Border Z Vietnam

[David]

HANOIAug. 30 (Xinhua) -- Under a new circular issued by Vietnam's central bank, the Chinese currency renminbi, or yuan, will be formally allowed for payment in Vietnamese border areas with China, helping foster border trade between the two countries.

According to the circular on foreign exchange management issued on Tuesday by the State Bank of Vietnam, which will come into force on Oct. 12, individuals and certain kinds of organizations can use yuan for payment of goods and services, the central bank's Foreign Exchange Management Department said on Thursday, noting that payment can be made via banks or in cash in yuan or Vietnamese dong.

The organizations include commercial banks and branches of foreign banks licensed to conduct foreign exchange transactions in Vietnam; branches of banks located in border areas and border gate economic zones of Vietnam and China; those trading in duty-free goods, providing services in isolated areas at international border gates, or engaging in bonded warehouses in border regions; the Vietnam-China Border Gate Economic Zone; and others conducting payment activities in Vietnam-China border trade.

The new circular has completed a legal framework for payment in border areas, and standardized foreign exchange activities in the areas, Can Van Luc, Vietnamese banking and finance expert, senior advisor to the chairman of the Bank for Industry and Development of Vietnam, told Xinhua on Thursday.

The circular has concretized a decree on payment in border areas by the Vietnamese government, which took effect in January this year, and replaced a decision made by the central bank in 2004 on payment in yuan in the areas.

Nguyen Thi Mai, a 37-year-old Vietnamese trader in Tan Thanh border gate in Vietnam's northern Lang Son province bordering China, told Xinhua on Thursday that traders like her have already used yuan for payment with Chinese partners.

Vietnam exported 23.4 billion U.S. dollars worth of goods to China in the first eight months of this year, posting a year-on-year surge of 25.2 percent, according to the Vietnamese General Statistics Office.

Even as the Vietnamese government has kept diplomatic channels with Beijing open, it has also sought to assert and advocate for its own sovereignty and rights by diversifying its diplomatic partnerships and strengthening its own capabilities.

Fast-forwarding to 2020, the neighboring countries held celebrations to commemorate the importance of the relationship and project an image of diplomatic goodwill. Official state media on both sides reaffirmed that this year would mark an important milestone for the two countries that would deepen their already strong and friendly party-to-party, state-to-state, and nation-to-nation bonds. But despite these choreographed celebrations, all is not well between Hanoi and Beijing. In 2020, the relationship has been fueled by mounting tensions, a weakening sense of camaraderie, and a growing sense of competition.

This is not the first time that discord between Vietnam and China has surfaced. Across seven decades of formal diplomacy between the current regimes built on the preceding millennia of historical interactions, the neighborly image the two sides seek to project has experienced no shortage of challenges. While Sino-Vietnamese relations have gone through multiple cycles of deterioration and subsequent renormalization, this current moment is arguably one of the lowest points in the relationship since the 1980s. During that tumultuous decade, the two neighbors fought on the land border (in 1979) and on the high seas when China seized what Vietnam calls Gạc Ma Reef (also known as Johnson South Reef or Chigua Reef) in 1988, resulting in Vietnamese casualties.

Tensions eventually died down, and Hanoi and Beijing again normalized ties in 1991 with the goal of maintaining positive relations. The carefully worded statement to mark the occasion hailed shared principles of cordiality and common purpose as the purported guide for the bilateral relations: friendly neighborliness, comprehensive cooperation, long-term stability, and a future-minded orientation as well as four key symbolic roles as good neighbors, good comrades, good friends, and good partners.

The pandemic has been disruptive to international diplomacy, just as it has to so many other aspects of everyday life. It has affected regional summit meetings and consultations, delaying some and prompting others to be converted to online meetings. As the ASEAN chair of 2020, Vietnam has no easy task with seeking to continue dialogue, convene collective discussions over regional matters, and even conduct important negotiations, including on the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership or the protracted talks over the code of conduct in the South China Sea.

The challenges facing Vietnam have become even more complex in light of how the coronavirus pandemic has visibly weakened the international community and provoked a startling absence of international leadership. The United States is distracted, offering contradictory signals of abandonment and heightened competition with China over the region. Washington will remain focused on its own November 2020 presidential election.

The South China Sea, while important, will have to compete with many more pressing priorities. Given the circumstances, unless it becomes a campaign issue, it is rather uncertain how much support beyond sporadic diplomatic backing the international community will be able to provide.

The lack of an international governance framework for military AI poses risks to global security. The EU should spearhead an inclusive initiative to set global standards and ensure the responsible use of AI in warfare.

While disputes over the terrestrial border have been settled with the signing of a land boundary treaty between the two countries, the maritime border is currently undefined due to disputes over the ownership of territorial waters and islands, including the Spratly and Paracel Islands.[2][1]

The terrestrial border begins in the west at the China-Laos-Vietnam tripoint at the Shiceng Dashan peak.[3] It then proceeds overland in a broadly eastwards direction, albeit in a highly irregular zig-zag pattern, predominantly through isolated mountainous areas inhabited by ethnic minorities.[4] In places, rivers are utilised for short sections, such as the Lixian River, Red River, Nanxi, Sng Gm, Song Chay, and Jin Jiang. In the east, the border reaches the mouth of the Beilun/Ka Long River near the Chinese city of Dongxing and the Vietnamese city of Mng Ci, following the river through a marshland out to the Gulf of Tonkin.[4]

During the Vietnam War China backed North Vietnam with arms and aid, assisting the North in its eventual victory.[18][19] However, after the war ended in 1975 relations deteriorated over several contentious issues, such as Vietnam's siding with the USSR in the Sino-Soviet split, China's rapprochement with the USA under President Richard Nixon, disputes over the maritime border, and China's alleged support for minority insurgent groups along the border.[16][20][21] The final straw came after Vietnam invaded Cambodia and removed the Chinese-backed Khmer Rouge government of Democratic Kampuchea in 1978.[22] The following year the brief Sino-Vietnamese War broke out along the border; though China withdrew after only three weeks it remained in occupation of small strategic areas along the frontier, and low-level skirmishes along the border continued throughout the 1980s.[21][23][24]

In 1990, Vietnam withdrew from Cambodia, ending one of the major points of contention between China and Vietnam, and relations were normalised in November 1991.[25] In October 1992 the two countries began work on resolving outstanding territorial issues.[16] Both sides accepted the validity of the 1887 and 1895 lines, and a final boundary treaty was then signed on 30 December 1999.[16][17][21] The treaty was ratified the following year, and full demarcation then began, which was completed in 2008.[25][17] Out of a disputed territory of 227 km2 (87.6 mi2), China acquired 114 km2 (44 mi2) and Vietnam acquired 113 km2 (43.6 mi2).[26] In 2000 an agreement on the maritime boundary in the Gulf of Tonkin was agreed, however disputes persist over islands in the South China Sea.[25] Neither of the agreements signed by the two parties are recognized by the Republic of China on Taiwan and continues to claim the territory, as reflected in its official maps.[27]

China and Vietnam signed an agreement on border trade in 1991. In 1992, 21 border trade points (cross border markets and goods import/export but limited through access for people) were opened, of which four also served as border crossings.[28] Vietnamese living in the border region may enter China using a one-day border pass that reduces wait at Chinese customs.[29]

The cross-border supply of banking and financial services into Vietnam is subject to Vietnamese law and the international treaties to which Vietnam has acceded. In general, offshore financial institutions can supply the following banking services into Vietnam on a cross-border basis:

The Agreement contains multiple commitments by Vietnam on issues related to illegal timber, including commitments to improve its Timber Legality Assurance System; keep confiscated timber (i.e., timber seized for violating domestic or international law) out of the commercial supply chain; verify the legality of domestically harvested timber regardless of export destination; and work with high-risk source countries to improve customs enforcement at the border and law enforcement collaboration.

Together with the Philippines, Vietnam is on the front line of maritime disputes with China. The risk of armed confrontation is low but growing. Hanoi should redouble efforts to build confidence, starting with less sensitive issues, and to establish an effective Code of Conduct.

Ideally, all parties would bring their claims into conformity with international law, which would not only facilitate resolution of the dispute in the long run but also contribute to a maritime order that benefits all countries in the region. In the absence of such comprehensive easing of disputes, Vietnam and the other claimants should show greater determination to finalise their maritime boundaries and re-energise negotiations with China on a Code of Conduct for the South China Sea. Vietnam should also work with the other claimants to reduce tensions and cooperate where possible. It has had some success along these lines, settling maritime boundaries with China in the Gulf of Tonkin and its continental shelf boundary with Indonesia. More importantly, it has undertaken various joint fisheries, coast guard, hydrocarbon development and marine scientific research projects with China, the Philippines and Malaysia. Vietnam and other claimant states should leverage these experiences to come up with new initiatives to boost cooperation in areas of common interest, such as scientific research and law enforcement.

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