Private Q Evidence

[Amaia Novara]

Thispaper investigates the relative performance of enterprises backed by government-sponsored venture capitalists and private venture capitalists. While previous studies focus mainly on investor returns, this paper focuses on a broader set of public policy objectives, including value-creation, innovation, and competition. A number of novel data-collection methods, including web-crawlers, are used to assemble a near-comprehensive data set of Canadian venture-capital backed enterprises. The results indicate that enterprises financed by government-sponsored venture capitalists underperform on a variety of criteria, including value-creation, as measured by the likelihood and size of IPOs and M&As, and innovation, as measured by patents. It is important to understand whether such underperformance arises from a selection effect in which private venture capitalists have a higher quality threshold for investment than subsidized venture capitalists, or whether it arises from a treatment effect in which subsidized venture capitalists crowd out private investment and, in addition, provide less effective mentoring and other value-added skills. We find suggestive evidence that crowding out and less effective treatment are problems associated with government-backed venture capital. While the data does not allow for a definitive welfare analysis, the results cast some doubt on the desirability of certain government interventions in the venture capital market.

We are very grateful to Scott Stern, Antoinette Schoar, Josh Lerner and other participants at the Savannah NBER conference on International Differences in Entrepreneurship. We also thank participants at workshops at Carleton University and at the Ottawa Economics Association. Financial support from SSHRC grants 844-2007-0212, 410-2008-0331, and 410-2005-1174 is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

These waivers have included various features: enrollee premiums, increased cost-sharing, incentives for healthy behavior, reductions in nonemergency medical transportation, and premium assistance for private insurance in lieu of public coverage.2 Some states have combined various elements from this list. For instance, using waivers, Iowa and Michigan implemented Medicaid premiums, but offered beneficiaries the opportunity to lower those premiums by completing a health risk assessment, wellness exam, and preventive health activities. Other states have linked premium nonpayment to disenrollment. For example, Indiana imposes fees when people do not pay premiums and prohibits individuals who miss a payment from reenrolling for six months.3

This unified Agency-wide PSE Evidence and Learning Plan serves as a guide to set the direction for key activities that will strengthen and improve the use of evidence in decision-making on PSE approaches. The research activities resulting from this plan will contribute to a growing base of knowledge about how to mainstream PSE across all sectors of development.

In the implementation of this plan, we will work collaboratively with external partners (research institutions, think tanks, private companies of all sizes, partner country government agencies, etc.) to strengthen the evidence on effective PSE by both

Drawing upon USAID and partner experiences and efforts, this plan focuses on understanding how we can be most effective in PSE. USAID will also prioritize sharing knowledge and learning on PSE research and best practices with our partners as a way of deepening our collaboration with the private sector in achieving our development and humanitarian objectives.

The need to assess the level of EU and national funding stems from the important role that public funding can play in leveraging private funds. With a view to deploying financing at the needed scale, Article 30 of the Directive requests EU countries to facilitate the establishment of financing facilities dedicated to energy efficiency investments. It states that the Commission will evaluate the current state of public funding support and the capacity of EU countries to increase the uptake of private investments in energy efficiency. In this context, the Commission is also mandated to evaluate whether an energy efficiency mechanism is needed at EU level. In principle, this should take the form of a report to the European Parliament and the Council by the end of 2024, which may be followed, if appropriate, by a legislative proposal.

Available in all 24 official EU languages, both calls for evidence are open until 26 February. As part of the ongoing consultation process, the Directorate-General for Energy is also organising an online stakeholder workshop on Thursday 8 February 2024.

The past two decades have seen a dramatic increase in private equity investment in healthcare, a sector in which intensive government subsidy and market frictions could lead high-powered for-profit incentives to be misaligned with the social goals of quality care at a reasonable cost. This paper studies the effects of private equity ownership on patient welfare and spending at nursing homes. With administrative patient-level data, we use a within-facility instrumental variables strategy to address both non-random targeting of facilities and non-random matching of patients into nursing homes. The estimates show that private equity ownership increases short-term mortality by 10%, which implies about 21,000 lives lost due to private equity ownership over our sample period. Private equity ownership also increases spending by 19%, the vast majority of which is billed to taxpayers. We observe several channels that help explain the increase in mortality: declines in patient-level health measures, such as worsening mobility and elevated use of anti-psychotic medications; declines in nurse availability per patient; and declines in compliance with federal and state standards of care.

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We quantify the impact of scientific grant funding at the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on patenting by pharmaceutical and biotechnology firms. Our paper makes two contributions. First, we use newly constructed bibliometric data to develop a method for flexibly linking specific grant expenditures to private-sector innovations. Second, we take advantage of idiosyncratic rigidities in the rules governing NIH peer review to generate exogenous variation in funding across research areas. Our results show that NIH funding spurs the development of private-sector patents: a $10 million boost in NIH funding leads to a net increase of 2.3 patents. Though valuing patents is difficult, we report a range of estimates for the private value of these patents using different approaches.

This paper studies gender spillovers in career advancement using 11 years of employer-employee matched data on the population of white-collar workers at over 4,000 private-sector establishments in Norway. Our data include unusually detailed job information for each worker, which enables us to define seven hierarchical ranks that are consistent across establishments and over time in order to measure promotions (defined as year-to-year rank increases) even for individuals who change employers.We first find that women have significantly lower promotion rates than men across all ranks of the corporate hierarchy, even after controlling for a range of individual characteristics (age, education, tenure, experience) and including fixed effects for current rank, year, industry, and even work establishment. In measuring the effects of female coworkers, we find positive gender spillovers across ranks (flowing from higher-ranking to lower-ranking women) but negative spillovers within ranks. The finding that greater female representation at higher ranks narrows the gender gap in promotion rates at lower ranks suggests that policies that increase female representation in corporate leadership can have spillover benefits to women in lower ranks.

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The evidence in these guidelines is not an exhaustive list. SEVP may issue a Request for Evidence (RFE) to your school, through Student and Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS), outlining additional information to be provided by a specified due date. All documents are subject to verification.

How can we address this problem? Our research team, which included Alison Heape Johnson, Mattie Harris, and Sarah Morris, found evidence that private school choice can be part of the solution. According to our new peer-reviewed study, just published in Educational Psychology Review, private schools outperform public schools in forming citizens, particularly in promoting political tolerance, political knowledge and skills, and voluntarism and social capital. Religious schooling especially produces positive civic outcomes. In other words, increasing private school choice may help, not hinder, democracy.

Notably, religious schooling seems to play a particularly positive role in shaping civic outcomes, with a boost of 7.6% of a standard deviation. Even for the outcome of political tolerance, arguably the toughest test for religious schooling effects on civics, we found that there is, at worst, no effect relative to public schools.

It may be tempting to point to growing interest in private schools as a contributing factor to the civics crisis. But the data do not support the concerns of harmful civic effects from private schooling, either paid for by parents or accessed through the increasing number of school choice programs sweeping the country. Based on the empirical evidence, private schooling does not threaten democracy. Educational pluralism seems to be a boon, and not a bane, for civic outcomes.

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