論文門破案! 英司法判決: LSE沒蔡英文口試紀錄
Allen Kuo
Thank you Michael Richardson, you have done a great job!
論文門破案! 英國判決出爐! 彭文正：
LSE沒蔡英文口試紀錄｜政經關不了（完整版）｜2021.11.28
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RjyAyyu64jk
Allen Kuo
Michael Richardson
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如要在網路上查看這項討論，請造訪 https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/bay-area-taiwanese-american/61a3acf2.1c69fb81.e7337.9135SMTPIN_ADDED_BROKEN%40gmr-mx.google.com。
Allen Kuo
Hi Michael:
Thank you for your additional comment.
Since the following document mentioned that the Council of LSE “denied holding TIW’s PhD and the report from her viva”, so I believe the “LSE Head of Legal Team” mentioned in your earlier message must be the Council?
Of course, on the other hand, the official position of the London School of Economics must be to tell the prosecutors of the Republic of China that they did grant Tsai Ing-wen a doctorate to cover up their lies. And I bet that if the public raises questions (since TIW did not meet the qualifications required for a real PhD), these officials will further argue that they have offered a "honorary doctorate" to TIW, to further cover up their lies!
Cheers;
Allen Kuo
Risenhoover Paul Maas
Section 1 – information not held
In scenarios where there is some dispute between the amount of information located by a public authority and the amount of information that a complainant believes may be held, the ICO, following the lead of a number of Information Tribunal decisions, applies the civil standard of the balance of probabilities.
In other words, in order to determine such complaints the ICO must decide whether on the balance of probabilities a public authority holds any information which falls within the scope of the request (or was held at the time of the request).
In order to assist with this determination please answer the following questions:
- What searches have been carried out to check no information was held within the scope of the request and why would these searches have been likely to retrieve any relevant information?
- Please describe thoroughly any searches of relevant paper/electronic records and include details of any staff consultations.
- If searches included electronic data, which search terms were used and please explain whether the search included information held locally on personal computers used by key officials (including laptop computers) and on networked resources and emails.
- If no or inadequate searches were done at the time, please rectify this now and let me know what you have done.
- If the information were held would it be held as manual or electronic records?
- Was any recorded information ever held relevant to the scope of the complainant’s request but deleted/destroyed?
- If recorded information was held but is no longer held, when did the [public authority] cease to retain this information?
- Does the [public authority] have a record of the document’s destruction?
- What does the [name of PA] formal records management policy say about the retention and deletion of records of this type? If there is no relevant policy, can the [name of PA] describe the way in which it has handled comparable records of a similar age?
- If the information is electronic data which has been deleted, might copies have been made and held in other locations?
- Is there a business purpose for which the requested information should be held? If so what is this purpose?
- Are there any statutory requirements upon the [name of PA] to retain the requested information?
In summary you are required to provide a thorough response to the above questions in order to comply with your statutory obligations. The Commissioner will therefore challenge responses and assertions made which fail to satisfactorily address our questions and require a more detailed explanation. The Tribunal has also demonstrated that it is very critical of public authorities who fail to respond adequately to our enquiries. We therefore expect a public authority where appropriate to provide full details of its searches to support its conclusions.
https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/key-questions-for-public-authorities-foi-act-2000/#1
Are there criminal offences in the Freedom of Information Act?
Yes, section 77 states that it is a criminal offence to alter, block, destroy or conceal information.
Depending on the nature of the incident, an authority or its individual members of staff could be charged with this offence. The penalty is a fine.
There are no financial or custodial penalties for failure to provide information on request or for failure to publish information. But you could be found in contempt of court for failing to comply with a decision notice, enforcement notice, or information notice. This could lead to a fine or, in theory, jail for a senior officer of the authority.
Sample questions we ask public authorities
We have published the standardised sample copy that our case officers use when writing to public authorities, including introductory information about the exemptions and key questions we may need to ask. The questions are not exhaustive and case officers tailor their correspondence in each case.
We have made this internal ICO resource available to help with transparency around freedom of information requests and how we approach casework. It may help public authorities to consider these questions, when deciding if relevant exemptions apply.
Risenhoover Paul Maas
Su-chang Haung Tang, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, Defendant.jaw-mann Jong, Also Known As Chung Hao-man and Chungchao-man, Cross-complainant and Appellant, v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, a Connecticut Corporation, Etal., Cross-defendants, 523 F.2d 811 (9th Cir. 1975)
Annotate this CaseDomingo R. Quintero, San Diego, Cal., for defendant.
Brundage, Williams & Zellmann, San Diego, Cal., for plaintiff-appellee.
OPINION
Before CARTER, HUFSTEDLER and GOODWIN, Circuit Judges.
HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge:
In this diversity action the district court granted summary judgment in favor of appellee Tang in her action to collect the proceeds of a life insurance policy on the life of appellant Jong's wife. Jong is the primary beneficiary of the policy. Tang, the decedent's mother, is the alternate beneficiary. Jong killed his wife in San Diego, California, in 1972. He fled to Taiwan, surrendered to Chinese authorities, and was tried and convicted for homicide by a Taiwanese court. He is now incarcerated in Taiwan.
Under California Probate Code section 258, "No person who has unlawfully and intentionally caused the death of a decedent . . . shall be entitled to succeed to any portion of the estate . . .. A conviction or acquittal on a charge of murder or voluntary manslaughter shall be a conclusive determination of the unlawfulness or lawfulness of a causing of death, for the purposes of this section." The provision has been held to apply to the proceeds of an insurance policy on the life of the decedent. (Beck v. West Coast Life Ins. Co. (1952) 38 Cal. 2d 643, 647-48, 241 P.2d 544, 547; New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cawthorne (1975) 48 Cal. App. 3d 651, 653-54, 121 Cal. Rptr. 808, 810; In re Estate of McGowan (1973) 35 Cal. App. 3d 611, 615, 111 Cal. Rptr. 39, 42.)
In his cross-complaint, Jong averred that he killed his wife while he was temporarily insane, and, therefore, his killing was not intentional. Both parties agree that if Jong was insane when he killed his wife, he is not foreclosed from recovering the proceeds of the policy.
The district court held that Jong is precluded from litigating the insanity issue because he litigated and lost that issue in the Taiwanese criminal case. The court also held that he is estopped to deny the findings of the Chinese court and that he waived his right to litigate the issue in California when he fled to Taiwan and submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the Taiwanese courts. We reverse because no conclusive or preclusive effect can be afforded the Taiwanese criminal judgment, and the record does not support the existence of estoppel or waiver by Jong.
We cannot assume that Probate Code section 258 was intended to include criminal convictions from foreign countries, particularly when, as here, the substantive criminal law and procedure significantly differ from that of the United States.1 In other contexts, the California legislature has expressly stated when it intended that foreign criminal convictions will be given effect in California proceedings. (Cal.Penal Code § 656 (double jeopardy), § 668 (effect of prior conviction on punishment for subsequent offense).)2 The failure expressly to include foreign convictions in section 258 and the availability of that section's prohibition through independent proof of an intentional and unlawful killing, See In re Estate of McGowan, supra at 617, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 44, lead us to conclude that the Taiwanese judgment cannot be a conclusive determination of Jong's entitlement to the policy proceeds.
But even if we were to assume, Arguendo, that absent an express legislative directive, California might recognize some criminal judgments from foreign countries for some purposes, we could not attach any preclusionary effect (collateral estoppel) to the Taiwanese resolution of Jong's insanity claim. The doctrine of collateral estoppel is based on the "policy of limiting litigation by preventing a party who has had one fair trial on an issue from again drawing it into controversy." (Bernhard v. Bank of America (1942) 19 Cal. 2d 807, 811, 122 P.2d 892, 894.) "This policy must be considered together with the policy that a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary proceeding in which fully to present his case." (Jorgensen v. Jorgensen (1948) 32 Cal. 2d 13, 18, 193 P.2d 728, 732.) The first policy is not fulfilled and the doctrine is inapplicable, unless the issue raised and decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the issue in the current litigation. (People v. Taylor (1974) 12 Cal. 3d 686, 691, 117 Cal. Rptr. 70, 73, 521 P.2d 622, 625; Bernhard v. Bank of America, supra, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.)
The burden of pleading and proving identity of issue rests on Tang, the party asserting the estoppel. (Erlich v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1965) 63 Cal. 2d 551, 556-57, 47 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476, 407 P.2d 649, 652; Haun v. Hyman (1963) 223 Cal. App. 2d 615, 619, 36 Cal. Rptr. 84, 86-87.) Tang has not carried that burden. In support of her summary judgment motion, Tang presented only the record of the Taiwanese criminal proceedings. That record provides no foundation for a conclusion that the defense of legal insanity in Taiwanese criminal law is the same as that defense under California law.3 Moreover, the Taiwanese record itself indicates that Jong did not have an opportunity "fully to present his case" on the insanity issue. The Taiwanese high court apparently refused his request to be examined by a psychiatrist, a procedure contrary to that provided by California law. (Cal.Penal Code § 1027.) There is, therefore, no factual or legal basis upon which to bar Jong.4
Nor is there a factual predicate for the court's conclusion that Jong has waived his insanity claim. He has consistently asserted that claim in California and in Taiwan.
Absent the operation of collateral estoppel or waiver, the insanity claim raised a material question of fact that foreclosed summary judgment. " When an issue requires determination of state of mind, it is unusual that disposition may be made by summary judgment." (Consolidated Electric Co. v. United States (9th Cir. 1966) 355 F.2d 437, 438.)
When the case is tried after remand, Jong, of course, has the burden of proving that he was insane when he killed his wife. (Cal.Evid.Code § 522; People v. Baker (1954) 42 Cal. 2d 550, 564, 268 P.2d 705, 714.)
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed.
The law of Taiwan was presented only in a fragmentary way, but it is evident from the fragments that Taiwanese criminal law and procedure are different from that of California. Many of the rights constitutionally guaranteed to criminal defendants in America do not exist in Taiwan. For example, a criminal defendant has no right to a jury trial
Similarly, California provides for recognition and enforcement only of specified kinds of civil judgments from foreign countries (Cal.Code Civ.Pro. § 1713.1), and it expressly excludes from recognition those civil judgments, for instance, that are "rendered under a system which does not provide . . . procedures compatible with the requirements of due process of law." Cal.Code Civ.Pro. § 1713.4(a) (1)
The Hsin-Chu district court opinion was translated as stating that Jong was "enraged" (or "filled with the anguish and hatred"), that he had "lost control of his intellectuality" (or "lost his rationality"), yet the court concluded that the "insanity proposal is . . . unrooted." These recitations of fact and unexplained legal conclusions are inadequate to show that the insanity defense in Taiwanese law is identical or even similar to the standard of insanity applied in California. Cf. Peterson v. Clark Leasing Corp. (9th Cir. 1971) 451 F.2d 1291 (issues not identical for collateral estoppel purposes if two cases used different legal standards for the same factual setting)
Michael Richardson
why would LSE hold these documents? didn't LSE explain long ago that the degree issuing institution at the time was the University of London?Risenhoover Paul Maas <sovereignnat...@gmail.com> 於 2021年11月29日 週一 下午12:55寫道：
Michael Richardson
the criminal evidence or Affidavit context is very different from the FOIA request context...what makes you think Hayes would have been the responsible officer for conducting the FOIA search ?Michael Richardson <richards...@gmail.com> 於 2021年11月29日 週一 下午10:00寫道：