Old Donald已頒布對我台灣人有利的2025 National Security Strategy
david chou
of the United States of America
November 2025
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2025/12/2025-National-Security-Strategy.pdf
2. Priorities
• Burden-Sharing and Burden-Shifting
The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over. We count among our many allies and partners dozens of wealthy, sophisticated nations that must assume primary responsibility for their regions and contribute far more to our collective defense.
P.19
B. Asia: Win the Economic Future, Prevent Military Confrontation Leading from a Position of Strength President Trump single-handedly reversed more than three decades of mistaken American assumptions about China: namely, that by opening our markets to China, encouraging American business to invest in China, and outsourcing our manufacturing to China, we would facilitate China’s entry into the so-called “rulesbased international order.” This did not happen. China got rich and powerful, and used its wealth and power to its considerable advantage. American elites—over four successive administrations of both political parties—were either willing enablers of China’s strategy or in denial.
P.23
Deterring Military Threats In the long term, maintaining American economic and technological preeminence is the surest way to deter and prevent a large-scale military conflict. A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.
P.24
We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone. Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do—much more for collective defense. America’s diplomatic efforts should focus on pressing our First Island Chain allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression. This will interlink maritime security issues along the First Island Chain while reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.
david chou
Old Donald已頒布對我台灣人有利的2025 National Security Strategy(II)
[to be continued]
David Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
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Unpacking a Trump Twist of the National Security Strategy
The Trump administration released its much-anticipated National Security Strategy this week. CFR convened seven of its experts to discuss the implications of a document that could reorient the United States’ approach toward the world.
Expert Brief by Rebecca Lissner, Will Freeman, David Sacks, Liana Fix, Steven A. Cook, Michelle Gavin, and Paul B. Stares
Last updated December 6, 2025 1:08 pm (EST)
https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/unpacking-trump-twist-national-security-strategy
On December 4, the Donald Trump administration released a new National Security Strategy (NSS) that criticized U.S. allies in Europe and pledged to assert U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere. The document’s principles—which emphasized non-interventionism and putting “America First”—signal a sharp change from the previous 2022 NSS that outlined the United States’ role in strengthening democracy and preserving peace under the current world order.
The strategy [PDF] says resolution of the Russia-Ukraine war is a central interest of the United States but directs stronger language at longtime U.S. allies in Europe than Russia, which had been called out in the first Trump administration as a chief geopolitical rival. Among other priorities, the White House called for a readjustment of U.S. military presence, moving troops away from the Middle East to focus on security and combating drug trafficking from in the Western Hemisphere. The strategy also calls on allies in the Indo-Pacific to increase its burden-sharing in deterring conflict with China in the Taiwan strait.
To break down the strategy and its pivot from past norms, CFR convened seven of its regional and conflict experts to discuss the global implications of Trump’s new security doctrine.
The Death of Great-Power Competition with China
David Sacks is a fellow for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Eight years ago, President Trump, in his first national security strategy, inaugurated an era of “great-power competition” with China. That NSS described China as a revisionist power that attempts to “shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests” and “displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region.” It was clear-eyed about the complex, long-term challenge that China poses to the United States.
With this NSS, that era has come to an end. Trump’s new strategy relegates geopolitics to a supporting role, while positioning economics as the “ultimate stakes.” China is not mentioned until page nineteen of the twenty-nine-page document. It is envisaged primarily as an economic competitor, and thus the need to rebalance bilateral economic ties is prioritized above concerns with Beijing’s strategic intentions. China is no longer framed as a systemic challenge with a vision of world order that is incompatible with U.S. interests. Trump’s first NSS starkly noted: “A geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region.” Such language is now entirely absent. While China has feared that Trump would seek to decouple the U.S. and Chinese economies, this NSS holds out the prospect of a “genuinely mutually advantageous economic relationship with Beijing.”
There is far more emphasis on Taiwan in this NSS than in previous documents, with a particular focus on deterring Chinese aggression against the island and a welcome emphasis on maintaining the ability to defeat aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. The statement that “deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority” should help ease fears in Taipei about U.S. commitment and convey a seriousness to leaders in Beijing.
Less welcome, though, is how it frames Taiwan. According to the document, the island’s importance lies in its dominance of semiconductor production and its critical geographic position. This is unfortunate, as it instrumentalizes Taiwan and overlooks the fact that Taiwan was seen as a critical interest long before the semiconductor was invented. Also worrying, the NSS states, “the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.” There has been much speculation in recent months that President Trump would shift U.S. declaratory policy on Taiwan independence from non-support to opposition. While the NSS did not address this question, the document made a counterproductive adjustment to U.S. policy on the status quo, weakening its stance from opposing unilateral changes to merely not supporting such changes. This shift is baffling.
Most significantly, the Indo-Pacific portion of the strategy is China-centric. Other countries in the region are valued insofar as they can help the United States win an economic competition with China and deter a conflict with Beijing. The Philippines, a U.S. treaty ally, is not even mentioned. Nor are the Pacific Islands or most countries in Southeast Asia. A strategy that played to U.S. strengths, though, would make U.S. allies and partners the starting point and nest China within a broader Indo-Pacific strategy.
david chou
Old Donald已頒布對我台灣人有利的2025 National Security Strategy(III)
"這次新版國安戰略報告，儘管公布前有諸多揣測，仍確立了美國「協防台灣」的戰略清晰，川普顯然在意廣大民意。就此而言，台灣強化安全的要務之一，是防制與境外勢力勾搭的內賊。"
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Appendix
自由時報社論》因應美國國安新戰略
https://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1735263
[美國川普政府四日公布「國家安全戰略」（NSS），闡述華府以「美國優先」重塑重大戰略的擘劃。（法新社資料照）]
美國川普政府四日公布「國家安全戰略」（NSS），闡述華府以「美國優先」重塑重大戰略的擘劃。它強調美國將維持在西半球的主導地位，指大量移民可能導致歐洲「文明抹除」，重申把拉丁美洲列為美國勢力範圍的「門羅主義」，卻對中、俄等專制國家措辭委婉。報告以現實主義取代自由民主人權價值觀，凸顯川普的商人本色，美國將不再扮演世界警察角色，把部分安全責任移轉盟友和戰略夥伴。
這卅三頁報告廣受關注。亞洲部分重申美國不支持任何片面改變台海現狀，要透過軍事優勢嚇阻台海衝突，強調第一島鏈安全，要求盟邦分擔更多防衛責任。報告不再點名中國為首要威脅，但主要仍圍繞中國，開宗明義指出卅多年來的錯誤假設：對中國開放市場，鼓勵投資中國，有利把它引入「以規則為本的國際秩序」；但事與願違，中國強大後只謀己利，美國反為此舉棋不定。有如戰爭部長赫格塞斯六日闡釋，美國今後將以實力而非對抗嚇阻中國，並尋求力量平衡；嚇阻不是為了支配，而要確保中國無法主宰美國或盟友。
對我國而言，新版國安戰略有關台灣的措辭更強硬：八次提到台灣，未提一中政策，強調嚇阻台海衝突為優先要務，要建構力能在第一島鏈任何地區阻止侵略的軍隊，透過維持壓倒性軍事優勢以避免衝突，也提及對台灣軍售；被視為力挺台灣、協防台灣的明確信號。賴清德總統為此回應，我國將堅定致力強化自我防衛，持續擔當值得信賴的夥伴。
美國新版國安戰略報告之外，中國侵略首要目標的我國、飽受中國侵擾的日本，都極力警戒中國；中國是為區域和平嚴重威脅、麻煩製造者，甚或潛在侵略者，已成國際共識。有如我國防部十月公布「國防報告書」，直指中國以常態化灰色地帶襲擾，結合認知作戰等混合手段，是我國最直接安全威脅。日本七月發表「防衛白皮書」，嚴重關切中國在東海及與俄國聯合軍事行動，對日本構成嚴重安全隱憂；日本強烈抗議自衛隊戰機六日兩度遭中國航母「遼寧號」艦載機以雷達照射，即此一例。
事實上，雷根總統基金會兩週前民調，也顯示美國人民對台灣抗拒中國，廣為支持︰六成七認為台灣是盟友；若中國侵略台灣，六成支持出動美軍防衛台灣，七成九贊同因而正式承認台灣獨立，七成四同意制裁中國，七成一支持提供台灣更多軍備。有如戰爭部主導政策次長柯伯吉（Elbridge Colby）曾言，台灣若落入中國之手，「對美國利益是災難」，他也強調台灣須提升國防開支，以嚇阻北京。
面對中國日增脅迫，我國須自強。實力獲致和平、軟弱引發侵略、自助而後人助…都是常理。賴清德政府提出八年一．二五兆元國防特別預算；以民主、反共、國家利益籲請國人團結對外，也是要務。同時，國際媒體注意到台灣主政者，正把握國際社會對台灣的重視，加強對美國等民主國家公眾遊說。
這一行動，見諸賴清德三日接受《紐約時報》論壇「交易錄峰會」專訪，強調台灣須做最壞打算、最好準備，維護和平，呼籲中國重視人民福祉而非擴張。為提出國防特別預算，他投書《華盛頓郵報》，既回應美國期盼，稱讚川普以實力維護和平，讓國際社會更安全，也宣示台灣自助人助，積極作為；並接受廣播節目塞克斯頓（Sexton Show）訪談，闡述台灣立場，與美國社會對話。
蕭美琴副總統也積極開展外交攻勢。她本月初受美國保守派媒體「戰情室」《War Room》專訪，強調台灣人不會坐等別人來救，面對混合戰、假訊息，須以實力帶來和平。十月初，她由外交部長林佳龍陪同，出席在比利時首都布魯塞爾「對中國政策跨國議會聯盟」（IPAC）年會，代表首次以會員國身分與會的台灣演講，是近年僅見副元首訪問非邦交國，並登上歐洲議會殿堂演說。六月間，她上蕭恩萊恩秀（Shawn Ryan Show），接受美軍海豹部隊出身的播客主持人專訪，一半時間談半導體，另一半軍事。