The Heritage Foundation的Michael Cunningham於3/27/2024發表一項特別報告---"THE AMERICAN CASE FOR TAIWAN"
david chou
"Taiwan’s Security Is Linked to America’s Security", 這就是我經常跟台灣與台美鄉親說的: 台灣的安全, 就是美國的安全. 維護台灣的安全, 就是維護美國的安全. 保衛台灣, 就是保衛美國. 我因此經常提醒台美人鄉親, 要參與 "抗支保台", 因為這即是在捍衛美國在台灣的安全/ 戰略/ 政治/ 經濟利益.
我也一再告訴鄉親們: 若我台灣族人與台美鄉親想解決台灣的前途或台灣的主權歸屬, 一定要先打贏一場 "反支那侵略與併吞台灣的戰爭", 只有在 "支那障礙" 或 "支那威脅" 不存在或消除之後, 我們才有機會解決台灣的前途. 如果台派的台灣與台美菁英與意見領袖不能或不願接受我這項認知/ 判斷/ 觀點, 就會錯置或虛擲人力與資源.
鄉親們不難從Michael這份報告看出, "維護台海現狀" 仍是或仍會是華盛頓現階段的對台政策的基調:
Appendix
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SUMMARY
This Special Report explains why keeping Taiwan free from an attack or takeover by mainland China is critical to America’s national security and economic prosperity. It also outlines principles that Washington should apply while working with Taipei to help preserve the island’s security amid changes in regional and cross-Strait dynamics. By strengthening deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and employing the wisdom and determination that helped America win the Cold War, policymakers can strike an effective balance between preserving Taiwan’s security and not inadvertently provoking a conflict with China, thereby enabling the U.S. to outlast its “new cold war” adversary and ensure peace and stability on this island that is indispensable to U.S. security and prosperity.
KEY TAKEAWAYS
If it controlled Taiwan, China could dominate technologies that power the U.S. economy and project power deep into the Pacific in pursuit of regional hegemony.
Taiwan plays such an indispensable role in the U.S. and global economies that war over the island could result in a global depression.
U.S. strategy should not attempt to “fix” Taiwan’s predicament, but rather to strengthen deterrence and preserve the status quo of Taiwan’s de facto sovereignty.
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In recent years, tensions in the Taiwan Strait have reached a fever pitch, making it one of the world’s preeminent military flashpoints and the issue most likely to spark a conflict between the United States and China. Currently, few international issues are subject to more discussion and speculation, yet most commentators struggle to explain why Taiwan matters to America.
If decisionmakers in Washington are unable to explain to the farmer in Kansas, the teacher in Indiana, or the welder in Maine how their lives are affected by what happens in Taiwan, they will struggle to justify sending American treasure, let alone soldiers, halfway across the globe to defend the self-governing island should the need ever arise.
Some politicians and pundits have already begun to question America’s long-standing policy of support for Taiwan. While still in the minority, these views appear to be gaining traction and reinforce the need to explain why Taiwan matters to everyday Americans and why preventing America’s top geopolitical rival, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), from gaining control of Taiwan is a vital U.S. national interest.
It is also important that policymakers know how best to act to protect this interest. Action is urgently needed to strengthen America’s deterrence posture in the Western Pacific; arm Taiwan to defend itself; and expand certain forms of economic, diplomatic, and military cooperation with Taipei in ways that are consistent with Washington’s long-standing Taiwan policy as outlined in such documents as the Taiwan Relations Act, the “Six Assurances,” and the three U.S.–China joint communiques.1
The Taiwan Relations Act was passed in 1979 to provide a basis for unofficial relations with Taiwan following the United States’ severing of diplomatic ties with Taipei and recognition of Beijing. The document, while vague, requires certain forms of security support for Taiwan for the explicit purpose of preserving cross-Strait peace and keeping Taiwan safe from Beijing. See H.R. 2479, Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th Congress, April 10, 1979, https://www.congress.gov/96/statute/STATUTE-93/STATUTE-93-Pg14.pdf (accessed February 8, 2024). The “Three Communiques” are joint statements issued by Washington and Beijing in 1972, 1979, and 1982 in which the U.S. “acknowledged” (but did not accept) that both sides of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is just one China and that Beijing claims ownership of Taiwan. See American Institute in Taiwan, “Three Communiques,” https://www.ait.org.tw/tag/three-communiques/ (accessed February 8, 2024). The “Six Assurances” are a brief clarification of the third communique that the Reagan Administration issued to Taipei in 1982 in response to concerns by the Taiwan government. See Susan V. Lawrence, “President Reagan’s Six Assurances to Taiwan,” Congressional Research Service In Focus No. IF11665, updated June 13, 2023, https://sgp.fas.org/crs/row/IF11665.pdf (accessed February 8, 2024).
At the same time, some proposals that are being touted, including diplomatic recognition of Taiwan or a formal defense treaty, are not supported by Taiwan’s government and could trigger an armed response from Beijing, precipitating the very crisis that policymakers hope to avoid. This report cautions against such extremes and calls instead for bold, thoughtful action to preserve peace, stability, and deterrence. Above all, U.S. policy should continue to emphasize preserving the status quo, which is that Taiwan continues to enjoy de facto sovereignty and freedom from the PRC without either side forcing a final resolution of the island’s diplomatic status—the position that is overwhelmingly supported by Taiwan’s people and government.
Taiwan: More than a Beleaguered Democracy
When asked why U.S. policymakers should care what happens to Taiwan, most default to the island’s status as a fellow democracy under threat from a larger authoritarian regime that seeks to extinguish its freedom.
The U.S. has a concrete interest in preserving Taiwan’s free democratic system. The very existence of a democratic Republic of China (Taiwan’s official name) threatens the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It shows that democracy can indeed thrive in a Chinese society, disproving the CCP’s condescending narrative that the Chinese people are unsuited to the exercise of the rights and responsibilities bestowed on citizens of democratic states and that the absence of authoritarian rule would only lead to chaos.2
There is a long-standing CCP narrative that China is uniquely unsuited for Western-style democracy because it lacks the cultural or socioeconomic basis for such a political system. See, for example, LuXin Liu, “Why Can’t China Be Democratic?” China News Digest, July 31, 2011, http://liu-luxin.hxwk.org/2011/07/31/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%B8%BA%E4%BB%80%E4%B9%88%E4%B8%8D%E8%83%BD%E6%B0%91%E4%B8%BB%EF%BC%9F/; Haiyan Chen, “Why China Cannot Implement Western Democratic System,” CPC [Communist Party of China] News, September 11, 2014, http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2014/0911/c143844-25643143-2.html (accessed February 8, 2024). In the first decade of the 2000s, this narrative had become so prevalent that it eventually garnered significant pushback from liberal-minded Chinese, such as the author of the following social media post that was translated into English by the China Media Project. See David Bandurski, “Questions for China’s Democracy Opponents,” China Media Project, January 17, 2012, https://chinamediaproject.org/2012/01/17/questions-for-chinas-democracy-opponents/ (accessed February 9, 2024).
As robust as this interest is, however, it alone would likely be insufficient to justify risking war with America’s most powerful geopolitical rival, which not only is a near-peer competitor in conventional military strength, but also has significant cyber capabilities along with nuclear and non-nuclear missiles capable of striking targets anywhere in the United States. A President’s foremost duty is to provide for the security and prosperity of the American people, and the stronger China becomes, the harder it will be to justify confronting Beijing to protect the freedoms of residents of a small island on the other side of the globe.
However, behind the David and Goliath story of Taiwan’s struggle for survival lies a more robust case for defending it. The security and prosperity of the United States depend to a shocking extent on a secure Taiwan that functions independently of the PRC.
Taiwan’s Security Is Linked to America’s Security
The most important reason why Washington should remain committed to keeping Taiwan safe and free from Beijing’s grip is that the island is vitally important to America’s national security. This may not be as readily apparent to everyday Americans as it is to those who are tasked with preserving their security. Taiwan sits roughly 5,000 miles from Hawaii and Alaska and 7,000 miles from the continental United States. The U.S. is separated from Asia by a vast ocean, and Taiwan’s status may not seem obviously relevant to the direct threats China poses to the U.S. homeland.
Those who view Taiwan as a security liability point out that the U.S. government’s main foreign policy responsibility is to keep Americans safe. They fear that the government’s support of Taiwan will only aggravate tensions with China and make it more likely that the U.S. will get drawn into a war with Beijing.
Taiwan, however, has retained a critical position in U.S. defense strategy in the Western Pacific since World War II. The strategic necessity of keeping Taiwan out of the control of hostile adversaries was first identified in the early days of the Cold War and remains just as important today. In 1950, General Douglas MacArthur wrote a classified “Memorandum on Formosa” laying out Taiwan’s importance in relation to the Soviet Union. His argument applies equally well to today’s strategic competition with China:
[T]he western strategic frontier of the United States rests today on the littoral islands extending from the Aleutians through the Philippine Archipelago. The geographic location of [Taiwan] is such that in the hands of a power unfriendly to the United States it constitutes an enemy salient in the very center of that portion of our position…. [Taiwan] in the hands of the Communists can be compared to an unsinkable aircraft carrier and submarine tender ideally located to accomplish Soviet offensive strategy….3
See “Memorandum on Formosa, by General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander in Chief, Far East, and Supreme Commander, Allied Powers, Japan,” June 14, 1950, Annex to Document 86, “Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large ([Philip C.] Jessup),” June 25, 1950, in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Korea, Volume VII, ed. John P. Glennon (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v07/d86 (accessed February 9, 2024).
Little has changed in the decades following the Cold War. The Biden Administration’s 2022 National Security Strategy (NSS) states that America has “an abiding interest in maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait, which is critical to regional and global security and prosperity.”4
National Security Strategy, The White House, October 2022, p. 24, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf, (accessed February 9, 2024).
The document links Taiwan’s defense to the greater competition with China, which it calls “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge” and “the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.”5
Ibid., pp. 11 and 23.
This assessment is in line with that of the Trump Administration and its 2017 NSS, which warned that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”6
National Security Strategy of the United States of America, The White House, December 2017, p. 25, https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/NSS2017.pdf?ver=CnFwURrw09pJ0q5EogFpwg%3d%3d (accessed February 9, 2024).
The document highlighted the national security threats that such a change in the balance of power would produce, concluding that the U.S. “must marshal the will and capabilities to compete and prevent unfavorable shifts [in the balance of power] in the Indo-Pacific,” among other regions.7
Ibid., p. 45.
Indeed, Taiwan is central to the U.S.–China competition for regional leadership, and preventing a Chinese takeover of the island is essential to countering the security threats posed by an ascendant China. A change in Taiwan’s status might not directly threaten the U.S. homeland in the immediate term, but it would irreversibly alter regional dynamics in ways that would benefit America’s chief geopolitical adversary and make every American less safe.
Geography Reigns Supreme. Taiwan’s raw, fundamental importance to U.S. national security can be summarized in one word: geography. Taiwan’s topography, consisting of a thick mountainous interior and very few beaches suitable for a landing by enemy troops, makes it a natural fortress, but its greatest value is its location. As one observer has noted, “Taiwan’s inherent military value cannot be wished away…. [I]ts location dictates that its fate will in large part determine the balance of power in the region.”8
David Sacks, “Why Is Taiwan Important to the United States?” Council on Foreign Relations, Blog Post, June 20, 2023, https://www.cfr.org/blog/why-taiwan-important-united-states (accessed February 9, 2024).
This balance of power in turn affects the security of U.S. allies and American citizens in Asia, the likelihood that regional tensions will escalate into armed conflict, and ultimately the safety of the U.S. homeland.
Taiwan sits directly astride some of the world’s most important sea lanes, which have both commercial and security importance. These include the roughly 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait between Taiwan’s main island and China, through which most of the world’s container ships pass, as well as the 160-mile-wide Luzon Strait that divides Taiwan from the Philippines.9
For more about the Taiwan Strait’s role in commercial shipping, see “Taiwan’s Outsized Role in the Global Economy,” infra.
The Luzon Strait connects the South China Sea to the Western Pacific, making it a particularly strategic waterway in the context of U.S.–China competition.10
Mark Valencia, “Strategic Value of Luzon Strait Must Not Be Overlooked,” Asia Times, May 28, 2023, https://asiatimes.com/2023/05/strategic-value-of-luzon-strait-must-not-be-overlooked/ (accessed February 9, 2024); Kevin Varley, “Taiwan Tensions Raise Risks in One of Busiest Shipping Lanes,” Bloomberg, August 2, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-08-02/taiwan-tensions-raise-risks-in-one-of-busiest-shipping-lanes (accessed February 9, 2024; subscription required).
The importance of these sea lanes bestows considerable leverage on whichever country controls them. Such leverage is rarely exploited during peacetime, but it can be weaponized to block access or cut off supplies to an adversary during times of war or diplomatic tension.
If China ever gained control of Taiwan, it would be better positioned to control the strategic waterways around the island. Recent experience in the South China Sea demonstrates that China does not respect freedom of navigation and routinely challenges the right of the U.S. and other countries to operate in those waters.11
Jeff M. Smith, “Biden Must Keep Challenging China on Freedom of Navigation,” Foreign Policy, February 16, 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/02/16/biden-south-china-sea-spratlys/ (accessed February 9, 2024).
Control of both sides of the Taiwan Strait would enable Beijing at the very least to curtail the U.S. military’s ability to navigate the waters surrounding Taiwan.
Beijing’s history of cutting off Japan’s supplies of some rare earth minerals in response to diplomatic disputes12
Keith Bradsher, “Amid Tension, China Blocks Vital Exports to Japan,” The New York Times, September 22, 2010, https://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/23/business/global/23rare.html (accessed February 9, 2024).
indicates that it would also not be averse to exploiting this leverage in the commercial sphere. It might even seek to restrict passage of container ships from or destined to certain countries.
The First Island Chain. Even more important, Taiwan is a critical node in what military strategists call the “first island chain,” a network of islands between Japan and maritime Southeast Asia controlled by U.S. allies, many of which house American military bases. This island chain is America’s first line of defense against Chinese aggression and the only significant barrier between the Chinese mainland and U.S. territories in the Pacific.
Taiwan’s importance to the first island chain cannot be overemphasized. Taiwan is the biggest island between Japan and the Philippines. American and Chinese strategists agree that if China gained control of Taiwan, it would effectively have broken through the first island chain and would be in a position to execute sea-denial operations against the U.S., Japan, and other allies and use Taiwan as a springboard from which to expand its military reach deep into the Pacific.13
Chris Rahman, “Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters,” Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Autumn 2001), p. 77, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26393872.pdf?refreqid=fastly- default%3Af28ab4e113b2a3294566a68249fec905&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1 (accessed February 9, 2024).
Retaining control of the first island chain is the best way to contain China’s aggressive ambitions and deter it from acting on its revisionist aims. Failure to do so would have several dire implications for U.S. national security. Specifically, it would:
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Undermine America’s alliance network. America’s network of regional allies is one of its greatest assets in the Indo-Pacific. The United States’ global alliance system helps to keep adversaries and conflicts largely contained far from the U.S. homeland. It also raises the costs associated with aggressive military action by hostile powers abroad, especially against U.S. allies. Arguably, nowhere are America’s alliances more important than in Asia, a region characterized by world-class powers, mutual hostilities, and numerous territorial disputes that is now at the center of global economic activity.
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Taiwan is not part of the U.S. alliance system, and Washington does not have a formal security commitment to the island. The mutual defense treaty that then-President Dwight Eisenhower signed with his Taiwanese counterpart Chiang Kai-shek in 1954 was dissolved on January 1, 1980, a year after the U.S. forged diplomatic relations with Beijing.
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However, the U.S. is widely viewed as Taiwan’s committed security guarantor, and discussions with officials and diplomats from throughout the region confirm that failure to fill this role would spark concern about Washington’s commitment to regional security. More important, a loss of Taiwan would weaken America’s ability to fulfill the obligations that it does have, including its security obligations toward Japan and the Philippines.
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Principles for Preserving Taiwan's Security
James J. Carafano, Michael Pillsbury, Jeff M. Smith, and Andrew J. Harding, eds., “Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China,” Heritage Foundation Special Report No. 270, March 28, 2023, https://www.heritage.org/asia/report/winning-the-new-cold-war-plan-countering-china.
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