trump presidency.
However, it will take years for these efforts to produce tangible results. Moreover, cooperation among middle powers is not taking the form of security treaties committed to mutual defense in times of crisis. That means such cooperation cannot replace the security umbrella provided by the U.S. to its allies.
Therefore, policymakers in these countries who fear Trump's second term are secretly hoping that he will be slowed down by the four criminal trials he faces or barred from running.
Separate from the criminal trials, legal battles over his eligibility to run for president are also underway. In December 2023, the Colorado Supreme Court ruled that Trump could not participate in the state's primary due to his role in the Jan. 6., 2021 Capitol riot in the U.S.
This month, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned the Colorado court decision barring Trump from the state's primary ballot, saying that individual states could not bar presidential candidates under the Constitution's insurrection provision.
Similar disputes are ongoing in about 20 states. However, such legal battles forcing him to lose by default or lose the election will not serve the interests of either the U.S. or the world. It could be the most dangerous scenario in the long run.
Trump could then claim that the election was stolen again due to a witch hunt and urge his supporters to rise up. This could risk violence spreading in various places, as Trump's claim would anger radical supporters and incite them to violent protests.
The most desirable outcome of the U.S. presidential election for the U.S. and the world is a clear, undeniable decision through a fair election. U.S. allies' best interests lie in an indisputable victory for Biden, who values international cooperation.
However, there are no ways for other countries to influence the choice of American voters.
david chou
Isolationism 2.0: Donald Trump and the Future of the Liberal Order
Donald Trump recently disparaged NATO and joked about future Russian aggression, increasing doubts around the world about the future of American foreign policy. With isolationism and protectionism rising and revisionist powers challenging a Western-dominated international order, many hear echoes of the 1930s.
by Gideon Rose
March 5, 2024
Donald Trump recently disparaged NATO and joked about future Russian aggression, increasing doubts around the world about the future of American foreign policy. With isolationism and protectionism rising and revisionist powers challenging a Western-dominated international order, many hear echoes of the 1930s. Fighting has already erupted in multiple regions, and as the political scientist Hal Brands notes, “the world could be as little as one mishandled crisis away from pervasive Eurasian conflict.”
Thankfully, the odds of another world war are tiny, because nobody has an interest in fighting it. In the eight decades since the last great power struggle ended, nuclear weapons have increased the cost of conflict, globalization has increased the benefits of cooperation, and dictatorships have become less extreme. Putin is not Stalin, Xi is not Mao, and neither of them is Hitler. So even if regional conflicts like those in Ukraine and Gaza fester, there is every reason to believe the long peace at the top of the international system will continue to hold.
Where the 1930s analogy does work well, however, is in the domestic politics of American foreign policy. Back then, military disappointments produced a powerful isolationist movement that hobbled the country’s foreign policy and prevented Washington from responding effectively to an increasingly challenging international environment. That same pattern is repeating itself now. The real danger to be worried about today is not foreign aggression escalating into World War III. It is the continued decay of the liberal international order thanks to home-grown American fecklessness.
The First America First
American entry into World War I represented a dramatic change from the country’s traditional approach to foreign policy. To justify it, President Woodrow Wilson cast the conflict as a noble crusade to defeat evil aggressors and make the world safe for democracy. But as the postwar era failed to live up to expectations, many Americans developed a strong case of buyer’s remorse. In retrospect, they came to see participation in the war as a giant mistake—one so obviously misguided, in fact, that it must have been driven by some nefarious conspiracy. Arms manufacturers had pushed the country into war for the profits to be made, people said. Bankers had done it to protect their loans to the Allies. The lesson seemed obvious: never let the country be suckered into foreign intervention again.
As storm clouds gathered across Europe and Asia during the 1930s, therefore, isolationists in Congress passed a series of laws barring American help to any nation fighting anywhere. The Neutrality Acts of 1935, 1936, and 1937 banned arms sales and loans to all foreign belligerents, prohibited travel by Americans on belligerent ships, and forbade the entry of American ships into foreign war zones. The idea was to create a geopolitical firebreak against the spread of war—so that even if the rest of the world burned down, at least the Western hemisphere would remain safe.
As international order continued to disintegrate, the world’s strongest power sat on the sidelines. Washington watched Japan invade China, Italy invade Ethiopia, and Nazi Germany threaten Europe, and did nothing. President Franklin Roosevelt was no fan of intervention himself, but he grudgingly came to realize that isolating the United States from Europe and Asia was only increasing the risk of a general war while hindering American preparedness for it. He tried to persuade Congress and the public to allow him greater policy flexibility to help friendly nations in danger, but to no avail. Only after the Nazi and Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 did the constraints begin to loosen, and even then, not by much. In 1940, hard-core isolationists banded together in the America First Committee, and it took the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in late 1941 to make their voices go silent.
Once in the war, Roosevelt sought to defeat the Axis and achieve a more modest version of Wilson’s liberal vision. He thought it would be possible for the victors to maintain harmony and prosperity through a combination of democratic peace, great-power concert, multilateral cooperation, and free trade. And he created a wave of new institutions to carry out his plan, including the United Nations, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.
But once again, however, the postwar era failed to live up to its billing. Britain turned out to be much weaker than expected; Europe, more devastated; and the Soviet Union, more truculent. After two years of drift, the Truman administration decided to shift course. Alongside FDR’s grand universal framework for global governance, it set up an American sphere of influence run along liberal lines, supplementing the UN and Bretton Woods institutions with the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and NATO.
The administration sold this new course, along with a permanent American military presence abroad to enforce it, to the public as a response to the increasing Soviet threat, and in some ways it was. But the threat being countered was not to the U.S. homeland. It was to the new, broader international order American policymakers had already decided to build, one in which a community of nations would cooperate and trade peacefully with one another under Washington’s guidance and protection. During the Cold War, this system developed and deepened in the West. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, it spread to the rest. And by the 21st century, it reached almost everywhere.
In practice, the postwar order consists of a dense web of voluntary interactions and institutions designed to enmesh countries and guide them to security, prosperity, and liberalization. Over its eight decades of existence, it has worked well in some ways and less well in others. It has not served everybody equally nor lived up to its own boasts or aspirations. But on balance, it has produced astonishing peace, growth, and human flourishing—more so on all counts than any other period in history.
The New Isolationism
It was easier to defend the order at the turn of the millennium, when American power was at its peak and its hegemony was generally welcomed or at least accepted. A series of military misadventures and economic problems in the new century, however, tarnished Washington’s reputation for wisdom, morality, and competence. Eventually rising powers such as Russia and China challenged American leadership abroad, while populists at home demanded protectionism and retrenchment. Once again, popular dissatisfaction with the results of an active, global foreign policy have spurred buyer’s remorse, bitter recrimination, and conspiracy theories. Nefarious elites lied the country into unnecessary wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, people say; they got rich from trade with China at the cost of other people’s jobs. Donald Trump rode this wave of anger and frustration to power in 2016, and since then has vigorously preached the old-time isolationist religion.
The postwar order was based on one basic insight policymakers drew from the failures of the interwar years: In the modern world, foreign policy was a team sport, not an individual one. As a dying Roosevelt explained in his Fourth Inaugural:
"We have learned that we cannot live alone, at peace; that our own well-being is dependent on the well-being of other nations far away. We have learned that we must live as men, not as ostriches, nor as dogs in the manger. We have learned to be citizens of the world, members of the human community. We have learned the simple truth, as Emmerson said, that “The only way to have a friend is to be one.”
Roosevelt and Truman actually believed that, and infused enough of it into their behavior, and into the system they created, that other countries were glad to join the effort. In return for joining the team, they got not just protection but membership in a shared collective enterprise, the development of a stabler, richer, more open world. Over the decades since, the United States has not always lived up to its own ideals or abided by its own rules. But it has remained remarkably devoted to the general project. Until now, that is.
Trump’s first term in office was something of an accident. Neither he nor anybody else expected him to win, and no real preparations had been made for what to do if that happened. Once in the White House, Trump displayed various isolationist tendencies, but their impact was kept in check by inattention, inertia, and resistance from professional staff. When Trump left office in disgrace, his successor returned American foreign policy to something resembling its previous course, and it seemed that the danger of an isolationist America had largely passed.
When Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022, for example, Washington responded by leading an international coalition to support Kyiv and help it resist and survive. Through the delivery of relatively modest amounts of military and economic aid to a friend in desperate need, Russian aggression was checked and NATO gained new members and a new sense of purpose—a rare popular, bipartisan foreign policy achievement.
But during 2023, Ukrainian forward progress stalled and Trump regained his hold on the Republican party. He turned support for Kyiv into a partisan wedge issue, demanding that his followers accommodate Moscow and sell out America’s partner. The more his political fortunes revived, the more his attempt to set a new party line gained traction. And now, thanks to the opposition of his minions, aid is about to be cut off.
At this point, therefore, Ukraine is facing its “Battle of Britain” moment—a period in which it must find a way to survive with limited American involvement even as it endures brutal attack, just like the United Kingdom did in 1940. Kyiv and its remaining friends need to stay in the fight, crouching and counterpunching and hanging on until the American presidential election in November. Trump and his isolationism will be on the ballot, and the result will send the world in one of two dramatically different directions.
If Trump loses, more active American global engagement will once again become possible. Further aid would be sent to Ukraine, Putin’s hopes of outlasting his enemies would be dashed, and the liberal international order would get a new lease on life.
If Trump wins, however, all bets are off, and not just for Ukraine. It is likely that in a second term, an angry and empowered Trump would move more quickly, forcefully, and effectively to achieve his goals, among which be a more isolationist foreign policy. Self-interested transactionalism would be everything; gone would be any sense of teamwork or partnership with others on equal terms in collective endeavors.
Trump is better at breaking things than creating them, and he has no plausible vision of international order to put in place of the existing system. Nor does he want real crises, only the appearance of them. So, his foreign policy is likely to produce decline and entropy, rot rather than revolution. The webs of benign international enmeshment will continue to fray, and the trust that underlies a sense of global community will continue to erode. “There is a great deal of ruin in a nation,” Adam Smith once said, and the same is true of an international order, especially one as comprehensive and deeply rooted as the Pax Americana has been to date. It is not at all clear what a post-American world would look like.
But astonishingly, we may start to find out soon enough.
About the Author: Gideon Rose, Former Editor of Foreign Affairs
david chou
Old Donald令盟國與NATO國家很不放心, 因為他的談話完全沒有美國外交傳統中的一個很重要以及很可貴的色彩或要素---以天下為己任的情懷.
==================================
Appendix I
Trump considering new 3 per cent Nato defence spending target
Former president also thinks accounting rules should change so that spending on military aid for Ukraine is not counted towards the increase
Tony Diver, US EDITOR and Rozina Sabur, DEPUTY US EDITOR3
May 2024 • 1:16pm
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/us/news/2024/05/03/donald-trump-three-per-cent-nato-defence-spending/
[Donald Trump has repeatedly threatened to withdraw US support for Nato allies if member states do not increase their defence budgets CREDIT: Yuki Iwamura/AP]
Donald Trump is considering plans to push Nato members to increase defence spending to 3 per cent of GDP if he wins a second term in the White House, The Telegraph understands.
The former president thinks member states should be asked to contribute more to the alliance’s collective defence in light of threats from Russia and China.
He also believes the accounting rules should be changed so that spending on military assistance for Ukraine is not counted towards the target – a policy that would push several countries below the current target of 2 per cent of GDP.
A source close to Mr Trump said he has been considering lobbying the alliance for an increase for some time, but was further convinced after meeting Andrzej Duda, the president of Poland, last month.
“His thinking is evolving towards 3 per cent, especially after speaking to Duda – and that’s not including money for Ukraine,” said the source.
Mr Trump’s meetings with Mr Duda were reportedly also key in persuading the former US president to drop his opposition to a long-delayed $60 billion aid package for Kyiv.
Mr Trump has repeatedly threatened to withdraw US support for Nato allies if member states do not increase their defence budgets.
Last year, just 11 of the alliance’s 32 members, including the UK, reached the current target. The others were the US, which is by far the largest overall contributor, alongside Poland, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia and Denmark.
Luxembourg, which had the smallest budget for defence compared to its GDP, spent just 1 per cent, while Belgium and Spain spent 1.2 per cent.
Mr Duda has previously argued that 3 per cent – a level reached only by Poland, the US and Greece – is required to defend against “growing threats” including Russia launching a “direct confrontation with Nato”.
On Tuesday, Timo Pesonen, a senior EU defence official, said a 3 per cent target was already under discussion among some member states behind closed doors.
“When the Nato allies are increasing their budget to at least one per cent of GDP, some people speak about 3 per cent already,” he said.
The UK spent 2.28 per cent of GDP on defence in 2023, and plans to increase its spending to 2.32 per cent in the 2024-25 fiscal year.
Rishi Sunak, the Prime Minister, last week announced that Britain’s spending would increase to 2.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade – an increase of £75 billion overall.
Labour has refused to match the pledge if it wins power in a general election later this year.
However, the current Nato rules allow Britain to include the £2.3 billion it has spent on aid for Ukraine in both 2022 and 2023 as part of its defence contributions, plus money for the intelligence services.
On Thursday UK government sources expressed cautious support for a reassessment of the Nato spending target, but suggested it should increase to 2.5 per cent of GDP, and that spending on Ukraine should still be included.
“There is a discussion to be had about the 2 per cent target and whether it is at the right point, but the UK has been clear that 2.5 per cent is the target we want other nations to get to,” said one insider.
“Ukraine is critical to both the UK and allies’ defence. That’s why we include it in our defence spending.”
On Wednesday, Grant Shapps, the Defence Secretary, said that all Nato countries should try to reach the UK’s new funding level of 2.5 per cent to meet the demands of a “more dangerous world”.
Some Nato leaders have expressed concerns about Mr Trump’s potential return to the White House re-election bid, warning that he would endanger the alliance and sabotage Ukraine’s war effort by withdrawing US military support.
The presumed Republican nominee has said that he would end the war “in one day” and that he would encourage Russia to “do whatever the hell they want” to allies that do not spend enough on their own defence.
‘Trump will stop the killing’
A source close to Mr Trump said he had developed a detailed plan for how to end the war peacefully, but that it would not be revealed before the election.
“There is a plan, but he’s not going to debate it with cable news networks because then you lose all leverage,” the source said.
Instead, they said he would focus on a simple message that he would end the war in an attempt to win over US voters hoping for peace.
“He wants to stop the killing,” said the source. “That’s the bumper sticker: Trump will stop the killing.”
In an interview with Time Magazine published on Tuesday, Mr Trump said his message to Nato allies was: “If you’re not going to pay, then you’re on your own.”
Mr Trump said Europe has “taken advantage of us, both on Nato and on Ukraine”.
“If Europe is not going to pay, why should we pay?” he said. “Because they’re much more greatly affected. We have an ocean in between us [and Russia]. They don’t.”
He added: “I’m going to try and help Ukraine but Europe has to get there also and do their job.”
A spokesman for Joe Biden’s campaign said Mr Trump was “threatening to abandon our allies if they are attacked and allow Putin to do whatever he wants, making Americans less safe”.
Appendix II
The Telegraph: Trump will demand that NATO raise defense spending to 3% of GDP, excluding aid to Kyiv
Kyiv • UNN
May 4 2024, 10:17 AM
If elected president, Trump plans to demand that NATO allies increase defense spending to 3% of GDP, excluding aid to Ukraine.
US Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump, if elected, may put pressure on NATO allies to raise the minimum threshold for defense spending to 3% of GDP, sources told The Daily Telegraph, UNN reports .
Details
It is noted that the calculation should not take into account military aid to Ukraine, as is currently the case.
According to the British newspaper, Trump had previously considered raising the minimum threshold for defense spending. He became more firmly committed to this idea after talks in New York with Polish President Andrzej Duda.
Addendum
In 2023, only 11 of NATO's 32 members will have reached the 2% defense spending target currently facing the allies. These are the United States, the United Kingdom, Poland, Greece, Estonia, Lithuania, Finland, Latvia, Hungary, Slovakia, and Denmark. Poland, the United States, and Greece spend more than 3% of their GDP on defense.
The European Union has previously confirmed that some members of the alliance are discussing raising the target to 3% of GDP. However, for example, British Prime Minister Rishi Sunak said last week that the country's defense spending would increase to 2.5% of GDP by the end of the decade.
david chou
前Old Donald政府的官員們 [這些人士將可望再被川普任用, 若他重返白宮] 應該已發現, 世界許多國家的 "疑川論" 將不利川普的選情, 所以, 已開始在設法爭取美國的盟國與security partners的支持, 包括開始告訴這些國家: 川普再執政後, 並不會背棄這些盟邦.
最近訪台的James Gilmore就告訴台灣人: 他相信川普會支持台灣. [這種保證應該由川普本人來說, 但川普這老油條至今仍在故弄玄虛, 表演玄疑的戲碼, 吊足台灣各方的胃口. 顯然, 他覺得這樣很好玩.]
//"I believe that President Trump will be supportive of Taiwan when he becomes president. He was in his first term," said Gilmore, visiting Taipei to speak at the Taiwanese think tank the Center for Asia-Pacific Resilience and Innovation.//
除了James, 還有其他一些前川普政府的官員也聯手發表一項報告, 目的是要排除美國的盟邦與安全夥伴的 "疑川論". 這份報告的作者們說, "疑川論" 是被敵人炮製的/ 用來打擊川普的 "陰謀論". 我尚未讀到這份有涉及台灣的報告.
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
===========
Appendix
Taiwan will have Trump's support if he wins, ex-appointee says
|
|
Reporting by Ben Blanchard; Editing by William Mallard
This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
---
這是 Google 網路論壇針對「Bay Area Taiwanese American」群組發送的訂閱通知郵件。
如要取消訂閱這個群組並停止接收來自這個群組的郵件，請傳送電子郵件到 bay-area-taiwanese-...@googlegroups.com。
david chou
回鍋的川普老條是否會保衛台灣? 川普的前國家安全顧問H. R. McMaster告訴日經亞洲新聞說: //The U.S. will remain committed to defending Japan and Taiwan even if Donald Trump returns to the White House after the November election, -------."
Gen. McMaster自己對這個問題的看法與答案也是正面的: //Successive American administrations have maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding the U.S. response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. When asked whether he thought the U.S. would deploy troops in defense of Taiwan, McMaster replied, "I think the answer is 'yes.'"//
=================
Appendix
U.S. will defend Japan, Taiwan if Trump wins election: H.R. McMaster
Former security adviser thinks Trump would be 'convinced' of need for troops in region
[H.R. McMaster, a former U.S. national security adviser, talks with Nikkei about his expectations for American foreign policy in East Asia if Donald Trump wins the November presidential election. (Screenshot by Yukihiro Sakaguchi)]
YUKIHIRO SAKAGUCHI and NISHANT ANNU, Nikkei staff writers
May 9, 2024 23:23 JST
WASHINGTON -- The U.S. will remain committed to defending Japan and Taiwan even if Donald Trump returns to the White House after the November election, former national security adviser H.R. McMaster tells Nikkei, saying he thinks the former president would be "convinced of the strategic importance" of American forces in Japan for deterring China.
McMaster, a retired lieutenant general who served the Trump administration as national security adviser for just over a year beginning in February 2017, spoke with Nikkei in an online interview May 3.
"Oftentimes, what President Trump asks is ... 'What is the U.S. interest? Why does the United States have to do this? And can others do more?'" McMaster said, explaining that Trump's foreign policy philosophy is based on ideas of burden-sharing and reciprocity.
When asked whether Trump would retaliate against an adversary that attacked Japanese territory, including a strike on the Senkaku Islands, McMaster cited the U.S.-Japan security treaty.
"I think he would adhere to the treaty," McMaster said, adding that "the Senkakus are certainly part of Japan and would fall into our defense treaty." The uninhabited Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are controlled by Japan but claimed by China and Taiwan.
McMaster asserted that the winner of the U.S. presidential election would recognize the importance of maintaining the American military presence on Japan's Okinawa island.
He said that "whoever wins" -- whether it is Democratic incumbent Joe Biden or Trump, a Republican -- "will be convinced of the strategic importance of Okinawa" to ensuring the security and sovereignty of Japan and other countries in the region.
"It's much cheaper to prevent a war than it is to have to fight one," he said.
The former national security adviser called the U.S.-Japan alliance crucial to deterring aggressive action by China.
"If we are strong, in terms of our alliance -- militarily, but also diplomatically -- ... that will send a strong message to would-be aggressors -- in particular, the People's Republic of China and the People's Liberation Army -- that they can't accomplish their objectives in the Indo-Pacific region through the use of force," he said.
Successive American administrations have maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity" regarding the U.S. response to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. When asked whether he thought the U.S. would deploy troops in defense of Taiwan, McMaster replied, "I think the answer is 'yes.'"
But McMaster said a presidential decision as critical as entering a war with China should need to obtain congressional approval.
"I think the American people have to have a say in that, through Congress," he said.
McMaster stressed the importance of the U.S., Japan and other allies accelerating the delivery of arms to Taiwan, arguing that the best way to avoid a major war over Taiwan is for the Taiwanese military to demonstrate its "ability to inflict huge costs on the [People's Republic of China]."
"We want [Chinese President] Xi Jinping and his military leaders to understand that they cannot accomplish their objectives on Taiwan through force at an acceptable cost," he said.
Senior U.S. military officials have warned that China aims to be ready for an invasion of Taiwan by 2027. Communist China has never ruled Taiwan but claims the island as part of its territory.
China's regional ambitions also should worry Association of Southeast Asian Nations members and other Indo-Pacific countries, McMaster said.
"This is not a choice between Washington and Tokyo on one side and Beijing on the other. It's really a choice between sovereignty and servitude," he asserted. "What the Chinese Communist Party expects from other countries in the region is servitude."
McMaster expects U.S. policy toward Beijing to remain consistent under Biden or Trump, saying there would be "more continuity on the approach to China between administrations than, maybe, any other area."
McMaster said if Trump returned to power, he expected "strong and rapid action ... against Chinese unfair trade and economic practices." Trump has discussed levying tariffs of 60% or more on Chinese imports.
The U.S. has expressed concerns about heavily subsidized Chinese firms flooding the American market with underpriced products. McMaster said he would not be surprised if Trump imposed "something like 200% tariffs on Chinese cheap electric cars."
Others who held senior roles in the Trump administration have expressed concerns about U.S. relations with allies if the former president wins the election.
John Bolton, another former national security adviser, suggested to Nikkei that Trump might seek to amend the U.S.-Japan security treaty or withdraw the U.S. from NATO. Mark Esper, who served as defense secretary, wrote in a memoir that Trump was fixated on the idea of withdrawing U.S. troops from South Korea.
McMaster described comments made by Trump about a potential U.S. withdrawal from NATO as "irresponsible," adding that the remarks were encouraging to Russian President Vladimir Putin, who wants to drive a wedge between Washington and its European allies.
It is important for any president to recognize that "what the president says can either advance U.S. interests and protect against Russian subversion, or it can aid and abet it," he said.
McMaster maintained that the U.S. would not withdraw from NATO, even if Trump returned to the White House.
Though he acknowledged a strain of "neo-isolationism" among some members of the Republican Party, McMaster said those members represented a vocal but small minority within the party. He noted that a major U.S. foreign aid package for Ukraine, Israel and Taiwan passed Congress in April over the objections of those members.
McMaster also said he expected a second Trump administration to expand sanctions pressure on Iran, including "secondary sanctions on banks that are engaged in facilitating financial transactions for Iran and its terrorist organizations and proxy forces."
·
Trump may press Japan to defend U.S. in security treaty: John Bolton
·
Carmen Lin
david chou
[Carmen鄉賢:] //我認爲除非川普沒有再用龐培歐為國務卿，否則，他一定會支持台灣，因為我不久前才在推特上面看到龐培歐提到一定要支持台灣的話。//
Read the Full Transcripts of Donald Trump’s Interviews With TIME
Photograph by Philip Montgomery for TIME
BY TIME STAFF
david chou
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (XII)
==========================
Trump Allegedly Suggested He Would Have Bombed Beijing and Moscow
In a shock to donors, the former US president is reported to have suggested he would have bombed the two capitals if they invaded Ukraine and Taiwan during his presidency.
by Kyiv Post | May 29, 2024, 1:06 pm
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/33446
Former US President and presumptive Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump reportedly suggested he would have bombed Beijing and Moscow if they invaded Taiwan and Ukraine under his presidency.
According to the Washington Post, Trump made the comment during an unspecified leg of his nationwide fundraising tour, a statement which reportedly shocked some of his donors.
“Oftentimes, his comments at the events are about foreign policy and topics he discusses at rallies, such as inflation and immigration.
“For example, at one event, he suggested that he would have bombed Moscow and Beijing if Russia invaded Ukraine or China invaded Taiwan, surprising some of the donors,” Josh Dawsey the writer of the report commented without further elaboration.
The publication said it reached out to the Trump Campaign with “detailed questions about his fundraising requests” but only received “a statement in support of his efforts.”
Trump has been known, and at times scrutinized, for his ambiguous position on Ukraine.
In February 2022, following Russia’s full-scale invasion, he praised Russian President Vladimir Putin as being a “genius” and “savvy,” a comment preceded and followed by a longstanding skepticism over aid to Ukraine.
However, in February this year, Trump alleged current US President Joe Biden – who has officially called for more aid to Kyiv – to be a weak leader who will “give” Ukraine to Putin, suggesting that he would do more for Ukraine.
Trump also accused Europe of “not paying their fair share” in support of Ukraine compared to Washington, a statement that was debunked in a Kyiv Post analysis earlier this month.
In a comment made in September 2023, Trump also said he would end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours without providing details of how he would go about it. An April Washington Post report claimed that Trump’s plan would require Ukraine to cede Donbas and Crimea, which would be a strategically significant departure from Washington’s current policy.
|
The Kyiv Post is Ukraine's English-language newspaper and proud winner of the 2014 Missouri Honor Medal for Distinguished Service in Journalism. The newspaper's first print edition came out on Oct. 18, 1995, and went online in 1997.
david chou
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (XII)
Dennis Peng
--
This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
---
這是 Google 網路論壇針對「Bay Area Taiwanese American」群組發送的訂閱通知郵件。
如要取消訂閱這個群組並停止接收來自這個群組的郵件，請傳送電子郵件到 bay-area-taiwanese-...@googlegroups.com。
david chou
[修正]
支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論" (XII)
david chou
david chou
您是 “TIW LSE博士論文與學位” 訴訟案/ 爭議一造的靈魂人物或主角. 這宗訴訟案與爭議則是 “前喜樂島聯盟” 與前總統和前民進黨主席TIW之間因台灣前途解決的路線鬥爭或矛盾的餘緒, 由於後來又夾雜權力鬥爭 [諸位先推William來挑戰TIW, 後來又欲推Annette來挑戰TIW] 和FTV的經營權之爭, 而導致今天您與PHK處境的艱難, 還有您的self-exile.
我讀到您給我的message後, 我就開始想您與PHK的處境, 我開始想我是否可以去拜訪一個人 [他在某人面前說得上話], 請他開始啟動改善您與PHK的處境的程序. 我不敢說我有什麼陳平/ 諸葛孔明/ 劉伯溫的奇計, 但我相信我的想法應該會work. 我的想法不會損害或威脅FTV Leadership的既得利益, 不會威脅到TIW, 也不會損害TIW & William的友善關係. 這件事當然不宜在網路上公開談論與處理, 值得一試, 成功了, 對大家都好, 不成功, 也無損您們的面子, 因為這想法完全出自我.
David
Hwan C. Lin
On May 31, 2024, at 9:56 AM, 'david chou' via Bay Area Taiwanese American <bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com> wrote:
david chou
David:
赤藍黨對TIW的博士論文與學位也有興趣, 因為這可做為政治鬥爭的工具.
我印象中, 諸君是在前喜樂島的政治議程被TIW無情打壓 [我始終認為, 在這件事上, TIW實在有夠笨. 要是我, 我會跟AIT說, 不, 這件事我不能處理, 你們來處理. 你們來處理, 我們的獨派弟兄沒話說, 若我處理, 我會被恨死] 之後, 特別是在FTV經營權的競爭全面挫敗後, 才開始對TIW的博士論文與學位產生興趣, 這個矛盾與鬥爭最終導致Dennis的self-exile.
david chou
Hwan C. Lin
On May 31, 2024, at 12:20 PM, david chou <davidch...@yahoo.com> wrote:
alle...@timebyte.com
[Hwan Lin] 教育的目的是：使受教育者有能力辨識誰在胡説八道。
è 台美人出國留學受教育的目的是：
1) 要有獨立於一般島內台灣人之外的思考能力, 不要人云亦云.
2) 要跳脫以藍綠為區分的狹窄思考範疇, 而以美國公民的寬廣角度去思考.
3) 要能提出有建設性的前瞻計劃, 而不只是檢討及抱怨過去.
4) 要有行動力, 而非只是空談.
新的美台政局, 要有新的格局!
昨天跟一位有實力的鄉親談了很久, 擬成立一個組織以取代目前已腐朽不堪而隨著蔡大媽走入歷史的 FAPA.
Any inputs?
Cheers,
Allen Kuo
。
david chou
我已讀到你的回應 [Appendix I].
你以如此的argument/statement與我對話或跟我說話, 是沒有幫助的/ 沒有建設性的.
連在 “前喜樂島聯盟” 與TIW的路線鬥爭 [台灣人的內戰] 中, 受害最深的與現在處境最艱難的Dennis都能保持風度, 都能以適當的語言和我對話 [Appendix II], 這很值得你效法.
我台灣族人 [正港台灣人, 包括認同台灣的新台灣人] 跟支共還有支共的在台同路人早已進入戰爭狀態, 我們正港台灣人會同主流台美人/ 美國與美國的盟國/ 全世界同情我台灣族人的人士早已在打一場 “抗支保台的戰爭”. 我現在總是以一個標準來檢視與看待所有台灣人與台美人的黨派與菁英: 您是我台灣族人在打一場 “抗支保台戰爭” 的資產or負債/ 助力or阻力/ 盟友or敵人or Neutral?
我因此一方面在台灣人內鬥的有關各方保持中立, 一方面竭盡棉薄, 協助台灣境內外各方勢力組成 “抗支保台的 United Front”. 在這個過程中, 當然有人要求我選邊站, 否則就要割袍斷義或不再支持台灣建州運動, 但我都不為所動, 因為我堅持只站在正港台灣人 [相對於附共投共的在台支那人/ 已投共的蔣該死流亡統治集團餘孽/ 老共的在台useful idiots/ 赤藍黨的同路人(柯痞黨)與useful idiots] 與主流台美人這一邊.
“全美台灣人權協會” 頒獎給盧主義前輩, 而NATPA撤銷頒給黃國昌的 “廖述宗紀念獎”, 這兩個events都足以讓BATA Forum中的若干鄉賢 [他們的立場/ 主張/ 論述不代表BATA, 只有MR. Allen Kuo的發言才能代表BATA的官方立場] 深思.
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
======================
Appendix I
[Dr. Hwanl Lin’s Email]
David Chou:
不是「沒有時間」就可為自己的胡説八道做為遁逃的藉口。
教育的目的是：使受教育者有能力辨識誰在胡説八道。
Hwan Lin
Appendix II
[Dr. Dennis Peng’s Email]
Dennis Peng
david chou
alle...@timebyte.com
瞭解!
阿扁 & 彭P你都有這個 Guts "不食嗟來食",
不會去接受 DPP 傲慢的施捨!
特赦告吹 扁：因不認「犯罪所得」將公布扁案金流
https://www.worldjournal.com/wj/story/121218/7987418
Allen Kuo
From: Dennis Peng <youma...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, June 1, 2024 1:59 AM
To: david chou <davidch...@yahoo.com>
Cc: Lin Wencheng <wen...@gmail.com>; Freeman Huang <free...@gmail.com>; 台灣日報編輯部 <davidy...@gmail.com>; Martin Tsai <taiw...@hotmail.com>; 郭正典 教授 ( Dr. CD Kuo ) <cdk...@gmail.com>; Key Wu <aki...@verizon.net>; Raymond Chuang <raysc...@gmail.com>; BATA Group <bay-area-taiw...@googlegroups.com>; Allen Kuo <alle...@timebyte.com>; John 2 Hsieh <jckh...@gmail.com>; Tek-Khiam Chia <tekk...@gmail.com>; Douglas Chiang <douglas...@gmail.com>; John Chou <johnc...@gmail.com>; Carmen Lin <chgosp...@yahoo.com>; Jerome F. Keating <taiw...@hotmail.com>; stephen...@gmail.com
Subject: Re: [BATA] Re: 支共與支共在台同路人開始渲染與傳播 "疑川普論" 與 "川普再執政將棄台論"
Dear David
david chou
阿扁 & 彭P你都有這個 Guts "不食嗟來食",
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Taitzer Wang
edito...@gmail.com
From: Seashon Chen <200...@gmail.com>
Sent: Saturday, June 1, 2024 7:03 AM
To: alle...@timebyte.com
Subject: Re: [BATA] RE: 教育的目的是：使受教育者有能力辨識誰在胡説八道
我在美國與加拿大受教育。
這種國會改革你要嗎？ (美國是法院判刑，ROC流亡政府立法院可判刑。)
<alle...@timebyte.com> 於 2024年6月1日 週六 上午1:37寫道：
--
This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
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--
Seashon Chen, Ph.D.
Dennis Peng
david chou
[Allen Kuo:]台美人出國留學受教育的目的是：
1) 要有獨立於一般島內台灣人之外的思考能力, 不要人云亦云.
2) 要跳脫以藍綠為區分的狹窄思考範疇, 而以美國公民的寬廣角度去思考.
3) 要能提出有建設性的前瞻計劃, 而不只是檢討及抱怨過去.
4) 要有行動力, 而非只是空談.
[David Chou:] 台美人出國留學受教育的目的是：
1) 能正確定義/ 協助制訂/ 幫助實踐符合 “美國價值/ 西方價值/ 普世價值” 以及服務我台灣族人/ 台派利益的democratic mechanism, 而非固守民主教條, 也非縱容/ 鼓勵/ 樂見/ 從旁幫助赤藍黨 & 赤黨 & 柯痞黨去定義民主/ 聯手支共來貫徹 “以民主來顛覆及埋葬台灣的民主” 及打倒台派政權的圖謀.
3) 能懂得如何維護與促進 “美國在台灣的安全/ 戰略/ 政治/ 經濟利益”, 絕不會去投靠/ 支持會危害 “美國在台灣的利益” 的赤藍黨/ 赤黨/ 柯痞黨, 也不成為那些政黨的sympathizers or useful idiots.
4) 要有行動力, 而非只是空談.
David Chou
Founder
david chou
alle...@timebyte.com
[彭文正] 徹查真相 民進黨不敢做 就讓藍白去做
è
彭P你會不會想的太美了些? 一路走來:
兆豐, 高端, 綠能…等等弊案, 藍白營有沒有真的在積極追查?
林宅血案, 陳文成命案, 江南案, 尹清楓等等命案, 綠營有沒有真的在積極追查?
不要再浪費時間搞笑啦, 你竟還寄希望於國民黨或民眾黨會幫忙追查 "黨國之女" 的論文門?
總之, 想要天色漸漸光 莫讓謊言吞沒良知,
我建議彭P既不能寄希望於民進黨, 更不可以寄希望於國民黨或民眾黨!
所謂中華民國架構, 乃是兩蔣為了極權統治, 殖民台灣而設立的.
而目前各政黨也樂得利用此陳腐的既成利益架構, 有的扮白臉, 有的扮黑臉. 前台打鬥, 後台分贓!
這些人怎可能去搞什麼公平正義, 良知良心?
破除外來政權加在台灣人民頭上不公不義的殖民/既成利益架構, 才是最根本的作法.
而這也是為何我們必需廢除中華民國, 建立起一個新而獨立的台灣國的主要目的!
Allen Kuo
Taitzer Wang
david chou
Dr. K. C. Hong's Post讀後感
我恭讀敬愛的Dr. Hong的post, 無比敬佩.
============================
陸防長談台獨狠話盡出 總統府回應了
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david chou
請BATA若干鄉親閱讀中央社的一篇報導, 希望他們能與柯痞黨保持距離(I)
====================
Appendix I
美智庫：中國決心顛覆和操縱台灣政治
2024-06-03 11:14
中央社／ 華盛頓2日綜合外電報導
https://udn.com/news/story/6656/8005966
美國前海軍部副次長、華府智庫「約克鎮研究所」創辦人兼所長克羅普希及資深研究員哈勒姆投書「華爾街日報」說，中國不太可能入侵台灣，但決心要顛覆和操縱台灣政治。
「約克鎮研究所」（Yorktown Institute）的克羅普希（Seth Cropsey）和哈勒姆（Harry Halem）在《對台灣的真正威脅》（The Real Threat to Taiwan）一文中表示，此一說法背後存在雙重假設，除非受到挑釁，否則中國不會入侵，而中國仍需建立自己的軍隊來發動攻擊。
大多數美國人忽略了操縱和顛覆在中國戰略中的核心地位。中國成功的關鍵不僅僅是軍事嚇阻和言論平衡，還涉及台灣的政治安全。
他們在文中寫道，中國突然發動攻擊的可能性不大。這對中國來說存在軍事風險，而台灣和美國很容易就能發現中方的準備行動。但北京若能凍結台灣的決策過程、擾亂其軍事準備並削弱國家能力，就能確保台灣依然處於弱勢且無盟友。
文中表示，中國干預選舉的手段眾所皆知。北京一直在尋求拉攏當地社會團體，包括台灣最大的佛教組織。中國贊助台灣前軍事和政府官員代表團對中國進行名義上的文化和經濟訪問，並為在中國營運業務的台灣企業提供好處。在政治上，中國共產黨和中國國家機器明顯表現出對中國國民黨的偏好，拒絕與民主進步黨正式接觸。
此外，中國還欲藉立法院之亂顛覆台灣政權。國民黨5月底強行通過新法，以民主透明的名義擴大立法機關權力。新法旨在透過賦予立院調查權來束縛行政部門，並迫使軍事官員和資深外交官在高額罰款和其他法律壓力威脅下，揭露敏感的國家機密。
這將使台灣成為一個不太可信的合作夥伴，因為任何大規模軍事或情報合作都有被曝光的風險。而國民黨提出的花東3大交通法案預算近2兆，金額龐大，恐迫使台灣大幅削減國防開支和接受通常來自中國的外部融資。
文中指出，雖然沒有直接證據顯示中共精心操縱台灣立院，但這類事件模式令人憂心。10多年來，北京一直向台灣施壓，並指控民進黨不合法。國民黨如今在中國於台灣週邊舉行大型軍演之際，制定了恐破壞台灣安全的新法。
克羅普希和哈勒姆說，中國的計畫很明確。它希望凍結台灣政治，使台灣成為美國、日本和其他區域大國不可靠的夥伴。隨著緊張局勢升溫，中國將製造危機，為逐步犯台提供正當理由，隨後展開類似俄羅斯首度入侵烏克蘭的「維和行動」。
兩人在文中表示，美國需要一個明確的應對計畫。華府應全力支持賴清德總統和民進黨，資助台灣行政機構和軍事計畫，以在危機發生前物色有能力、可靠的人選。美國也可透過抵制中國的影響和操縱，來擴大對台灣民間社會的資助。
華府毋須改變對一個中國政策的承諾。畢竟，美國前國務卿季辛吉（Henry Kissinger）在1972年上海公報談判中的觀點是確保美國對未來突發事件保留外交彈性。中國應該被迫接受美國對台做出新承諾的挑戰。
克羅普希和哈勒姆說，沒有任何事物可以無限期阻止戰爭，但這些舉措能爭取時間。如果缺乏對政治戰爭的一致關注，台灣將持續處於弱勢。
Appendix II
Appendix I
美智庫：中國決心顛覆和操縱台灣政治
2024-06-03 11:14
中央社／ 華盛頓2日綜合外電報導
https://udn.com/news/story/6656/8005966
美國前海軍部副次長、華府智庫「約克鎮研究所」創辦人兼所長克羅普希及資深研究員哈勒姆投書「華爾街日報」說，中國不太可能入侵台灣，但決心要顛覆和操縱台灣政治。
「約克鎮研究所」（Yorktown Institute）的克羅普希（Seth Cropsey）和哈勒姆（Harry Halem）在《對台灣的真正威脅》（The Real Threat to Taiwan）一文中表示，此一說法背後存在雙重假設，除非受到挑釁，否則中國不會入侵，而中國仍需建立自己的軍隊來發動攻擊。
大多數美國人忽略了操縱和顛覆在中國戰略中的核心地位。中國成功的關鍵不僅僅是軍事嚇阻和言論平衡，還涉及台灣的政治安全。
他們在文中寫道，中國突然發動攻擊的可能性不大。這對中國來說存在軍事風險，而台灣和美國很容易就能發現中方的準備行動。但北京若能凍結台灣的決策過程、擾亂其軍事準備並削弱國家能力，就能確保台灣依然處於弱勢且無盟友。
文中表示，中國干預選舉的手段眾所皆知。北京一直在尋求拉攏當地社會團體，包括台灣最大的佛教組織。中國贊助台灣前軍事和政府官員代表團對中國進行名義上的文化和經濟訪問，並為在中國營運業務的台灣企業提供好處。在政治上，中國共產黨和中國國家機器明顯表現出對中國國民黨的偏好，拒絕與民主進步黨正式接觸。
這將使台灣成為一個不太可信的合作夥伴，因為任何大規模軍事或情報合作都有被曝光的風險。而國民黨提出的花東3大交通法案預算近2兆，金額龐大，恐迫使台灣大幅削減國防開支和接受通常來自中國的外部融資。
文中指出，雖然沒有直接證據顯示中共精心操縱台灣立院，但這類事件模式令人憂心。10多年來，北京一直向台灣施壓，並指控民進黨不合法。國民黨如今在中國於台灣週邊舉行大型軍演之際，制定了恐破壞台灣安全的新法。
克羅普希和哈勒姆說，中國的計畫很明確。它希望凍結台灣政治，使台灣成為美國、日本和其他區域大國不可靠的夥伴。隨著緊張局勢升溫，中國將製造危機，為逐步犯台提供正當理由，隨後展開類似俄羅斯首度入侵烏克蘭的「維和行動」。
兩人在文中表示，美國需要一個明確的應對計畫。華府應全力支持賴清德總統和民進黨，資助台灣行政機構和軍事計畫，以在危機發生前物色有能力、可靠的人選。美國也可透過抵制中國的影響和操縱，來擴大對台灣民間社會的資助。
華府毋須改變對一個中國政策的承諾。畢竟，美國前國務卿季辛吉（Henry Kissinger）在1972年上海公報談判中的觀點是確保美國對未來突發事件保留外交彈性。中國應該被迫接受美國對台做出新承諾的挑戰。
[只摘錄兩段] The Real Threat to Taiwan
China is unlikely to invade but determined to subvert and manipulate the island’s politics.
By Seth Cropsey and Harry Halem
June 2, 2024 4:40 pm ET
https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-real-threat-to-taiwan-legislature-manipulation-china-dbfcd442
The U.S. is preparing for a crisis in the Taiwan Strait but getting China’s calculations wrong. The assumptions are twofold: that China won’t invade unless provoked, and that China still needs to get its military built to attack. Most Americans miss the centrality of manipulation and subversion to Chinese strategy. Taiwanese political security, not simply military deterrence and rhetorical balancing, are key to Chinese success.
Taiwan’s politics are a complicated accident of history. From 1949 to 1987 the island was governed by the Chinese Nationalist Party, or KMT. It is now the major opposition party, and because of the Taiwanese system’s design is the largest party in the legislature and holds an informal majority alongside the populist Taiwan People’s Party. The KMT is little more than a series of patronage networks with no formal ideology. Its leaders fantasize about eventual reunification with a democratic mainland China. Unlike the KMT, the center-left Democratic Progressive Party, which just won a third presidential term, has a distinct ideology. It seeks recognition of Taiwan as a sovereign nation, which angers Beijing.
david chou
Appendix I
Heritage Foundation Head Refers to ‘Second American Revolution’
Kevin Roberts, president of the group that has coordinated the Project 2025 policy plan, said it could be “bloodless if the left allows it to be.”
[The president of the Heritage Foundation said he was encouraged by the immunity ruling from the Supreme Court.Credit...Haiyun Jiang for The New York Times]
By Maggie Astor
July 3, 2024
https://www.nytimes.com/2024/07/03/us/politics/heritage-foundation-2025-policy-america.html
James Singer, a spokesman for the Biden campaign, said in a statement that noted the coming July 4 holiday: “America declared independence from a tyrannical king, and now Donald Trump and his allies want to make him one at our expense. On Jan. 6, they proudly stormed our Capitol to overturn an election Donald Trump lost fair and square — something not even the Confederacy was able to accomplish — now they are dreaming of a violent revolution to destroy the very idea of America.”
Maggie Astor covers politics for The New York Times, focusing on breaking news, policies, campaigns and how underrepresented or marginalized groups are affected by political systems. More about Maggie Astor
A version of this article appears in print on July 4, 2024, Section A, Page 20 of the New York edition with the headline: A Plug for a New ‘American Revolution’.
Heritage Foundation president celebrates Supreme Court immunity decision: “We are in the process of the second American Revolution”
Kevin Roberts: “We're in the process of taking this country back ... we ought to be really encouraged by what happened yesterday”
WRITTEN BY MEDIA MATTERS STAFF
PUBLISHED 07/02/24 11:35 AM EDT
00:00
02:48
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CitationFrom the July 2, 2024, edition of Real America’s Voice’s War Room
KEVIN ROBERTS (HERITAGE FOUNDATION PRESIDENT): In spite of all this nonsense from the left, we are going to win. We're in the process of taking this country back. No one in the audience should be despairing.
No one should be discouraged. We ought to be really encouraged by what happened yesterday. And in spite of all of the injustice, which, of course, friends and audience of this show, of our friend Steve know, we are going to prevail.
Number two, to the point of the clips and, of course, your preview of the fact that I am an early American historian and love the Constitution. That Supreme Court ruling yesterday on immunity is vital, and it's vital for a lot of reasons. But I would go to Federalist No. 70.
If people in the audience are looking for something to read over Independence Day weekend, in addition to rereading the Declaration of Independence, read Hamilton's No. 70 because there, along with some other essays, in some other essays, he talks about the importance of a vigorous executive.
You know, former congressman, the importance of Congress doing its job, but we also know the importance of the executive being able to do his job. And can you imagine, Dave Brat, any president, put politics off to the side, any president having to second guess, triple guess every decision they're making in their official capacity, you couldn't have the republic that you just described.
But number three, let me speak about the radical left. You and I have both been parts of faculties and faculty senates and understand that the left has taken over our institutions. The reason that they are apoplectic right now, the reason that so many anchors on MSNBC, for example, are losing their minds daily is because our side is winning.