在第一島鏈建單一戰區, 進行區域集體聯防
david chou
在第一島鏈建單一戰區,進行區域集體聯防(I)
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National Security Strategy of the United States of America
November 2025
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
Deterring Military Threats
A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority.
We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense. America’s diplomatic efforts should focus on pressing our First Island Chain allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression. This will interlink maritime security issues along the First Island Chain while reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.
Given President Trump’s insistence on increased burden-sharing from Japan and South Korea, we must urge these countries to increase defense spending, with a focus on the capabilities—including new capabilities—necessary to deter adversaries and protect the First Island Chain. We will also harden and strengthen our military presence in the Western Pacific, while in our dealings with Taiwan and Australia we maintain our determined rhetoric on increased defense spending.
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要在第一島鏈建單一戰區,進行區域集體聯防,構想甚佳,但難度不小.
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Appendix I
Joint first island chain shield urged
READINESS: Building a democratic shield should be done during peacetime, as systems that could be paralyzed during a crisis are not a credible deterrent, Lin Chia-lung said
By Lee I-chia / Taipei Times Staff Reporter
Sun, Apr 12, 2026 page 1
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2026/04/12/2003855439
In light of China’s authoritarian expansion and military threat, democratic countries should reconceptualize the First Island Chain as a single theater, and build a collective and coordinated democratic shield to deter aggression, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung (林佳龍) told a forum in Taipei yesterday [Apr. 11].
Lin made the remark at the “Shield of Democracy: The First Island Chain Social Resilience Cooperation Forum” held by the Formosa Republican Association and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Drone Diplomacy Task Force.
“We are confronting a reality that is becoming clearer day by day. The First Island Chain is no longer a line on a map, it has become a major front line for global freedom, democracy and order,” Lin said.
[Minister of Foreign Affairs Lin Chia-lung speaks at the “Shield of Democracy: The First Island Chain Social Resilience Cooperation Forum” in Taipei yesterday. Photo: CNA]
Countries in the First Island Chain prioritize preventing war and preserving peace, but “peace is never sustained by hope alone,” as true peace relies on “credible deterrence” that shows those that seek to destroy it that they cannot succeed, he said.
China’s mounting military pressure, gradual intimidation, cognitive warfare and economic coercion against Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and the US are not isolated incidents, but part of a coordinated security threat, he added.
“We can no longer rely on independent defense and response systems. We must move toward building a collective and coordinated democratic shield for the first island chain,” Lin said.
“We must begin to understand the First Island Chain through the lens of a single theater,” he said, adding that it includes the Taiwan Strait, the East and South China seas, the Miyako Strait, the Bashi Channel, and their surrounding sea and air spaces.
These seemingly separate domains are increasingly being integrated into one strategic framework: authoritarian expansionism, “gray zone” tactics, electromagnetic disruption, supply chain coercion and cognitive warfare, Lin said.
Therefore, the First Island Chain should be viewed as a single theater where countries jointly monitor the situation, issue joint warnings, conduct joint deployments and jointly maintain resilience, he said.
Low-cost and high-endurance uncrewed systems are key components of the democratic shield, as they are essential to protecting sea lanes and other sea infrastructure, as well as central to establishing an “asymmetrical” framework that raises the cost of invasion and extends resilience, Lin said.
Low-altitude airspace is more than a battle space; it is also a space of governance, carrying out peacetime tasks such as daily coastal patrols, bridge inspections, mountain search and rescue, port security, disaster response, and logistics for outlying islands — becoming a part of national resilience, he added.
“Building a democratic shield should not stop in wartime. It should be built up step by step in peacetime governance,” Lin said. “If uncrewed devices are the nervous system of the democratic shield, then democratic supply chains are its backbone.”
If an uncrewed system could be paralyzed in wartime, data cannot be integrated in a crisis, maintenance resources cannot be replenished quickly, or training has not reached optimal levels in peacetime, then even the most advanced equipment would struggle to provide credible deterrence, he said.
The key to a democratic shield for the First Island Chain comes down to “whether we can build a comprehensive framework that links research, development, manufacturing, validation, training, maintenance and deployment into one coherent system,” he added.
Appendix II
外交部長林佳龍出席「民主之盾」論壇，倡議強化第一島鏈全社會韌性與區域安全合作
發布時間：2026-04-11
資料來源：非政府組織國際事務會
2026/04/11
第143號新聞稿
社團法人福和會本（4）月11日在台舉辦「『民主之盾』：第一島鏈全社會韌性合作論壇」，邀集含前美國印太司令部陸軍司令佛林（Charles A. Flynn）在內之美國、日本、韓國及菲律賓等國的國防及戰略研究專家學者來台與會，外交部長林佳龍應邀於開幕典禮致詞。林部長強調，我們必須將第一島鏈視為「單一戰區」，面對來自中國的軍事壓迫、灰色地帶脅迫、認知作戰及經濟脅迫，共同建立集體協作的第一島鏈「民主之盾」則是首要目標。
林部長指出，無人載具系統是建構「民主之盾」的重要元素，也是發展不對稱戰略的關鍵。台灣應追求成為無人載具系統之印太樞紐，並扮演民主供應鏈關鍵節點、制度創新示範者，以及國際訓練與能力建構平台。
林部長強調，台灣將與美、日、韓、菲等理念相近國家，共同建構具信任度的韌性機制以及具融合度的非紅供應鏈。民主之盾並非一堵牆，而是一張連結網，它是由前線部署、無人系統與民主供應鏈維持的動態韌性架構，期盼各國能將單一戰區的觀念轉化為具體行動，將第一島鏈由前線轉化為穩定、合作與自由之鏈。
外交部「無人機外交小組」並於當（11）日下午與福和會合辦「印太第一島鏈X無人機韌性供應鏈」研討會，由台灣卓越無人機海外商機聯盟（TEDIBOA）、社團法人中華民國國際經濟合作協會及財團法人工業技術研究院協辦。研討會由陳彥升理事長引言，並由無人機外交小組執行長江振瑋領銜，特別邀請前日本自衛隊統合幕僚長岩崎茂上將、工研院院長張培仁、中科院航空所所長邱祖湘、雷虎科技董事長陳冠如及漢翔航空軍業處處長蔡明晃擔任與談人，討論我國如何在威權主義威脅下，藉由產官學界之跨領域合作平台，促進無人機產業發展，建構非紅供應鏈的亞太中心，並拓展我國關鍵產業之全球商機。該場有來自各領域近80人參加。
david chou
在第一島鏈建單一戰區,進行區域集體聯防(II)
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關於川普政府在第一島鏈的軍事建設與佈署, 國防部長Pete Hegseth於23 April 2025在賓州Carlisle鎮的Army War College表示: 為了要嚇阻Communist China, 美國正在印太地區進行 "a more forward regional force posture".
Remarks by Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth at the Army War College (As Delivered)
April 23, 2025
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所謂 "a more forward regional force posture", 內容如下:
The US and Japan are rapidly strengthening their military presence in the Nansei Islands (Ryukyu Chain) to deter China, shifting from a primarily defensive posture to active deterrence, with a focus on Okinawa, Miyako (宮古島), Ishigaki (石垣島), and Yonaguni (最靠近台灣的與那國島). Japan is deploying anti-ship/air defense missiles and upgrading units, while the US focuses on integrating Marine Littoral Regiments.
Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces (JGSDF) Deployment
Missile and Surveillance Units: JGSDF has deployed anti-ship and surface-to-air guided missiles, along with coastal surveillance and electronic warfare units, on Amami, Miyako, and Ishigaki islands.
Yonaguni Garrison: Located only 110 kilometers from Taiwan, this base houses surveillance, electronic warfare units, and has plans for surface-to-air missile units.
Upgrade to Division: Japan plans to upgrade the JGSDF 15th Brigade, based in Naha, into a full division, significantly increasing personnel numbers in the area.
"Specific Use" Bases: Several airports and ports in the Nansei region (南西地區) are being upgraded for dual civil-military use to enhance logistical support during a potential conflict.
US Military Activity and Joint Operations
Marine Littoral Regiments (MLRs): The U.S. Marine Corps plans to utilize specialized regiments geared toward island defense and sea denial within the first island chain, including the Nansei Islands.
Joint Exercises: The annual USMC-JGSDF "Iron Fist" exercise has shifted to southwest Japan to improve combat interoperability in the region.
Rapid Deployment Units: Joint strategies often center on utilizing rapid response units to counter attempts to alter the regional status quo, particularly near Taiwan.
Strategic Objectives
Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD): The combined presence creates an "island shield," restricting freedom of maneuver for Chinese naval forces in the East China Sea and strengthening defenses for the surrounding waters.
Taiwan Contingency Planning: The build-up is directly motivated by potential threats to Taiwan, with the goal of creating a "scrum" to ensure stability and deter aggression.
US Forward Military Deployments in Northern Philippines Near Taiwan
The US military is increasing rotational deployments to the Batanes and Babuyan Islands, focusing on securing the Luzon Strait near Taiwan through joint exercises like Balikatan and KAMANDAG. These missions involve deploying Marines from the 3d Marine Littoral Regiment (3d MLR) to set up sensors, radars, and NMESIS missile systems (Navy-Marine Expeditionary Ship Interdiction System) to simulate anti-ship operations.
Key Deployment Details & Activities
Strategic Location: The islands are strategically located in the "First Island Chain" to observe, and potentially block, the Bashi Channel in a Taiwan contingency.
Units Involved: U.S. Marines (3d MLR), U.S. Army (1st Multi-Domain Task Force), and Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Key Terrain Security Operations (MKTSO): During Exercises Balikatan 25 and KAMANDAG 9, forces have deployed, patrolled, and established surveillance on islands in the Batanes chain.
Weapon Systems: The U.S. Marines have deployed NMESIS—a robotic anti-ship missile launcher—and the Marines Air Defense Integrated System (MADIS) for littoral maneuver.
Sensor Operations: US and Philippine forces have established commercial radar systems on high ground to monitor aircraft and surface vessels.
Specific Areas: Activity has occurred on Batan Island and the northernmost point of Mavulis Island.
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This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
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如要取消訂閱這個群組並停止接收來自這個群組的郵件，請傳送電子郵件到 bay-area-taiwanese-...@googlegroups.com。
如要查看這個討論，請前往 https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bay-area-taiwanese-american/863322794.3328151.1776082049503%40mail.yahoo.com。
david chou
在第一島鏈建單一戰區,進行區域集體聯防(III)
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Appendix
First island chain teamwork key
By Lin Chia-lung 林佳龍
In the face of China’s daily escalating military pressure, “gray zone” threats, cognitive warfare and economic coercion, it is no longer enough for the nations along the First Island Chain to individually defend themselves and respond. The First Island Chain is no longer just a line on a map. It has become a major front line for global freedom, democracy and order.
The core objective of many nations regarding the status of the Indo-Pacific region is ultimately the same: to prevent war and preserve peace. However, peace is never sustained by hope alone. It must rest on credible deterrence. Stable, long-term peace is only possible when the cost of undermining it becomes unbearable and those who would attempt to destroy it are unable to prevail.
The “gray zone” coercion of South Korea, ongoing maneuvers in the waters and airspace around Japan, military pressure on the US in the western Pacific, and intrusions by military planes and vessels around Taiwan, along with military exercises and blockade rehearsals targeting Taiwan daily are not unconnected. They are part of a coordinated security threat.
By engaging in collective coordination and taking shared responsibility, we must move toward a democratic shield for the first island chain and consider it anew through the lens of a single theater. The Taiwan Strait, the East and South China seas, the Miyako Strait and the Bashi Channel are increasingly being integrated into the same strategic framework.
In this picture, the first island chain is no longer just a collection of isolated points. Its security must be regarded as part of a single theater where first island chain nations jointly monitor the situation, issue warnings, conduct deployments and maintain resilience.
Within this strategic environment, drones and uncrewed systems are becoming a key component of the democratic shield. Uncrewed aerial systems form a monitoring network — eyes that never sleep — while uncrewed surface vessels are low-cost, high-endurance guardians of the ocean and uncrewed underwater vehicles and underwater sensing nodes are essential to protecting ports, sea lanes and undersea infrastructure.
When these systems are combined with space-based and airborne intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, electronic defense, data links and joint operational nodes, they can detect threats earlier, share information faster and distribute risk more effectively.
This is especially important for Taiwan. Against a much larger authoritarian power, Taiwan cannot and should not try to compete symmetrically. What it needs is an asymmetric framework that raises the cost of invasion, disrupts tempo and extends resilience. Uncrewed systems are central to that strategy.
Moreover, uncrewed systems not only have military applications but also force nations to take a fresh look at low-altitude airspace as more than a battlespace; it is also a sphere of governance.
Low-altitude airspace is tied to coastal patrols, bridge inspections, mountain search and rescue, port security, disaster response and logistics for outlying islands. As common tasks increasingly rely on uncrewed systems, low-altitude governance is becoming part of national resilience.
Building the democratic shield should not start in wartime. It should be built step by step in peacetime.
If uncrewed systems are the nervous system of the democratic shield, then democratic supply chains are its backbone. Flight control systems, sensors, batteries, communication modules, cybersecurity validation and maintenance capacity are all connected to that strategy. Taiwan, Japan, South Korea and the US should create a framework for diverse production, maintenance and support.
Taiwan’s strengths lie not only in production, but also in integration. It has semiconductors, electronics manufacturing expertise, precision engineering, sensor modules, communications technology, artificial intelligence know-how and supply chain coordination capabilities. As such, Taiwan can serve as an uncrewed systems hub for the democratic camp. Even more important is institutional trust. For uncrewed systems heavily reliant on data links, flight control logic and verifiable cybersecurity, a trusted source is in itself a strategic asset.
Competition of the future would not just be decided by who has the hardware, but by who has the people to operate, maintain, integrate, apply and improve it. As such, cultivating an international talent pool and creating training systems would be indispensable for cooperation in the first island chain.
Looking southward from Taiwan, the importance of the Philippines comes into sharper focus. It is a key link in the southern segment of the first island chain. It is also a testing ground for the convergence of archipelagic governance, sea and air surveillance, disaster management, island logistics and regional security challenges. Cooperation in the first island chain can begin with less sensitive but practical initiatives such as medical resupply to outlying islands, post-disaster assessment, coastal patrols and infrastructure surveys. Cooperation on civilian and governance issues can gradually build theater resilience and mutual trust.
A truly effective democratic shield is not hastily put together during a crisis. It is built in advance through mutual connections, understanding and trust. Supply chain interoperability, data link connectivity and complete maintenance and training systems are what would transform advanced equipment into a legitimately solid deterrent force. A democratic shield for the first island chain is not a wall. It is a network.
It is not a static line of defense but a dynamic and resilient structure. It is built by forward deployment, expanded by uncrewed systems, supported by low-altitude governance, sustained by democratic supply chains, strengthened by joint training, reinforced by whole-of-society resilience and legitimized by the shared values of free people.
A democratic shield can maintain peace and make aggressors understand that their ambitions would not prevail. If we can translate the idea of a single theater into shared monitoring, shared deployment, shared maintenance and shared resilience, then the first island chain would be more than a front line — it would become a chain of stability, a chain of cooperation and a chain of freedom.
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The people of Taiwan would rather have Taiwan directly governed by the US than be indirectly governed by the Taiwan authorities (ROC government-in-exile), which is currently working towards unification with the PRC.
Taiwan Is not Equivalent to ROC
The Republic of China (ROC) was a republican government established on the Chinese mainland in 1912. After Japan's surrender in 1945, Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang) took over the administration of Taiwan, but did not receive the territory from Japan; therefore, Taiwan does not have a so-called Retrocession Day. In 1950, ROC having lost mainland China and with only Kinmen and Matsu remaining as its territories, Chiang revived the ROC name in Taipei to govern Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen, and Matsu. The Treaty of Peace with Japan, which came into effect in 1952, replaced the letters of intention of the Cairo Communiqué and the Potsdam Declaration. The Treaty did not determine the ownership of Taiwan (Formosa and the Pescadores), but the U.S. became the principal occupying power.
UN Resolution 2758 (1971) replaced the ROC with the People's Republic of China (PRC) in all its powers and interests within the UN. In 1979, the US enacted the Taiwan Relations Act (a domestic law that takes precedence over international law), severing diplomatic relations with the ROC and establishing unofficial relations with Taiwan (the Taiwan authorities). However, the US remains the principal power in Taiwan. The United States does not recognize the ROC, but the ROC still exists because it possesses territory (Kinmen and Matsu) and a central government in exile in Taipei.
The ROC held democratic elections for its legislators in 1992 and for its President in 1996, resulting in several changes of ruling parties. Although the US enacted the TAIPEI Act (2020) to advocate for Taiwan's accession to international organizations, elections held in conjunction with the merger of ROC-occupied territories (Taiwan and Penghu) and its former lands (Kinmen and Matsu) have resulted in only a dozen or so allies established through financial aid recognizing the ROC; this fact demonstrates that Taiwan has not yet formally established as a nation. The United States should send the ROC government-in-exile and the KMT back to Kinmen and Matsu; and hold elections in Taiwan and Penghu for a Governor (or President) and legislators under the name of Taiwan to establish Taiwan's status and eliminate the PRC's ambition to annex Taiwan.
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台灣人民寧願由美國直接管轄台灣，而不願意被正在進行統一的台灣當局(ROC流亡政府)間接管轄台灣。
台灣不等同於中國共和國
Republic of China (ROC) 是1912在中國大陸成立共和政體的政府。1945年日本投降後蔣介石 (K.S. Chiang) 接管台灣的治理權，不是接收日本的領土台灣及澎湖，所以台灣沒有所謂的光復節。1950年失去中國大陸，領土僅剩金門及馬祖的 K.S. Chiang 在台北重啟ROC的名號治理台灣、澎湖、金門及馬祖。1952年生效的《對日本和平條約》取代《開羅公報》及《波茲坦宣言》兩則意向書。和平條約沒有確定 Taiwan (Formosa and the Pescadores) 之歸屬，但是美國成為首要(principal)佔領國。
聯合國2758決議(1971)以中國人民共和國(PRC)取代ROC在聯合國所有的權力與利益。1979年美國制定國內公法(優先於國際法)《台灣關係法》與ROC斷交並且以Taiwan (台灣當局) 取代ROC與Taiwan以非官方關係往來，但是美國仍然是台灣(principal)佔領國。美國不承認ROC，但ROC仍然存在，因它有領土(金門及馬祖)，有流亡台北的中央政府。
ROC在1992民主選舉立法委員，1996選舉總統，到現在有數次的政黨輪替。美國雖然制定公法TAIPEI Act (2020)生效倡議Taiwan加入國際組織，但因ROC佔領地(台灣及澎湖)與領土(金門及馬祖)合併舉行的選舉，只剩十幾個用金援建立的邦交國承認ROC；此事實顯示台灣還沒有正式建國。美國應遣送ROC流亡政府及KMT回去金門及馬祖；在台灣及澎湖舉辦以Taiwan為名的總督(或總統)及立委確定台灣的地位以消除PRC併吞Taiwan的野心。
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david chou
在第一島鏈建單一戰區,進行區域集體聯防(IV)
在第一島鏈建單一戰區,進行區域集體聯防(IV)
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ROC (金門及馬祖) 並不歸入第一島鏈。
美國要出手，結束 ROC (KMT) 代理佔領(台灣及澎湖)。
顧立雄：第2次軍購專報，KMT立委只1人到場 (2026/04/21)
