MEMORANDUM: Likely Supreme Court Outcomes in Louisiana v. Callais and LULAC v. Abbott Under Current Equal Protection Jurisprudence
AustinLiberator
I. INTRODUCTION
This memorandum analyzes the evolving jurisprudence of the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) concerning the role of race in redistricting and applies those principles to two pending high-profile matters:
- Louisiana v. Callais, concerning the Legislature’s adoption of a second majority-Black congressional district; and
- LULAC v. Abbott, concerning the validity of Texas’s 2025 congressional map.
Based on the Supreme Court’s recent decisions—particularly Alexander v. South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP, 602 U.S. 1 (2024)—and its increasingly rigorous evidentiary standards for proving unconstitutional racial predominance, the Court is poised to:
- Uphold the Louisiana map, affirming that its design complies with federal voting-rights obligations and does not constitute an unconstitutional racial gerrymander; and
- Reverse the lower court in the Texas case, holding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the demanding burden for proving racial predominance under the Equal Protection Clause.
This memorandum explains the relevant legal standards, outlines the Court’s current doctrinal posture, and applies that framework to both cases.
II. LEGAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING THE USE OF RACE IN REDISTRICTING
A. Strict Scrutiny Applies When Race "Predominates" Over Traditional Districting Criteria
Under longstanding precedent, state use of race in districting is subject to strict scrutiny only when race is shown to be the predominant factor guiding the map. See:
- Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993);
- Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); and
- Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996).
Racial predominance is a high bar. Plaintiffs must prove that race overrode traditional considerations, such as:
- compactness,
- contiguity,
- respect for political subdivisions,
- preservation of communities of interest, and
- adherence to longstanding district boundaries.
Merely showing that a district has racial consequences or correlates with racial demographics is insufficient.
B. The Supreme Court’s Modern Approach: Evidentiary Demands Tightened in Alexander
In Alexander v. South Carolina NAACP, 602 U.S. 1 (2024), the Court imposed an exacting evidentiary burden on challengers. It reversed a lower court that inferred racial intent where evidence showed only partisan motivations.
Key holdings include:
- Courts must not conflate race with partisanship, even if correlated.
- District courts must not “presume racial intent” from demographic outcomes.
- Plaintiffs must provide clear, direct evidence demonstrating that legislators intentionally made race the controlling factor.
The Alexander standard directs lower courts to exercise significant deference to state legislatures absent compelling proof to the contrary.
C. Compliance With Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act Remains a Compelling Government Interest
The Court has long held that Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”) may require states to draw majority-minority districts under certain circumstances. Compliance with Section 2 is a recognized:
- Compelling governmental interest, and
- Valid constitutional basis for race-aware—but not race-predominant—line drawing.
Section 2 remains fully enforceable even after Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013), which struck down Section 4(b)’s preclearance formula.
III. APPLICATION TO THE LOUISIANA CASE: THE MAP IS LIKELY TO BE UPHELD
A. The Legislature Acted in Response to Clear Federal VRA Obligations
Louisiana faced ongoing Section 2 litigation, with substantial evidence suggesting that a second majority-Black district was required to avoid minority vote dilution. Compliance with the VRA is expressly recognized as a compelling interest sufficient to justify limited use of race.
Unlike past racial gerrymandering cases, Louisiana’s map is not a discretionary creation but a statutorily grounded response to federal legal requirements.
B. The Districts Comply With Traditional Redistricting Principles
Unlike the highly contorted districts invalidated in Shaw, Miller, and Bush, the Louisiana district at issue:
- follows recognizable geographic lines,
- retains compactness, and
- respects established communities.
Media analysis, including reporting from the Washington Post, confirms that the shape bears no resemblance to the “bizarre” or “unexplainable except by race” districts condemned in previous cases.
C. Plaintiffs Cannot Prove Racial Predominance Under Alexander
Applying the rigorous evidentiary burden from Alexander, plaintiffs lack:
- legislative communications showing explicit racial targets,
- procedural irregularities,
- disregard for race-neutral map proposals, or
- contradiction of traditional criteria.
This lack of concrete proof means the challengers cannot meet the required threshold.
D. Likely Supreme Court Holding in Louisiana
Given:
- the legitimacy of the VRA justification,
- the conformity with traditional districting principles, and
- the absence of direct evidence of racial predominance,
the Supreme Court is likely to affirm the validity of the Louisiana map and reverse the lower court’s decision.
IV. APPLICATION TO THE TEXAS CASE: THE LOWER COURT IS LIKELY TO BE REVERSED
A. The Lower Court’s Findings Do Not Satisfy the Alexander Standard
The Texas district court relied heavily on demographic outcomes and statistical correlations. This is precisely the type of reasoning that Alexander forbids.
The Legislature asserted legitimate, non-racial motivations:
- protection of incumbents,
- partisan strategy, and
- continuity of existing district lines.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized that partisanship, even if correlated with race, is not unconstitutional.
B. Plaintiffs Failed to Produce Direct Evidence of Racial Predominance
The record in Texas lacks:
- emails,
- statements,
- legislative testimony, or
- expert findings
demonstrating that race, as opposed to partisanship, drove the redistricting choices.
Under Alexander, this evidentiary gap is fatal to plaintiffs’ claims.
C. The Lower Court Overstepped by Substituting Inference for Proof
Federal courts cannot:
- infer racial intent from racial patterns,
- assume race-based motives from the mere presence of minority population shifts, or
- apply strict scrutiny without clear justification.
The lower court’s reasoning is incompatible with governing Supreme Court doctrine.
D. Likely Supreme Court Holding in Texas
Based on the evidentiary flaws and doctrinal conflict with Alexander, the Supreme Court is likely to:
- Reverse the lower court,
- Reinstate the Texas map, and
- Issue guidance reinforcing the narrow definition of racial predominance.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the Supreme Court’s modern Equal Protection jurisprudence—anchored by the Court’s recent decision in Alexander—the challengers in both Louisiana and Texas face a steep evidentiary burden. The facts in both cases strongly favor the legislatures.
Likely Outcomes:
- Louisiana: The Supreme Court will uphold the challenged congressional map, finding that Louisiana acted within its statutory obligations under the Voting Rights Act and that race did not predominate in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
- Texas: The Supreme Court will reverse the lower court’s ruling, holding that the plaintiffs failed to prove racial predominance and that the Legislature’s partisan motivations fall within constitutionally permissible mapmaking discretion.
Together, these outcomes would reaffirm judicial restraint in redistricting disputes and restore primary authority to state legislatures to craft district boundaries within constitutional and statutory limits.