Re: 從尋求連任的美國在職總統受到自己黨內競爭者挑戰的史例，來談賴清德(William Lai)對蔡英文(TIW)的挑戰(5)------兼談美國國安外交事務專家譚慎格(John J. Tkacik, Jr.)為什麼會對支那殺人魔毛澤東跟Henry Kissinger說的一句玩笑話---「讓台灣由美國代管還比較好」---著迷

[davidch...@yahoo.com]

Thanks, Jim.

我順便把這封信[這封信與其他的相關通訊都無涉personal matters]與裡頭的一篇文章也發給BATA Forum，讓BATA的兄姊們有機會再閱讀，如果大家有興趣再讀一遍。

David

On Sunday, June 16, 2019, 6:45:24 AM GMT+8, Jim Chen <jim.li...@gmail.com> wrote:

On Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 10:34 AM Jim Chen <jim.li...@gmail.com> wrote:

per your request, as you see I DID ask favor to mkinze passing YOUR WISE PROPOSAL to Dr. William & Vice President Lu ( she is now in Washington, D.C.for an interview @ VOA))

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: Jim Chen <jim.li...@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, Mar 27, 2019 at 10:25 AM
Subject: Fwd: 從尋求連任的美國在職總統受到自己黨內競爭者挑戰的史例，來談賴清德(William Lai)對蔡英文(TIW)的挑戰(5)------兼談美國國安外交事務專家譚慎格(John J. Tkacik, Jr.)為什麼會對支那殺人魔毛澤東跟Henry Kissinger說的一句玩笑話---「讓台灣由美國代管還比較好」---著迷
To: Minze Chien <minze...@gmail.com>
Cc: david chou <davidch...@yahoo.com>

"Dear David and Minze + Dear NH: PLEASE Psss the David's WISE PROPOSAL to Dr. William Lai and to our most lovable Vice President Lu for their advice in time. Thanks !   Jim 

---------- Forwarded message ---------
From: david chou <davidch...@yahoo.com>
Date: Mon, Mar 25, 2019 at 7:09 AM
Subject: 從尋求連任的美國在職總統受到自己黨內競爭者挑戰的史例，來談賴清德(William Lai)對蔡英文(TIW)的挑戰(5)------兼談美國國安外交事務專家譚慎格(John J. Tkacik, Jr.)為什麼會對支那殺人魔毛澤東跟Henry Kissinger說的一句玩笑話---「讓台灣由美國代管還比較好」---著迷
To: Dennis Peng <youma...@gmail.com>
Cc: 郭正典 教授 ( Dr. CD Kuo ) <cdk...@gmail.com>, 曹長青 Cao Changqing <caocha...@gmail.com>, Weni Chin <weni...@yahoo.com.tw>, Martin Tsai <marti...@taiwanus.net>, Lin Wencheng <wen...@gmail.com>, Freeman Huang <free...@gmail.com>, 台灣日報編輯部 <davidy...@gmail.com>, Chintso Chang <chints...@gmail.com>, Matsumoto Kuroyuki <lat...@gmail.com>, Allen Kuo <alle...@timebyte.com>, Luby Liao <luby...@gmail.com>, Li-Lin Cheng <hln...@gmail.com>, Yufen Tsao <nadia...@gmail.com>, lich...@aol.com <lich...@aol.com>, James Tsao <jamest...@gmail.com>, Christine Yang <tingy...@gmail.com>, AOL <yuanm...@aol.com>, spin...@hotmail.com <spin...@hotmail.com>, flyi...@hotmail.com <flyi...@hotmail.com>, Jim Chen <jim.li...@gmail.com>, et...@worldjournal.com <et...@worldjournal.com>, lind...@ettvamerica.com <lind...@ettvamerica.com>, sean...@ctitv.com.tw <sean...@ctitv.com.tw>, China Times <li...@aol.com>, James Wang <jwang...@aol.com>, Formosa LATWTV <latwt...@gmail.com>, James Tsao <jame...@hotmail.com>, lat...@hotmail.com <lat...@hotmail.com>

從尋求連任的美國在職總統受到自己黨內競爭者挑戰的史例，來談賴清德(William Lai)對蔡英文(TIW)的挑戰(5)------兼談美國國安外交事務專家譚慎格(John J. Tkacik, Jr.)為什麼會對支那殺人魔毛澤東跟Henry Kissinger說的一句玩笑話---「讓台灣由美國代管還比較好」---著迷

十一

我在3/24/2019發表了一篇短文，標題是: //美國國安外交事務專家譚慎格(John J. Tkacik, Jr.): 我唯一認同「毛主席語錄」的話，就是「讓台灣由美國代管還比較好」//。

譚慎格原是華盛頓智庫---「傳統基金會」(The Heritage Foundation)---的資深研究員，在阿扁執政期間，很受扁政府的重用，他對美國的「一支政策」進行專案研究，希望能破除美國的「一個支那政策」。由於他與扁政府關係太密切，在尊奉「一支原則」的馬英九與支那國民黨的眼裡，簡直是罪大惡極，罪無可赦，所以，馬還沒上台，「傳統基金會」就應馬之要求，交出譚慎格這個「戰犯」，把譚逐出家門，譚成了喪家之犬，在冠蓋滿京華的帝都華盛頓的一處寒窯苦撐待變。

「傳統基金會」原是一個重量級的國安與外交智庫，它的出版物與政論被世界各國的政治觀察家[觀察美國的內政、國防與外交政策走向]列為必讀，我在1970年代末期-2000年代，就一直把它的出版物與政論列為必讀。

「傳統基金會」的黃金時代在雷根執政時期，但在1990-2010年代，它的影響力就不如CSIS(美國戰略與國際研究中心)、Brookings(布魯京斯研究所)、AEI(美國企業研究所)、Rand(蘭德公司)、Council on Foreign Relations(設於紐約的「外交關係協會」)與Carnegie Endowment(卡內基和平研究中心)，也許連波士頓的哈佛大學「費正清支那研究中心」(Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies)與北加州的史丹佛大學「胡佛研究所」(Hoover Institution)這種學術研究機構都還不如。在川普崛起後，它與Hudson Institute(哈德遜研究所)一樣，都抓住機會，準備恢復它們的昔日榮光。在川普競選期間，原來親希拉蕊的蔡英文也不敢把所有雞蛋都放在普遍被看好的希拉蕊的"Rose Garden Party"(玫瑰花園派對)藍子裡，也不敢怠慢親川普的「傳統基金會」訪問團。在傳統的美國國安外交事務圈普遍不接受川普時，「傳統基金會」慧眼獨具，燒冷竈，與急需有人送暖的川普合作。在川普準備接掌政權期間，這個基金會的專家與行政人員就扮演了很重要的角色，也就在那時，「傳統基金會」的人馬安排了川蔡通話。

十二

華府的國安與外交事務圈的專家與學者[他們或她們之中，有的人是前政府官員，有的會是未來的官員，學官兩棲]在台灣議題或台海議題上，其實都是有立場的，只是通常他們不便明說，因為他們希望維持學者的形象。我因為長期研究與追蹤台海問題與台美關係，所以比較能掌握他們的思維理路、內心世界與真正的想法。

譚慎格為什麼會對支那的殺人魔毛澤東跟Henry Kissinger說的一句玩笑話---「讓台灣由美國代管還比較好」---有興趣呢?我們只要再讀他過去與賓州大學的林蔚教授合力撰寫的文章的其中一段[這一段常被我引述]，就可以得到答案:

//The status of Taiwan under international law, as the U.S. State Department lawyers put it, "remains to be determined." Nothing the U.S. said to China has changed that. Thus, Washington has behaved very responsibly, as custodian of the ultimate rights of the people of Taiwan, the formerly Japanese-controlled island surrendered to the U.S. at the end of the Second World War, and never transferred by America to anyone else.// [台灣在國際法上的地位，正如美國國務院的法律顧問所說的，是「法律地位未定」，美國過去不管跟北京怎麼說，都沒有改變這種觀點與立場，因此，美國始終都很負責任地承擔「台灣人民最終權利的監護者」的角色，從沒有將在終戰後向美國投降的台灣的主權轉移給任何其他人。][註: 這段話也曾被我拿來做為我提出的「美國政治監護台灣主權論」的佐證或註腳。]

十三

在民主黨主政的時代，台灣的總統候選人原則上要通過CSIS、Brookings[現在應該會加上CNAS]的測試，在川普執政的時代，原則上應該要通過「傳統基金會」與/或Hudson Institute的測試。[若民主黨老將Bernie Sanders入主白宮，說不定可能就會改由Cato Institute這類的智庫來測試。]

現在台灣一些可能的總統候選人已陸續前往美國東岸與西岸做探詢與測試之旅，倘若AIT沒有安排他們跟「傳統基金會」或/與Hudson Institute接觸，並在那裡發表政策演說，那就應該可以說，在華府的眼中，他們並非什麼真正被華府矚意的台灣大選候選人。

若「傳統基金會」或/與Hudson Institute的人馬針對這些presidential contenders/candidates發言，就比較能看出川普政府對他們的觀感與態度，這兩個智庫以外的人馬的發言[不管他們過去在台海事務上是如何地有影響力]都只能當做參考，不過，倘若連這兩個智庫以外的人馬都對他們有負面的或做出有保留的發言，那就情勢有點不妙或者仍在繼續被觀察的名單中。

「美國之音粵語部」一名鍾姓女記者於日前訪問了在Brookings的「台灣通」---前AIT主席卜睿哲博士(Dr. Richard C. Bush, III) ，Richard表示: //對於美國政府會如何看待賴清德的參選，他的預期是美國會持“保留”(reserved)態度，因為現在沒有人能知道賴清德是否會成為總統候選人。//這就是說，根據卜睿哲的了解，華府還在觀察賴清德，還沒有對他的初選或/與大選的candidacy表態。他這項發言應屬客觀，換言之，William若要取得華府的背書，他與他的主要國安與外交事務顧問還必須努力。

十四

華府對William的candidacy的態度，至今為止是未知數，但對TIW的candidacy的態度，則為已知數。

現在，TIW要做的事是，她要對華府傳達，她若連任，她的第二任大政方針是什麼，依我看，她或許應以「安全與繁榮的台灣、和平的台海、開放與自由的印太」做為傳達她對美訴求的主軸，這個主軸有底下幾個優點:

(1)它說美國人的語言;
(2)它能迎合川普執政團隊與establishment elites(美國建制派菁英層)的口味;
(3)它仍隱含她先前給華府的「維持現狀」[「現狀」由華府定義]承諾;
(4)它釋出「台北不片面打破台海現狀」[這可安撫華府，也可爭取台灣的中間選民，不爭取這些中間選民，不可能勝選]以及台北要配合美國的「印太戰略」的訊息與政策[這可滿足川普行政團隊與美國國會的要求，也可讓台灣的獨派滿意，不爭取獨派，絕不可能勝選) ;
(5)「繁榮與和平」的訴求可把「台海的緊張和衝突」歸咎於北京，這樣蔡政權既可以不投降北京，又可將「台海的緊張與衝突」歸罪於北京這個真正的麻煩製造者。

十五

TIW為了向川普主政下的華府與美國建制派菁英層傳達她的政策與訊息[她不是要應試，因為她已無需再參加考試]，所以，她要「過境」有「印太美軍司令部」的夏威夷歐胡島，並於美東時間3/27/2019下午3:00，在檀香山與「傳統基金會」舉行越洋視訊會議[這項安排是天才之作，可見她的國安與外交幕僚是很用心的]，會議的主題正是: 「台美: 印太區域恆久夥伴關係」("Taiwan-US: An Enduring Partnership in the Indo-Pacific: A Special Policy Dialogue")，TIW要藉這項「特別政策對話」，來做政策宣示，這是她的對美外交工作與競選活動極為重要的一環。[William則以「TIW出國拼外交」為由，暫停競選活動，這是有點奇怪的判斷與決定。]

[未完待續]

台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization calling for Taiwan 's incorporation into the United States as a territorial commonwealth, leading to statehood)

=============================

附錄一

「傳統基金會」視訊會議公告
https://www.heritage.org/…/taiwan-us-enduring-partnership-t…

March 27, 2019
"Taiwan-US: An Enduring Partnership in the Indo-Pacific
A Special Policy Dialogue"

Wednesday, March 27, 2019
3:00 pm - 4:00 pm

The Heritage Foundation
Allison Auditorium
214 Massachusetts Ave NE
Washington, DC

RSVP FOR THIS EVENT

Featuring a live video conference with 
Her Excellency Tsai Ing-wen
President, Republic of China (Taiwan)

Hosted by
Kay Coles James
President of The Heritage Foundation

Followed by a panel discussion with

Edwin J. Feulner Ph.D.
Founder

The Honorable Cory Gardner (R-CO)
Chairman, Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cyber Security Policy Senate Committee on Foreign Relations

The Honorable Ted Yoho (R-FL) 
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and Nonproliferation, House of Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs

附錄二

What the 'One China Policy' Really Means [美國的「一支政策」的真正意涵]
By John Tkacik and Arthur Waldron
Wall Street Journal
September 19, 2002

We constantly hear that America has a "One China" policy, most recently during the dust-up over Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian's Aug. 3 suggestion that two sovereign entities exist on either side of the Taiwan Strait. The "One China" phrase was immediately invoked in Washington, and seems to have calmed things down by reassuring Beijing that the United States was not aiding and abetting a "Taiwan independence" move. But legally, in fact, it had nothing to do with the issue at hand.

"One China" most emphatically does not mean that the United States accepts Beijing's claims to sovereignty over Taiwan. What it means is that the U.S. recognizes no more than one Chinese government at a time -- and not multiple regimes -- according to the territory they control. That is what the U.S. did with the two Germanys and may ultimately do with the two Koreas. West Germany used to insist on this approach for itself: the "Hallstein doctrine" forbade recognition of the German Democratic Republic as well as Bonn, a counterproductive approach that was dropped by Chancellor Willy Brandt, a major positive step towards peace in Cold War Europe.

In 1972, U.S. President Richard Nixon "acknowledged" the view, then held by governments on both sides of the strait (Taiwan being a mainlander-run dictatorship), that Taiwan was part of China -- but he did not accept it or agree to it. Then in 1979, President Jimmy Carter cut all official ties with Taiwan and embraced Beijing as the sole legitimate government of China, something Mr. Nixon had not done. But while the U.S. recognized Beijing as the sole government of China, Washington was agnostic about the status of Taiwan and who, if anybody, might be its legitimate government. In fact, even when the government of Chiang Kai-shek's Republic of China moved to Taiwan after losing the mainland in 1949, the U.S. did not recognize its sovereignty over the island itself -- only its administrative control -- even while America continued to recognize Chiang's regime, until 1979, as the legitimate government of China.

Confusing? Indeed it is. But here is the bottom line. As U.S. President Reagan put it in his six assurances to Taiwan in 1982 and as has been reaffirmed by every subsequent administration, the U.S. "takes no position on the sovereignty of Taiwan." The status of Taiwan under international law, as the U.S. State Department lawyers put it, "remains to be determined." Nothing the U.S. said to China has changed that. Thus, Washington has behaved very responsibly, as custodian of the ultimate rights of the people of Taiwan, the formerly Japanese-controlled island surrendered to the U.S. at the end of the Second World War, and never transferred by America to anyone else.

Now for the final and massively ironic twist. In 1979 when President Carter cut all official relations with Taipei and ended the defense alliance, the U.S. intention was to aid and abet the island's incorporation by China. Taiwan was considered an American client state like the unfortunate South Vietnam, and the near universal expectation at the time was that the diplomatic and military break was a blow it could not bear. After a decent interval, so ran the common wisdom, Taiwan's mainlander leadership would make a deal for incorporation into China under "one country, two systems" -- proposed for that purpose by Deng Xiaoping. That would have rendered the sovereignty issue moot, and no other outcome was seriously considered.

But that was more than 20 years ago and we all know what happened. Far from collapsing, Taiwan rose to the occasion and legitimized its own government by freeing the press and political prisoners, and carrying out repeated and fully democratic elections. By international standards, today its government has a far more legitimate claim to Taiwan than the government of the People's Republic of China, which has avoided the remotest approaches to freedom and democracy, does to China itself.

Hence the anomalous present situation which finds the U.S. closely tied to a dictatorship but bereft of official connections to a path-breaking democracy, while professing to hope that Taiwan the democracy, whose status it considers undetermined, will nevertheless join China, the dictatorship, with which it pursues close ties. Stranger things have been seen in international politics, and this one is not about to change -- until and unless someone appears on the Chinese side with the qualities of a Willy Brandt.

Meanwhile the U.S. must work with the ambiguity, insist on non-use of force, and press both sides to avoid rocking the boat -- even while grasping that despite Washington's intent since the 1970s to somehow resolve the issue, it has far from succeeded in doing so and in some respects rendered it more volatile. Genuine resolution is of course possible, but the U.S. lacks the power to deliver it.

Resolution will come, however, and as long as deterrence is maintained, most likely not with the rain of rockets that some in Beijing threaten. Beijing has abruptly switched course before when its interests demanded, so let us not be overly astonished when the day dawns when Beijing drops its hardline and militaristic rhetoric and deals realistically and equitably with its democratic neighbor Taiwan. Its interests require that sooner or later it must.

(Mr. Tkacik, a research fellow at the Heritage Foundation in Washington, D.C., is a retired officer in the U.S. foreign service who served in Beijing, Guangzhou, Hong Kong and Taipei. Mr. Waldron is the director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute and a professor of international relations at the University of Pennsylvania.)

[Jay Tu]

David,

Don't go around the topic.  The obvious thing is Cheating.  If people simply turn blind eyes and pretend that they did not see the gross cheating by Tsai, their judgements or reasonings are susceptible.

S-H Toh

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