David Chou的大戰略是要 "將美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭"
david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要 "將美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (I)
1許多關心我台灣族人的前途與命運的人都知道, David Chou近年來的最大關切是我台灣族人/ 台美族人/ 台派/ 台派政權的 "抗支保台, 救亡圖存的戰爭" , 我的大戰略是要 "將美國denied/denies支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭 (America's war to deny China's evil scheme to replace America as the global superpower)" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭".
David的 "台灣民族解放" 是要讓我台灣族人能擺脫 "支那威脅" 或者在 "支那威脅" 仍然存在與肆虐時, 台灣也能免於被支那併吞與被 "支共的在台同路人" 搔擾或出賣.
2
According to David Chou, "台灣民族解放" 的形式有:
(i)台灣成為美國的領地, 最終成為美國一州;
(ii)台灣成為美國的 "自由結盟邦" (a freely associated state with the United States), 與美國有特殊的關係, 美國承擔防衛台灣的一部分/ 大部分/ 全部責任, 台美之間的貿易視同interstate commerce, 台美之間的immigration準用美國與 "自由結盟邦" 之間的immigration regulations; or
(iii)美國承認台灣是主權獨立的國家, 但台灣是美國的勢力範圍(Pax Americana的一部分), 是美國的Protectorate, 台灣的產業與製造業是美國的供應鏈的一環.
3
但如果Jennifer Kavanagh & Stephen Wertheim的思想與戰略成為美國國安與外交事務界的顯學/ 共識/ 主流, David Chou的大戰略就會collapse.
他們兩人的戰略的背後的一些立基與目前美國國安事務界的主流派的思想立基不同, 甚至是背道而馳 [例如, 他們認為, "Controlling Taiwan would not, in itself, transform China into a hegemon." "The military gains China would reap from taking Taiwan would not be that profound.", 他們兩人令我們背脊發涼.
請鄉親們閱讀Appendix, 我的LKK老鄉親只要讀字體被我放大的段落即可.
不願/ 不肯聽David的勸, 不願將部分人力與資源釋出給台灣建州運動的台灣鄉親與台美鄉親, 務必要好好讀Kavanagh & Wertheim的文章, 也要每天祈禱上帝, 希望這兩人的思想與戰略不會被美國政府採納與執行.
3
Kavanagh & Wertheim是美國國安事務界的兩株 "奇葩", 希望他們的 "異端邪說" 不會成為病毒株, 也不會擴散.
[to be continued]
David ChouFounderFormosa Statehood Movement
==========================
The Taiwan Fixation
American Strategy Shouldn’t Hinge on an Unwinnable War
Jennifer Kavanagh and Stephen Wertheim
Foreign Affairs March/April 2025
Published on February 25, 2025
JENNIFER KAVANAGH is a Senior Fellow and Director of Military Analysis at Defense Priorities and an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University’s Center for Security Studies.
STEPHEN WERTHEIM is a Senior Fellow in the American Statecraft Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the author of Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. Global Supremacy.
The fate of Taiwan keeps American policymakers up at night, and it should. A Chinese invasion of the island would confront the United States with one of its gravest foreign policy choices ever. Letting Taiwan fall to Beijing would dent Washington’s credibility and create new challenges for U.S. military forces in Asia. But the benefits of keeping Taiwan free would have to be weighed against the costs of waging the first armed conflict between great powers since 1945. Even if the United States prevailed—and it might well lose—an outright war with China would likely kill more Americans and destroy more wealth than any conflict since the Vietnam War and perhaps since World War II. Nuclear and cyber weapons could make it worse, bringing destruction on the U.S. homeland. These would be catastrophic consequences for the United States.
As terrible as a U.S.-Chinese war would be, an American president would face immense pressure to fight for Taipei. Many U.S. policymakers are convinced that Taiwan, a prosperous democracy in a vital region, is worth protecting despite the daunting price of doing so. Political calculations may also push a U.S. president into war. By staying out, the president could expect to be blamed not only for permitting the economic meltdown that China’s invasion would trigger but also for losing Taiwan after a decades-long battle of wills between Washington and Beijing over the island’s future. That would doom a president’s legacy. Against such a certainty, any chance of salvaging the situation could look like a better bet—and by opting to fight China to protect Taiwan, the president would preserve the possibility of going down in history as a great wartime victor. In the 1960s, President Lyndon Johnson faced a choice between ramping up a U.S. military campaign in Vietnam and allowing the Communists to take over the country. He doubted that a war was necessary or winnable. But he sent American soldiers all the same.
U.S. leaders need a way to escape the ghastly decision to either wage World War III or watch Taiwan go down. They need a third option. Washington must make a plan that enables Taiwan to mount a viable self-defense, allows the United States to assist from a distance, and keeps the U.S. position in Asia intact regardless of how a cross-strait conflict concludes. This way, the United States could abstain from sending its military forces to defend Taiwan if China invades the island and does not attack U.S. bases or warships.
The Trump administration should launch an effort now to make this third option viable. Washington should condition its aid on defense spending and reforms in Taipei, pushing Taiwan into a position to better protect itself. It must also develop capabilities and plans to resupply the island if needed.
Yet U.S. policymakers must also accept that, without direct U.S. military intervention, Taiwan may manage only to stall a Chinese invasion, not repel one. The United States therefore needs to insulate its regional interests from Taiwan’s fate. Instead of clarifying its commitment to defend Taiwan, Washington should retain an ambiguous stance and downplay the importance of keeping the island out of Beijing’s hands. It should, meanwhile, bolster the self-defenses of its other Asian allies and partners, blocking any path for China to convert a successful bid for Taiwan into regional dominance. At home, U.S. politicians and analysts should speak frankly about the cost of a war with China and push back against the misguided idea that the United States’ survival and prosperity turn on Taiwan’s political status. Through a policy of firm but limited support for Taiwan, the United States can avoid involvement in a world-rending war while putting China off a risky invasion—and safeguarding U.S. interests if an invasion comes anyway.
PRICING IN WORLD WAR III
The United States rightly expends considerable resources to dissuade China from using coercion to control Taiwan. If China were to seize Taiwan, the United States would suffer significant military, economic, and reputational setbacks. China would gain a new foothold from which to project power across East Asia, complicating U.S. military operations in the region. Beijing could disrupt trade routes in the western Pacific, rattling the global economy. U.S. allies would have a new reason to question Washington’s commitment to their security. The repercussions would be greatest, of course, for the people of Taiwan, who would lose their vibrant democracy.
Nevertheless, for the foreseeable future, the benefits of preserving Taiwan’s de facto self-rule do not warrant the enormous human and economic costs of a U.S.-Chinese war. The United States’ vital interest lies in preventing China from attaining untrammeled regional hegemony in Asia. With such dominance, China could project large-scale military power into the Western Hemisphere or cut the United States off from Asia’s dynamic economic markets. But controlling Taiwan would not, in itself, transform China into a hegemon. The United States would remain capable of rallying a counterbalancing coalition to impede any potential Chinese bid for political and military supremacy in Asia.
For one thing, the military advantages China would reap from taking Taiwan would not be that profound, and the United States and its allies would have time to adjust. Beijing could use control of the island to expand the reach of its missiles, air defenses, radars, and maritime and air surveillance systems, allowing the People’s Liberation Army to operate farther from China’s coast and more easily hold at risk U.S. military assets, including bases in Guam and vessels near Japan and the Philippines. But the PLA’s weapons can already reach these U.S. targets, so adding a few hundred more miles to their range would make only a marginal difference. China’s undersea gains would be similarly modest and unlikely to offset U.S. advantages. Seizing Taiwan would allow China to dock submarines in the deepwater ports off Taiwan’s eastern coast, which would extend their range and enable them to avoid some U.S. underwater sensors in the Miyako and Luzon Straits. They might not evade U.S. monitoring entirely, however, because satellites or sound surveillance in the region could probably detect them. Moreover, China may, in time, develop quieter submarines, and these could avoid U.S. detection without being launched from Taiwan.
U.S. politicians should speak frankly about the cost of a war with China.
Such limited operational gains would not give China the ability to bring about a dramatic regional expansion. Despite the fears of some in Tokyo and Manila, China would still face formidable obstacles to seizing outlying territories belonging to Japan or the Philippines—most of which are farther from Taiwan than Taiwan is from China—let alone more distant and populous islands, such as Okinawa or Kyushu in Japan or Luzon in the Philippines. Furthermore, it would take China years to build the infrastructure needed to use Taiwan as a base for military operations; the United States and its partners would have plenty of time to prepare additional defenses. In short, control of the island would hardly overturn the military balance in the region. Countries threatened by China’s rise have to invest in security measures no matter what happens in and around Taiwan.
If military considerations do not necessitate the direct U.S. defense of Taiwan, neither do the economic stakes. National security officials who favor a strong U.S. commitment to Taiwan frequently cite their concern that China could commandeer high-tech assets on the island. Taiwan produces about 90 percent of the world’s most advanced chips, largely through the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. They argue that if Beijing gains control of TSMC, it could leap ahead in the global technology race, and Washington would lose its most important source of semiconductors, constraining U.S. economic growth and military innovation. TSMC, however, cannot operate without Western components and intellectual property, both of which could be immediately cut off after a Chinese invasion. These steps, of course, would disrupt the United States’ own chip supply chains. Fortunately, the United States is already preparing for the possibility of losing access to Taiwanese production by building semiconductor fabrication plants at home. Boston Consulting Group has estimated that the United States is on track to produce 28 percent of the world’s advanced semiconductors by 2032.
The United States similarly has little reason to fear that it would lose access to East Asia’s valuable economic markets if China controlled Taiwan. China likely already has the military capability to disrupt shipping through the narrow sea-lanes of the East China and South China Seas, yet it has not done so. Fully blocking traffic would be expensive and time-consuming for the PLA, even if China controlled Taiwan, and China’s own economy would suffer, too. If necessary, commercial ships headed for Japan or South Korea could take new routes, bypassing the South China Sea by traveling through the Indonesian and Philippine archipelagoes or around Papua New Guinea through the Solomon Sea.
Some argue that the United States must fight for Taiwan because a failure to do so would undermine U.S. credibility, driving countries in the region closer to China. This seems unlikely. India and Japan, two of the United States’ cornerstone partners in the Indo-Pacific, have a deep history of animosity toward Beijing and tend to respond forcefully to Chinese aggression. To prevent Asian countries from aligning with Beijing if it takes Taiwan, the United States should stop reinforcing the idea that its reputation hinges on the defense of Taiwan. Instead, it should focus on its larger objective—preventing Chinese regional dominance—and stake its credibility on that.
PLAYING PORCUPINE
Taiwan certainly matters to the United States—just not enough to justify a war with China. The U.S. government thus needs a new strategy to support the island’s defense without having American troops engage in combat. Of course, if China were to target American forces first, keeping out of the fight would become impossible. But Beijing would have reason to refrain from attacking U.S. forces if it believed there was a good chance that Washington might abstain from conflict. To make a Taiwan-led U.S.-supplied defense viable, the United States should adopt two policies over the next decade: insist that Taipei reorient and step up its defense efforts, and improve the Pentagon’s ability to send military supplies to Taiwan during a conflict without putting Americans in harm’s way.
Taiwan’s current defense strategy leaves it unprepared for a Chinese attack. Taipei spends a significant share of its resources on advanced equipment, such as F-16 fighter jets, Abrams tanks, and submarines, intended to fight China head-on. Taiwan cannot defeat a Chinese invasion this way. China could easily find and destroy big assets, and its much larger military force would overwhelm any of these systems that survive an initial attack, leaving Taiwan without offensive firepower or sufficient defenses. At that point, Taiwan’s survival would depend entirely on U.S. military warships and aircraft rapidly arriving and entering into the conflict—a massive gamble for Taipei and a devil’s choice for the United States.
Instead, as many analysts have argued, the best way for Taiwan to protect itself is to become a “porcupine” whose sharp defenses—large numbers of antiship missiles, sea mines, and air defense systems, for instance—can thwart an invader’s attempt to absorb the island. With this asymmetric denial defense, Taiwan’s military could prevent China from quickly seizing the island, dragging the PLA into a long and costly war that paves the way for a political settlement. Under the first Trump and the Biden administrations, Washington encouraged Taiwan to embrace such an approach, and Taipei made some progress, for example by investing in antiship missiles and starting to build a fleet of small drones. But change has been halting and insufficient.
The United States can spur Taiwan to acquire the capabilities it needs to become more self-reliant. Washington should clearly convey to Taipei that it will increase or decrease aid depending on how much Taiwan spends on its military and whether it invests in the right kinds of weapons and personnel to mount a denial-focused strategy. To turn up the pressure, U.S. leaders should publicly state that, although the United States has an abiding interest in maintaining the cross-strait status quo and a legal obligation under the Taiwan Relations Act to equip the island with defensive weapons, Taiwan bears the primary responsibility for its own defense.
To receive the maximum U.S. assistance on offer, Taiwan should be required to increase its defense spending from the roughly two and a half percent of GDP it spends today to at least four percent by 2030—a level of expenditure on par with that of other countries in precarious security environments. Israel spends about five percent of GDP on defense despite being far stronger than any of its adversaries. Poland and the Baltic states are working toward military spending of four percent of GDP even though they are protected by NATO’s security guarantee.
Just as important, the United States should condition military assistance on the extent to which Taiwan uses its expanded budget to prepare a denial defense. Taiwan will need to triple or quadruple its arsenal of antiship missiles to have a chance at disabling a significant number of the vessels China would use to move its forces onto Taiwan’s shores. Taipei should increase and modernize its stockpiles of naval mines, which would, in the event of an invasion, allow it to wreak further havoc on approaching Chinese ships. Taiwan should, at a minimum, double its supply of shoulder-fired and mobile air defense systems and purchase or manufacture thousands of the munitions they need. It will also have to acquire tens of thousands of cheap drones that can harass PLA aircraft as they try to control the skies over the island. This would inhibit China from relentlessly bombing Taiwan’s critical infrastructure or dropping paratroops inland. Finally, the United States should reject Taiwanese requests for big-ticket items such as aircraft and warships that would be easy targets for Chinese missiles and would be unlikely to withstand an initial Chinese attack. Washington should cancel unfilled Taiwanese orders for Abrams tanks and F-16 fighter jets and reallocate the funds to smaller, cheaper systems suited to a denial strategy.
In addition to setting spending targets, the United States should demand that Taiwan improve its military training so that it generates a large, reliable reserve force capable of holding off Chinese invaders. With enough skilled personnel, Taiwanese forces could occupy hardened positions along the island’s coast to prevent the PLA from amassing the numbers needed to break out from their beachheads and seize and hold territory farther inland. Responding to internal and external pressure, Taiwan lengthened its conscription term in 2024 from four months to one year for all Taiwanese men born after 2005 and updated the curriculum for conscripts and reservists to include some live-fire drills. But much of this training remains divorced from the realities of warfighting. For example, it focuses on the most basic military skills rather than offering the advanced field exercises that would prepare soldiers to operate in a conflict. In addition, only six percent of eligible conscripts reported for training last year; the rest received deferments to complete their education. To get Taiwan’s reserve force to its necessary size and readiness, the Trump administration should press Taipei to require two full years of more intense instruction and limit the use of deferments.
Controlling Taiwan would not, in itself, transform China into a hegemon.
The United States, for its part, must do all it can to equip Taiwan with asymmetric capabilities. Washington should make the island a priority recipient of arms sales, filling Taipei’s orders before those of other clients, just as the United States has done for Ukraine. U.S. suppliers can produce much of the materiel Taiwan needs most, such as antiship missiles, naval mines, and small air and sea drones, cheaply and in large quantities. The Biden administration transferred excess stocks of U.S. weapons to Taiwan, and the Trump administration should continue to do so. The United States should also invest in Taiwan’s defense industrial base so Taipei can produce and distribute munitions, spare parts, and medical supplies around the island during a conflict. This would also alleviate the burden on the United States’ own defense industrial base. Co-production arrangements and even joint ventures with U.S. firms could help Taiwan meet its needs.
Taiwan should become as self-reliant as possible, but the United States may still need the capability to replenish Taiwan’s military stockpiles during a Chinese blockade or under Chinese fire—without bringing U.S. forces into the conflict. Washington’s best option is to transport military supplies using uncrewed systems, including aircraft, surface vessels, and undersea vehicles, because even if the PLA fired on them, the United States would suffer no casualties and could avoid entering into a war. On the few occasions that adversaries have damaged U.S. drones, Washington has never retaliated with a direct military strike. During the war in Ukraine, for instance, a Russian fighter jet forced down a U.S. Reaper drone over the Black Sea, and the U.S. military did not respond.
Uncrewed vehicles tend to be smaller than crewed ones, but they can still carry essential items such as ammunition, shoulder-fired and other small missiles, and naval and antitank mines. Some uncrewed systems already exist: the U.S. Marine Corps has developed an autonomous vessel, modeled on the boats of drug smugglers, that can be remotely operated from thousands of miles away. The Pentagon should accelerate efforts to develop other such systems, working with traditional defense contractors and smaller startups to produce autonomous air and sea craft that can carry cargo.
For now, the military infrastructure on Taiwan’s eastern coast is limited, making it difficult to receive cargo during a war. Taiwan should build additional runways, reinforced aircraft hangars, shelters for ships and submarines, and more extensive roads leading to the rest of the island. At the same time, the United States should expand current plans to stockpile military equipment at facilities near Taiwan, including in Guam, Japan, the Marshall and Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, the Philippines, and South Korea. Where necessary, Washington should seek explicit permission from host countries for the U.S. military to conduct resupply missions there. So far, no country in the region has clearly and publicly pledged to provide this type of support in the event of a Taiwan contingency. Some may be leery of getting pulled into a conflict with China, but U.S. officials should make clear that Washington, too, is seeking to avoid direct intervention.
SELF-DEFENSE CLASS
In addition to reducing Taiwan’s dependence on U.S. military assistance, the United States should insulate its regional strategy from developments in Taiwan. That way, Washington can minimize the fallout in case Beijing succeeds in taking the island. In recent years, the Pentagon has adopted a Chinese invasion of Taiwan as its “pacing scenario,” the prospective future conflict on which U.S. budget and posture decisions are determined. Civilian leaders, meanwhile, speak more forcefully about their commitment to defend Taiwan than they did in previous decades. This approach has potential benefits. Demonstrating U.S. readiness and resolve over Taiwan may deter China from attempting an invasion by suggesting that the price would likely be direct war with the United States. But it also raises the risk of the worst outcome: that China is provoked into war and the United States is compelled to join that war out of fear that its credibility is on the line. To avoid such a calamity, Washington should change tack. The Trump administration should encourage countries in the region to become ready to defend themselves, and it should signal a more modest and ambiguous U.S. military commitment to Taiwan.
The balance of power in Asia does not hinge on control of Taiwan. More important are the United States’ ties to the major centers of economic and military power—Japan, India, and, to a lesser degree, South Korea—and countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines that are located on sea-lanes through which the United States gains commercial and military access to the region. Instead of planning to fight China in a war over Taiwan, the United States should prioritize shoring up the self-defense capabilities of these partners. Over the past few years, U.S. efforts to strengthen allied militaries have emphasized Taiwan-related scenarios. In the Philippines, the United States has concentrated investments in defense infrastructure in Luzon, the main territory closest to Taiwan, where the United States hopes to base missiles and personnel in a conflict. U.S. officials have likewise encouraged Japan to purchase cruise missiles that are capable of striking China. Yet Washington has paid insufficient attention to its allies’ most immediate security requirements. Manila needs to better protect bases and airfields across the Philippine archipelago, and Tokyo should bolster its air defenses and build munitions stockpiles.
The United States has also erred by expanding its military bases close to China and Taiwan. Washington has tried to gain more military access along the so-called first island chain, which encompasses the seas closest to the east coast of mainland China. The United States has also pushed increasingly powerful military hardware in greater quantities close to Chinese shores. Washington would be better served, instead, by reinforcing existing infrastructure where it is most defensible. The U.S. military should enhance airfields and ports, logistics and supply hubs, and pre-positioned military equipment in northern rather than southern Japan, and along the so-called second island chain, including Guam, the Marshall and Northern Mariana Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. China has fewer of the longer-range missiles needed to hit these distant and dispersed locations, making them more secure. By helping partners develop their own asymmetric defenses and protecting the U.S. military presence at better-defended bases farther from mainland China, the United States can both deter Beijing from widening a conflict over Taiwan and prevent it from achieving regional hegemony in any scenario, including if it gained control of the island.
For similar reasons, the Trump administration should take a public stance on cross-strait issues that is less provocative than the Biden administration’s. Over the last four years, the United States has effectively watered down its “one China” policy, which has long allowed Washington and Beijing to paper over their deep differences regarding Taiwan and avoid conflict. Under the policy, the United States acknowledges the Chinese position that Taiwan is part of China, agrees not to challenge that position, and maintains only unofficial relations with Taiwan. In the early months of the Biden administration, however, the State Department loosened restrictions on meetings between U.S. and Taiwanese officials. In 2022, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi met with Taiwan’s president in Taipei, becoming the highest-ranking U.S. official to visit the island in 25 years. Biden himself said on four occasions that he would order U.S. forces to defend Taiwan if China were to attack the island, a departure from the usual stance of maintaining ambiguity over the U.S. response. Twice, he said it was up to the people of Taiwan to decide whether to declare independence, although he later returned to the customary position that the United States does not support Taiwan’s independence.
Many Asian allies worried that Washington’s actions provoked Beijing into cross-strait escalation, or at least handed Beijing a convenient justification for expanding its military activities around Taiwan. Trump and his team should be less assertive. If U.S. allies and partners deem the United States responsible for the outbreak of a Chinese-Taiwanese war—even if inciting a conflict is not Washington’s intent—they will be less willing to assist U.S. resupply missions and less likely to view China as a threat to themselves. This perception would undermine the paramount U.S. objective of preventing Chinese hegemony in Asia. Moreover, when allies see the United States stake its credibility on Taiwan’s political status, they, too, may come to see Taiwan’s defense as the litmus test of Washington’s commitment to the region. It would be much better for the United States to set realistic expectations with its allies and partners, not to mention for itself.
The United States should no longer let Taiwan policy come at the expense of regional strategy. Building on the assurances exchanged between Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in November 2023, the new administration should make a determined effort to shore up the “one China” policy. Washington should remain ambiguous about whether it would defend Taiwan by force. It should consistently discourage unilateral Taiwanese moves toward independence and restore limitations on official U.S.-Taiwanese contacts. The Trump administration should consider gradually removing the U.S. military trainers who have been working on Taiwan’s outlying islands since at least 2020; similar missions have been largely unsuccessful at teaching partners to become self-sufficient. At the very least, the training could be carried out in a less sensitive place. The Trump administration could also offer new assurances, publicly or privately, that it will respect China’s redlines. For example, the United States could announce that under no circumstances would it support Taiwan’s independence, unless, perhaps, the island faces an armed attack initiated by Beijing. In addition, Washington could affirm that it would accept any resolution of cross-strait differences, including unification, that is reached peacefully, without coercion, and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.
The military gains China would reap from taking Taiwan would not be that profound.
These steps are best taken in return for corresponding Chinese actions, such as a reduction in military activities around Taiwan and a declaration that Beijing has no deadline for resolving the Taiwan question. Still, the United States would benefit from strengthening its “one China” policy regardless of Beijing’s willingness to reciprocate. Doing so would show U.S. allies and partners in Asia that Taiwan is not the United States’ overriding concern and that further escalation of cross-strait tensions would stem from Chinese aggression, not American provocations.
The main risk of this strategy is that it could weaken deterrence by suggesting to China that the United States might not defend Taiwan militarily. The United States can limit this risk by adhering to its traditional policy of “strategic ambiguity,” which entails remaining purposely vague about how the United States would respond to a Chinese attack on Taiwan. Even if the United States does develop a viable option to aid the island without entering a war, Beijing should not discount the possibility that the United States might yet decide to fight. U.S. presidents will still face significant pressure to intervene in a conflict over Taiwan, from civilian and military advisers, Congress, and segments of the American public. And by increasing its assistance to Taiwan and investing in its regional military capabilities, Washington could even strengthen deterrence. Beijing may nonetheless conclude that the likelihood of U.S. military intervention has somewhat diminished, but this calculation could have a bright silver lining: believing it can keep U.S. forces out of a conflict, China would have less incentive to target American troops at the start if it did decide to invade Taiwan.
A different risk is that Taiwan could, in effect, arm itself too well: China, seeing that the possibility of ever unifying with the island is ending, might invade sooner to avoid losing the opportunity forever. But it seems unlikely that Taiwan would strengthen its defenses so robustly as to persuade China’s leaders that the island had become irrevocably separate from the mainland. To be convinced to attack, Chinese leaders would have to conclude that Taiwan was about to outmatch China and would indefinitely sustain its military advantage. Realistically, even major investments will enable Taiwan only to make an invasion slow, long, and costly, not to render coercive unification impossible. Even if Taiwan turned itself into the ultimate porcupine, China would probably respond by improving its own capabilities—not by gambling on an invasion.
Furthermore, Beijing’s concerns should be mitigated by U.S. efforts to quell its fears. Taiwan may become materially better prepared to counter a Chinese attack, but Chinese leaders should not perceive any new challenge to their political claim to Taiwan. On the contrary, they would see the threat subside as Washington takes greater care not to publicly challenge the legitimacy of Beijing’s territorial claim and aspiration for eventual unification.
VIBE SHIFT
To preserve their latitude in a Taiwan conflict and stay out of war, American policymakers won’t just need a new approach in the Indo-Pacific. They must also change the conversation at home so that U.S. presidents do not fear political retribution for doing what best serves U.S. interests: avoiding war with China. Since 2019, American politicians, especially those in Congress, have pushed for a flurry of antagonistic policies that have created an atmosphere of hostility toward China. In such a climate, the president and Congress may be more prone to taking up arms to defend Taiwan. As the political scientist Evan Medeiros has argued, developing a domestic consensus in favor of U.S.-Chinese coexistence is “not just a useful condition—but also a critical one—for avoiding conflict between these two geopolitical rivals.”
Before the moment of crisis arrives, political leaders should initiate a frank national dialogue about U.S. interests in the western Pacific. Americans must know the true costs of conflict with China: the deaths of tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands of U.S. soldiers, the possibility that nuclear weapons would be fired in desperation, an economic downturn dwarfing that of the Great Recession of 2008, and severe disruption to everyday life. It will take great effort for policymakers to communicate the scale of the potential devastation because a war with China would look nothing like the relatively small and contained wars that the United States has waged in recent decades.
In addition to making clear the costs of war with China, U.S. officials should stress the need to coexist with China as prominently as they discuss the need to compete with it. In the coming years, especially if Beijing’s behavior improves, American policymakers should adopt “competitive coexistence” as an approach for U.S. relations with China. In doing so, they would convey Washington’s willingness to establish stable patterns of interaction, limit security competition, and address global problems collaboratively. At a minimum, political leaders should avoid undue alarmism about Taiwan. The Biden administration was right to tamp down public speculation about the year by which China might intend to launch an invasion. The Trump administration should go further to discourage catastrophic thinking, including by communicating to the public that China would not pose an immeasurably greater challenge to the United States if Taiwan came under its control.
david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要 "將美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (II)
將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭"---崩潰的Kavanagh & Wertheim的 "異端邪說".
台灣成為美國領地 甚至納為一州
美國行動方案之六：美國可以將台灣納為一州。這項提案並非天方夜譚。早在一八五○年代，美國派駐福爾摩沙領事館的兩名外交官，就曾提出這項政策。
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星期專論》確保台灣安全：最佳可行方案
吉耐獅（Guermantes Lailari）
自由時報
https://talk.ltn.com.tw/article/paper/1694322
習近平最近為什麼對台灣不滿？因為，雖然中共利用間諜活動和統戰部門利誘籠絡，人民解放軍及武警／海警透過演習恫嚇，還有日以繼夜的顛覆性政治戰手段，包括網路攻擊、經濟脅迫與外交孤立，台灣人民卻沒有變得更「親中共」。
台灣人民支持維持現狀或朝向獨立發展的比例持續上升，截至二○二四年十二月已達七十六％。國立政治大學所做的民意調查顯示，台灣人民支持與中共「統一」的比例持續下降，目前僅約十三．三％（從二○一八年的高點廿六．一％大幅下降）。
數項「禁忌」建議 斷中共侵台企圖
因此，習近平（或其繼任者）恐怕只剩下一種選擇：依據二○○五年通過的《反分裂國家法》第八條採取行動，該條文規定：「或者和平統一的可能性完全喪失，國家（中華人民共和國）得採取非和平方式及其他必要措施，捍衛國家主權和領土完整。」
中共對於以「和平」方式統一台灣的計畫，似乎愈來愈沒有信心。二○二四年六月，中華人民共和國政法機關發布一項法律指示，強化《中華人民共和國刑法》第一○三條與第一一三條，對所謂「台獨頑固分子」的懲治。這項新的法律指示明確規定，將針對支持台灣獨立者，抑或組織、策劃或實施「分裂國家、破壞國家統一活動」行為者，給予嚴厲制裁。這些「犯罪行為」甚至可處以極刑。
如果中共對「和平」統一充滿信心，為什麼還要更新法令，進一步威脅熱愛自由的台灣人民？答案是：中共領導階層認為，只要施加更多脅迫，就可以逼迫台灣人民卑躬屈膝、俯首稱臣，喪失為其政治獨立與自由奮鬥的意志。
由於戰爭已經逐步逼近（儘管許多台灣人仍對威脅視而不見，就像以色列人直到二○二三年十月六日，還以為「哈瑪斯」（Hamas）不敢發動攻擊一樣），本文將提出歷屆美國和台灣政府，當然也包括中共，都視為「禁忌」的建議。
美國總統川普的思維往往跳脫常規，同時也是手腕高超的一流談判專家。他曾提出讓美國掌控格陵蘭、加拿大、巴拿馬運河，甚至加薩走廊的構想，引發了推崇與否定並存的兩極反應。而本文所提出的建議，勢必也將面臨正反不同的評價。
以下列出台灣當前面臨的兩大關鍵挑戰，以及六項可能有助於台灣免於中共「紅色恐怖」（毛澤東曾使用這種說法，鼓勵共產黨處決隊「毫不留情地」殘殺地方反對勢力）蹂躪的行動方案（COA）。
挑戰之一：美國質疑，台灣未能積極備戰自衛，是否意味著台灣人民無意奮戰？二○二四年以來，國民黨和民眾黨立委透過一系列癱瘓議事的手段，削弱台灣的國防，包括凍結預算、將國防經費挪作他用、取消投資或削減新武器系統的預算（例如，潛艦預算縮減一半、刪減無人機發展基金，弱化反制中共宣傳的能量）。台灣必須增強防衛能力，才能嚇阻中共入侵。
民進黨行動方案之一：台灣人民應該要求在野黨停止在立法院杯葛預算，確保國防預算持續成長，以裝備與訓練國軍。民進黨正在號召選民，罷免至少卅二名（最多四十名）國民黨及無黨籍立委。倘若民進黨能夠改變立法院的政黨版圖，使該黨躍居多數地位，即可透過增加國防預算，滿足確保國家安全的需求，來解決挑戰一。賴清德總統宣示，台灣二○二五年的國防開支將達到國內生產毛額（GDP）的三％。然而，只要立法院朝小野大的結構不變，實際預算將只有GDP的約二．四五％，比二○二四年的二．五％還少。
台龐大外匯存底 應提撥挹注國防
那麼，立法院無權掌控的資金來源有哪些？
台灣累積了龐大的外匯存底（截至二○二五年一月，達五七七五．八億美元），並持有大量外國證券（一．三兆美元），合計將近兩兆美元。台灣的外匯存底在全球排名第四，僅次於中國（三．二七兆美元）、日本（一．○八兆美元）與瑞士（八二二○億美元）。
若從外匯存底中每年額外撥出二○○億美元（即外國資產總額的一％）用於國防，讓年度國防開支達到四○○億美元（約占GDP的五％），應該可行。台灣政府現在若不動用這筆資金，未來就可能會由中共來決定其用途。
美對台關稅收入 可支付台灣軍購
美國行動方案之二：二○二五年一月廿七日，川普總統威脅對台灣製造的半導體徵收最高達一○○％關稅。台灣有許多人對此感到震驚，因為他們原本以為台灣可被豁免。
台灣要如何從這些和其他關稅中受益？筆者建議，美國應該將對台灣徵收的關稅收入，用於支付台灣無法自行生產的武器採購費用。換言之，採購外國武器的國防預算，將從立法院轉移到美國政府。這將使原本規劃用於台灣對外軍購的資金，能夠轉而用於延長訓練並擴編軍隊人力，尤其是後備部隊。
大多數台灣人和美國人可能不知道，台灣的一六六萬名後備軍人中，只有七％在完成義務役期後接受過任何形式的訓練。目前，每兩年只有五萬名後備軍人接受為期一週的召集訓練，另有八千人每年接受兩週的集訓。換句話說，每兩年僅十一．六萬名後備軍人接受訓練，全台仍有一五○萬名後備軍人沒有機會受訓！而且，對於應對中國的威脅而言，目前的訓練時間根本無法有效備戰。
台後備軍人培訓規模 須大幅提高
台灣必須大幅提高後備軍人的培訓規模，並將訓練時間增加到每年至少卅天（而非每兩年一次）。中華民國國軍應該將強化後備軍人的訓練，列為當前的首要任務。
相較之下，以色列國防軍（IDF）自二○二五年起，每年將召集四十六萬五千名後備軍人，從事至少四十二天的戰鬥勤務。以色列人口（約九○○萬）還不到台灣人口（約二三○○萬）的一半。然而，以色列這種小國每年召集的後備軍人，幾乎是台灣的四倍，而且訓練時間更長達四十二天。因此，台灣應該每年召集至少一○○萬名後備軍人，並將訓練時間延長為兩週以上。
此外，美國的七十三萬八千名後備軍人與國民兵（National Guard）成員，每年都必須服役至少卅八天（每月一個週末，以及全年兩週的回營集訓）。
過去，台灣的役男必須服兵役兩到三年，視其所屬軍種而異。現在，台灣的義務役役期已縮短為一年。其他民主國家的役期普遍較長，例如南韓（十八到廿一個月）、新加坡（廿二到廿四個月）、以色列（男性為卅六個月，女性則為廿四個月）。立法院應該將台灣的義務役役期恢復為至少兩年。一旦延長服役時間，受過訓練且完成戰備的有效兵力也將增加。每年約有十萬名役男符合入伍條件，這意味著將有廿萬名受過訓練的人力，可以立即動員支援現役部隊。
不過，台灣還需要解決另外一個問題。新實施的一年期義務役，容許太多得以豁免的例外。二○二四年，符合中華民國國軍徵兵條件的十萬七七一三名役男中，實際入伍比例偏低。外部觀察家可能會認為，台灣的免役與延役條件過於寬鬆，導致常備兵徵集嚴重不足，後備軍人也缺乏戰鬥準備。這意味著台灣現役部隊僅有十八萬八千名志願役官兵，在戰爭爆發時必須獨自面對解放軍的全面攻勢。
挑戰之二：中共有自己的入侵台灣時間表。台灣和美國需要改變其應變對策，迫使中共重新評估並延遲其攻台行動。
美國會修《作戰授權法》 適用台灣
美國行動方案之三：一九五五年，美國國會通過《福爾摩沙決議案》（Formosa Joint Resolution），授權艾森豪總統動用美國武裝部隊保護福爾摩沙（台灣）、澎湖群島，及該地區相關陣地和領土的安全。這項決議案的性質，與二○○一年國會通過《作戰授權法》（AUMF），授權布希總統發動全球反恐戰爭類似。
如果美國國會更新《作戰授權法》使其適用於台灣，川普總統將擁有更大的行動自由，來應對中共的侵略並強化嚇阻。此外，《戰爭權力法》（War Powers Act）規定，川普總統若計畫在「第一島鏈」及其周邊地區部署軍隊，必須在四十八小時內通知國會，以確保美國能夠主動保護台灣、美國盟友（日本、菲律賓、南韓等國）以及關鍵戰略利益。
共同防禦條約 台美應該重新締結
美國行動方案之四：台灣和美國應該重新締結《共同防禦條約》（MDT）。該條約可以是雙邊性質，或發展為多邊協定，納入南韓、日本、台灣、菲律賓及其他國家。這將重現一九五四年時任美國國務卿杜勒斯（John Foster Dulles）提出的「東北亞公約組織」（NEATO），再加上菲律賓成為「NEATO+1」。目前，東北亞公約組織已透過美日韓三邊安全協議（US-Japan-ROK Trilateral Security Pact）初具雛形。
美國行動方案之五：有三種可能的選項，可以讓台灣成為美國領地，例如非合併領地（如關島）、非合併且未通過組織法領地（如美屬薩摩亞），以及合併但未通過組織法的領地（如帕邁拉環礁）。然而，最理想的選擇是與美國簽署《自由加盟協約》（CFA），即類似馬紹爾群島、密克羅尼西亞聯邦和帛琉的「自由聯繫邦」（FAS）模式。這些「自由聯繫邦」是主權獨立的聯合國會員，並與美國協商締結雙邊《自由加盟協約》。根據協約，美國擁有負責「自由聯繫邦」防禦與安全事務的權限。
台灣成為美國領地 甚至納為一州
美國行動方案之六：美國可以將台灣納為一州。這項提案並非天方夜譚。早在一八五○年代，美國派駐福爾摩沙領事館的兩名外交官，就曾提出這項政策。
總而言之，美國與台灣應該更深入地探索所有行動方案，以及其他可能的選項，以阻斷中共未來併吞台灣的企圖。其中，美國行動方案二、三、四（關稅、台灣《作戰授權法》及《共同防禦條約》）最有可能成功，因為這些方案可能在較短時間內實現，而且當前美國政壇不分朝野一致力挺台灣。其他選項則因內部政治因素（如民進黨行動方案一），或是因為所需時間過長（如方案五和六），而較不可能推動。希望美國與台灣都能把握機會，阻止中共的紅色恐怖。
（作者吉耐獅為退役美國空軍外務官，專研反恐怖主義、非正規作戰、飛彈防禦與戰略。二○二二年獲選我國外交部「台灣獎助金」學人，二○二三年在國立政治大學、國防大學擔任駐點訪問學人，現為國防安全研究院客座研究員。國際新聞中心陳泓達譯）
david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (III)
1
(1)台灣建州運動關於發佈領地協約(草案)與領地憲法(草案)之聲明 (Statement by the Formosa Statehood Movement on the Issuance of a Draft Covenant and a Draft Constitution);
(2) 建立福爾摩沙領地協約(草案) (A Draft Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of Formosa in Political Union with the United States of America);
david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (IV)
//U.S. officials should make clear that Washington, too, is seeking to avoid direct intervention.//
//The United States should no longer let Taiwan policy come at the expense of regional strategy. Building on the assurances exchanged between Biden and Chinese leader Xi Jinping in November 2023, the new administration should make a determined effort to shore up the “one China” policy. Washington should remain ambiguous about whether it would defend Taiwan by force. It should consistently discourage unilateral Taiwanese moves toward independence and restore limitations on official U.S.-Taiwanese contacts. The Trump administration should consider gradually removing the U.S. military trainers who have been working on Taiwan’s outlying islands since at least 2020; similar missions have been largely unsuccessful at teaching partners to become self-sufficient. At the very least, the training could be carried out in a less sensitive place. The Trump administration could also offer new assurances, publicly or privately, that it will respect China’s redlines. For example, the United States could announce that under no circumstances would it support Taiwan’s independence, unless, perhaps, the island faces an armed attack initiated by Beijing. In addition, Washington could affirm that it would accept any resolution of cross-strait differences, including unification, that is reached peacefully, without coercion, and with the assent of the people of Taiwan.//
This is the Bay Area Taiwanese American E-Mail Group. Our main objective is to provide open communication channel for the Taiwanese American community, let the Taiwan Spirit grow and pass down to the future.
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david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (V)
david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (VI)
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david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (VII)
//Firfth[sic], three options exist for Taiwan to be a US territory such as an unincorporated territory (Guam), unincorporated unorganized territory (American Samoa) and incorporated unorganized territory (Palmyra Atoll). However, the best option would be to sign a Compacts of Free Association (CFA) with the US such as the Freely Associated States (FAS): Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. The FAS are sovereign, UN member states that have a negotiated bilateral CFA with the US. The US is responsible and has the authority for FAS defense and security matters.//
//Sixth, the US could make Taiwan a state. This proposal is not so far-fetched. In the 1850s, two diplomats stationed at the US Consulate in Formosa even proposed this policy.
In conclusion, the US and Taiwan should explore all of the above COAs and others in more detail to short-circuit future attempts by the CCP to annex Taiwan.
Appendix
Guermantes Lailari On Taiwan: Keeping Taiwan Safe: Best Possible Options
Taipei Times
3/3/2025
https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2025/03/03/2003832770
Why is Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) not a “happy camper” these days regarding Taiwan? Taiwanese have not become more “CCP friendly” in response to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) use of spies and graft by the United Front Work Department, intimidation conducted by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the Armed Police/Coast Guard, and endless subversive political warfare measures, including cyber-attacks, economic coercion, and diplomatic isolation.
The percentage of Taiwanese that prefer the status quo or prefer moving towards independence continues to rise — 76 percent as of December last year. According to National Chengchi University (NCCU) polling, the Taiwanese cohort who want “unification” with the CCP is shrinking — currently 13.3 percent (down from a high of 26.1 percent in 2018).
Consequently, Xi (or his replacement) will have only one alternative: applying Article 8 of the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, which states that if “possibilities for peaceful reunification should be completely exhausted, the state [the People’s Republic of China (PRC)] will employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.”
The CCP appears to be losing confidence in the “peaceful” unification plan with Taiwan. In June of last year, the PRC published a legal instruction enhancing the PRC Criminal Code, Articles 103 and 113 against “Taiwan independence diehards.” This new instruction clarifies punishments for those who support Taiwan independence, or organize, plot, or conduct schemes of “splitting the State or undermining the country’s unity.” Punishments for these crimes include the death penalty.
If the CCP were confident of “peaceful” unification, why would it update the law to increase threats to freedom-loving Taiwanese? Answer: the CCP leadership believes more coercion will make Taiwanese more submissive, cowardly, and unwilling to fight for their political independence and freedom.
Given that war is coming (although many Taiwanese — like Israelis on Oct. 6 2023 who thought Hamas was deterred — are in denial about the threat), this article provides the US and Taiwan “forbidden” suggestions by previous US and Taiwanese administrations and certainly by the CCP.
US President Donald Trump is an out-of-the-box thinker and an “uber” negotiator. His ideas for the US to gain control of Greenland, Canada, the Panama Canal, and even Gaza, have garnered respect and scowls. This article will get the same reception.
Listed below are two key challenges and six courses of action (COA) that could be pathways for Taiwan to avoid the CCP’s “red terror.”
Americans wonder whether Taiwan’s failure to prepare seriously to defend itself for war means Taiwanese do not intend to fight. Since last year, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) have eroded Taiwan’s defense through a series of legislative maneuvers: freezing budgets, reallocating defense funds to other purposes, cancelling investments or cutting new weapon systems budgets (e.g., the submarine budget has been cut in half, funds to develop unmanned aerial vehicles have been reduced, and efforts to counter CCP propaganda have been feeble). Taiwan must increase its defense capabilities to deter the CCP.
The public should demand an end to the turmoil in the Legislative Yuan that prevents growth of the budget to equip and train the Republic of China (ROC) military. The governing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) is currently gathering votes to recall at least 32 (up to 40) KMT/TPP legislators. If the DPP can change the composition of the Legislative Yuan to a DPP majority, then the DPP can address this challenge by increasing the defense budget to meet the needs of national security. President William Lai (賴清德) says that Taiwan would reach 3 percent of GDP spending for defense this year. However, barring a change in the legislature, the actual budget will be 2.45 percent, a decrease from last year’s 2.5 percent budget.
Taiwan has large foreign currency reserves (US$577.58 billion as of January this year) and holdings in foreign securities (US$1.3 trillion) or almost US$2 trillion in total. Taiwan is the fourth-largest holder of foreign currency reserves in the world, trailing only China (US$3.27 trillion), Japan (US$1.08 trillion) and Switzerland (US$822.0 billion).
Spending an additional US$20 billion per year from the foreign reserves (1 percent of total foreign assets) on defense to reach US$40 billion per year (5 percent of GDP) is doable. If the government does not spend it now, then someone else (the CCP) will.
On Jan. 27 this year, Trump proposed up to 100 percent tariffs on semiconductors made in Taiwan. The announcement shocked many Taiwanese since they believed that Taiwan would be exempt from tariffs.
How could this and other tariffs benefit Taiwan? I propose that the US use the income from these Taiwanese tariffs to pay for weapons that Taiwan cannot produce themselves. In other words, the defense budget for purchasing foreign weapons would shift from the Legislative Yuan to the US government. This means that money planned for Taiwan’s external weapons budget could shift to spending on extended training and more military personnel, especially reservists.
Most Taiwanese and Americans do not know that only 7 perccent of Taiwan’s 1.66 million reservists receive any training after they complete their mandatory service. Currently, during a two-year cycle, 50,000 personnel receive one week of training while 8,000 receive two weeks of training per year. In other words, every two years 116,000 reservists receive training out of 1.5 million available reservists. Moreover, the training period is not credible for preparing for war with China. [Editor’s note: Males are eligible for military service from the age of 18; according to the Ministry of Education, last year more than 86 percent of Taiwanese continued their studies at university after school.]
Taiwan must increase the numbers of trained reservists dramatically and the length of training should be at least 30 days every year (not every other year). This training should be the focus of the ROC military.
For comparison, starting this year, Israel’s IDF will call up 465,000 reservists for at least 42 days of operational duty each year. Israel’s population (9 million) is less than half of Taiwan’s population (23 million). If a smaller country like Israel can call up almost four times the reservists for 42 days of training every year, Taiwan should be able to train at least 1 million reservists annually for more than two weeks.
738,000 US reservists and National Guard members are required to serve a minimum of 38 days a year (one weekend per month and two weeks of training).
Originally, Taiwanese served two to three years depending on the service they chose. Currently, Taiwan’s conscription is one year. Other democratic countries such as South Korea (18 to 21 months), Singapore (22-24 months), Israel (36 months for men and 24 months for women) already do more time. The legislature should restore Taiwan’s required military service to at least two years. Increasing the time period served will also increase the number of personnel available, trained, and ready for combat. Approximately 100,000 males become eligible every year for conscription, which means that 200,000 trained personnel would be immediately available to support the active force.
But Taiwan needs to fix another problem. The new one-year conscription law allows too many exemptions. Last year, the ROC military drafted only 9,127 out of 107,713 eligible males (8.5 percent). An outside observer would note there are too many exemptions to avoid or postpone service. The sparse number of conscripts and lack of combat ready reservists means that the active-duty volunteer force of 188,000 will have to fight the full force of the PLA in a war.
Secondly, the CCP has its own timeline for a Taiwan invasion. Taiwan and the US need to change the calculus so that the CCP must re-assess and delay their timeline.
Thirdly, in 1955, US Congress passed the Formosa Joint Resolution authorizing then-US president Eisenhower to employ the Armed Forces of the United States for protecting the security of Formosa [Taiwan], the Pescadores and related positions and territories of that area. This Joint Resolution was the equivalent of Congress’ passing the Authorization for Use of US Armed Forces (AUMF) for then-US president George W. Bush in 2001.
If the US Congress updated the wording of the AUMF for Taiwan, then Trump could have greater freedom of action in dealing with CCP aggression and enhance deterrence. Additionally, the War Powers Act would also require Trump to inform Congress within 48 hours of his intent to deploy forces in and around the First Island Chain to proactively protect Taiwan, our allies (Japan, Philippines, South Korea, and others), and our vital interests.
Fourth, Taiwan and the US should re-establish a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). The MDT could be a bilateral MDT and/or a multilateral MDT to incorporate South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and others. This would be a rebirth of the Northeast Asia Treaty Organization (NEATO) + 1 (Philippines) which former secretary of state Dulles proposed in 1954. A nascent version of NEATO already exists with the US-Japan-ROK [South Korea] Trilateral Security Pact.
Firfth[sic], three options exist for Taiwan to be a US territory such as an unincorporated territory (Guam), unincorporated unorganized territory (American Samoa) and incorporated unorganized territory (Palmyra Atoll). However, the best option would be to sign a Compacts of Free Association (CFA) with the US such as the Freely Associated States (FAS): Marshall Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, and Palau. The FAS are sovereign, UN member states that have a negotiated bilateral CFA with the US. The US is responsible and has the authority for FAS defense and security matters.
Sixth, the US could make Taiwan a state. This proposal is not so far-fetched. In the 1850s, two diplomats stationed at the US Consulate in Formosa even proposed this policy.
In conclusion, the US and Taiwan should explore all of the above COAs and others in more detail to short-circuit future attempts by the CCP to annex Taiwan. The most successful scenarios for US COAs are tariffs, Taiwan AUMF and MDT due to their short timelines and the current US political support for Taiwan. The other options are less likely due to internal politics (COA #1), or the remaining COAs would take too long (#5 and #6). Let us hope that the US and Taiwan seize the opportunity to prevent the CCP’s red terror.
Guermantes Lailari is a retired US Air Force Foreign Area officer specializing in counterterrorism, irregular warfare, missile defense, and strategy. He holds advanced degrees in international relations and strategic intelligence. He was a Ministry of Foreign Affairs Taiwan Fellow in 2022, a visiting scholar at National Chengchi University and National Defense University in 2023, and is a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in 2024.
david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (VIII)
---往昔向美國政府提出「美國應該對福爾摩沙(台灣)主張主權」之倡議或建議的人士，清一色是白種的美國人，但在1994年出現的「台灣建州運動」則以福爾摩沙人的子孫為主導或主體，他們把一個半世紀以前Commodore Matthew Perry（白理）所規劃的路徑圖，以及Gideon Nye所做的擘劃，列入了工作議程。這些工作當然要包括文宣與組織，以便爭取台灣人民與美國人民對「台灣加入美國提案」的認同與支持，支持這個提案的台灣人民與美國人民就可或就會構建 "a well-established American community"，這個「基礎穩固的美利堅社群」就可向美國國會提出「台灣加美國之請願」。
---在台灣與美國的「美利堅社群」於「未來適當的時機」，向美國國會提出「台灣加入美國之請願」後，華盛頓方面就會或才會做出官方的回應，到那時，「美國到底會不會接納台灣?」這個問題才會有初步的或正式的答案，在此之前，「美國到底會不會接納台灣?」這個問題都只是學術性或假設性的議題，堅信「美國會接納台灣」的一方，與堅信「美國不會接納台灣」的另一方，即使論辯一千零一夜，也都無法說服對方。
---相信「台灣加入美國符合最大多數台灣住民的最大利益、台灣終將會被美國接納」的台灣住民勇敢地站出來，相信「台灣加入美國符合美國最大的與最長遠的國家利益」的美國公民(包括台裔美國人)義無反顧地站出來，一起來努力推動「台灣加入美國的提案」，這才是「台灣會被美國接納」的最大憑藉與保證。倘若被「美國到底會不會接納台灣?」這種學術性或假設性的議題無謂地困擾或糾纏，因而不願付諸行動或不願給予「台灣建州運動」實際的支持，那麼Commodore Matthew C. Perry所規劃的路徑、Gideon Nye所做的擘劃、還有周威霖等人描繪與舖陳的願景就永遠沒有走到、落實與實現的一天。
話雖如此，願意或有勇氣公開站出來支持，或與我們一起來推動「台灣加入美國」這個提案的人畢竟還是不多，之所以會出現這種落差，以及會有這種很令人遺憾的現象，之所以我至今會讓不少支持者及潛在的支持者失望，這當然事出有因。但無論如何，我當然不能為自己找藉口或理由，來為自己開罪。
縱然美國政府一再聲明「不支持台灣獨立」之後，也還是有很多人不去質疑，這是前民視的郭董今天能為「台灣獨立建國運動」造另一波勢的原因之一。就這一點來說，我們認為台灣的許多民眾還是獨厚「台灣獨立建國運動」的，他們慷慨捐輸，出錢出力，無怨無悔，完全沒有什麼條件或前提，他們只有無私的奉獻。
換言之，由於民進黨政府受到台灣內外部環境制約，因而無法帶領台灣人實現「自決與獨立」的目標，並因而產生了一些政治神棍，許多支持「台灣獨立建國提案」的台灣人，還一度以為台灣出現了「救星」，「台灣獨立建國運動」出現了曙光與突破。
那一小撮政治神棍深深了解許多台灣人殷切期待「台灣人出頭天」，也知道民進黨政府無法克服瓶頸，建立「台灣共和國」，所以他們知道他們的機會來了！他們開始假託美國，裝神弄鬼，製造神蹟，編織謊言。那些層出不窮與堆積如山的謊言，都指向一個目標，那就是他們要台灣人相信： 「他們才是美國政府溝通的渠道與對口，美國政府承認與接受他們為真正的台灣政府，美國準備把台灣的政權交給他們」。
可是那一小撮人所自組的「政府」與其「官員」卻會拿那些白宮的回信來大做宣傳，企圖欺騙一些台灣人與台美人，他們總是利用他們的小聰明，來騙吃騙喝與欺世盜名，雖然他們辦不了什麼對台灣人有幫助的正經事，可是他們就是樂此不疲。
那些以詐騙斂財為業的政治神棍，為什麼要這麼做？因為他們知道：只有讓台灣人相信，他們「很有辦法」，相信他們的主張與組織「得到美國政府的認可或支持」，台灣人才會跟著他們走。
正因為一般台灣人如此要求政治人物，所以有心搞詐騙的野心家與政治神棍，每天要想、要忙與要做的最重要的事是：如何讓台灣的民眾相信「他們與美國政府有官方的與正式的往來」；如何讓台灣的民眾相信「美國政府承認與接受他們的主張與組織」；如何讓台灣的民眾相信「他們的主張具有可行性」。
這些政治神棍選擇欺騙，並藉詐騙而起家，而事實證明，他們也的確是個中高手，他們讓許多台灣民眾相信「他們得到美國政府的支持」，相信「他們的政治主張可行」。
可是他們夜路走多了，最終還是會碰到鬼，他們的騙局終究還是會被看破與拆穿，不甘再被他們欺騙的追隨者與幹部終於忍無可忍，向檢調單位告發他們，檢調單位發現他們在過去十年，從台灣人手中詐得七億元，詐取到的現金堆滿衣櫥（「台灣錢淹腳目」的另一明證）。
由於「台灣獨立建國的議程」受阻，且由於過去十年，那一小撮政治神棍惡搞與胡鬧，所以我最近幾年碰到一些鄉親，他們之中有一些人會問我：「台灣若能加入美國，那是再好不過了，但是美國會要我們嗎（或者敢要我們嗎）？」他們在關心「台灣加入美國」這個提案的可行性。
從「把台灣變成美國一州」這個念頭，於1980年代末，開始在我的腦中萌芽與縈繞那時起，特別是在1994年我們正式推出「台灣成為美國一州」這個提案後，我就開始接觸與研究美台關係有關的（特別是涉及台灣本土人與美國的互動的）著述與文獻，我因而逐漸了解美國政府對台灣與台灣本土人（即福爾摩沙人，現在則要包括所有有「福爾摩沙認同」的台灣住民）的態度、立場與政策，這其中我最想掌握的資訊，是從19世紀中葉起（甚至是從早期美國政府開始與大清帝國互動之後），美國菁英與政府對在遠東地區（特別是福爾摩沙）進行拓殖與領土擴張一事的態度與政策。
台灣通Leonard Gordon的論文告訴我們：19世紀中葉與下半期，有若干十分具有遠見的美國人（海軍艦隊指揮官、外交家、傳教士、國際貿易商）陸陸續續向美國政府提出建言，呼籲美國政府對福爾摩沙主張主權或購買福爾摩沙，這其中有海軍准將 Matthew C. Perry、美國駐日本的首任公使Townsend Harris、美國的國際貿易商兼外交家Gideon Nye, Jr.與美國駐大清國的公使Peter Parker等人，可惜，他們的建議都沒有被當時的Franklin Pierce政府採行（註: 這個政府忙著在中南美洲與加勒比海地區進行擴張，對在遠東地區進行拓殖與擴張則缺乏興趣）。
//As Perry considered the strategic value of Formosa ------- In his report to the President, Perry virtually advocated an American protectorate over the island. He expressed the belief that "the United States alone should assume the initiative" in encouraging measures to better the political and civil condition of various Far Eastern countries, and it appeared to be his premise for taking positive steps in acquiring a foothold on the island. Perry believed that an American settlement in Formosa would have many advantages for the United States. He suggested that it would make a suitable entrepot for American trade, have strategic value in its naval and military position and yield large quantities of coal so necessary for the expanding commercial intercourse of America in the Far East.// （譯：Perry將軍相信，美國在福爾摩沙從事拓殖，將會給美國帶來許多好處，例如，它會成為很適當的、美國在遠東的商貿中心，也會給美國海軍一個具有戰略價值的基地）
Leonard緊接著說:
//The American government, however, virtually ignored Perry's project of obtaining a foothold on the island.// （然而，Pierce政府對Perry將軍要在福爾摩沙取的立足之地的計劃，卻予以漠視）
他談到Gideon:
//---- he expressed pleasure at the possibility of taking possession of the southern part of the island "in the interests of humanity and commerce." Nye also claimed that he would "assist in its colonization " if his actions were recognized and protected."
接下來，他提及Peter:
//A letter and memorandum by Parker indicates that they conferred on the matter and were in full agreement on the following views: ------ (3) Formosa was a most desirable island and would be particularly valuable to the United States------"
Pierce政府對這些建議與主張，沒有給予正面的回應，Leonard說:
//The Pierce administration in which [William] Marcy was Secretary of State was very actively expansionist. However, prime attention in the Far East was focused on the expansion of trade and not the acquisition of territory. Although Parker once expressed his belief that "America is known not to be a colonizing nation," he was following a contrary policy. Shortly after the Buchanan administration came into office, however, Parker received word that William B. Reed was appointed Minister to China, and all preparations for an expedition to Formosa ceased.// （Pierce政府其實是一個很積極地在進行對外擴張的政府，然而，它的遠東政策是聚焦在貿易的擴張之上，而非領土的擴張。在Buchanan繼任總統後，他任命Reed擔任駐大清國的公使，取代了擬佔領福爾摩沙的Peter，Peter擬遠征福爾摩沙的計劃就劃上了休止符）
//Prior to the abandonment of the expedition, Commodore Armstrong had sent Captain John D. Simms, of the U.S. Marines, to make the necessary preparations for a future claim to the island. -------- [William B.] Reed [Peter Parker的繼任人] soon decided upon a firm opposition to any such enterprise and was quick to express his approval "that the experiment which was then contemplated had been relinquished." Reed further remarked that "Eastern colonization is not yet part of our policy, and it is as well not to be suspected of it."// （在遠征福爾摩沙的計劃被放棄之前，美國東印度艦隊司令Commodore James Armstrong(他被Peter說服)指派海軍陸戰隊軍官Captain John D. Simms為佔領福爾摩沙進行必要的準備。但在William Reed接替Peter後，這項佔領的計劃就被終止。Reed認為，在遠東從事拓殖一事，尚未成為美國的政策的一部分，但同時我們美國人也不必懷疑它。註: Reed公使的意思是: 美國佔領與統治福爾摩沙，現在雖然還沒有成為美國的政策，但未來也可能會成為美國的政策。果然，在美日太平洋戰爭於1941年爆發之後，美國海軍系統就力主要進攻與佔領福爾摩沙）
專研美台關係史的美國學者 Leonard H. D. Gordon，在他寫的"Early American Relations with Formosa, 1849-1870”（美國與福爾摩沙早年的關係）論文，也提到在1860年代擔任美國駐香港的領事 Issac J. Allen，在美國南北戰爭之後，重新啟動美國要取得福爾摩沙的計劃：
//------ Issac J. Allen, American consul at Hong Kong, kindled the old fires regarding the acquisition of Formosa. He informed the Department of State of the interest at Hong Kong in the island of Formosa and frankly stated that "the acquisition of this great Island by our Government" was his main point of departure. He reported that "almost daily" he came into contact with Americans who indicated the necessity of obtaining a "port or station" where American jurisdiction would be paramount. Although he realized that it was not an American policy to acquire territory abroad, he believed that "for the protection of home interests" it would be permissible. Moreover, he thought that the acquisition of Formosa would be "the greatest boon that our Government could confer upon our national commerce in the East." ----- However, [the Secretary of State, William H.] Seward cautioned [the American Minister in Peking, Anson] Burlingame "that in no case do the United States desire to seize and hold possession of Formosa or any part of said island."// (這一段是 Leonard Gordon根據美國兩筆外交文件寫的：一筆是 Issac領事寫給美國國務卿Seward的信，4/7/1867；另一筆是Seward寫給美國駐大清國公使Burlingame的信，6/20/1867)
上面這一段有兩個重點:
(1)1850年代，美國幾位賢達建議美國政府對福爾摩沙主張主權，但因為Pierce政府對在遠東擴張領土缺乏興趣，而接任的Buchanan總統雖有很強的外交背景與經驗，但因美國南北衝突加劇與奴隸問題惡化，所以無暇西進。之後，南北戰爭爆發，美國已不可能再對遙遠的遠東的問題給
予關注。Issac在南北戰爭之後被派到香港擔任領事，他對美國取得福爾摩沙的計劃再度點火，他向William Seward主持下的國務院表達了他對取得福爾摩沙的興趣，他向國務卿報告說，「讓美國取得福爾摩沙這個偉大的島嶼，是他的主要出發點」。他致函國務卿表示，「他幾乎每天都碰到一些美國人，他們都指出，美國有在遠東取得一個港口或駐地的必要，而美國對這個港口與駐地，必須擁有至高無上的管轄權或主權」。他說，「雖然他知道美國有一個不在海外取得領土的政策，但他相信，為了保護美國本土的利益，在海外取得領土是可被允許的」。 Issac告訴國務卿，「倘若美國取得福爾摩沙，那麼美國在東方的商貿將會有極大的發展」。
(2)然而，Seward還是跟他的前幾任國務卿一樣，對在遠東擴張領土仍無興趣，雖然他有興趣在太平洋與阿拉斯加進行擴張。
Issac的外交文件的最後一部分，對美國官方（白宮與國務院）於1849-1870這段期間，對若干美國賢達的「取得福爾摩沙」的提案的態度與回應做了一個總結：
//The expansion, development and protection of trade was the focus of such attention as the Department of State gave to the Far East. Acquisition of territory was consistently viewed as undesirable -----//（雖然有東印度艦隊的司令官、美國駐大清國的公使、美國駐香港的領事、美國駐日本的公使，建議美國政府對福爾摩沙主張主權或購買福爾摩沙，在福爾摩沙進行拓殖，但國務院與白宮在遠東的擴張，都只是聚焦在貿易的發展與保護，而領土擴張與取得，則持續被視為不受歡迎的主張）
今天我就來援引與摘錄該書的若干小片段。但請注意，由於他是有「支那認同」的「在台支那人學者」，因此有用詞不當的毛病，所以有些用詞我會加以改寫或調整，以免我的鄉親看了吐血。（我調整過的用詞會加上”括弧”）
//道光十年(1830)，美國教士（David Abeel）航經（福爾摩沙）附近海面時，早就發出（福爾摩沙）應予注意的呼籲。他指出荷蘭人（統治福爾摩沙）期間所從事的基督教傳佈工作相當成功，接受洗禮的教徒為數可觀。荷蘭人被逐之後，原設教堂破毀，教士遇害，傳教事業隨而停頓，實在是一件令人痛惜的事。（Abeel）於其日記中透露，（福爾摩沙）當時依然變亂頻仍，否則在這個美麗的海島上，仍為宣揚基督教義的理想領域。
1832年，歐籍教士（Charles Gutzlaff）隨同英船至（福爾摩沙），看到淫佚的風氣正在瀰漫全島，而以各海口為尤甚，不禁大為嘆惜，深望基督教義再度傳入（福爾摩沙），以消除那些蝕害人類的流毒。
Gutzlaff的航海紀錄，次年即送至美國出版，所提將基督教義再度傳入（福爾摩沙）的意見，當然會受到美國教士們的重視。其後美國教士Edwin Stevens論到（福爾摩沙），對於前此荷蘭教士傳佈教義的功蹟，也表示不勝嚮往，字裏行間流露出希望基督教重行輸入的心情。//
//在商務方面，美國人尤其重視（福爾摩沙）的地位。1832年，原由美國人William B. Wood創辦並自行主編的"Chinese Courier and Canton Gazette"（[支那]快報與廣州新聞）刊出一篇題名（福爾摩沙）的文章，立論更為強烈------假如（歐美人士能在福爾摩沙）發現有適於建立殖民地的處所，無疑地，（福爾摩沙人）會樂於跟歐美國家的軍隊合作，以期實行對抗其苛酷的統治者---（支那人或清國人）//
//這樣一種企圖（獲取與經略福爾摩沙）的觀念，作者申辯絕非愚蠢的妄想，而為可以付諸實行的理論，且其結果必可獲致成功。一旦（福爾摩沙）與（支那或大清國）脫離關係，變成美國對（支那）貿易的一個站，一定可以得到巨大的利益-----。此外，一旦歐美國家擁有了（福爾摩沙島），就可控制介於支那與（福爾摩沙）間的海峽，所有（支那）沿海往來必須經過（福爾摩沙海峽）的船隻，隨時都可以加以遏制------。//
//說到獲取（福爾摩沙）的可能性，Wood認為沒有問題。//（Wood申論的理由略去）
//（在1830年代即造訪大清國的）美國海軍官員對於（福爾摩沙）也有相當前衛的主張。//（黃嘉謨的記述略去）
//（1857年春），美國東印度艦隊司令James Armstrong於徵得美國駐（支那的）代表Peter Parker同意後，特派所屬水兵隊長John D. Simms，以調查前年美國商船飛鳥號（The Highflyer）在（福爾摩沙）南端沿岸失事經過及其船員的下落為名，前赴打狗（註: 高雄）美商居留地（註: Gideon Nye & Co., Wetmore & Co., Anthon Williams & Co. 以及W. M. Robinet & Co.等美國商行的居留地）駐紮，其實際任務是代表美國艦隊在（福爾摩沙）建立一個營地，升起美國國旗，並蒐集各種有關資料，作為日後美國在（福爾摩沙）採取行動的根據。//
//可是，當Simms提出報告的時候，原計劃在（福爾摩沙）採取行動的Parker早已去職，Armstrong雖將此一報告以及Marcus L. Woodward等的報告錄送新任美國駐大清國全權公使William B. Reed核辦，卻避不提及當初派遣Simms到（福爾摩沙）去駐紮的本意。Reed發現Armstrong已經放棄在（福爾摩沙）採取行動的企圖後，十分欣慰。他認為東方的殖民事業，事實上還沒有成為美國政策的一部分。//
//首先建議美國政府購取（福爾摩沙）的美國人，以Townsend Harris為最具代表性。-------1854年，Harris鑒於（福爾摩沙）所具備的條件，對於美國而言，不但可作為美國海軍的前進基地，在政治及商務上也同樣的有重要性，特就其年來研究的結果，撮要備函專呈美國國務卿 William L. Marcy，主張自（大清國）的手中，將（福爾摩沙）取得。-----美國政府當時以實力所限，似無意在東亞擴張領土，對於購取（福爾摩沙）的主張，未予採納。//
//在Harris建議美國政府購取（福爾摩沙）的同一年，率領美國東印度艦隊遠征（支那海）及日本的Commodore Matthew C. Perry（白理准將）對於（福爾摩沙）也很有興趣，經過調查研究以後，他提出了在（福爾摩沙）建立美國基地的主張。-------他於啟航後不久，即向海軍部陳明此次遠征的行動，在與日本接觸之前，要先在日本以南的海洋中擇定適當的島嶼一二處，建立美國艦隊的集合基地。------美國總統Millard Fillmore對於Perry的此項意見，完全同意。-----然則此類基地的建立，應該擇定什麼地方？Perry所注意的目標，初時是琉球群島，其後則轉屬意（福爾摩沙）----他主張美國應單獨在（福爾摩沙）採取機先的行動。Perry所提的機先行動，是先在（福爾摩沙）建立一個美國殖民地（colony）或居留地（settlement），作為美國發展其東方商務的中心-----以及美國的海軍基地。//
//Perry的全套計劃，顯然是商務利益與海軍基地並重，他認為在美國國家立場上，應該沒有遭受反對的理由，因為一個商業國家的需要殖民地，幾乎與其需要運輸商品以從事貿易的船隻一樣，同樣是不容置疑的真理。不巧的是，原來支持Perry（白理）政策的美國總統Fillmore經已卸職，現任總統Franklin Pierce並不接納此項建議，原因是非經國會授權，美國行政當局不能遠到東方去佔據或領有像（福爾摩沙）那樣的島嶼。而美國國會方面，除通過議案請海軍部把Perry率領艦隊遠征（支那海）及日本的報告及圖表等件移送國會，並令將是項文件付印公佈外，並無進一步的行動，因此，Perry所提在（福爾摩沙）建立美國殖民地與海軍基地的主張，終於無法實現。//
由於Perry知道忙著在加勒比海與中南美洲進行領土擴張的Pierce政府，無心在遠東進行擴張，所以他預先提出了一個構想，他希望後世子孫能在福爾摩沙如此經營，以便實現他領有（福爾摩沙）的夢想。
一百年後，美國子弟George H. Kerr（葛超智，柯喬治）在其"Formosa Betrayed"（被出賣的福爾摩沙）一書中這麼說:
//In 1853-1854 Commodore Perry wanted to annex Formosa, but knowing that Washington would not approve, suggested a joint Sino-American economic and administrative program, indicating that he thought a well-established American community would in due course petition for union with the United States as the Americans in Hawaii were then proposing to do. He envisioned Formosa as an American outpost guaranteeing peace and order along the Western Pacific rim. // （在1853-1854，白理將軍想要領有福爾摩沙，但後來他知道美國政府不同意他的計劃，所以，他就提出一個「台美經濟與行政計劃」，該計劃要在福爾摩沙建立一個規模與有實力的美國社區或社群，以便在未來適當的時機，向美國政府提出加入美國的請願。他提出了福爾摩沙作為美國確保西太平洋的和平與秩序的前進基地的願景。]
Perry的願景正待「台灣建州運動」帶領台灣人民來實現，而「台灣建州運動」正巧把Perry所規劃的路徑圖列入了工作議程。
我繼續摘錄黃嘉謨所寫的書的若干片斷，雖然我不喜歡他寫的這本書，雖然今天摘錄的內容部分與過去摘錄的有些重覆。
//美商W. M. Robinet遵照（美國駐大清國公使）Peter Parker的請求，提送一件相當冗長的報告-------（該報告建議）假如美國政府鑒於（福爾摩沙）與美國疆界的距離過遠，不適於採取直接控制（福爾摩沙）的措施，至少也應實行從旁支持與保護的辦法，由美國公民自行在（福爾摩沙）建立一個獨立的政府（註: 這種想法與做法，跟那時在夏威夷的白種農場主、海軍軍官與傳教士的想法與做法一樣），也足可促進人道、宗教及文明的進展。-----Parker將有關的文件全部錄呈美國國務院，並備文重申其前此一再提及由美國佔領（福爾摩沙）的建議。（他還報告，在打狗的美商）已在（福爾摩沙）島上設有居留地，美國國旗且已在該地懸掛一年以上（註: Gideon Nye等美商在打狗設置美國的居留地，並插上星條旗）//
/ /直至2/27/1857，美國國務院才收到Parker的報告，國務卿William L. Marcy鑒於Franklin Pierce總統的任期只剩了幾天，而國會的現行會期又將結束，總統正忙於處理各種緊急公務，實在來不及把Parker的報告轉呈給總統，又鑒於Pierce總統前此對於法國所提採取軍事行動，打開到北京之路的建議，早已抱定不贊同的觀點，他因此基於Pierce的既定政策，逕自否定Parker對（福爾摩沙）的主張與提案。------不過，Marcy也聲明，所有關於（福爾摩沙）問題的公文，當然要移交給（下一任總統），而新執政者對於（福爾摩沙）問題，也許會有不同的觀點。-----（稍後於）James Buchanan當選美國總統後，-----另行遴任William B. Reed擔任Parker的繼任者，這無異否定了Parker的建議。[6/18/1857]，Parker收到國務卿通知其移交的訓令，他只好悄然地擱下其佔領（福爾摩沙）的計劃，踏上回美國的航程。//
在1870年代到19世紀結束這段期間，有幾名美國人在協助日本取得福爾摩沙，雖然美國政府沒有同意也沒有支持他們的行動。
由於大清國的官員認為「臺地生番，不隸版圖，為王化所不及」、「生番行同獸類，不可理喻」，這促成了從駐廈門領事一職退休的美國人Charles W. Le Gendre（李仙得、李讓禮）在1874年出版了一本小冊子---"Is Aboriginal Formosa a Part of the Chinese Empire?" （福爾摩沙原住民族居住區是支那帝國的一部分嗎?）。他認為也主張「福爾摩沙半屬獨立，番境不隸支那版圖」。
台灣的書市中有一本大開本的、印刷十分精美的書---"Charles W. Le Gendre: Reports on Amoy and the Island of Formosa"，這本書是李仙得在職時撰寫的，談他所認識與了解的福爾摩沙，我們目前在市面上所見的這個版本收錄了「福爾摩沙原住民族居住區是支那帝國的一部分嗎?」一文。
李仙得於1874年，協助日軍征討福爾摩沙東南部的原住民。
1895年，從美國國務卿一職退休的John W. Foster（1836-1917，他是1950年代的美國國務卿John Foster Dulles的外公）被大清國政府聘為顧問，協助談判與締結割讓福爾摩沙的「下關條約」，Foster也陪同清使李經方，至福爾摩沙北部的外海，與日軍統帥進行交割。
美國的戰地新聞記者James W. Davidson（禮密臣）於1895年前往福爾摩沙，採訪日軍接收福爾摩沙以及敉平福爾摩沙人抵抗的戰事，他前往日軍的大本營並陪同日軍進入台北城，他很可能在那時就與辜顯榮結識，這可能就是後來禮密臣與歡迎日軍接收福爾摩沙的台北士紳（李春生、英商John Dodd等人）結為莫逆的原因。禮密臣於1897-1904年間，擔任美國駐淡水的領事，他是一本有關福爾摩沙史的名著---"The Island of Formosa: Past and Present"（福爾摩沙島的過去與現在）---的作者。
在19世紀的美國先賢中，就美國對福爾摩沙主張主權一事，做了較大的努力的，除了曾擔任美國東印度艦隊司令打開日本門戶的Commodore Matthew C. Perry（白理）之外，就要數美國駐大清國公使Dr. Peter Parker，與在打狗的美商Gideon Nye, Jr.與William M. Robinet等三人。
//Nye was a splendid example of the type of individual often associated with the British Empire in its period of greatness --- men who welcomed the challenge of "the white man's burden" in Asia. In an American context we associate his type with the most flamboyant forms of Manifest Destiny. Firm in his own convictions, he advocated a policy for his government which contained a blend of arguments for the advancement of civilization, the spread of Christianity, the expansion of commerce and national interest, and a bold move in the game of power politics.// （奈基甸這位美國先賢十分推崇偉大的、歡迎接受「白種人的負擔」的挑戰的大英帝國，對他而言，美國人的版本就是「美國在亞洲擴張的天命」（註: 「美國的天命」的原始版本，是美國從大西洋岸到太平洋岸的領土擴張），基於他的信念，他呼籲美國政府在亞洲採取領土擴張的政策，具體而言，就是要領有福爾摩沙，他的論述建築在文明的促進、基督教的傳播、商業與國家利益的擴張以及大國政治的實踐之上）
奈基甸雖然年輕，但生意做得好，發了大財，但由於擴張太快，又碰到美國不景氣，所以他的公司垮了，他因此從大清國的廣州搬到澳門，幫一些商行拉生意，賺傭金，在那段人生低潮期，他設法尋找東山再起的機會。
大約在1856年7月（但也可能是在1855年間），設於廣州的、且已在福爾摩沙已建立了幾個據點的美國商行Williams, Anthon, and Co.派遣他到打狗的Ape's Hill（猴山）工作，這個據點已有一個身世與際遇還滿特殊、在世界若干地方有重要聯繫的、認識Commodore Matthew C. Perry的、已經歸化為美國公民的年輕人William M. Robinet在那裡工作，在Nye到了打狗之後，他們兩人就展開了商務與政治上的合作。
Nye寫了一份「台灣建州運動」（廣義的「台灣建州運動」）史上劃時代的文件: "Notes upon Formosa: Historical, Religious, Political, & Statistical, Including Observations Made during a Visit and Tour of the Island in 1855; With a Glance at the Private Inducements and Public Considerations for its Colonization by the United States of America "(Macao, 1857; For private circulation)。Robinet為這份文件提供了許多資料，因此，可以説他是該文件的co-author。由於Nye把這份文件寄給他熟識的麻州同鄉---曾擔任美國駐大清國公使的Caleb Cushing，所以，它就被收錄在"Cushing Papers"（顧興文件與書信集）之中。
Nye準備這份文件或報告的目的是，要開始在美國營造輿論，也要說服美國政府同意或批准他要在福爾摩沙為美國建立居留地或殖民地的計劃，也就是要對福爾摩沙主張主權的計劃。
為此，他在3/4/1857（他選擇那天寫信，是因為那一天是新任總統就職日，當時他人應該是在澳門）寫信給一些美國的政界與軍方人士，他請求他們說服美國政府（當時是James Buchanan政府，其國務卿是Lewis Cass），來同意或批准他的計劃或主張。
其中一封寫給他的同鄉與舊識Cushing，但顯然他找錯人，因為Cushing代表的就是「美國不在東方進行領土擴張，只尋求商業或貿易的利益的擴張」這一派或者是「美國在東亞進行領土擴張的時機尚未成熟」這一派。
//Nye told Cushing that the matter of Formosa pressed for instant solution. He begged Cushing to "hasten to communicate with the President and his Cabinet and all others of influence, impressing upon them the value in a pecuniary view and thus all but inestimable value in all respects --- moral, religious, commercial ----" of the island.//
他也要求Cushing把該信及附加的報告出示給主張領有福爾摩沙的Commodore Matthew C. Perry，他更期待Perry能再度率領艦隊來佔領福爾摩沙。
//Let Comm Perry come out overland to complete this matter and his Steamers & Ships follow as soon as possible, detaching some from the West Coast of America Station if possible quickly.//
Cushing雖然沒有支持Nye的提案的熱情，不過，他應該有把Nye的信件與報告轉達或出示給Perry。當時Perry賦閒，住在紐約，但在3/4/1858即蒙主寵召。在辭世之前幾個月，也就是在6/25/1857，他給Nye回了一封信，之後，在9/23/1857，Nye寫了一封信，回覆Perry。
6/25/1857那封信沒有出土，但Langley說，Perry無疑地很同情與支持Nye的提案。
Langley告訴我們，Nye在9/23/1857的回信中跟Perry說: "-------it seems to me lamentable that opportunities to extend permanent protection to our Flag in these seas should be lost by inaction." （看起來，這是很可惜也很可悲的，倘若由於美國政府的不作為，那就會造成美國在東亞這些海域永久插旗的機會失去。註: 「東亞這些海域」係指福爾摩沙及其周邊海域。） Nye請求Perry運用其對Buchanan總統及其他有力人士[如很有影響力的媒體The National Intelligencer的編輯Joseph Gales, Jr.]的影響力。來幫助他完成他的理想。但如我們後世的人所知，Nye的計劃沒有得到Buchanan政府的支持，此時美國已快要打南北戰爭了。
Langley說，由於Nye沒有實現他的美國領有福爾摩沙的計劃，因此，直到他生命的盡頭，他很可能都在為此事感到遺憾。Langley說: "As a long-time resident of China and as a publicist of sorts, Nye was active in the affairs of the American community in China until his death in 1888. While the subject of Formosa dropped out of his correspondence and public writings, it is probable that to the end of his life he regretted that America did not acquire that island during the troubled times of the late 1850's."
Prof. Langley 告訴我們：Cushing與Buchanan總統都沒有對Nye的計劃、主張、呼籲與請求給予正面的回應。
//It would be interesting to know the precise reactions of Cushing and Pierce（Prof. Langley搞錯了，應該是Buchanan總統，不是Pierce總統）to Nye's letters and printed material. From other information it is known that neither man supported Nye.//
Nye的失敗告訴我們：
第一，Nye當時已沒有很大的財力，而且Nye等美商並沒有像在夏威夷經營的美商一樣，在福爾摩
沙深耕（更沒有持續與長久深耕），沒有能成功地控制福爾摩沙的經濟。
第二，Nye這些美商跟在夏威夷的美商不一樣，他們沒有得到美國海軍與海軍陸戰隊的支撐，因為
美國海軍與海軍陸戰隊沒有駐紮在福爾摩沙。
1895年到1941年12月7日（檀香山時間12/7/1941清晨）美日「太平洋戰爭」爆發這段期間，由於福爾摩沙的主權已歸屬日本帝國，所以，美國朝野若是談論福爾摩沙議題，也是在日本內政的範疇內來談，但日本對美國發動戰爭之後，美國朝野的態度就開始改變了。在支那那一頭，被日本帝國的支那派遣軍打到就快完全潰敗與投降之時，不意不可一世的大日本帝國海軍千里迢迢去奇襲美國的夏威夷領地，招惹了孤立主義氾濫的，以及因致力於國內經濟復甦而自顧不暇的美國，導致美國對日宣戰，這讓不斷敗退、走投無路的支那人意外揀到一個便宜，由於美國大力扶持，實際控制支那國民政府的軍事委員會委員長蔣介石與他的黨羽，不但獲得一線生機，還開始展露要染指福爾摩沙、蒙古、滿州、東土耳其斯坦與圖博（甚至香港與琉球群島）、以進行領土擴張的狼子野心。
在美日「太平洋戰爭」爆發之前，亦即在8/14/1941，美國總統小羅斯福與聯合王國首相邱吉爾發表了「大西洋憲章」(The Atlantic Charter)，它的前三條是:
First, their countries seek no aggrandizement, territorial or other（第一點，美英兩國不尋求擴張，不管是領土的或是其他性質的）；
Second, they desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned（第二點，它們兩國不希望看到沒有出於相關人民自由表達的意願的任何領土改變）；
Third, they respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.（第三點，它們兩國尊重所有民族有在它們自己選擇的政府治理下生活的權利，它們也希望看到被迫失去主權與自治權的民族或人民能再度擁有主權與自治權）可是從事後的發展，我們看到美國在終戰前與終戰後的十年間(1942-1952)，就福爾摩沙主權與領土處分的議題而言，並沒有依循「大西洋憲章」的原則來進行處理，這種下了爾後的台海紛擾、台灣人受到支那威脅以及日後美支之間可能因為台灣問題而發生軍事衝突的惡因。
1947年3月，福爾摩沙人慘遭蔣介石派遣的支那軍屠殺之前，基本上可說，福爾摩沙人的菁英都未曾公開呼應「大西洋憲章」，起來尋求六百餘萬福爾摩沙人民之解放，一直要等到福爾摩沙人慘遭支那人屠殺之後，有留學美國經驗的廖文奎博士（Joshua Liao: Formosa Speaks---The Memorandum Submitted to the United Nations in September 1950 in Support of the Petition for Formosan Independence by the Formosan League for Re-Emancipation）才於1950年正式援引「大西洋憲章」，主張「福爾摩沙人民自決」與尋求「福爾摩沙獨立建國」，終結福爾摩沙被以美國為首的盟國，授權或委託來自支那的蔣介石統治集團佔領與統治的狀態。可惜為時已晚，因為手無寸鐵的六百餘萬福爾摩沙人，已匍匐在蔣介石的馬靴與刀劍下。如果在太平洋戰爭爆發後，能有福爾摩沙的菁英，在第一時間，向華盛頓與世界，發出福爾摩沙，要「加入美國」或「獨立建國」之訴求，那福爾摩沙人的命運，可能就會完全改觀，可惜那時的福爾摩沙菁英的思想，都還很落伍，連一個李承晚、金日成或胡志明都沒有。
以下的內容主要的參考資料是: Dr. Richard C. Bush（卜睿哲）：At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942 (M. E. Sharpe, New York, 2004)。
太平洋戰爭爆發後，美國政府若干部門都在沒有互相聯繫的狀況下（這也是小羅斯福總統刻意要這麼做的，他在胸有成竹、拿定主意之後，仍然故作神秘，把其他人都蒙在鼓裡，讓各單位仍繼續研擬方案），分別研擬與提出戰後的福爾摩沙處分方案（以國務院Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy的Territorial Subcommittee於5/25/1943所提的"Alternative Political Solutions"為例，戰後的福爾摩沙的處分，就有四種可能：
這一決定給福爾摩沙帶來了噩運與災難，當年六百多萬福爾摩沙人所繁衍的兩千萬子孫，至今仍是烏雲罩頂，腹背受敵，前景仍然十分黯淡，他們步履蹣跚地走在黑暗的隧道裡，看不到有陽光的另一個盡頭。
（由於小羅斯福與他的寵信，痛恨日本，為了懲罰日本，竟稱滿洲、福爾摩沙與澎湖群島是「日本從支那人手裡偷走的」，且置「開羅公報」中明言的"They covet no gain for themselves and have no thought of territorial expansion."（它們三國無意圖謀自己的利益，也無意進行領土擴張）這句話於不顧，竟欲將台澎交給支那，這簡直是胡鬧。台澎是滿洲人建立的大清帝國割讓給日本帝國的，不是日本人從支那人那裡「偷走」的，在台澎被割讓給日本時，支那人與福爾摩沙人一樣，都被滿洲人統治，位階相同，都是滿洲人的奴隸與臣民。滿洲人亡國後，又建立滿洲國，現在小羅斯福竟說日本人「偷走」了滿洲，這真是精神錯亂，胡扯瞎鬧）
關於「福爾摩沙獨立」這個可能的處分，國務院這個單位認為不太可行。
那時的福爾摩沙菁英，即便是受美國教育與有美國聯繫的廖文奎與廖文毅兄弟，在政治上都是笨笨的或低能的。（美國當年在重慶設有駐支那的大使館，美國政府當然會知曉那群「半山」在支那的活動與主張）
關於「福爾摩沙交由國際共管(即託管)」這項可能的處分提案，是把福爾摩沙的主權，直接與唯一地交給聯合國設立的國際機構或其他國際管理機構，國務院這個單位認為，支那人會對這種處分抱持懷疑的態度，是可以預期的。
雖然有這兩種處分的提案，不過，我們都知道，小羅斯福總統以及繼任的杜魯門總統，最後採取的方案，都是要在戰後把福爾摩沙「歸還」給「中華民國」。
從1950年(韓戰爆發那一年)或從1952年(舊金山和約與日蔣台北和約生效那一年)起，美國就不斷拒絕或否定「中華民國」、中華人民共和國對台澎的主權之主張，美國只承認或給予蔣介石流亡集團在台澎重建的「中華民國」與「中華民國政府」對台澎的「施政權」。
（其實，在韓戰爆發前，杜魯門總統就曾於1/5/1950發表的“Statement on Formosa”指出: "In keeping with these declarations(指「開羅公報」與「波茨坦公告」）, Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and for the past 4 years the United States and other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the island."。此處的"authority"就是「施政權」）
不過，美國政府也沒有對台澎主張主權，也不曾表示要佔領台灣（如杜魯門總統於1/5/1950發表的“Statement on Formosa”指出"The United States has no predatory designs on Formosa."美國對福爾摩沙沒有領土野心），雖然偶爾出現有美國人，如哈佛大學的費正清教授（Prof. John King Fairbank），私下曾探詢或嘗試「台灣成為美國一州」的方案。
台灣人這一頭，在「台灣建州運動」於1994年成立之前，也不曾有台灣人或台灣人的政治組織公開主張「台灣與美國合併」，除了於1940年代流亡在香港的廖文奎與廖文毅兄弟之外，當時他們曾一度公開將「台灣與美國合併」，列為台灣前途公投的四個選項之一。
1940-1950年代，不斷有台灣人及美國人（包括重量級的參議員與眾議員）提出「美國或聯合國託管台灣」之議，美國政府內部甚至也曾經研究（包括國會委託的研究）或討論（包括白宮國家安全會議的討論）過，但美國政府最終都沒有採行。倘若美國政府採行，那「台灣成為美國的一部分」，在1970-1980年代就不無可能實現。
韓戰爆發後，杜魯門總統的一項聲明，強調「台澎國際法律地位未定」的狀態，這種法律地位未定的狀態，透過1952年生效的「舊金山和約」而得到確立，雖然它還是不斷受到蔣介石流亡政權的質疑，及來自北京的挑戰，這些質疑或挑戰在1958年又達到一個高峰。
由於美國一直拒絕把台澎主權轉移給蔣介石統治集團及其「中華民國」，所以，蔣介石活著非常不踏實，他的人馬因此不斷向John Foster Dulles（後來擔任美國國務卿）進行遊說，Dulles為了應付蔣介石的人馬，所以就台灣與美國之間的微妙關係、台灣的法律與政治地位做了一些發言，那些有關的發言，被卜睿哲博士收錄在他撰寫的"At Cross Purposes"一書中，我在3/21/2008發表的一篇論文---「台灣與澎湖的主權在美國政府的政治監護之中」，就引用了這些材料，我現在把有關的部分張貼出來:
//我們現在試著引用深諳美台關係、台灣事務的美國在台協會前理事主席卜睿哲 (Dr. Richard C. Bush, III) 在 2004年出版的 "At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942" 一書第四章中所陳述的若干重要史實與論點：
(1) 美國在台澎主權之立場上，與國民黨政府不同。美國政府認為，台澎是美日太平洋戰爭後遺留未決的一項法律問題。
中國人總是說，「台灣問題是中國內戰遺留的問題，是中國的內政問題」，但「台灣建州運動」從一開始，就點明「台灣問題是美日太平洋戰爭遺留未決之問題，而在中國內戰中戰敗、流亡台灣的蔣介石政權，以法律地位未定的台澎為基地，與北京政權進行鬥爭，只不過是將台灣問題之解決複雜化，並將台灣問題之解決時間，予以無限期拖延而已。」
(2) 艾森豪政府時代的美國國務卿杜勒斯（John F. Dulles，在杜魯門政府時代，即已是國務院首席顧問，被杜魯門總統委以對日和約的起草與籌辦事宜）表達了「美國做為對日本的主要戰勝國，對台灣與澎湖最終的未來擁有利益」的立場與觀點（原文為 Also in conflict with the Nationalists' view of itself was the unchanged U.S. position that Taiwan and the Pescadores were a piece of unfinished legal business, left over from the war against Japan. Dulles's view, as conveyed to Britain and New Zealand was that the islands had not been ceded by Japan to China, and that the U.S. as a principal victor over Japan has an interest in their ultimate future."）
杜卿這一句話十分重要而且關鍵，它支撐及強化了「台灣建州運動」的一貫認知與信念：美國是太平洋戰爭的戰勝國，是台灣的解放者，它對台澎的前途解決，掌握了關鍵性的權力，它對台澎的未來扮演決定性的角色。
杜卿這句話也似乎在傳達一項信息：美國做為太平洋戰爭的主要戰勝國，對台灣事務與未來有發言權，美國對台灣的事務與未來加以發言或處置時，不得被指為對台灣或對中國內政之干涉，因為台灣的事務與前途，是美國的合法關切；美國對台灣的監護權，是因美國戰勝日本而自然或當然取得。
(3)艾森豪總統傳達給美國國會的觀點是：中華民國政府並沒有擁有美國決定要加以防衛的台澎之主權）。
從韓戰爆發後到「美蔣共同防禦條約」之談判與簽訂這段期間，蔣介石及其政權之代表，不斷向美國政府要台澎之主權，亦即不斷要求美國政府，在法律上承認中華民國及中華民國政府對台澎主權之主張，但美國政府始終加以拒絕，最後且在參議院批准「美蔣共同防禦條約」時，做出了保留，亦即該條約之簽訂與批准，並沒有改變「台澎法律地位未定之狀態」。
(4)杜勒斯國務卿曾對印度與緬甸外長表示，「美國本來可以對台灣進行法律的主張，因為美國擊敗日本，而且日本只是宣佈放棄對台澎的主權」（這句話的原文是： "To [India's foreign minister, Krishna Menon, and Burma's prime minister, U Nu,] he claimed that the United States could exert a legal claim to Taiwan because it had defeated Japan and Japan had merely renounced title over Taiwan."）
此一段談話極其重要，這句話如果翻成白話，那就是：美國在戰爭中擊敗及征服日本，台灣這塊原日本領土就是美國的戰利品，美國可以單獨對台灣與澎湖進行處分，美國當然也可以佔領及擁有台灣，就如同在美西戰爭之後，美國佔領及擁有關島、菲律賓及波多黎各一樣。美國政府是基於其他考量，而沒有對台灣及澎湖進行直接的佔領與統治，而且沒有對台澎主張主權。雖然美國在過去沒有提出要佔有台澎之主張，但是美國今天仍然可以做此主張，因為日本在「舊金山和約」中，只聲明放棄對台灣與澎湖之主權，但沒有言明收受國。
「台灣建州運動」主張「台灣加入美國，最終成為美國一州」，及主張美國將台灣與澎湖納入美國版圖，以增進及確保台灣住民的福祉，並維護美國的利益，絕非癡人說夢，絕非無的放矢，其理由與根據即在此。
(5)在多次的場合中，杜卿不斷重申美國政府的看法：在對日和約中，日本只是放棄了台澎主權，可是卻沒有將台澎主權交給任何國家。中華民國在某種意義下，只是一個「佔領國」，美國本身由於是對日的戰勝國，所以它對台灣擁有「剩餘權」（此段話之原文為： "On several occasions Dulles reiterated the the administration's view that the Japan peace treaties had renounced title over Taiwan but not transferred it, that the ROC was in some sense an 'occupying power,' that the United States itself had a 'residual right' by virtue of its status as victor over Japan, and that the current conflict impinged too much on U.S. security interests to be considered merely a civil war."）。
杜卿這段話與上一段話似乎有了矛盾，不過，我們必須了解他的發言背景，他之所以做此發言，是因為蔣介石的代表，不斷以「有效佔領與控制台澎」為由，要求美國承認中華民國對台澎的主權主張，杜卿因而退一步（這是律師出身的人慣性的思維模式與論辯技巧）向蔣介石的代表表明：即便你們所說的論點站得住腳，美國仍對台澎有「剩餘權」。（這個詞不能以法律或政治語言視之，而必須視為外交語言，它做為外交語言，仍然等同於「美國對台澎的未來有最後的決定權」或者「美國對台灣仍有監護權」，即使美國讓中華民國政府實際控制及統治台灣。）
在這部分談話中，杜卿跟蔣介石的代表說，若根據美國人所熟悉的"squatter"理論與實踐，實際佔領與有效控制台澎的中華民國，的確比其他國家更有權利或資格，對台澎的主權進行主張，不過，美國終究並沒有在法律上承認中華民國政府，對台澎的主權主張，亦即沒有將台澎主權移交給中華民國。//
我引用上述的材料，一來是要為我的論文---「台灣與澎湖的主權在美國政府的政治監護之中」---進行論證，二來是為了告訴我的台灣與台美鄉親：「台灣建州運動」主張的「台灣加入美國，最終成為美國一州」，就台美關係的本質來看，一點也不牽強，一點也不離譜。
「台灣建州運動」於7/4/1994成立，它是台灣人有史以來第一個公開主張「台灣應透過台灣人民自決與公投，加入美國，先成為美國的領地，最終成為美國一州」的政治組織，這距離美國海軍准將白理（Commodore Matthew C. Perry）正式向美國政府提出「將福爾摩沙納為美國領土」之議的1854年，已有140年。
在2000年代中期，台灣開始出現一股由一小撮政治神棍與「戰爭法、國際法理論家」（這些所謂的「理論大師」的研究風氣，是建州運動帶起來的，但他們沒有受過法學院的正規訓練，對法理與法律一知半解，走火入魔，且他們的主張與建州派不同）掀起的「自組政府」的妖風。
他們自組「政府」，在活動中揮舞著星條旗，在論述中常呼美國之名，讓民眾誤以為他們是建州運動的人馬，其實他們幹的都是在破壞建州運動的勾當，這使建州運動在2000年代下半期之後，出現了將近八年的衰退與逆轉，那一股破壞建州運動的妖風，直到最近兩三年，那些政治詐騙集團的斂財與詐術，被揭穿且被告到法院時才戢止。
針對何姓理論大師所寫的文章，我們撰寫了一篇文章回應，其部分內容如下:
//由於文章出自您之手，為尊重您起見，我也跟「台灣建州運動」發起人周威霖 先生報告，並請他指示如何回應，他於日前就已口述了回應之重點，但因為近日出現「軍購 」的重要話題，所以只好優先處理該議題，給您回應的事只好延後一兩天。
回應您的事之所以比較不急，是因為
(1)您的「台灣是美國軍事政府統治之下一塊海外的未合併領土」一說，已於今年4月24日被美國國務院「台灣協調科」科長夏千福 先生指為「沒有歷史或法律的基礎的揣測」，我們已多次在網路中加以披露，許多網友應已知道，
(2)您們過去在台美人社區及台灣散播「美國國會已聲明不接受新州」的不實言論及「建州在我們有生之年看不到」（您的人馬還有一度把它扭曲為「建州永遠不會成功」）等說法，我們過去一年來，即已陸續及間歇的加以回應。
您寫"Can Taiwan Become a State of the USA?"一文，並由您的人馬張貼在網路上，應該是對我們近一年來的回應的答辯，我今天要就您的答辯進行「再答辯」。
您使用英文進行答辯，我們則決定用漢文再答辯，以方便所有華文網路世界的朋友，來了解建州派的觀點。我們認為，若我們活動的網站的網友，多數能夠知道我們在說什麼，我們在網站上活動才有意義。
「台灣建州運動」在1994年即已誕生，比您發表您的理論及主張要早許多年，我們在公開推動「台灣建州」之前，當然已做過相關的研究（包括國際法、美國憲法與法律------等），發表了理論，也擬訂了策略。研究與建州有關的美國憲法條款及法律以及美國歷史，當然是不會跳過的階段與工作。
(1)美國憲法第四條第三項，載列「新州得被國會准許加入合眾國」一款。
(2)憲法規定，國會應根據什麼條件或準則來准許新州之加入，其中之一是（我們可以從第四條第四項推論出）要申請成為美國一州，「政治實體」必須具備「共和形態的政府」之要件。
(3)憲法沒有修正案，來排除「新州得被國會准許加入合眾國」一款之適用。
(4)國會不曾通過、總統也不曾簽署任何法案或決議案，來排除「新州得被國會准許加入合眾國」一款之適用，若有，當然是違憲。
(5)國會曾制訂有關法案來處理新州加入的問題，如1787年的「西北法案」(The Northwest Ordinance)。「西北法案」規定被規範的領土的政治組織分三階段：
(a)由國會所任命的總督與法官治理。
(b)若領土內有5,000名男性、自由、成年居民，該領土可成為一自治領地（self-governing territory），有一名由國會同意任命的總督，有它自己的立法機關，且有一名派駐在國會但無投票權的代表。
(c)若領地內的自由居民已達60,000名，在國會同意下，可成為美國一州，與其他原始的13州居於同等地位。
(6)但國會不曾通過任何法案或有法效的決議案，來規定成為新州的其他領土必須先經過「領地」（territory）階段，雖然許多州加入美國之前經過「領地」階段，但至少有Texas是直接從一個主權獨立的國家跳到州的階段。
(7)國會對新州或新領地申請案，是以個案審理之方式，設定不同之條件，例如，要求Utah領地先要禁止一夫多妻制，在條件滿足後，才核准加入合眾國，國會所設定的條件有時被聯邦最高法院否決。
(8)雖然憲法、法律、國會決議案沒有設定「領地」階段是新州加入之前提，但鑒於各種實際考量，「台灣建州運動」主張「兩階段加入美國」，第一階段是先申請成立「福爾摩沙自治邦」（Commonwealth of Formosa），亦即先成為美國的領地，在經過一段「台美整合期」之後，再進一步申請成為美國一州。
(9)由於
(a)台灣係在美日太平洋戰爭中，被美國從日本手中解放，
(b)盟國在「舊金山和約」中，將台灣的主權默示交給美國監護，台灣主權歸屬未定，
(c)「台灣關係法」明文規定，「台灣的前途，必須以和平方式解決」為美國之政策（此政策當然可以被解釋為隱含包括「台灣人民自決」之方式在內），
(d)聯合國憲章載列「人民自決」條款，
因此，台灣人民在「台灣建州運動」成為主流，且在美國政府認為適當的未來某一時機，即可在美國國會立法或通過決議案的情況下，進行「加入美國，成為美國領地」的公決，將台灣主權正式交給合眾國。「台灣建州運動」主張準用北馬里亞納群島加入美國之模式及程序，
來讓台灣加入美國，成為美國領地。
(10)美國憲法與法律並沒有規定任何要加入美國、成為美國領地的任何一個地方或政治實體，必須先與美國有prior relationship，雖然如此，我們認為台灣做為美國的解放地、監護地、保護地數十年的漫長歷史，已說明台灣與美國已建立了既深且廣的政治、文化、軍事、經濟、社會聯繫，在「台灣建州運動」成為主流後，被美國監護的台灣當然有權透過公投，把日本放棄的台灣主權正式交給美國，沒有任何國際條約、法律可以加以阻止。
(11)美國憲法及法律沒有規定，任何地方或政治實體要加入美國、成為美國一州或領地，需先經過當地人民公決，不過，基於美國及台灣所珍視及奉行的民主價值及民主程序，「台灣建州運動」當然要尊重台灣人民之意願，因此，主張透過公投，來讓台灣成為美國的領地，最後再成為美國一州。//
二十五 結論
鑒於
(1)美國憲法有「國會得接納新州」的條款，
(2)美國國會不曾通過會被最高法院判定為違憲的、「美國不再接受新領地或新州」的決議案或法案，
(3)美國在終戰後，已有透過人民自決與公投，將北馬里亞那群島納為美國的領地與領土、粉碎行政部門先前曾發表的「美國不再進行領土擴張」的政策與承諾的前例，
(4)在美國立國後，就陸陸續續有美國各界菁英（主要是美國的白種人）在公開或私下場合，向美國政府提出「美國應該對福爾摩沙(台灣)主張主權」之倡議或建議，在「美日太平洋戰爭」爆發後與終戰後，也都陸陸續續有美國各界菁英提出「由美國來直接託管福爾摩沙(台灣)」議，
(5)美國是對日作戰的「主要戰勝國」，也是原日本帝國領土的「主要佔領國」，美國對國際法律地位未定、主權歸屬尚未進行終局處分、主權尚在美國監護之下的福爾摩沙(台灣)的最後處分與歸屬仍有發言權。我們認為，今天的台灣住民（特別是台灣本土人與其後裔）可以嘗試也有
權利追隨往昔美國白種先賢之腳步，推動「台灣加入美國之提案」。
前面的第十節說：由於Perry知道，忙著在加勒比海與中南美洲進行領土擴張，Pierce政府無心在遠東進行拓殖或開疆拓土，所以他預先提出了一個構想，他希望後世子孫能在福爾摩沙經營，以便幫他實現美國領有福爾摩沙的夢想。
一百年後，美國子弟George H. Kerr（葛超智，柯喬治）在其"Formosa Betrayed"（被出賣的福爾摩沙）一書的導言中這麼說:
//In 1853-1854 Commodore Perry wanted to annex Formosa, but knowing that Washington would not approve, suggested a joint Sino-American economic and administrative program, indicating that he thought a well-established American community would in due course petition for union with the United States as the Americans in Hawaii were then proposing to do. He envisioned Formosa as an American outpost guaranteeing peace and order along the Western Pacific rim. // （1853-1854，白理將軍想要領有福爾摩沙，但後來他知道美國政府不同意他的計劃，所以，他就提出一個「台美經濟與行政計劃」，該計劃要在福爾摩沙建立一個規模與有實力的美國社區或社群，以便在未來適當的時機，向美國政府提出加入美國的請願。他提出了福爾摩沙作為美國確保西太平洋的和平與秩序的前進基地的願景）
往昔向美國政府提出「美國應該對福爾摩沙(台灣)主張主權」之倡議或建議的人士清一色是白種的美國人，但在1994年出現的「台灣建州運動」則以福爾摩沙人的子孫為主導或主體，他們把一個半世紀以前Commodore Matthew Perry所規劃的路徑圖以及Gideon Nye所做的擘劃列入了工作議程。這些工作當然要包括文宣與組織，以便爭取台灣人民與美國人民對「台灣加入美國提案」的認同與支持，支持這個提案的台灣人民與美國人民就可或就會構建 "a well-established American community"，這個「基礎穩固的美利堅社群」就可向美國國會提出「台灣加美國之請願」。
在台灣與美國的「美利堅社群」於「未來適當的時機」，向美國國會提出「台灣加入美國之請願」後，華盛頓方面就會或才會做出官方的回應，到那時，「美國到底會不會接納台灣?」這個問題才會有初步的或正式的答案，在此之前，「美國到底會不會接納台灣?」這個問題都只是學術性或假設性的議題，堅信「美國會接納台灣」的一方與堅信「美國不會接納台灣」的另一方即使論辯一千零一夜，也都無法說服對方。
相信「台灣加入美國符合最大多數台灣住民的最大利益、台灣終將會被美國接納」的台灣住民勇敢地站出來，相信「台灣加入美國符合美國最大的與最長遠的國家利益」的美國公民(包括台裔美國人)義無反顧地站出來，一起來努力推動「台灣加入美國的提案」，這才是「台灣會被美國接納」的最大憑藉與保證。倘若被「美國到底會不會接納台灣?」這種學術性或假設性的議題無謂地困擾或糾纏，因而不願付諸行動或不願給予「台灣建州運動」實際的支持，那麼Commodore Matthew C. Perry所規劃的路徑、Gideon Nye所做的擘劃、還有周威霖等人描繪與舖陳的願景就永遠沒有走到、落實與實現的一天。
台灣建州運動發起人周威霖
David C. Chou
Founder
Formosa Statehood Movement
(an organization calling for Taiwan's incorporation into the United States as a territorial commonwealth, leading to statehood)
第二本書是親台灣（親「台灣人」，也親「在台支那人」）的「台灣通」卜睿哲博士（Dr. Richard C. Bush）寫的"At Cross Purposes: U.S-Taiwan Relations Since 1942" (2004年出版)。
論文則是由專研美台關係史的美國學者Leonard H. D. Gordon寫的"Early American Relations with Formosa, 1849-1870)（美國與福爾摩沙早年的關係），這是他於1950年代在University of Michigan所完成的碩士論文。我拿來參考的三筆資料，含蓋了1784-2001這217年的台美關係。此外，我也參考及引用The Catholic University of America的Prof. Harold D. Langley在"The Pacific Historical Review" (Vol. 34, No. 4, Nov., 1965, pp. 397-420)期刊上發表的一篇論文，其標題是"Gideon Nye and the Formosa Annexation Scheme." (奈基甸與合併福爾摩沙計劃)，讓本文的論述更完整。
david chou
David Chou的大戰略是要將 "美國不讓支那邪惡帝國取代美國成為世界新Superpower的戰爭" 轉化為 "台灣民族解放戰爭" (IX)
(1-d-i)增強美國政府與人民對台灣與台灣人的政治/ 軍事/ 法律/ 道義支持;
(1-d-ii)動員更多美國人對台灣人的支持與協助;
(1-d-iii)促使美軍重新駐台與確保美軍介入台灣人的 “抗支保台戰爭" 或 “反支那侵略與併吞台灣的戰爭”;
(1-d-iv)容納愛台灣以及願意保衛台灣但又不願接受台灣獨派/ DPP/ DPP政權的鄉親, 讓他們可以成為 "抗支保台" 的正向力量;
(1-d-v)在我們這場戰爭勝利後的台灣主權最終歸屬問題 (或我台灣族人的民族解放) 的解決進行較好的準備.
2
請讓我們先提出FSM現在準備要在美國的台美人社區發展的幾個guiding principles [這同時也是FSM在美國的組織的mission/ purposes/ 工作項目]:
(A)要為 “台灣民族的最終解放” 建立基礎, 以便最終完成Formosan people (包括新台灣人) 的最終解放 [FSM認為, 台灣民族解放的理想形式是: (a)台灣加入美國, 先成為美國的organized, unincorporated territory, 經過一段時期的全方位整合後, 再成為美國一州; 或(b)在 “Pax Americana” 之下, 台灣成為美國的 “freely associated state” [這是主權獨立國家, 但與美國有特殊關係, 是美國的protectorate]; FSM追求與訴求的是(A-a), 我們建議DPP & 獨派追求與訴求(A-b), 這都是為了解決 “支那威脅” / “支那障礙”/ “支那麻煩”].
(B)要與(a)DPP/ (b)DPP政權/ (c)獨派/ (d)各族裔的美國人民與美國各黨派/ (e)各黨派的台美人/ (e)全世界友台的力量合作, 以取得 “抗支保台戰爭” 或 ”反支那侵略與併吞台灣的戰爭” 的最終勝利. 勝利之後, “支那威脅” 與 “支那障礙” 被排除或不存在之後, 我們才有機會進行台灣前途之解決.
(C)要與美國各族裔人民與美國各黨派一起來捍衛 “Pax Americana” or “U.S.-led & Rules-based Liberal International Order”, 這種世界秩序最有利Formosan people & FSM的生存與發展.
(D)現階段要捍衛在美國的Guardianship & Protection之下的台灣Autonomy.
(E)要與台美人獨派合作, 為未來的台灣前途解決進行若干必要的準備工作.
(F)要向美國各族裔人民與美國各黨派人士宣揚FSM的主張與理念.
(G)要帶頭捍衛美國在台灣的安全/ 戰略/ 政治/ 經濟利益, 要帶頭neutralize & counter在美國的Chinese American communities & Taiwanese American communities中有害台灣與台灣人的利益的暗黑勢力, 也要增進TRA所列的美台各項non-diplomatic relations.
(1)首先當然應認同FSM的主張---"台灣加入美國";
(1-a)"台灣加入美國" 可以是您的唯一選項, 也可以是您的第一選項. 若您還有第二選項, 那也只能是 "台灣獨立建國", 而非 "台灣被支那併吞" 或 "台灣與支那以任何型式進行政治聯合".
(1-b)您現階段也可以或必須支持或接受華盛頓的 "維持現狀政策" [因為那是Washington的現行政策, 我們很難加以挑戰], 但那只是過渡或過程, 不是台灣前途解決之選項或目標;
(1-c)您當然要認同與推動 "台灣加入美國", 但您不要或不宜反對 "台灣獨立建國", 您若反對它, 就會有害FSM跟獨派在 "抗支保台" 與其他議題的合作, 也會傷害David Chou 的感情, 因為David系出台灣獨立運動, 也因為David認為 "台灣獨立建國" 也是台灣前途解決的理想選項, 只是 "台灣加入美國" 比 "台灣獨立建國" 更為理想而已.
(1-d)您不必接受也不必承認 "ROC or ROC (Taiwan)" 對台灣的主權主張, 但現階段可以也必須接受 "ROC or ROC (Taiwan)" 對台灣的施政權, 但無論如何, 這也只是過渡.
(1-e)您不能反對FSM要跟DPP及DPP政權在 "抗支保台" 與其他議題合作, 您若反對, 就會有害我們要保衛台灣的工作與目標, 也會傷害David Chou 的感情, 因為他系出民進黨, 他不是被民進黨掃地出門, 他是為了發起與推動 "台灣加入美國", 才主動退出民進黨.
(1-f)您當然不能同情台灣那三股亂黨 (包括KP黨) 與其他暗黑勢力, 但您不必也不能與它們的supporters/ sympathizers/ "useful idiots" 為敵, 相反地, 您要爭取他們(她們)來支持或同情FSM.
(2)應在美國兩大主要政黨之間保持中立;
(2-a)您要跟美國兩大政黨及它們的從政黨員/ 要員/ 它們背後的支持勢力都保持親善, 都要爭取它們與他們的支持;
(2-b)在選舉中, 若您要對某政黨或某候選人表示支持, 都是私下為之; 若您要參加候選人的募款餐會, 那兩大政黨的募款活動都去;
(2-c)美國兩大政黨都在進行重組, 所以您要與那些退出主要政黨的要員也都保持親善, 都要爭取他們的支持;
(2-d)要identify but ignore美國境內那些不利台灣/ 台灣人/ FSM的勢力, 但對Chinese American communities/ societies之中親支反台的暗黑勢力則應正面迎戰或反制 [但要理解與尊重 Taiwanese American communities/ societies之中親近或同情KP黨的台美人, 不可樹敵, 若他們對您不敬或挑釁, 也儘量給予包容, 不與他們一般見識].