美國戰爭部次長Elbridge Colby接受NYT的Ross Douthat訪問時所釋出的訊息
david chou
美國戰爭部政策次長Elbridge "Bridge" Colby日前接受New York Times的專欄作家Ross Douthat訪問時所釋出的訊息 (I)
[摘錄與台灣有關的內容] Iran, China, Canada? A Defense of Trump’s Grand Strategy
A Pentagon official argues that “people can no longer take the United States for granted.”
By Ross Douthat
Produced by Sophia Alvarez Boyd
July 23, 2026
https://www.nytimes.com/2026/07/23/opinion/us-defense-geopolitics-elbridge-colby.html
First, China. In the first Trump term, you were part of the group that wrote the National Security Strategy that identified China as the U.S.’s geopolitical — I don’t know what language you want to use — but rival, adversary.
In the second Trump administration, there seemed to be a certain amount of internal debate about whether that framing is correct and whether you want to emphasize more hemispheric defense or defense of the homeland, and so on.
Give me your perspective: Is China the most important threat that the U.S. faces right now?
Our view, as the National Security Strategy sets out, is we’re going to have a strong denial defense along the First Island Chain, and we’re going to work with our allies and partners to make sure that’s the case.
Douthat: Yes, and is Taiwan considered part of the First Island Chain?
Colby: Obviously, I’m going to be careful about discussing Taiwan. As Secretary of State Marco Rubio pointed out, we have not had a change in our policy, but the overall goal is strategic stability.
To your second point about the policy on China, I think we also have to look at things across time. In 2016, President Trump was the first to really introduce that we needed to relook at our policy toward China across the board, with the economic piece obviously being vital as well.
We’re 10 years down the road. People sometimes say, “Oh, Bridge. You’re becoming such a dove,” or, “You’re falling away from your position.” I don’t think that at all.
Douthat: Just for backdrop, you wrote a book called “The Strategy of Denial,” which was a book arguing specifically that U.S. foreign policy should be oriented around deterrence against potential Chinese aggression in the Pacific. That’s the backdrop to anything someone says to you about China.
Colby: I’ve always been a realist. I’m certainly not an isolationist, but I’m also not an uber-hawk. One of the areas where I think I’ve been very consistent is focusing more on the reality of the situation — the structural elements — rather than the rhetoric.
I personally engage with Chinese counterparts. That doesn’t mean we’re naïve — to the contrary.
Douthat: What, then, is the structural reality, in terms of the actual balance of power? And how is it different from 2016?
Colby: There’s a couple things, and there are some areas where my own views have changed. I remember having a debate about whether the Chinese economy would ever pass the American economy in nominal G.D.P. — I thought it would — and I think the president deserves tremendous credit for ensuring the growth of the American economy.
Douthat: So you’re more optimistic about America’s economic advantages than you would have been eight years ago?
Colby: Yes, I am. I think that’s borne out by the performance. And for those who anticipated it, kudos. That’s one where I’ve altered my view.
Colby: A lot of that is financialization of the economy. Vice President Vance has been talking very eloquently about this. We need to reindustrialize. We need to be able to make sure that we can re-onshore some of these industrial capacities, because especially when you’re looking at military production, a lot of that is really about reindustrialization.
Obviously we’re also working with allies. The president set a new global standard of 3.5 percent on hard-core military spending. South Korea’s committed to that. We’re looking for other allies in the region to step up. The Australians are spending quite a bit as well, so that’s going to contribute as well.
Colby: Seize and hold the key territory of the designated ally and partner.
What we are trying to achieve along the First Island Chain is not regime-changing somebody and occupying their country and pacifying them, blah, blah, blah. No, no. It is about maritime and aerospace defense along an archipelago.
Douthat: OK. There were reports last summer -there have been a lot of stories about you in the press -which I may reference occasionally over the course of this conversation.
One such report said that you were pushing allies to clarify their own approach in the event of Chinese aggression toward Taiwan.
As you’ve said in this interview, the United States is famously strategically ambiguous in our own approach to what might happen if China were to attack Taiwan. Are we asking our allies to be less ambiguous than we are ourselves?
Colby: I won’t comment on specific conversations going on in the Pentagon. But people can, I think, fairly criticize me for my views or that maybe I’m too direct, or any number of things. I don’t think somebody can criticize me for being inconsistent or unclear where I’m coming from.
Of course, I’m not going to ask our allies to do something that’s way beyond what we would do. That violates common sense. That’s not realistic. What we are trying to do is put everybody on the same page in terms of whatever contingency they might be facing, whether it’s in Asia or Europe, and say: Hey, what can we reasonably expect?
With Japan, we’re having much more candid conversations. With Australia, we’re having much more candid conversations. And the different policy particularities come out in different ways.
I think the vibe and the message that we are trying to send, and that I think is being received, is: Oh, wow, these people are actually serious. They’re actually planning to potentially get into that conflict precisely so they can avoid it, because that’s the best way to deter a conflict, by everybody having a clear sense of what they’re supposed to be doing in that context. And oh, wait, I’m actually supposed to deploy forces that can do that?
Some people are really getting it. Look at Germany, for instance — just a historic change over the last couple years. They’re saying: Oh, the Americans are telling us, here’s what we need to be able to do.
The president has said he is really focused on peace. That’s what our agenda is about. Obviously, you have to be ready to use military force. That’s what we’re thinking about, but with the goal of peace and strategic stability.
I have had any number of people watching what’s gone on in the Middle East — with the Iran conflict, with attacks on our bases there, missile attacks, and so on — say that in the event of a conflict with China, the United States’ position right now is just untenable. That our bases and aircraft carriers around China are just not going to survive Day 1 to 20 of a conflict, and we will effectively have to fight our way back into the Pacific Theater in that kind of scenario, whatever is happening with an actual Chinese invasion of Taiwan.
This is something, by the way, that the president, whom you’re very careful to praise throughout this conversation, has himself commented on repeatedly: Oh, Taiwan, it’s so close to China, so far from the U.S.
Colby: You make a number of excellent points, and there’s a lot of realities in there. This is why you really have to scope your objective. What is it that we are trying to achieve?
We may be trying to project power in certain ways, but if China, in this scenario, were to try to project power, it would also be trying to project power over significant bodies of water, whichever of those areas you’re talking about. That’s a very difficult proposition.
Maritime warfare, amphibious warfare — it’s very difficult. You not only have to get someplace, you have to sustain those operations. That is very complicated. That is why obviously, we’re focused on ground forces, the presence operations of the Navy, etc.
At the end of the day, what’s really relevant in this context are platforms and munitions that can operate in heavily denied environments and reach out and achieve very significant effects, not perfection.