北京支共流氓政權是否計劃何時要入侵台灣不是重點
david chou
2026 (U) ANNUAL THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY", 這份報告其中有一段很引我台灣人.台美人.境內外敵對勢力的注意:
[to be continued]
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March 2026
DIVERSE THREAT VECTORS
MILITARY
The risk of conflict is heightened by major power competition. Beijing and Moscow view Washington and its allies and partners as aggressors, and hostile toward their interests in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. They could respond with force should they determine there are critical threats to their core interests.
CYBER
Cyber actors from China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and ransomware groups will continue to pose critical threats to U.S. networks and critical infrastructure. These global cyber actors almost certainly will continue malicious cyber activities because they gain unmatched intelligence collection value and financial incentives from these operations. These cyber adversaries also have the ability to pre-position or execute disruptive and destructive attacks against U.S. critical infrastructure and other targets. They continue to pour resources into operations to compromise U.S. systems and core global IT resources.
China is the most active and persistent cyber threat to U.S. Government, private-sector, and critical infrastructure networks, while Russia poses a persistent, advanced cyber attack and foreign intelligence threat. Both countries are continuing their R&D and pre-positioning efforts to advance their premier cyber attack capabilities for use against the U.S.
REGIONAL CHALLENGES
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea view the U.S. as a strategic competitor and potential adversary, perceiving it as a threat to their respective interests and ambitions, and seek to counter and undermine U.S. influence and power through a range of diplomatic, economic, and military means. China aims to dominate its region and challenge Washington’s leadership, promote its own multilateral and economic influence, and strengthen its military while viewing the U.S. as its main strategic competitor. Russia continues to challenge U.S. interests and power, seeking to restore its influence in the former Soviet space, particularly Ukraine. Iran’s strategic position faces extreme challenges as it attempts to address potentially regime-threatening conflict and the ongoing risk of domestic unrest. For now, it retains the ability to project power in the region and to suppress internal threats to the regime’s hold on power. North Korea is committed to expanding its strategic weapons programs, including missiles and nuclear warheads, to solidify its deterrent capability. However, even in an era of major power competition, these powers will sometimes have common or overlapping interests where they can cooperate for mutual benefit, as we saw recently between the U.S. and China with the Busan Agreement.
Asia
China Strategic Overview
President Xi and his government aim to achieve “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” by 2049. China will seek to increase its power and influence to shape its region and world events; create an environment favorable to Chinese interests; overcome perceived containment efforts by the U.S.; secure its freedom of movement at sea; reduce U.S. military presence and operations on its periphery; and fend off challenges to its reputation, legitimacy, and capabilities at home and abroad. China also sees benefits to and is prioritizing a productive, stable economic relationship with the U.S., as evinced by its approach to the Busan Agreement with the Trump administration.
Beijing has been deeply suspicious of Washington’s intentions and has long viewed the U.S. as pursuing a coordinated effort to contain China’s development and rise, undermine Chinese Communist Party (CCP) rule, and prevent the country from achieving its aims.
At the same time, Chinese leaders will seek to reduce tension with Washington when they believe that such efforts benefit Beijing, protect China’s core interests, and buy time to strengthen its position.
Beijing will continue to strengthen its conventional military capabilities and strategic forces, intensify competition in space, and sustain its industrial- and technologyintensive economic strategy to compete with U.S. economic power, making advances in the “Global South” in advanced manufacturing and the exportation of goods. China will likely continue working to maintain U.S. dependence on sectors such as critical minerals, energy storage systems, pharmaceutical ingredients, and UAVs, while accelerating efforts to reduce China’s dependence on the U.S. in sensitive or strategic areas, such as semiconductors and AI. In addition, China has shown its ability to compromise U.S. infrastructure through formidable cyber capabilities for both espionage and strategic advantage in the event of a conflict.
China’s engagement with Russia substantially strengthens Moscow’s ability to sustain the war in Ukraine and resist external pressure. China’s imports of Russian oil and natural gas provide key sources of revenue for Moscow, helping it weather international sanctions. China’s exports of dual-use goods and technology to Russia help sustain Moscow’s defense production while reducing its incentives to reach a cease-fire in Ukraine.
China–Taiwan
In 2026, Beijing probably will continue seeking to set the conditions for eventual unification with Taiwan short of conflict. China, despite its threat to use force to compel unification if necessary and to counter what it sees as a U.S. attempt to use Taiwan to undermine China’s rise, prefers to achieve unification without the use of force, if possible. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) also continues to develop military plans and capabilities for attempting to achieve unification using military force if directed to do so.
The PLA probably is making steady but uneven progress on capabilities that it would use in any attempt to seize Taiwan and deter—and, if necessary, defeat—U.S. military intervention.At times, it has increased the scope, size, and pace of operations around Taiwan.
The IC assesses that Chinese leaders do not currently plan to execute an invasion of Taiwan in 2027, nor do they have a fixed timeline for achieving unification. However, China publicly insists that unification with Taiwan is required to achieve its goal of “national rejuvenation” by 2049—the 100th year anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Beijing almost certainly will consider a variety of factors in deciding whether and how to pursue military approaches to unification, including PLA readiness, the actions and politics of Taiwan, and whether or not the U.S. will militarily intervene on Taiwan’s behalf.
Chinese officials recognize that an amphibious invasion of Taiwan would be extremely challenging and carry a high risk of failure, especially in the event of U.S. Intervention.
david chou
底下是非閉門會議記錄之中的幾個重點:
The IC assesses that China aims to elevate its own political, economic, military, and technological power to increase its own regional positioning and global influence to fend off threats to their interests. While there are challenging areas where interests diverge, President Trump's diplomatic engagements with President Xi to work towards U.S. interests have enabled progress where those interests align. The IC assesses that China continues to rapidly modernize its military forces across all domains in pursuit of its goal to achieve world-class status by mid-century. This includes building a force with the aim of being capable of deterring U.S. and allied forces in the region, and to achieve their stated objective of developing the ability to seize Taiwan by force if necessary. However, the IC assesses that China likely prefers to set the conditions for an eventual peaceful reunification with Taiwan short of conflict.
The IC assesses that China, Russia, and North Korea see the United States as a strategic competitor and potential adversary.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for being here today to all of our witnesses. So for more than a decade, the United States has tried to make a pivot to Asia in its national defense strategy in order to confront significant threats from China. For years, administrations of both parties have identified China as a top threat facing our country and worked to build relationships across Asia and deter Chinese aggression. At the same time, we have bolstered our European allies and asked them to contribute more to their defense to deter Russia. Directors Gabbard and Ratcliffe, would you agree that China and Russia are our primary geopolitical rivals? Director Gabbard?
Tulsi Gabbard (&01:52:04):
Yes, they are our primary strategic competitors.
King (&01:52:06):
Thank you. Director Radcliffe?
John Ratcliffe [CIA Director] (&01:52:08):
I would agree with that, although I don't think they're equal in terms of the threats that they pose.
Appendix
[Excerpts] Senate Intelligence Hearing on 3/18/26
Mr. Cotton [Chairman](&00:00):
... Worldwide threat assessment hearing. Let me begin by welcoming our esteemed panel of witnesses, the Director of National Intelligence, Tulsi Gabbard, the CIA Director, John Ratcliffe, the FBI Director, Kash Patel, the Acting Director of the National Security Agency and Commander of US Cyber Command, Lieutenant General William Hartman, and the DIA Director, Lieutenant General James Adams. Thank you all for your appearance today and for your service. I also want to offer a special thanks to General Hartman who is about to enter a well-earned and well-deserved retirement. General, on behalf of the committee, thank you for your lifetime of service to our nation.
(&00:41)
I'd first like to take this opportunity to commend the thousands of men and women in our intelligence agencies whom our witnesses represent. Our intelligence professionals are second to none. Because of their service, their dedication, and their sacrifice, Americans are safer at home and around the world. But because of the nature of their work, grateful Americans don't buy their lunch at restaurants or even have a chance to say thank you. So on their behalf, let me simply say thank you. I want to make two basic points this morning. First, the world is always a dangerous place, especially for America, but thanks to your agencies and President Trump's leadership, the world isn't quite as dangerous for Americans as it was a year ago. Thanks to the efforts of our military and intelligence personnel, including my fellow Arkansans who are now serving in the Middle East, the Iranian revolutionary regime that terrorized the world for 47 years is finally knocked on its back foot.
(&01:39)
Last summer, we devastated Iran's nuclear facilities. In recent weeks, we've eliminated Iran's top leadership, pummeled its military, sunk its navy, destroyed its missiles, neutered its proxies, and left its economy reeling. After 47 years of indecision and timidity, America has finally put our foot down. I'm also pleased to report that things have improved a lot in our own backyard now that Venezuela's illegitimate communist dictator, Nicolas Maduro, is rotting in a New York prison. Only the United States could execute a military and intelligence operation of this difficulty without a single American life lost. Our military is awesome, but these operations wouldn't have succeeded and they probably wouldn't have even been tried without timely, accurate, and fact-based intelligence from your agencies. These successful operations are a testament to our intelligence professionals' ability to expose and uncover critical details about America's enemies.
(&02:40)
So let this be a warning to those who wish America harm, we leave no stone unturned, and there's no one or no thing close to you that might not betray you. Today's hearing is an opportunity for the American people to hear an unvarnished and unbiased account of the remaining threats we face from communist China, North Korea and Russia to the East to Narco terrorist cartels here at home, these threats truly do span the globe. And for my second point, your agencies have improved over the last year thanks to reforms that has gotten them back to basics. Of course, my two points are related. When our intelligence agencies return to their core mission, stealing the secrets of our adversaries to deliver timely and needful intelligence, America is safer for it. These efforts are already bearing fruit. For example, last year, the CIA increased its foreign intelligence reporting by 25%. This year, the CIA is on track to hire and deploy more officers than at any point in the last quarter-century.
(&03:46)
While I'm greatly encouraged by the progress, more remains to be done. We must always equip our intelligence personnel with the tools they need to do their jobs well and execute their missions. That's why I fully support President Trump's request for a clean reauthorization of FISA Section 702. And it's why I expect a healthy intelligence budget request in the administration's supplemental appropriations request to fund operations against Iran and Narco terrorists. No doubt our military needs supplemental funding, but our intelligence agencies need it just as badly. Moreover, I urge each of you to continue to make personnel and institutional reforms that will cement these changes and foreclose a return in the future to bureaucratic bloat, political bias, and excessive caution within your services. When I became chairman, I promised real reform across the entire intelligence community. Our first Intelligence Authorization Act set the foundation for a more efficient intelligence community by, for example, reorganizing the ODNI, improving the security of CIA installations, and directing resources towards foreign intelligence collection and covert action.
(&04:58)
This year, I look forward to going further, namely by growing our cadre of collectors, making generational investments and core capabilities, providing new capabilities to defend our space assets, and further codifying reforms to guard against any future return of bloated and biased bureaucracy. I look forward to working with you towards these ends. I now recognize the vice chairman.
Mr. Warner (&05:22):