FD. Are God Beliefs Special? A42 vs TB
Trance Gemini
Date: Wed, 3 Feb 2010 12:24:16 -0800 (PST)
Local: Wed, Feb 3 2010 3:24 pm
Subject: Re: For Answer: Details on the God Belief ...
On Feb 3, 7:05 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> > > So, in order to get this discussion out of my epistemic belief thread,
> > > and to perhaps address directly some of the issues. I have two main
> > > points to address here:
> > > 1) You have repeatedly demanded that I provide a belief that I hold
> > > that is like my God belief. However, when I do so, you say that those
> > > aren't the same. It is clear that we are working under different
> > > definitions, but I admit that I am at a loss since I can't find any
> > > set of attributes that you have ever said that clearly outlined what
> > > separates a God belief from any of the othesr a priori. Even in the
> > > latest post, you did seem to give at least two different accounts:
> > > a) "However, in the case of your god beleif, because of its root, the
> > > belief itself is about the existence of the source, and thus is
> > > special. "
> > > b) "Indeed, becasue the belief is ABOUT something real, not about
> > > something whose very existence is unverified, untestable and
> > > unfalsifiable. "
> > > Now, the former sounds a lot like difference is that the belief is
> > > about the existence of something, but we have tons of beliefs about
> > > the existence of things,
> > Such as?
> Um, you don't think that you believe that things exist?
Things that are real, yes.
However, I do not believe they exist, I KNOW they exist.
Now, I may have beliefs ABOUT those things, but that is different.
> > > and so it sounds like you are driving more at
> > > the latter.
> > The latter is just a justification of the former. They are one and the
> > same.
> Hardly. There are things that exist that we believe exist -- and
> don't know exist, or didn't always know existed --
Such as?
> that are in fact
> testable, verifiable and falsifiable, at least in principle. Thus.
> they are clearly NOT the same thing.
> > > So I will give an example of that: other minds. While I
> > > KNOW that I am conscious and have mental experiences, I do not know
> > > that -- I submit -- about anyone else. For very good reasons. So,
> > > that you or anyone I encounter has a mind is unverified, untestable,
> > > and it seems unfalsifiable. Thus, by b) it is precisely the same as a
> > > belief in God. And yet I don't think that you are uncommitted to
> > > other people having minds, nor am I.
> > Nice try, but you failed again.
> > And no, it is nothing like your belief in god.
> > While it is true that at some philosophical level you cannot ascertain
> > whether other minds exist, at least you know you have a mind (I hope
> > you do!). So, you know that minds are real. Again, your belief rests
> > on something that you know is real, as you can verify.
> > So, trying to ascertain whether other minds actually exist is at least
> > justified by the fact that you know that minds are real.
> Okay, this is just getting ridiculous.
The ridiculous part is the lengths you go through to ignore what I am
trying to articulate, which has been the same ever since we first
discussed the topic almost a year ago.
> I pointed out in this post that you had never clearly outlined the
> criteria you were using to judge God beliefs as different,
Yes, I did, many times.
All the examples you ever provided as beliefs rested on things we know
are real, therefore, those beliefs are statements ABOUT things known
to be real. Not so with god. The core belief in the case of god is its
very existence. Before anyone can make any statement ABOUT god, we
have to first accept, through pure belief, that god is real.
> and in my
> stupidity I still played along. But at this point, I have no clue
> what you could possibly mean and how you could possibly find a useful
I understand English is not my first language, but I did not think
that my posts were so hard to decipher.
> categorization here. And the thing is that since YOU assert that the
> God belief is different and since YOU claim that it is not special
> pleading, the onus is on YOU to provide:
> 1) A clear, unambiguous definition of the distinction/categorization.
A) You can have beliefs about things/concepts known to exist, either
directly or indirectly
or
B) You can have beliefs about things/concepts that exist only in our
collective imagination.
> 2) A clear justification for why that categorization is useful and
> meaningful.
In the case of A), we make statements representing what we think some
truth values are ABOUT those things on which the beliefs are focusing.
In other words, once the belief is stated, no one questions whether
the actual object of the belief itself exists or not. For instance,
you say things like "I believe 'M' about 'P'." No one needs to ask you
to prove that "P" is real. We can proceed directly to "M," i.e. your
belief statement and examine its meaningfulness, accuracy, etc.
Everybody agrees that "P" exists, so there is no need to ever preface
such belief statements with "I believe 'P' exists."
I guess we can divide A) in two:
A-1) You can make statements that are verifiable and falsifiable about
things that are known to exist.
A-2) You can make statements that are not verifiable and unfalsifiable
about things that are known to exist.
In the case of B) we first have to make a statement of belief
regarding the actual reality of the thing being believed in, and then,
once we have made a statement regarding its existence, without being
able to back it up in anyway, we can proceed to making statements
about that thing which we believe exist. However, in this case, many
people can, and quite rightly so, question whether those statements
even have any significance because the very object of the belief
itself is not known to exist, nor is it necessary that it exist. So,
here, we cannot proceed directly to "M," we have to question the
belief in "P" first. All statements of belief about "P" are double
belief statements, except when you claim "I believe 'P' exists." So,
beleif "M" is not meaningful or useful because "P"is not even known to
exist in any shape or form. Belief "M" is only interesting to the one
who holds belief "M."
I will also add in this category a special kind of belief. There are
things people believe about real objects/concepts, so, according to
what I have written so far, this type of beleif should belong to A)
above. However, these beliefs I am referring to are beliefs that are
verifiable and falsifiable, and that have been verified and falsified
as false beliefs. Yet some people still insists on believing that they
are true. Those are irrational beliefs, and as such are no really
different from a pure B) belief because they are useless beliefs that
are not stating anything meaningful in any way. Let's label those B').
> 3) A clear argument for why God in fact does meet that
> categorization.
I think the text under 2) is clear.
Note that I have stated this point many times, but you have always
refused to address it or claimed you did not get it.
> I've more than done my part by even TRYING to provide examples without
> having this, but at this point my patience has run out. I need you to
> do this so that I can:
> 1) Search through my other beliefs to find one that might match your
> critieria.
All the examples that you ever provided fit the A) pattern above,
under 1).
Only your god belief fits B). I have asked you to provide other
examples of belief you have that are similar to your god belief, i.e.
that match pattern B). You have either failed to do so [by actually
providing something that matched A)] or refused to try.
> 2) Decide whether or not that categorization really should matter in
> how we consider beliefs.
It certainly does.
> 3) Evaluate whether or not MY God belief meets your criteria.
It does.
> It is not possible for me to search through my beliefs to find one
> that meets your criteria if you are unable to communicate what that
> criteria is. If you refuse or cannot do so,
<Sigh>
I have done so many times.
Give me an example of a belief you have that similarly to your god
belief rests on something we do not know exist (and whose existence
cannot be verified or falsified).
See A) and B) above.
> then any reasonable
> person would clearly conclude that you are, indeed, resorting to
> special pleading
I hope the above finally makes it clear that I am not doing such a
thing.
> because even if there IS a criteria that makes God
> beliefs unique the evidence would clearly suggest that you do not know
> what it is.
Yes I do, your inablity to comprehend my posts or my inadequacy in
conveying my thoughts to you notwithstanding.
> Let me point out an oddity in this reply, just to get you thinking:
> Your claim here is that because I can perceive -- and therefore know
> -- that I have a mind, it is not the same to posit that there are
> minds in others because I am basing it on something that I know
> exists. However, my entire point was that from that we cannot
> conclude in any reasonable way that others have minds; that I have a
> mind does not prove that others have minds.
I know, and this is not what I was saying.
I was simply saying that in this case you DO know that "mind" is a
known verified real concept.
Period.
Now, when you go on about other minds, then yes, everything you say is
valid. But the core beleif is not "I believe that minds exist." but "I
believe that other OTHER minds exists."
Can you see the connection to your god belief here?
> Therefore, from this your
> categorization has to be "Based on or derived from something that is
> known to be real, even if the existence of that real thing does not
> necessarily support the proposition being considered". To which my
> reply for God would be: The Bible exists,
Yes, a book exist. We know that people write books. We know that
people write about whatever they want to write about, whether it is
something based on reality or something based on the fruit of their
imagination. So, a book, per se, can never prove that something other
that that book is real, unless something in that book can be
corroborated and is know to be real, such as a book of pictures
depicting the lichens that were observed in the Canadian tundra in
2004, for instance.
> and Christians exist,
Yes, Christians are people; and we know people exist. Furthermore, we
know for a fact that people can believe anything, regardless of the
actual reality of the thing being believed.
> so why
> does that not count?
The fact that a book exists and that people who believe in the content
of said book does not prove that said content is real, in fact, those
two things alone do not help one iota in establishing whether said
content is real.
> Certainly neither of those necessarily support
> the belief ... but then you cannot consider that to be a useful
> criteria because then other minds hits that, too.
> So I hope that you can outline your criteria such that questions like
> this are answered.
> > > 2) The claim about "supernatural". You got upset about my seemingly
> > > bringing up the term and commented that you hadn't used the word, but
> > > I hadn't said you did.
> > Upset?
> > No, just cautious and making sure we are on the same page.
> And, interestingly, you did that by focussing on the word and not on
> my point, since my point was explicitly THAT you didn't use the word,
> but it still influences your thinking.
No, it does not.
> > The point is, in the past, every time I addressed that concept after
> > it had been brought up (by other posters), you somehow objected to my
> > discussing the concept of supernatural. Yet, every single time you
> > seemed to ignore the fact that I was merely addressing a concept
> > others brought up; not a concept that I use or even consider
> > worthwhile. I am usually just indulging in what others are saying.
> > Again, I think that the concept is useless, misleading and
> > meaningless.
> Although my point is that you still seem to categorize things on
> nothing else than that classification,
And you are wrong.
> and your dodging my questions
> here hasn't addresed that.
If you want a "categorization", here is one I actually use:
i) There are things that are real
ii) There are things people imagine are real.
> > So, now, when you brought it up, I made a point of
> > 1) highlighting that YOU brought it up while it was totally
> > unnecessary to do so; and
> > 2) ignoring it thereafter.
> > > I did say that you seemed to divide things
> > "seemed" is the correct word.
> > In fact, I am not.
> Then you should have been able to answer my questions, and should be
> able to demonstrate that, no?
> > Others do, mainly those who believe in so-called "supernatural" things
> > and events.
> > For the gazillionth time, let me repeat that everything anyone ever
> > observes or reports about is part of the natural world.
> > Some of these experiences are confusing, misleading, rare,
> > coincidental, unexplained, illusory, etc.
> Do you have any list of the things that you consider to be those a
> priori, concepts that you consider to be more likely to fall into the
> latter category as soon as you hear about them?
> > > into two categories that just happened to map to what most people call
> > > "natural" and "supernatural". Now, part of this is again caused by my
> > > not being able to see exactly what criteria you used for these things,
> > How can I delineate criteria for something I think is useless and that
> > I do not use?
> Um, you use a criteria to distinguish God from other things,
See ii) above.
> and you
> also seem to at least potentially include other things in that
> criteria. Since you have never made that criteria clear -- ie what is
> or isn't a "mundane" belief -- my thinking that it happens to align
> with "supernatural" might be incorrect. But that's hardly my fault,
> since I'm working blind here.
No, you are not. I have repeatedly written that your god belief is
based on something we do not know is real, AND that cannot be
falsified, verified or observed; whereas every other example you ever
brought up rested on something we know is real and that can be
observed, verified or falsified.
Even with your latest one: "minds." I trust you can verify and observe
that your own mind is real, right?
> > When posters bring up the "supernatural" my first reaction, if I want
> > to discuss it, is to ask them what they mean by that, precisely
> > because as far as I am concerned, the concept is non-existent and
> > useless. Furthermore, because of the way it gets thrown around willy-
> > nilly, it gives carte blanche to anyone to bring up any fanciful topic
> > they want without first establishing the reality of said topic, such
> > as spirits for instance.
> Well, taking the above, if spirits
IF, indeed.
> are disembodied minds, and I know
> that my mind exists, and I can conceive of it being disembodied,
I can conceive of my mind being materialized in the shape of a
Chocolate Easter Bunny. So, what does that prove?
> then
> how is that in any way special? Or is it?
At least minds are real, so the belief that minds can be disembodied
in not similar to you belief in god. However, if you claim that ghosts
are disembodied minds, then you have a slight problem. People have
claimed that somehow ghosts had an impact on the world. So, you would
have to show that minds
1) can be disembodied
2) can survive death
3) that survive death and are disembodied can somehow interact with
the material world
So, if you claim that minds can be disembodied, can survive death and
can interact with the world, you are making a claim that fits A-2)
above, under your point 1). Which is not a very useful claim.
If, however, one were simply to claim that "Ghosts are real and I have
no idea what they are, but they are real." then this would be a belief
that matches pattern B) above, under 1).
> Seems that it might be exactly as real as other minds.
> > > but part of it is an impression I had about what you thought about
> > > other things. So, let's clarify by adding a few more things:
> > > Ghosts.
> > > Telepathy.
> > > Precognition.
> > > Clairvoyance.
> > > Which of these, if any, fall into the same category of belief as God
> > > does, for you?
> > Nice dodge, Allan.
> Um, it's you doing the dodging here. I'm asking if these things fit
> into the same category as God, so that I can address my impression
> that your category really is "supernatural", and that you don't want
> to address it. It has nothing to do with your demand that I provide a
> belief that fits your category. This is something that I'm ASKING
> YOU. The least you could have done was answer it.
Ghost: Do knot know what ghosts are, so, a priroi, this belief would
be in the same category as a god belief.
The other three: Every single test that was ever conducted to verify
whether those concepts are real were categorical failure. So, those
three concepts WERE verified to be wrong and WERE falsified. So, to
beleive in those things is to ignore the evidence and such belief are
irrational, see B') above, under 1)
> > I asked YOU to give me example of belief YOU hold that is similar to
> > your belief in god, i.e. a belief about the very existence of
> > something that is unverified, untestable and unfalsifiable.
> > Do YOU believe in any of these things?
> Are any of these in the same category as God?
What does it matter?
Do you believe in any of these things or don't you?
__________________________________________
Assure a man that he has a soul and then frighten him with old wives'
tales as to what is to become of him afterward, and you have hooked a
fish, a mental slave.
-- Theodore Dreiser
Trance Gemini
and A42.
Anyone else who wants to respond may do so on the thread of the same
title but marked PG.
Thanks for your cooperation.
Treebeard
that my classes are finished and so I don't have to do an assignment
for it or have to work to make up the hours.
> Yes, a book exist. We know that people ...
>
> read more »- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text -
>
> - Show quoted text -
Treebeard
clean up who's saying what. I'll leave out the examples at the end to
focus on the meat of the discussion.
Here's your view of the categories of "beliefs":
> A) You can have beliefs about things/concepts known to exist, either
> directly or indirectly
> or
> B) You can have beliefs about things/concepts that exist only in our
> collective imagination.
Broken down later and added to later as:
> I guess we can divide A) in two:
> A-1) You can make statements that are verifiable and falsifiable about
> things that are known to exist.
> A-2) You can make statements that are not verifiable and unfalsifiable
> about things that are known to exist.
> There are
> things people believe about real objects/concepts, so, according to
> what I have written so far, this type of beleif should belong to A)
> above. However, these beliefs I am referring to are beliefs that are
> verifiable and falsifiable, and that have been verified and falsified
> as false beliefs. Yet some people still insists on believing that they
> are true. Those are irrational beliefs, and as such are no really
> different from a pure B) belief because they are useless beliefs that
> are not stating anything meaningful in any way. Let's label those B').
Okay so far? Now let's start analyzing your categorization.
First, you were supposed to draw up a list of distinguishing qualities
of beliefs or claims, and then show that the distinguishing qualities
of beliefs like that of God made those beliefs irrational or requiring
special proofs. You didn't do that, as shown in the paragraph right
above: you instead divided beliefs up BY whether or not you consider
them irrational. This is somewhat circular, don't you think? After
all, we have to agree on the categorizations first, and then argue
over whether or not they can be divided into rational and irrational.
I will get into at least one of your justifications later, but this is
a problem with your basic approach.
So, let's start looking at them. And immediately, we can see a
problem: you talk about beliefs about things known to exist, and
beliefs about things not known to exist, but you're missing a
category: beliefs in the existence of things. Can I rationally
believe that something exists, even if I don't know that it exists?
After all, theism is about that sort of belief, and so if you want to
call it irrational you had better be able to address that specific
form directly. Which you don't, at all.
Next, it does seem that we need to have beliefs and even knowledge
about things that we only believe exist, at least at some level. For
example, I do know things about unicorns. I know that if something
was going to be a unicorn, it would be horse-like and have a horn.
All of this despite the fact that not only do I not know that they
exist, but that I don't even believe they exist. But we need this to
determine if these things exist, because they are the things that
would allow us to test if the thing existed. I submit that all of the
things that you rant about God being "beliefs about something that you
don't know exists" are, in general, those sorts of beliefs, and those
are required to do any identification whatsoever. There are
exceptions, but in most of our discussions it is only those properties
or things that should follow from them that are discussed.
Next, you have a justification for not believing things about things
that we don't know exist and why it is irrational:
> In the case of B) we first have to make a statement of belief
> regarding the actual reality of the thing being believed in, and then,
> once we have made a statement regarding its existence, without being
> able to back it up in anyway, we can proceed to making statements
> about that thing which we believe exist. However, in this case, many
> people can, and quite rightly so, question whether those statements
> even have any significance because the very object of the belief
> itself is not known to exist, nor is it necessary that it exist. So,
> here, we cannot proceed directly to "M," we have to question the
> belief in "P" first. All statements of belief about "P" are double
> belief statements, except when you claim "I believe 'P' exists." So,
> beleif "M" is not meaningful or useful because "P"is not even known to
> exist in any shape or form. Belief "M" is only interesting to the one
> who holds belief "M."
First, it strikes me that someone being able to question the first
belief is what believing is all about, as opposed to knowing. I
accept that someone could indeed challenge the basic belief, and even
that I could be proven wrong about it. I argue, however, that this
does not make the belief useless or meaningless. Just because I
cannot convince every single person that it is true doesn't mean that
it isn't true or even that it is not the best thing for me to believe,
even on the basis of probabilities. If I had to wait before I
actually knew things before acting on them, I'd never do anything.
Now, you can claim that you are just talking about entities, but I
submit that your rationalization goes further than that. It applies
to any belief that anyone holds where their belief is dependent on
another belief. So, for example, I believe that it will not rain
tomorrow or Sunday. Because of this, I believe that I will be able to
rake the yard tomorrow or Sunday, and so decide not to rake it today.
Now, my belief that it will not rain on either of those days could be
wrong, and someone may be unconvinced by it, so it seems to fit your
rationalization, but surely the above chain is not irrational, is it?
And if it isn't, how do you justify making the existential a special
case? Especially when we need to have at least definitional beliefs
about things that we are considering whether or not they exist?
This should do to start.
Answer_42
I did:
Known to exist vs. not known to exist.
> of beliefs or claims, and then show that the distinguishing qualities
> of beliefs like that of God made those beliefs irrational or requiring
> special proofs. You didn't do that, as shown in the paragraph right
> above: you instead divided beliefs up BY whether or not you consider
> them irrational.
Not at all, I was dividing according to the general consensus we have
that some things are known to exist and other are not known to exist.
I only used "irratioanl" to set apart a special type of beliefs, i.e.
the belief that something exists when it has been demonstrated
objectively that it does not. Don't you agree that such a belief is
irrational?
> This is somewhat circular, don't you think? After
I guess it would be if this is what I had done, luckily, I did not do
that.
> all, we have to agree on the categorizations first, and then argue
> over whether or not they can be divided into rational and irrational.
> I will get into at least one of your justifications later, but this is
> a problem with your basic approach.
It will be as sson as you can expalin why I cannot categorize
according to "known to exist" and "not known to exist."
> So, let's start looking at them. And immediately, we can see a
> problem: you talk about beliefs about things known to exist, and
> beliefs about things not known to exist, but you're missing a
> category: beliefs in the existence of things.
What?
How is "known to exist" and "not known to exist " NOT addressing the
core issue of existence?
You lost me there.
This was my actual intent, to address the fact that we know that some
things exist and we do not know whether others do.
> Can I rationally
> believe that something exists, even if I don't know that it exists?
Yes, this is possible.
> After all, theism is about that sort of belief, and so if you want to
> call it irrational you had better be able to address that specific
> form directly. Which you don't, at all.
Actually, I did, but obviously not as clearly as I could have.
Except that rain is known to exist.
So whatever belief you might have that stems from rain being a factor
will not make me say something like:
"Wait a minute, what is this "rain" you are referring to? How do yo
know it is even real?"
> tomorrow or Sunday. Because of this, I believe that I will be able to
> rake the yard tomorrow or Sunday, and so decide not to rake it today.
> Now, my belief that it will not rain on either of those days could be
> wrong, and someone may be unconvinced by it, so it seems to fit your
> rationalization, but surely the above chain is not irrational, is it?
> And if it isn't, how do you justify making the existential a special
> case? Especially when we need to have at least definitional beliefs
> about things that we are considering whether or not they exist?
>
> This should do to start.
My point is that if you are going to have belief of the type B), in
order for the belief to be rational, it must be based on something
that can be verified otherwise is is pure wishful thinking, i.e. an
irrational belief.
For instance, I think that Dark Matter is not know to exist with any
certainty (We don't have a box of dark matter to prod and examine).
However, measurements and observations plus mathematical
demonstrations seem to indicate that it does exist. We have some sort
of objective evidence for positing that it exist. Dark matter may not
exist; but, based on the objective evidence we have, it is not
irrational to believe that it does.
Where is that type of evidence for your god belief?
Finally, A) beliefs are not automatically rational simply because the
core elements in the belief are known to exist. This is why I
mentioned B') beliefs. I can see now that labelling it B') maybe the
reason you thought I was suggesting that B) beliefs are automatically
irrational... Sorry about that.
For example, one can believe that the Sun goes around the Earth. Both
the Sun and the Earth are known to exist, yet the belief is
demonstrably wrong. So, to hold such a belief in the face of absolute
evidence that it is wrong is irrational.
So, you see, contrary to what you seem to suggest I think, it is not
the case that A) beliefs are always rational and that B) beliefs are
always irrational. I do accept that it is true that I could have been
more explicit on that point.
I am saying that they are different, and that we must consider the
difference before judging whether they are rational or not since the
criteria for determining rationality are not quite the same.
Treebeard
avoid repetition ...
Um, no. You flat-out said "ABOUT things that are known to exist" and
"ABOUT things that are not known to exist", but your B' example seems
to be sticking some things in B even though they fit -- by your own
admission -- into A. That's the issue: why should those irrational
beliefs be called B' if you weren't saying that things in B were
irrational? What connection do they have to B? Why are they not
simply A beliefs that happen to be irrational?
[snip]
> > all, we have to agree on the categorizations first, and then argue
> > over whether or not they can be divided into rational and irrational.
> > I will get into at least one of your justifications later, but this is
> > a problem with your basic approach.
>
> It will be as sson as you can expalin why I cannot categorize
> according to "known to exist" and "not known to exist."
Sure, you can, but if you use this precise wording my immediate reply
is that you're talking about knowledge vs belief, which is not what
you were going for and tosses your justification out of the water. So
are you sticking with the inadequate "ABOUT things that are known to
exist" or moving to this one which is more inclusive -- it covers all
of the cases -- but then is a trivial distinction?
[snip]
> > Can I rationally
> > believe that something exists, even if I don't know that it exists?
>
> Yes, this is possible.
So, then ... what is the criteria for that? How do I determine if
such a belief is rational, in detail?
[snip]
Um, so? Your justification was that the belief rested on something
that could be challenged. As I stated, I don't see any reason to only
make the entity case an exception and not these cases.
>
> So whatever belief you might have that stems from rain being a factor
> will not make me say something like:
> "Wait a minute, what is this "rain" you are referring to? How do yo
> know it is even real?"
So why isn't it just as problematic for someone to say "How do you
know it will rain? I don't think it'll rain!".
>
> > tomorrow or Sunday. Because of this, I believe that I will be able to
> > rake the yard tomorrow or Sunday, and so decide not to rake it today.
> > Now, my belief that it will not rain on either of those days could be
> > wrong, and someone may be unconvinced by it, so it seems to fit your
> > rationalization, but surely the above chain is not irrational, is it?
> > And if it isn't, how do you justify making the existential a special
> > case? Especially when we need to have at least definitional beliefs
> > about things that we are considering whether or not they exist?
>
> > This should do to start.
>
> My point is that if you are going to have belief of the type B), in
> order for the belief to be rational, it must be based on something
> that can be verified otherwise is is pure wishful thinking, i.e. an
> irrational belief.
So, what do you mean by "verified"? This is a completely different
argument, it seems, since it seems to strike more at the testability
of a belief in God than anything else.
>
> For instance, I think that Dark Matter is not know to exist with any
> certainty (We don't have a box of dark matter to prod and examine).
> However, measurements and observations plus mathematical
> demonstrations seem to indicate that it does exist. We have some sort
> of objective evidence for positing that it exist. Dark matter may not
> exist; but, based on the objective evidence we have, it is not
> irrational to believe that it does.
Actually, this example is bad, since there were a lot of theories
about what Dark Matter was, and some of them didn't involve there
being real things at all. I agree that it is not irrational to
believe in any specific theory, but don't see how it impacts on the
overall stance.
>
> Where is that type of evidence for your god belief?
>
> Finally, A) beliefs are not automatically rational simply because the
> core elements in the belief are known to exist. This is why I
> mentioned B') beliefs. I can see now that labelling it B') maybe the
> reason you thought I was suggesting that B) beliefs are automatically
> irrational... Sorry about that.
Well, I still need clarification about why you called them B beliefs
at all, B' or otherwise. If A beliefs can be irrational, and B
beliefs can be irrational, then we need to delve deeper into what
makes things irrational because the categories you gave, clearly,
don't define it.
[snip]
Answer_42
And what is the difference?
> but your B' example seems
> to be sticking some things in B even though they fit -- by your own
> admission -- into A. That's the issue: why should those irrational
> beliefs be called B'
Simply because they are similar in that they are based on imagination,
not collective imagination, but an individual's imagination.
But we can toss that, it's not all that important.
> if you weren't saying that things in B were
> irrational? What connection do they have to B? Why are they not
> simply A beliefs that happen to be irrational?
>
> [snip]
>
> > > all, we have to agree on the categorizations first, and then argue
> > > over whether or not they can be divided into rational and irrational.
> > > I will get into at least one of your justifications later, but this is
> > > a problem with your basic approach.
>
> > It will be as sson as you can expalin why I cannot categorize
> > according to "known to exist" and "not known to exist."
>
> Sure, you can, but if you use this precise wording my immediate reply
> is that you're talking about knowledge vs belief, which is not what
> you were going for and tosses your justification out of the water.
Not really, unless you are saying that one cannot have beliefs about
things that are known to exist, IOW, a belief, not knowledge.
And that is the crux of the matter, one can have beliefs about things
that are factually known to exist (in other words, beliefs about
knowledge) and one can have beliefs about beliefs (things that are not
known to exist, i.e about which it can be said that we have no factual
knowledge).
> So
> are you sticking with the inadequate "ABOUT things that are known to
> exist" or moving to this one which is more inclusive -- it covers all
> of the cases -- but then is a trivial distinction?
It is not trivial.
Beliefs about knowledge are very different from beliefs about beliefs.
> [snip]
>
> > > Can I rationally
> > > believe that something exists, even if I don't know that it exists?
>
> > Yes, this is possible.
>
> So, then ... what is the criteria for that? How do I determine if
> such a belief is rational, in detail?
Logical necessity and indirect evidence.
(See the dark matter example.)
No, it was the existence of the object of the belief that can be
challenged. The existence of rain cannot be challenged, it is a fact
that rain occurs on this planet.
> As I stated, I don't see any reason to only
> make the entity case an exception and not these cases.
>
>
>
> > So whatever belief you might have that stems from rain being a factor
> > will not make me say something like:
> > "Wait a minute, what is this "rain" you are referring to? How do yo
> > know it is even real?"
>
> So why isn't it just as problematic for someone to say "How do you
> know it will rain? I don't think it'll rain!".
It is not problematic in either case, both are rational beliefs.
> > > tomorrow or Sunday. Because of this, I believe that I will be able to
> > > rake the yard tomorrow or Sunday, and so decide not to rake it today.
> > > Now, my belief that it will not rain on either of those days could be
> > > wrong, and someone may be unconvinced by it, so it seems to fit your
> > > rationalization, but surely the above chain is not irrational, is it?
> > > And if it isn't, how do you justify making the existential a special
> > > case? Especially when we need to have at least definitional beliefs
> > > about things that we are considering whether or not they exist?
>
> > > This should do to start.
>
> > My point is that if you are going to have belief of the type B), in
> > order for the belief to be rational, it must be based on something
> > that can be verified otherwise is is pure wishful thinking, i.e. an
> > irrational belief.
>
> So, what do you mean by "verified"? This is a completely different
> argument, it seems, since it seems to strike more at the testability
> of a belief in God than anything else.
It is not about the testability of the belief itself, but about the
testability of the object of the belief.
> > For instance, I think that Dark Matter is not know to exist with any
> > certainty (We don't have a box of dark matter to prod and examine).
> > However, measurements and observations plus mathematical
> > demonstrations seem to indicate that it does exist. We have some sort
> > of objective evidence for positing that it exist. Dark matter may not
> > exist; but, based on the objective evidence we have, it is not
> > irrational to believe that it does.
>
> Actually, this example is bad, since there were a lot of theories
> about what Dark Matter was, and some of them didn't involve there
> being real things at all.
Totally irrelevant.
The point is that there was a logical necessity and observations
implied that such a thing had a strong chance of existing. Its exact
nature is a different story.
> agree that it is not irrational to
> believe in any specific theory, but don't see how it impacts on the
> overall stance.
It is the whole stance.
A belief in something that is not known to factually exist can only be
called rational if there exist some observation that leads to the
conclusion that the object of the belief might be real and/or if there
exist a logical necessity to posit its existence even though we cannot
directly observe the object in question.
In such a case it is also rational to hold additional beliefs about
the belief, such as beliefs regarding the origin, the nature,
location, etc.
However, if the core belief is not warranted in any way and rest on
personal fiat (Am I using that word correctly?), then any beliefs
about such an irrational belief will also be irrational, the core
being irrational itself.
Treebeard
what you might mean here, so let's examine this question:
Let's say that I have a belief B that a thing T exists. Let's say
that that belief is rational but that I don't know that T exists.
Now, imagine that I have a belief B' about T (other than existence).
The question is: Does the fact that I only have B make B' irrational?
[spoiler space; I'd like you to answer without seeing the consequences
first]
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
If your answer is "Yes", then that is hugely problematic, since it
implies that I cannot have beliefs about things that I rationally
believe exist.
If your answer is "No", then your claim reduces to "beliefs about
something that I only believe exists are only rational if the belief
in the existence of that thing is rational". Which gets us right back
where we started: how do we tell if a belief is rational?
Answer_42
> I'm going to have to drag this down to bare bones before I can see
> what you might mean here, so let's examine this question:
>
> Let's say that I have a belief B that a thing T exists. Let's say
> that that belief is rational but that I don't know that T exists.
> Now, imagine that I have a belief B' about T (other than existence).
> The question is: Does the fact that I only have B make B' irrational?
>
> [spoiler space; I'd like you to answer without seeing the consequences
> first]
No.
> If your answer is "Yes", then that is hugely problematic, since it
> implies that I cannot have beliefs about things that I rationally
> believe exist.
>
> If your answer is "No", then your claim reduces to "beliefs about
> something that I only believe exists are only rational if the belief
> in the existence of that thing is rational". Which gets us right back
> where we started: how do we tell if a belief is rational?
I have already answered that, and I quote from my previous post:
"
A belief in something that is not known to factually exist can only be
called rational if there exist some observation that leads to the
conclusion that the object of the belief might be real and/or if there
exist a logical necessity to posit its existence even though we cannot
directly observe the object in question.
In such a case it is also rational to hold additional beliefs about
the belief, such as beliefs regarding the origin, the nature,
location, etc.
However, if the core belief is not warranted in any way and rest on
personal fiat (Am I using that word correctly?), then any beliefs
about such an irrational belief will also be irrational, the core
being irrational itself.
"
Let me just add that by "observation" above I mean "objective
observation, that which can be repeatedly observed."
_____________________________________________
If oxen and horses and lions could draw and paint, they would
delineate the gods in their own image.
-- Xenophanes
Treebeard
And my reply is: on what grounds do you insist that only those things
can result in a rational belief? Logical necessity requires
certainty, which would be knowledge if we could ever get it. And
since sometimes the existence of a thing is justified BY a secondary
belief being tested/observed, that isn't going to work: how can you
observe a thing without observing something about it?
Answer_42
Logic may tell us that A is necessary, so we may try to establish what
A is, but we maybe totally wrong about A's nature. So, at best, we
only claim that there seem to exist something we label "A" about which
little is known, so little that the actual "A" may in fact be "B +
C"...
So, tell me, how is "god" necessary within your web of belief?
Before you can answer, you need to define god.
Whence is that definition from?
But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
> which would be knowledge if we could ever get it.
If we had the knowledge that gods as a class of bing exist, then we
could rationally discuss the existence of your preferred god, based on
what those beings are defined as.
But, no, even the class of beings we could call gods is totally
hypothetical, unobserved in any ways and unnecessary for anything.
So, to me, before we can discuss YOUR personal god, we must establish
that gods, as a class of being, actually exist.
But we cannot because as I keep repeating, we have no observational
data, and neither did we ever have any, furthermore there does not
exist a logical necessity to posit their existence.
Finally, all so-called "divine experiences" are totally subjective in
nature, so nothing useful can be said about such alleged beings.
There is no rational reason to believe that they exist independently
of the mind of specific humans who claim that they do, like some
humans claim that there are devils, angels and ghosts flying around in
some supernatural dimension.
Many religious groups admit this and claim that faith alone, which is
claimed to be the antithesis of reason, is justification enough for
their beliefs. So much so that many religious groups have gone to
extraordinary lengths to vilify knowledge and reason because they
claim that it is an obstacle to reaching their god.
If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
gods exist?
> And
> since sometimes the existence of a thing is justified BY a secondary
> belief being tested/observed,
> that isn't going to work: how can you
> observe a thing without observing something about it?
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Treebeard
sounds like you're talking about theoretical entities, but that would
presume a theory first. I can't imagine there being anything that was
actually logically necessary in the sense you seem to describe it
here.
To put it in perspective, God is necessary from the perspective of the
Argument from Design (or at least something very much like it) but
not necessary in a theory that rejects that. But I fail to see how
you can settle disputues amongst theories so casually.
>
> So, tell me, how is "god" necessary within your web of belief?
could be wrong. Whatever you mean by "logical necessity", in my
system it really does mean what I claimed above.
> Before you can answer, you need to define god.
> Whence is that definition from?
>
> But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
observation first? After all, people DO claim to have observed/
experienced God and you and other atheists deny that they have. How
sure do we have to be that an experience is of God before someone
could believe it was, even if others don't (and don't have to).
>
> > which would be knowledge if we could ever get it.
>
> This is what i I keep saying about gods as a class of beings.
> If we had the knowledge that gods as a class of bing exist, then we
> could rationally discuss the existence of your preferred god, based on
> what those beings are defined as.
you can prove or know that a god exists". And that's ridiculous,
since proving that the class exists generally means proving that an
instance exists, and we've just gone through notions that it is in
fact allowable -- at least sometimes -- to just believe that something
exists.
So why do you insist that we'd have to know that God exists before we
could believe that God exists? If God is the only God, that's
pragmatically what you are insisting on, and that doesn't make sense.
[snip]
> If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
> on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
> gods exist?
that the evidence and justification is similar to that for other
beliefs. You deny this because you claim god beliefs special, but
have not been able to establish a rational argument showing that they
are.
>
> > And
> > since sometimes the existence of a thing is justified BY a secondary
> > belief being tested/observed,
>
> Such as?
at least we didn't. We see what they do to things. That's a
secondary belief, that proves and justifies the first. And you can't
even get into "Well, we knew that particles existed" because we
didn't, until we proved that one did, by appealing to secondary data.
And yet it would be ridiculous to suggest that no one could have
believed they existed rationally before we proved it.
>
> > that isn't going to work: how can you
> > observe a thing without observing something about it?
>
> --
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> To post to this group, send email to atheism-v-c...@googlegroups.com.
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> - Show quoted text -
Answer_42
<snip>
> > > And my reply is: on what grounds do you insist that only those things
> > > can result in a rational belief? Logical necessity requires
> > > certainty,
>
> > Not at all.
> > Logic may tell us that A is necessary, so we may try to establish what
> > A is, but we maybe totally wrong about A's nature. So, at best, we
> > only claim that there seem to exist something we label "A" about which
> > little is known, so little that the actual "A" may in fact be "B +
> > C"...
>
> I don't really understand your use of "logically necessary" here. It
> sounds like you're talking about theoretical entities, but that would
> presume a theory first. I can't imagine there being anything that was
> actually logically necessary in the sense you seem to describe it
> here.
Therefore something must be involved that is currently unknown or
unobserved, thus the logical necessity .
Many discoveries were made based on such a course of events.
You provided an example of such a logical necessity at the end of your
post.
> To put it in perspective, God is necessary from the perspective of the
> Argument from Design (or at least something very much like it)
The logical necessity must not be based on a fallacy.
> but
> not necessary in a theory that rejects that. But I fail to see how
> you can settle disputues amongst theories so casually.
>
>
>
> > So, tell me, how is "god" necessary within your web of belief?
>
> No beliefs are necessary.
> That's why they're beliefs, since they
> could be wrong. Whatever you mean by "logical necessity", in my
> system it really does mean what I claimed above.
>
> > Before you can answer, you need to define god.
> > Whence is that definition from?
>
> Loosely, "that guy in the Bible" is a pretty good start.
The same god who advise the Benjamites to kidnap virgins from a
neigbouring town so that they could force the women to marry them?
The same god who acquiesced to a prohpet's request to have children
killed because they made fun of his baldness?
The same god who killed the entire world population except for one
family because he was displeased by what some were doing?
That guy?
In any case, how can words in a book lead you to believe that
something is real? (Keeping in mind that nothing outside the book can
corroborate the claims we read in said book.)
>
>
> > But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
>
> Woudn't we have to define God and what would count as such an
> observation first? After all, people
I was talking about YOU.
> DO claim to have observed/
> experienced God and you and other atheists deny that they have.
We do not deny the feelings/experiences that they claim to have had.
We just have a different explanation for such events.
> How
> sure do we have to be that an experience is of God before someone
> could believe it was, even if others don't (and don't have to).
the god concept reported having had an experience that involved
contact with someone who claimed to be a higher power.
Think about all such reports of divine experiences. They can ALL be
explained using mundane explanations.
The only ones that would defy mundane explanations are miracles.
However, how strange is it that since we have lightning-fast
communications and amazingly accurate recoding technologies, miracles
have stopped occurring or only occur in areas/conditions where it is
impossible to record them?
The problem is that ill-defined feelings and experiences that are
matched to a pre-conceived concept of what god is, without actually
knowiing if gods are real, is not rational.
If we knew for a fact that gods were real, then people reporting
divine experiences would be taken just as seriously as any person who
claims to have felt love or hatred towards another human being, for
instance.
So, basically, you believe in god because you accept the ill-defined
claims made by others before you?
> > > which would be knowledge if we could ever get it.
>
> > This is what i I keep saying about gods as a class of beings.
> > If we had the knowledge that gods as a class of bing exist, then we
> > could rationally discuss the existence of your preferred god, based on
> > what those beings are defined as.
>
> This reduces to "You can't believe in the existence of a god unless
> you can prove or know that a god exists". And that's ridiculous,
> since proving that the class exists generally means proving that an
> instance exists,
germs were as well, all you would need is a logical necessity that
would account for such a class of being to be real.
> and we've just gone through notions that it is in
> fact allowable -- at least sometimes -- to just believe that something
> exists.
Again, i ask you, why is it necessary to claim that gods might be
real?
> So why do you insist that we'd have to know that God
> exists before we
> could believe that God exists? If God is the only God,
is there some rule somewhere that states that there must be more than
one member of a class before the class can be said to be viable?
> that's
> pragmatically what you are insisting on,
> and that doesn't make sense.
>
> [snip]
>
> > If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
> > on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
> > gods exist?
>
> This is you, as usual, imposing an unproven epistemology on me. I say
> that the evidence and justification is similar to that for other
> beliefs. You deny this because you claim god beliefs special, but
> have not been able to establish a rational argument showing that they
> are.
Fine Allan.
You go on deluding yourself that your god belief is exactly the same
type of belief as the belief that you heard some song in some TV show
some time ago.
Whatever.
The fact is, you have not been able to give me another example of a
belief you have that rests wholly on something that cannot be
demonstrated to be real in any shape or form.
And THAT speaks volume.
> > > And
> > > since sometimes the existence of a thing is justified BY a secondary
> > > belief being tested/observed,
>
> > Such as?
>
> Take, oh, anything dealing with particles. We don't see particles, or
> at least we didn't. We see what they do to things. That's a
> secondary belief,
predictions made and realized.
Physicists do not only believe that particles are real, they KNOW they
are.
> that proves and justifies the first. And you can't
> even get into "Well, we knew that particles existed" because we
> didn't, until we proved that one did,
existence. Tests and research were conducted, theories refined,
discoveries made, etc.
Again, what is your theory/reason that makes us need to posit that a
god must/might be real?
> by appealing to secondary data.
> And yet it would be ridiculous to suggest that no one could have
> believed they existed rationally before we proved it.
necessity I was talking about.
Now, do the same with god and I will shut up and admit that it is not
irrational to believe in such a being.
Simple, no?
Treebeard
On Apr 23, 3:13 pm, Answer_42 <ipu.belie...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On Apr 23, 1:06 pm, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
>
> <snip>
>
>
>
> > > > And my reply is: on what grounds do you insist that only those things
> > > > can result in a rational belief? Logical necessity requires
> > > > certainty,
>
> > > Not at all.
> > > Logic may tell us that A is necessary, so we may try to establish what
> > > A is, but we maybe totally wrong about A's nature. So, at best, we
> > > only claim that there seem to exist something we label "A" about which
> > > little is known, so little that the actual "A" may in fact be "B +
> > > C"...
>
> > I don't really understand your use of "logically necessary" here. It
> > sounds like you're talking about theoretical entities, but that would
> > presume a theory first. I can't imagine there being anything that was
> > actually logically necessary in the sense you seem to describe it
> > here.
>
> We observe something, but, based on what we know, it does not add up.
> Therefore something must be involved that is currently unknown or
> unobserved, thus the logical necessity .
>
> Many discoveries were made based on such a course of events.
>
> You provided an example of such a logical necessity at the end of your
> post.
associated with a theory. But there can be other theories.
So, yes, the Argument from Design says that there is a theoretical
entity: God. Other theories disagree and don't add that entity. But
thus the Argument from Design posits an entity with logical necessity,
just like the case of particles. If we knew the theory correct, we'd
know that God exists. We don't. But belief is not knowledge, and
thus, again, it seems like you're asking for knowledge to justify
belief, and that simply doesn't work.
>
> > To put it in perspective, God is necessary from the perspective of the
> > Argument from Design (or at least something very much like it)
>
> Except that this is a begging-the-question type of "theory."
> The logical necessity must not be based on a fallacy.
get you any specific God, but we aren't looking for knowledge anyway.
Right now, we're looking for belief. That designer also pretty much
has to have the power to create everything, and so is a candidate for
any god you want to name. It's a theory that does establish at least
some kind of god.
>
> > but
> > not necessary in a theory that rejects that. But I fail to see how
> > you can settle disputues amongst theories so casually.
>
> > > So, tell me, how is "god" necessary within your web of belief?
>
> > No beliefs are necessary.
>
> I meant logically necessary.
point out quite clearly that your definition of "logical necessity" is
not mine, and so you can't ask how something in my system maps to
yours. They aren't similar enough to make such demands.
>
> > That's why they're beliefs, since they
> > could be wrong. Whatever you mean by "logical necessity", in my
> > system it really does mean what I claimed above.
>
> > > Before you can answer, you need to define god.
> > > Whence is that definition from?
>
> > Loosely, "that guy in the Bible" is a pretty good start.
>
> Really?
> The same god who advise the Benjamites to kidnap virgins from a
> neigbouring town so that they could force the women to marry them?
> The same god who acquiesced to a prohpet's request to have children
> killed because they made fun of his baldness?
> The same god who killed the entire world population except for one
> family because he was displeased by what some were doing?
>
> That guy?
existence of such a being? You're just ad homineming on God here;
He's bad, so we shouldn't believe He exists?
>
> In any case, how can words in a book lead you to believe that
> something is real? (Keeping in mind that nothing outside the book can
> corroborate the claims we read in said book.)
beliefs, even about the existence of things? Even if all alone?
We're talking belief, not knowledge.
>
>
>
> > > But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
>
> > Woudn't we have to define God and what would count as such an
> > observation first? After all, people
>
> <sigh>
> I was talking about YOU.
Second, when you insist that you don't know what the definition of
"God" is, how could any of my observations count, even if I had them?
Wouldn't you just deny that that was really an experience of God, like
you generally do, based on finding another way to explain it?
>
> > DO claim to have observed/
> > experienced God and you and other atheists deny that they have.
>
> Wrong.
> We do not deny the feelings/experiences that they claim to have had.
> We just have a different explanation for such events.
alternative explanations for any experience or theory. Why do you
think it rational to say that if you can find an alternative theory --
no matter how improbable -- that should be believed over it being an
experience of God? Not just for yourself, but for them as well?
If you KNEW that it wasn't an experience of God and that the
alternative explanation was correct, that would be different. Do you
have that?
>
> > How
> > sure do we have to be that an experience is of God before someone
> > could believe it was, even if others don't (and don't have to).
>
> I would put stock in such reports if someone who had never heard of
> the god concept reported having had an experience that involved
> contact with someone who claimed to be a higher power.
> Think about all such reports of divine experiences. They can ALL be
> explained using mundane explanations.
> The only ones that would defy mundane explanations are miracles.
> However, how strange is it that since we have lightning-fast
> communications and amazingly accurate recoding technologies, miracles
> have stopped occurring or only occur in areas/conditions where it is
> impossible to record them?
have other things on their minds. But we'd have to examine the
miracles in detail, as some seem pretty wide-spread ...
>
> The problem is that ill-defined feelings and experiences that are
> matched to a pre-conceived concept of what god is, without actually
> knowiing if gods are real, is not rational.
> If we knew for a fact that gods were real, then people reporting
> divine experiences would be taken just as seriously as any person who
> claims to have felt love or hatred towards another human being, for
> instance.
Anyway, I don't -- and have never -- claimed that ill-defined
experiences are good evidence for the existence of God. I'm as
skeptical on that point as you are. But that's not enough to say "No
one should believe, or you're being irrational!" which is what you're
asserting.
>
> So, basically, you believe in god because you accept the ill-defined
> claims made by others before you?
>
> > > > which would be knowledge if we could ever get it.
>
> > > This is what i I keep saying about gods as a class of beings.
> > > If we had the knowledge that gods as a class of bing exist, then we
> > > could rationally discuss the existence of your preferred god, based on
> > > what those beings are defined as.
>
> > This reduces to "You can't believe in the existence of a god unless
> > you can prove or know that a god exists". And that's ridiculous,
>
> No, it is not, see below.
it has at least one member in the set "gods" -- without knowing that
at least one god actually exists?
>
> > since proving that the class exists generally means proving that an
> > instance exists,
>
> Or, like DNA was hypothesized before it was actually discovered, or
> germs were as well, all you would need is a logical necessity that
> would account for such a class of being to be real.
were competing theories at the time in both cases.
There are competing theories where at least one god-like thing is
required, too.
>
> > and we've just gone through notions that it is in
> > fact allowable -- at least sometimes -- to just believe that something
> > exists.
>
> Only if something calls for the claim to be made.
>
> Again, i ask you, why is it necessary to claim that gods might be
> real?
believe something.
>
> > So why do you insist that we'd have to know that God
>
> Not "God", but "gods."
>
> > exists before we
> > could believe that God exists? If God is the only God,
>
> So?
> is there some rule somewhere that states that there must be more than
> one member of a class before the class can be said to be viable?
replying. If there really was only one God, and I had to know that a
god existed before BELIEVING that any other god existed, that's what
your suggestion pragmatically boils down to. That's absurd, so that
can't work.
>
> > that's
> > pragmatically what you are insisting on,
>
> No, it is not.
you'd be insisting on.
>
> > and that doesn't make sense.
>
> > [snip]
>
> > > If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
> > > on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
> > > gods exist?
>
> > This is you, as usual, imposing an unproven epistemology on me. I say
> > that the evidence and justification is similar to that for other
> > beliefs. You deny this because you claim god beliefs special, but
> > have not been able to establish a rational argument showing that they
> > are.
>
> I have, but you refuse to acknowledge that I might have a point.
argued against them. We've dropped your initial distinction because
it ended up not being relevant, since things in your B category could
be rational beliefs and you accepted that it could be rational to just
believe that something exists. Now we're arguing over other
distinctions. So far, I haven't found a point that works. You need
to argue more for your positions and do less demanding that I answer
questions that are irrelevant in my epistemological system.
>
> Fine Allan.
>
> You go on deluding yourself that your god belief is exactly the same
> type of belief as the belief that you heard some song in some TV show
> some time ago.
> Whatever.
You haven't. And this is consistent with you: instead of getting down
and dirty and arguing for your position, you end up simply dismissing
it and trying to bail on the discussion. If you can't prove your
point, why should I or anyone else accept it? If you can't or won't
argue for your position, why should anyone accept it?
You and I disagree on this point. What you're doing here is rather
sulkily suggesting a stance of "we agree to disagree" ... except that
then you use YOUR view to judge MY beliefs, which I of course won't
accept. Which, then, is intellectually dishonest and dirty pool.
>
> The fact is, you have not been able to give me another example of a
> belief you have that rests wholly on something that cannot be
> demonstrated to be real in any shape or form.
I've argued that I have the same evidence as I have for other
beliefs. You insist that in the case of God Beliefs I need more. I
ask why I shouldn't treat God Beliefs like any other belief. This
whole thread is the free forum for you to prove that God Beliefs
really are special. You haven't done that. And now you want to run
and hide behind vague "cannot be demonstrated to be real in any shape
or form"? What is that supposed to mean, precisely?
>
> And THAT speaks volume.
>
> > > > And
> > > > since sometimes the existence of a thing is justified BY a secondary
> > > > belief being tested/observed,
>
> > > Such as?
>
> > Take, oh, anything dealing with particles. We don't see particles, or
> > at least we didn't. We see what they do to things. That's a
> > secondary belief,
>
> It is not a belief when an observation can be repeated at will,
> predictions made and realized.
right?
>
> Physicists do not only believe that particles are real, they KNOW they
> are.
knowledge WAS based on secondary beliefs, which was about their effect
on other things. Which is what I was supposed to demonstrate. Why
are you saying this about my demonstrating precisely what I was
supposed to demonstrate?
>
> > that proves and justifies the first. And you can't
> > even get into "Well, we knew that particles existed" because we
> > didn't, until we proved that one did,
>
> No, we had a logical necessity that made us hypothesize their
> existence. Tests and research were conducted, theories refined,
> discoveries made, etc.
particle existed -- ie that that theory was correct -- it was based on
secondary beliefs. But surely at least some scientists rationally
believed that they did (the ones that rationally believed that their
theory was true).
>
> Again, what is your theory/reason that makes us need to posit that a
> god must/might be real?
doesn't undermine it.
>
> > by appealing to secondary data.
> > And yet it would be ridiculous to suggest that no one could have
> > believed they existed rationally before we proved it.
>
> Indeed, you have just provided an exampe of the type of logical
> necessity I was talking about.
unproven theory. Thus, no difference.
Answer_42
fallacy is not an actual theory, but just wishful-thinking.
Show me one theory that posits the existence of a god that is not
based on fallacy and then we can talk.
> > > To put it in perspective, God is necessary from the perspective of the
> > > Argument from Design (or at least something very much like it)
>
> > Except that this is a begging-the-question type of "theory."
> > The logical necessity must not be based on a fallacy.
>
> Except it isn't. It argues: "If designed, a designer".
First you have to prove that it was designed, which you cannot.
So, basically, you are going in circles with this, hence the fallacy.
> It wouldn't
> get you any specific God, but we aren't looking for knowledge anyway.
> Right now, we're looking for belief. That designer also pretty much
> has to have the power to create everything, and so is a candidate for
> any god you want to name. It's a theory that does establish at least
> some kind of god.
the same hypothetical entity.
> > In any case, how can words in a book lead you to believe that
> > something is real? (Keeping in mind that nothing outside the book can
> > corroborate the claims we read in said book.)
>
> Um, why would you assert that something written in a book can't form
> beliefs, even about the existence of things? Even if all alone?
> We're talking belief, not knowledge.
Just that if all you have is the book, then believing that the entity
described in the book is actually real is not very rational, is it?
> > > > But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
>
> > > Woudn't we have to define God and what would count as such an
> > > observation first? After all, people
>
> > <sigh>
> > I was talking about YOU.
>
> First, I think you already know the answer to that question.
>
> Second, when you insist that you don't know what the definition of
> "God" is, how could any of my observations count,
if that is all you got, I guess we will have to make-do.
> even if I had them?
> Wouldn't you just deny that that was really an experience of God, like
> you generally do, based on finding another way to explain it?
And you cannot prove that you had an experienced linked to what you
call a supernatural being wh was somehow contacting you, here, in this
natural world.
Heck, you cannot even demonstrate in any shape or form that the
supernatural is a real realm/dimension/something.
So, between a non-existent being (as far a we can tell) and a natural
explanation, in my book, in ALL cases, the natural explanation wins.
If there is more than one possible natural explanation, more
investigation is needed. "goddidit" never explained anything, and it
never will, unless we can first establish that there are/is gods/a
god.
>
>
> > > DO claim to have observed/
> > > experienced God and you and other atheists deny that they have.
>
> > Wrong.
> > We do not deny the feelings/experiences that they claim to have had.
> > We just have a different explanation for such events.
>
> And what can be settled then? There are always thousands of
> alternative explanations for any experience or theory. Why do you
> think it rational to say that if you can find an alternative theory --
> no matter how improbable -- that should be believed over it being an
> experience of God? Not just for yourself, but for them as well?
>
> If you KNEW that it wasn't an experience of God and that the
> alternative explanation was correct, that would be different. Do you
> have that?
>
>
> > > How
> > > sure do we have to be that an experience is of God before someone
> > > could believe it was, even if others don't (and don't have to).
>
> > I would put stock in such reports if someone who had never heard of
> > the god concept reported having had an experience that involved
> > contact with someone who claimed to be a higher power.
> > Think about all such reports of divine experiences. They can ALL be
> > explained using mundane explanations.
>
> But you don't know that the mundane explanations are correct.
god-believer refuses to admit that one of those might be corret, so we
cannot investigate any further, adding to the irrational side of the
equation...
> > The only ones that would defy mundane explanations are miracles.
> > However, how strange is it that since we have lightning-fast
> > communications and amazingly accurate recoding technologies, miracles
> > have stopped occurring or only occur in areas/conditions where it is
> > impossible to record them?
>
> Um, I don't, really, since most miracles occur at times when people
> have other things on their minds. But we'd have to examine the
> miracles in detail, as some seem pretty wide-spread ...
> > The problem is that ill-defined feelings and experiences that are
> > matched to a pre-conceived concept of what god is, without actually
> > knowiing if gods are real, is not rational.
> > If we knew for a fact that gods were real, then people reporting
> > divine experiences would be taken just as seriously as any person who
> > claims to have felt love or hatred towards another human being, for
> > instance.
>
> So, if we knew that gods existed, we could believe they existed, huh?
anyone's claims of a particular god being a real entity seriously.
i
> experiences are good evidence for the existence of God. I'm as
> skeptical on that point as you are. But that's not enough to say "No
> one should believe, or you're being irrational!" which is what you're
> asserting.
Again, tell me about other things that YOU believe are real based on
such ill-defined subjective reports?
> > So, basically, you believe in god because you accept the ill-defined
> > claims made by others before you?
>
> > > > > which would be knowledge if we could ever get it.
>
> > > > This is what i I keep saying about gods as a class of beings.
> > > > If we had the knowledge that gods as a class of bing exist, then we
> > > > could rationally discuss the existence of your preferred god, based on
> > > > what those beings are defined as.
>
> > > This reduces to "You can't believe in the existence of a god unless
> > > you can prove or know that a god exists". And that's ridiculous,
>
> > No, it is not, see below.
>
> How can you know that the class exists -- meaning that you know that
> it has at least one member in the set "gods" -- without knowing that
> at least one god actually exists?
be real.
> > > since proving that the class exists generally means proving that an
> > > instance exists,
>
> > Or, like DNA was hypothesized before it was actually discovered, or
> > germs were as well, all you would need is a logical necessity that
> > would account for such a class of being to be real.
>
> Um, but there was no logical necessity, except in that theory; there
> were competing theories at the time in both cases.
observations.
> There are competing theories where at least one god-like thing is
> required, too.
> > > and we've just gone through notions that it is in
> > > fact allowable -- at least sometimes -- to just believe that something
> > > exists.
>
> > Only if something calls for the claim to be made.
>
> > Again, i ask you, why is it necessary to claim that gods might be
> > real?
>
> And again I reply that you don't need it to be necessary in order to
> believe something.
cannot be said to be rational, can it?
For example, you are right that in every day beliefs, necessity is not
important . For instance, I can choose to believe that you hate
chocolate, there is no necessity for such a belief. However, for the
belief to even make sense (i.e. be rational at some level), you have
to exist, so does chocolate, and the feeling of hate itself must be
something that is possible.. So, at some level, there does exist a
necessity of sorts.
So, such a belief, as is, can be rational. Now if one really wanted to
assign a level of rationality, then one would have to examine the
context. Given that Allan, chocolate and hate exist, why would I have
such a belief? If it is based on no facts whatsoever, then it is not a
rational belief. If I can witness you eat chocolate everyday and hear
you claim you love it, then still, it is not rational. If I never see
you eat chocolate and know for a fact that you do not like sweet
stuff, then we are starting to get at a rational belief, etc.
> > > So why do you insist that we'd have to know that God
>
> > Not "God", but "gods."
>
> > > exists before we
> > > could believe that God exists? If God is the only God,
>
> > So?
> > is there some rule somewhere that states that there must be more than
> > one member of a class before the class can be said to be viable?
>
> Um, please read more carefully, and read entire arguments before
> replying. If there really was only one God, and I had to know that a
> god existed before BELIEVING that any other god existed, that's what
> your suggestion pragmatically boils down to. That's absurd, so that
> can't work.
have no logical reason to posit the existence of such a being.
Do not blame me for not being able to even suggest ONE objective
logical reason that would make your god possible.
> > > that's
> > > pragmatically what you are insisting on,
>
> > No, it is not.
>
> Yes, in the case where there is only one god, that's exactly what
> you'd be insisting on.
suggest that a god is possible.
I am listening.
> > > and that doesn't make sense.
>
> > > [snip]
>
> > > > If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
> > > > on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
> > > > gods exist?
>
> > > This is you, as usual, imposing an unproven epistemology on me. I say
> > > that the evidence and justification is similar to that for other
> > > beliefs. You deny this because you claim god beliefs special, but
> > > have not been able to establish a rational argument showing that they
> > > are.
>
> > I have, but you refuse to acknowledge that I might have a point.
>
> No, you haven't. I haven't just dismissed your claims, but have
> argued against them. We've dropped your initial distinction because
> it ended up not being relevant, since things in your B category could
> be rational beliefs
beliefs in rational vs. irrational.
> and you accepted that it could be rational to just
> believe that something exists. Now we're arguing over other
> distinctions.
The fact is you refused to acknowledge that my distinction had merit.
Again, you can have beliefs about things that are known to exist and
you can have beliefs about things that are not factually known to
exist.
In the second case, because we are talking about beliefs about
beliefs, such beliefs are indeed special and cannot be compared to
basic first degree beliefs about actualities.
For those beliefs to be rational, you need some objective logical
arguments to support the belief.
You have none for your god belief, but somehow it is my fault?
This is why it is special, you have beliefs about a belief which is
based on nothing but subjective reports.
> So far, I haven't found a point that works. You need
> to argue more for your positions and do less demanding that I answer
> questions that are irrelevant in my epistemological system.
>
>
>
> > Fine Allan.
>
> > You go on deluding yourself that your god belief is exactly the same
> > type of belief as the belief that you heard some song in some TV show
> > some time ago.
> > Whatever.
>
> If I am delusional, you should be able to demonstrate that I'm wrong.
real? And were you able to get corroboration from others?
> You haven't. And this is consistent with you: instead of getting down
> and dirty and arguing for your position, you end up simply dismissing
> it and trying to bail on the discussion. If you can't prove your
> point, why should I or anyone else accept it? If you can't or won't
> argue for your position,
> why should anyone accept it?
> You and I disagree on this point. What you're doing here is rather
> sulkily suggesting a stance of "we agree to disagree" ... except that
> then you use YOUR view
belief rational, said belief must be based on objective logical
observations/arguments?
> to judge MY beliefs, which I of course won't
> accept. Which, then, is intellectually dishonest and dirty pool.
>
>
>
> > The fact is, you have not been able to give me another example of a
> > belief you have that rests wholly on something that cannot be
> > demonstrated to be real in any shape or form.
>
> Nice rant, but it is too vague to have any argumentative substance.
> I've argued that I have the same evidence as I have for other
> beliefs.
one single example.
> You insist that in the case of God Beliefs I need more. I
> ask why I shouldn't treat God Beliefs like any other belief.
All you have to do is give me examples of beliefs you have that are
based on nothing more that subjective reports by other people.
The very fact that you cannot do this actually proves my point that
your belief is indeed special, when compared to your other beliefs
which ALL rest in reality as demonstrated and corroborated by others
at large.
> This
> whole thread is the free forum for you to prove that God Beliefs
> really are special. You haven't done that.
single example of another belief that is similar to your god belief.
But even if you could, it might help you, but you would still have to
explain why you think that a belief that rests on absolutely nothing
objective at all is simply identical in nature to a belief that rests
on something objective.
> And now you want to run
> and hide behind vague "cannot be demonstrated to be real in any shape
> or form"? What is that supposed to mean, precisely?
Untestable, unverifiable, unfalsifiable, unnecessary in any logical
scheme, etc.
> > And THAT speaks volume.
> > > > > And
> > > > > since sometimes the existence of a thing is justified BY a secondary
> > > > > belief being tested/observed,
>
> > > > Such as?
>
> > > Take, oh, anything dealing with particles. We don't see particles, or
> > > at least we didn't. We see what they do to things. That's a
> > > secondary belief,
>
> > It is not a belief when an observation can be repeated at will,
> > predictions made and realized.
But you can have beliefs about those things that are now facts.
> Um, at one point we could not observe particles. You accept that,
> right?
>
>
>
> > Physicists do not only believe that particles are real, they KNOW they
> > are.
>
> Yes, they do. I did not deny that. I pointed out, though, that that
> knowledge WAS based on secondary beliefs,
observations of the real world, not based on fancy wishful thinking.
> which was about their effect
> on other things. Which is what I was supposed to demonstrate. Why
> are you saying this about my demonstrating precisely what I was
> supposed to demonstrate?
> > > that proves and justifies the first. And you can't
> > > even get into "Well, we knew that particles existed" because we
> > > didn't, until we proved that one did,
>
> > No, we had a logical necessity that made us hypothesize their
> > existence. Tests and research were conducted, theories refined,
> > discoveries made, etc.
>
> We had competing theories at the time, and until we proved that a
> particle existed -- ie that that theory was correct -- it was based on
> secondary beliefs. But surely at least some scientists rationally
> believed that they did (the ones that rationally believed that their
> theory was true).
existence of a god.
> > Again, what is your theory/reason that makes us need to posit that a
> > god must/might be real?
>
> I've given one.
That is a fallacy.
> That there are competing theories PROVES my point; it
> doesn't undermine it.
> > > by appealing to secondary data.
> > > And yet it would be ridiculous to suggest that no one could have
> > > believed they existed rationally before we proved it.
>
> > Indeed, you have just provided an exampe of the type of logical
> > necessity I was talking about.
>
> Except that it wasn't logically necessary unless you accepted an
> unproven theory. Thus, no difference.
The theory itself was the logical necessity.
Particles were logically predicted based on observations and
predictions that were being confirmed.
Present your god theory based on logical arguments and observed
behaviours of the universe and we can talk about your belief being
just like any other belief.
> > Now, do the same with god and I will shut up and admit that it is not
> > irrational to believe in such a being.
> > Simple, no?
(Sorry for not reviewing, I gotta go... so there are probably quite a
few typos...)
Treebeard
At any rate, the "fallacy" that you seem to refer to in this case is a
fallacy of "You don't know that your premises are true". The only
fallacy in the argument from design is that we don't know if the state
of the universe/world that we have requires design or not. Or, if
not, you can post the fallacy.
Again, the argument from design's basic form is not fallacious, as it
is "If designed, a designer". And then we have to settle whether or
not it was designed. There are competing theories, but competing
theories do not a fallacy make.
> Show me one theory that posits the existence of a god that is not
> based on fallacy and then we can talk.
>
> > > > To put it in perspective, God is necessary from the perspective of the
> > > > Argument from Design (or at least something very much like it)
>
> > > Except that this is a begging-the-question type of "theory."
> > > The logical necessity must not be based on a fallacy.
>
> > Except it isn't. It argues: "If designed, a designer".
>
> Exactly - "IF"...
> First you have to prove that it was designed, which you cannot.
> So, basically, you are going in circles with this, hence the fallacy.
"circular reasoning", which seems to be what you're going for here.
At any rate, expanding the argument is:
If the universe is designed, there is a designer.
The empirical evidence about the universe indicates that it was
designed.
Therefore, there is a designer.
The second premise is, of course, challengeable and I will agree that
the empirical evidence doesn't prove it correct. But that's not the
point. ANY theory will have premises like that, and that's what we
have to settle before we decide what theory to accept. That doesn't
make it a fallacy.
If the alternative theories cannot prove that the evidence is on their
side, then they are equally unevidenced and as equally unworthy of
consideration as the one I just talked about.
And then we have to get into epistemology again to determine which of
these we can accept or believe.
>
> > It wouldn't
> > get you any specific God, but we aren't looking for knowledge anyway.
> > Right now, we're looking for belief. That designer also pretty much
> > has to have the power to create everything, and so is a candidate for
> > any god you want to name. It's a theory that does establish at least
> > some kind of god.
>
> Nope, it is a fallacy.
don't know if it is true, but that doesn't make it a fallacy.
positives, and you'd want both to be doing identification. No, you
were trying to get a concession of negatives to presumably use later,
except that in this discussion the negatives are all irrelevant.
Care to try it again without the ad hominem set-up?
>
> > > In any case, how can words in a book lead you to believe that
> > > something is real? (Keeping in mind that nothing outside the book can
> > > corroborate the claims we read in said book.)
>
> > Um, why would you assert that something written in a book can't form
> > beliefs, even about the existence of things? Even if all alone?
> > We're talking belief, not knowledge.
>
> I did not say it could not...
> > > In any case, how can words in a book lead you to believe that
> > > something is real? (Keeping in mind that nothing outside the book can
> > > corroborate the claims we read in said book.)
> Just that if all you have is the book, then believing that the entity
> described in the book is actually real is not very rational, is it?
couldn't believe something that you could only find in a book (see the
"Even if all alone") part?
So, I repeat, why can't I believe something that I find in a book and
can't corroborate with anything outside that book? If I find a
journal of a young school girl in my attic but can't corroborate any
of the personal writings in it, why would it be a problem for me to
believe them?
>
> > > > > But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
>
> > > > Woudn't we have to define God and what would count as such an
> > > > observation first? After all, people
>
> > > <sigh>
> > > I was talking about YOU.
>
> > First, I think you already know the answer to that question.
>
> > Second, when you insist that you don't know what the definition of
> > "God" is, how could any of my observations count,
>
> A definition based on subjective observations is far from ideal, but
> if that is all you got, I guess we will have to make-do.
is "They don't indicate a god", that isn't what you're going to do,
now is it?
Unless we know what experiences would indicate "God" we cannot make
claims about what a particular experience means.
>
> > even if I had them?
> > Wouldn't you just deny that that was really an experience of God, like
> > you generally do, based on finding another way to explain it?
>
> Except that you cannot prove that other explanations are not valid...
knowledge. Remember, I ACCEPT that other explanations are valid, but
don't hold myself to the other answers just because someone else likes
them better.
> And you cannot prove that you had an experienced linked to what you
> call a supernatural being wh was somehow contacting you, here, in this
> natural world.
> Heck, you cannot even demonstrate in any shape or form that the
> supernatural is a real realm/dimension/something.
"supernatural" distinction, despite the fact that it is well-known
that NEITHER of us accepts it or thinks it useful. Remember, I DON'T
call it a supernatural being, and have no idea how to define such a
thing, as I've said in the past. A position that you've agreed with.
Thus, you cannot use it or its "realm" as any sort of distinction
about the belief. And remember, that's what this thread is about:
showing why I should consider beliefs about God different than beliefs
about what time the restaurant opens.
>
> So, between a non-existent being (as far a we can tell) and a natural
> explanation, in my book, in ALL cases, the natural explanation wins.
> If there is more than one possible natural explanation, more
> investigation is needed. "goddidit" never explained anything, and it
> never will, unless we can first establish that there are/is gods/a
> god.
(again, dismissing the "natural" qualifier since it isn't relevant for
EITHER of us, despite your attempts to use it) what is it acceptable
to BELIEVE in the meantime? Anything? None?
>
>
>
> > > > DO claim to have observed/
> > > > experienced God and you and other atheists deny that they have.
>
> > > Wrong.
> > > We do not deny the feelings/experiences that they claim to have had.
> > > We just have a different explanation for such events.
>
> > And what can be settled then? There are always thousands of
> > alternative explanations for any experience or theory. Why do you
> > think it rational to say that if you can find an alternative theory --
> > no matter how improbable -- that should be believed over it being an
> > experience of God? Not just for yourself, but for them as well?
>
> > If you KNEW that it wasn't an experience of God and that the
> > alternative explanation was correct, that would be different. Do you
> > have that?
>
> See above.
experiences reflect God just because YOU don't think -- and therefore
believe -- that they don't? Why should they accept the alternative
explanation that YOU prefer, or be called irrational?
>
>
>
> > > > How
> > > > sure do we have to be that an experience is of God before someone
> > > > could believe it was, even if others don't (and don't have to).
>
> > > I would put stock in such reports if someone who had never heard of
> > > the god concept reported having had an experience that involved
> > > contact with someone who claimed to be a higher power.
> > > Think about all such reports of divine experiences. They can ALL be
> > > explained using mundane explanations.
>
> > But you don't know that the mundane explanations are correct.
>
> Correction: I do not know WHICH one is correct because, usally, the
> god-believer refuses to admit that one of those might be corret, so we
> cannot investigate any further, adding to the irrational side of the
> equation...
no need to consider their explanation to be possibly correct, they
have no need to consider yours to be possibly correct either. Why is
your "mundane explanation" so much better than theirs? Because you
like it? Because you have a foundational principle -- that you
personally DENIED having -- that insists that that sort of mundane
explanation is to be preferred, even though they hold no such
principle?
>
> > > The only ones that would defy mundane explanations are miracles.
> > > However, how strange is it that since we have lightning-fast
> > > communications and amazingly accurate recoding technologies, miracles
> > > have stopped occurring or only occur in areas/conditions where it is
> > > impossible to record them?
>
> > Um, I don't, really, since most miracles occur at times when people
> > have other things on their minds. But we'd have to examine the
> > miracles in detail, as some seem pretty wide-spread ...
>
> Really? What miracles are "wide-spread"?
range. Again, hard to photograph at the time.
>
> > > The problem is that ill-defined feelings and experiences that are
> > > matched to a pre-conceived concept of what god is, without actually
> > > knowiing if gods are real, is not rational.
> > > If we knew for a fact that gods were real, then people reporting
> > > divine experiences would be taken just as seriously as any person who
> > > claims to have felt love or hatred towards another human being, for
> > > instance.
>
> > So, if we knew that gods existed, we could believe they existed, huh?
>
> If we knew that such a class of beings existed, then we would take
> anyone's claims of a particular god being a real entity seriously.
right?
> i
>
> > Anyway, I don't -- and have never -- claimed that ill-defined
> > experiences are good evidence for the existence of God. I'm as
> > skeptical on that point as you are. But that's not enough to say "No
> > one should believe, or you're being irrational!" which is what you're
> > asserting.
>
> The problem, is, what else is there?
them IS enough for rational belief, as long as they accept that they
could be wrong and that it isn't knowledge. I haven't had them, and
so don't have that basis, but you still need to defend why that's not
rational, with far more than a loaded demand for similar things.
> Again, tell me about other things that YOU believe are real based on
> such ill-defined subjective reports?
>
> > > So, basically, you believe in god because you accept the ill-defined
> > > claims made by others before you?
>
> > > > > > which would be knowledge if we could ever get it.
>
> > > > > This is what i I keep saying about gods as a class of beings.
> > > > > If we had the knowledge that gods as a class of bing exist, then we
> > > > > could rationally discuss the existence of your preferred god, based on
> > > > > what those beings are defined as.
>
> > > > This reduces to "You can't believe in the existence of a god unless
> > > > you can prove or know that a god exists". And that's ridiculous,
>
> > > No, it is not, see below.
>
> > How can you know that the class exists -- meaning that you know that
> > it has at least one member in the set "gods" -- without knowing that
> > at least one god actually exists?
>
> Logical necessity would dictate that at least one such being need to
> be real.
view of this requires a theoretical entity, and nothing more, which
isn't all that hard to do.
>
> > > > since proving that the class exists generally means proving that an
> > > > instance exists,
>
> > > Or, like DNA was hypothesized before it was actually discovered, or
> > > germs were as well, all you would need is a logical necessity that
> > > would account for such a class of being to be real.
>
> > Um, but there was no logical necessity, except in that theory; there
> > were competing theories at the time in both cases.
>
> Yes, but SOMETHING needed to be there, based on logic and on
> observations.
way does not grant them greater proof at the time they were proposed.
>
> > There are competing theories where at least one god-like thing is
> > required, too.
>
> Name one that is not based on a fallacy.
>
> > > > and we've just gone through notions that it is in
> > > > fact allowable -- at least sometimes -- to just believe that something
> > > > exists.
>
> > > Only if something calls for the claim to be made.
>
> > > Again, i ask you, why is it necessary to claim that gods might be
> > > real?
>
> > And again I reply that you don't need it to be necessary in order to
> > believe something.
>
> If there exists nothing else to back the beleif, then such a belief
> cannot be said to be rational, can it?
you continually asserting it.
>
> For example, you are right that in every day beliefs, necessity is not
> important . For instance, I can choose to believe that you hate
> chocolate, there is no necessity for such a belief. However, for the
> belief to even make sense (i.e. be rational at some level), you have
> to exist, so does chocolate, and the feeling of hate itself must be
> something that is possible.. So, at some level, there does exist a
> necessity of sorts.
>
> So, such a belief, as is, can be rational. Now if one really wanted to
> assign a level of rationality, then one would have to examine the
> context. Given that Allan, chocolate and hate exist, why would I have
> such a belief? If it is based on no facts whatsoever, then it is not a
> rational belief. If I can witness you eat chocolate everyday and hear
> you claim you love it, then still, it is not rational. If I never see
> you eat chocolate and know for a fact that you do not like sweet
> stuff, then we are starting to get at a rational belief, etc.
invent it -- then it is irrational. I also agree that it would be
irrational if you didn't invent it but if you knew that it WAS
invented, and so Russell's Teapot and the FSM fall out of the picture
(we know they were invented thought experiments). But the belief in
God is not such a belief. So, what basis do you have for the claim,
then, that god beliefs are irrational on the basis of what's talked
about here? Beyond "You don't know that gods exist"? Because I
return to the argument from design: The universe exists and shows some
signs that things that are designed show. That fits your criteria.
Note that I still do not AGREE with your criteria.
>
> > > > So why do you insist that we'd have to know that God
>
> > > Not "God", but "gods."
>
> > > > exists before we
> > > > could believe that God exists? If God is the only God,
>
> > > So?
> > > is there some rule somewhere that states that there must be more than
> > > one member of a class before the class can be said to be viable?
>
> > Um, please read more carefully, and read entire arguments before
> > replying. If there really was only one God, and I had to know that a
> > god existed before BELIEVING that any other god existed, that's what
> > your suggestion pragmatically boils down to. That's absurd, so that
> > can't work.
>
> Except that you do not kow that there exist just the one god, and you
> have no logical reason to posit the existence of such a being.
to "Prove that God exists before you can even believe that God
exists". Yes, I don't know that that's true, but I don't know that
that's false, either. And since that's a stupid way to proceed (you
can't believe that ANY subatomic particles exist until you've proven
that one does) it's right out as a rational way to know things. Thus,
objections based on that are impractical and defeat the purpose of
belief entirely. And thus should be ignored.
Rebuttal?
>
> Do not blame me for not being able to even suggest ONE objective
> logical reason that would make your god possible.
>
> > > > that's
> > > > pragmatically what you are insisting on,
>
> > > No, it is not.
>
> > Yes, in the case where there is only one god, that's exactly what
> > you'd be insisting on.
>
> All you need to do is give me one logical objective reason to even
> suggest that a god is possible.
> I am listening.
"objective" that's developed enough that I can understand it and that
I agree with so that I WILL use it. You don't seem to have one.
>
> > > > and that doesn't make sense.
>
> > > > [snip]
>
> > > > > If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
> > > > > on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
> > > > > gods exist?
>
> > > > This is you, as usual, imposing an unproven epistemology on me. I say
> > > > that the evidence and justification is similar to that for other
> > > > beliefs. You deny this because you claim god beliefs special, but
> > > > have not been able to establish a rational argument showing that they
> > > > are.
>
> > > I have, but you refuse to acknowledge that I might have a point.
>
> > No, you haven't. I haven't just dismissed your claims, but have
> > argued against them. We've dropped your initial distinction because
> > it ended up not being relevant, since things in your B category could
> > be rational beliefs
>
> Except that the original distinction was not based on segregating
> beliefs in rational vs. irrational.
beliefs from the other ones that _I_ consider equivalent and then show
that because of their "specialness" they'd be irrational. You haven't
really done either yet.
>
> > and you accepted that it could be rational to just
> > believe that something exists. Now we're arguing over other
> > distinctions.
>
> Nope.
>
> The fact is you refused to acknowledge that my distinction had merit.
>
> Again, you can have beliefs about things that are known to exist and
> you can have beliefs about things that are not factually known to
> exist.
> In the second case, because we are talking about beliefs about
> beliefs, such beliefs are indeed special and cannot be compared to
> basic first degree beliefs about actualities.
justified by beliefs" which is actually quite common ...
> For those beliefs to be rational, you need some objective logical
> arguments to support the belief.
> You have none for your god belief, but somehow it is my fault?
>
> This is why it is special, you have beliefs about a belief which is
> based on nothing but subjective reports.
these. When I bring them up, however, you drop the "existence" claim
back in despite never having shown why that particularly matters.
>
> > So far, I haven't found a point that works. You need
> > to argue more for your positions and do less demanding that I answer
> > questions that are irrelevant in my epistemological system.
>
> > > Fine Allan.
>
> > > You go on deluding yourself that your god belief is exactly the same
> > > type of belief as the belief that you heard some song in some TV show
> > > some time ago.
> > > Whatever.
>
> > If I am delusional, you should be able to demonstrate that I'm wrong.
>
> What personal experience have you had that confirms that YOUR god is
> real? And were you able to get corroboration from others?
experience was such that I wouldn't expect to?
Of course, again you forget that I never DID claim to base it on
personal experiences.
Now, as to the specific example, the point of that was that I actually
did, in fact, have EVIDENCE that I was wrong: the DVD release that had
a different song (not the same song, but a different) than I
remember. And I concluded that it was still rational of me to TRUST
MY MEMORY and circumstantial data. So, why is it more rational to
maintain belief in a proposition that I have DISCONFIRMING EVIDENCE
for?
>
> > You haven't. And this is consistent with you: instead of getting down
> > and dirty and arguing for your position, you end up simply dismissing
> > it and trying to bail on the discussion. If you can't prove your
> > point, why should I or anyone else accept it? If you can't or won't
> > argue for your position,
>
> I did.
>
> > why should anyone accept it?
>
> Ask yourself.
>
> > You and I disagree on this point. What you're doing here is rather
> > sulkily suggesting a stance of "we agree to disagree" ... except that
> > then you use YOUR view
>
> So, when did it become MY view to insist that before one can call a
> belief rational, said belief must be based on objective logical
> observations/arguments?
portion. At any rate, my epistemology and yours do not align on this
point, as you well know, and so in this debate it is, indeed, YOUR
view that you are using to judge what evidence _I_ can present and
what beliefs _I_ can have. Which is not a valid move in a debate.
>
> > to judge MY beliefs, which I of course won't
> > accept. Which, then, is intellectually dishonest and dirty pool.
>
> > > The fact is, you have not been able to give me another example of a
> > > belief you have that rests wholly on something that cannot be
> > > demonstrated to be real in any shape or form.
>
> > Nice rant, but it is too vague to have any argumentative substance.
>
> It does not make it false either.
use it as a criteria for the beliefs and discussions in this thread.
>
> > I've argued that I have the same evidence as I have for other
> > beliefs.
>
> You have claimed it, but you have falied to demonstrate it with even
> one single example.
indication that I've failed, but an indication what we have completely
different ideas about what counts as evidence and how it applies to
other beliefs. This thread is supposed to be about settling this.
And instead of engaging at that level, you retreat to "You can't
provide an example of any other belief that you hold on that basis!"
assertions and present that as if that's a failure of my position,
when again all that is doing is indicating the area of disagreement
between us.
We're supposed to be settling the disagreement, so why are you
insisting on presenting that disagreement as if it was evidence in
favour of your position?
>
> > You insist that in the case of God Beliefs I need more. I
> > ask why I shouldn't treat God Beliefs like any other belief.
>
> <sigh>
> All you have to do is give me examples of beliefs you have that are
> based on nothing more that subjective reports by other people.
> The very fact that you cannot do this actually proves my point that
> your belief is indeed special, when compared to your other beliefs
> which ALL rest in reality as demonstrated and corroborated by others
> at large.
Again, we disagree about the underlying definitions and criteria.
That is not an indication that your position is in any way valid.
In short, you demand examples, I give them, you say they aren't the
same, and I insist they are. What we need to do is settle the
disagreement between us about why they are or are not the same. You,
instead, retreat to asserting your position and then hold my position
to YOUR standards to argue that my position is wrong. Which is
intellectually dishonest.
> > And now you want to run
> > and hide behind vague "cannot be demonstrated to be real in any shape
> > or form"? What is that supposed to mean, precisely?
>
> You know what it means.
> Untestable, unverifiable, unfalsifiable, unnecessary in any logical
> scheme, etc.
And how do you know whether or not something is untestable to the
degree presented here?
>
> > > And THAT speaks volume.
> > > > > > And
> > > > > > since sometimes the existence of a thing is justified BY a secondary
> > > > > > belief being tested/observed,
>
> > > > > Such as?
>
> > > > Take, oh, anything dealing with particles. We don't see particles, or
> > > > at least we didn't. We see what they do to things. That's a
> > > > secondary belief,
>
> > > It is not a belief when an observation can be repeated at will,
> > > predictions made and realized.
>
> Exactly!
> But you can have beliefs about those things that are now facts.
addressed immediately below? Attributions messed you up?
>
> > Um, at one point we could not observe particles. You accept that,
> > right?
>
> > > Physicists do not only believe that particles are real, they KNOW they
> > > are.
>
> > Yes, they do. I did not deny that. I pointed out, though, that that
> > knowledge WAS based on secondary beliefs,
>
> Except that they were posited based on logical arguments and
> observations of the real world, not based on fancy wishful thinking.
>
> > which was about their effect
> > on other things. Which is what I was supposed to demonstrate. Why
> > are you saying this about my demonstrating precisely what I was
> > supposed to demonstrate?
>
> Do the same with god.
>
> > > > that proves and justifies the first. And you can't
> > > > even get into "Well, we knew that particles existed" because we
> > > > didn't, until we proved that one did,
>
> > > No, we had a logical necessity that made us hypothesize their
> > > existence. Tests and research were conducted, theories refined,
> > > discoveries made, etc.
>
> > We had competing theories at the time, and until we proved that a
> > particle existed -- ie that that theory was correct -- it was based on
> > secondary beliefs. But surely at least some scientists rationally
> > believed that they did (the ones that rationally believed that their
> > theory was true).
>
> Again, all you have to do is give me on logical theory that posit the
> existence of a god.
have no idea what you mean by this, and see no reason why I should
hold YOUR view of a "logical theory" as paramount in determining what
_I_ should believe.
> > > > by appealing to secondary data.
> > > > And yet it would be ridiculous to suggest that no one could have
> > > > believed they existed rationally before we proved it.
>
> > > Indeed, you have just provided an exampe of the type of logical
> > > necessity I was talking about.
>
> > Except that it wasn't logically necessary unless you accepted an
> > unproven theory. Thus, no difference.
>
> What?
> The theory itself was the logical necessity.
the theory was not proven. You ARE aware that there are competing
theories in science, right?
Answer_42
refocus...>
> So, I repeat, why can't I believe something that I find in a book and
> can't corroborate with anything outside that book?
You can, sure, but then it is a special belief.
How many of those do you have?
> If I find a
> journal of a young school girl in my attic but can't corroborate any
> of the personal writings in it, why would it be a problem for me to
> believe them?
Except that you know for a fact that young girls exist, that young
girls do often write journals, that young girls who write journals
tend often exaggerate, etc.
So, if all you have is the journal, and the you decide to believe it
as it is written, the belief would be slightly irrational, but not
special becasue of the aforementioned known facts about journals and
young girls.
Now apply the same to your god belief. What is it in that book you
read that you know is real that points to your god also potentially
being real? What are the "young girls" and the "journals" equivalent?
>
>
> > > > > > But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
>
> > > > > Woudn't we have to define God and what would count as such an
> > > > > observation first? After all, people
>
> > > > <sigh>
> > > > I was talking about YOU.
>
> > > First, I think you already know the answer to that question.
>
> > > Second, when you insist that you don't know what the definition of
> > > "God" is, how could any of my observations count,
>
> > A definition based on subjective observations is far from ideal, but
> > if that is all you got, I guess we will have to make-do.
>
> Except that if one of the major charges against subjective experiences
> is "They don't indicate a god", that isn't what you're going to do,
> now is it?
>
> Unless we know what experiences would indicate "God" we cannot make
> claims about what a particular experience means.
And this is MY problem exactly how?
You are the god believer, so you are the one who should be able to
define what constitute an objective "god" experience.
The fact that you cannot indicates that I am on the right track here,
not that I am at fault.
>
>
> > > even if I had them?
> > > Wouldn't you just deny that that was really an experience of God, like
> > > you generally do, based on finding another way to explain it?
>
> > Except that you cannot prove that other explanations are not valid...
>
> If I could, I'd know it. So what? We're talking belief, not
> knowledge. Remember, I ACCEPT that other explanations are valid, but
> don't hold myself to the other answers just because someone else likes
> them better.
>
> > And you cannot prove that you had an experienced linked to what you
> > call a supernatural being wh was somehow contacting you, here, in this
> > natural world.
> > Heck, you cannot even demonstrate in any shape or form that the
> > supernatural is a real realm/dimension/something.
>
> It is quite interesting that you have now retreated to the
> "supernatural" distinction, despite the fact that it is well-known
> that NEITHER of us accepts it or thinks it useful. Remember, I DON'T
> call it a supernatural being, and have no idea how to define such a
> thing, as I've said in the past. A position that you've agreed with.
> Thus, you cannot use it or its "realm" as any sort of distinction
> about the belief. And remember, that's what this thread is about:
> showing why I should consider beliefs about God different than beliefs
> about what time the restaurant opens.
Simply because we know that restaurants are real, that restaurants do
have opening hours (except for the 24/7 types, of course...).
Now, what facts do you know about gods that would make your god belief
equivalent to that restaurant belief (or the aforementioned young girl
journal belief for that matter)?
> > So, between a non-existent being (as far a we can tell) and a natural
> > explanation, in my book, in ALL cases, the natural explanation wins.
>
> What's a "natural explanation"?
One that rest on at least one known fact or one logical proof.
> > If there is more than one possible natural explanation, more
> > investigation is needed. "goddidit" never explained anything, and it
> > never will, unless we can first establish that there are/is gods/a
> > god.
>
> And my question is this: if we have multiple theories or explanations
> (again, dismissing the "natural" qualifier since it isn't relevant for
> EITHER of us, despite your attempts to use it) what is it acceptable
> to BELIEVE in the meantime? Anything? None?
The one that expains the most using the least assumptions.
> > > > > DO claim to have observed/
> > > > > experienced God and you and other atheists deny that they have.
>
> > > > Wrong.
> > > > We do not deny the feelings/experiences that they claim to have had.
> > > > We just have a different explanation for such events.
>
> > > And what can be settled then? There are always thousands of
> > > alternative explanations for any experience or theory. Why do you
> > > think it rational to say that if you can find an alternative theory --
> > > no matter how improbable -- that should be believed over it being an
> > > experience of God? Not just for yourself, but for them as well?
>
> > > If you KNEW that it wasn't an experience of God and that the
> > > alternative explanation was correct, that would be different. Do you
> > > have that?
>
> > See above.
>
> The above doesn't address this at all: why should THEY deny that their
> experiences reflect God just because YOU don't think -- and therefore
> believe -- that they don't? Why should they accept the alternative
> explanation that YOU prefer, or be called irrational?
It is not about me wanting them to deny what their experiences tell
them, it is about you considering for a moment that a belief that rest
on no observable facts at all and on no logical proof/necessity of any
kind is a special beleif. Period.
Note that I am not talking about rational vs. irrational at this
point. This has to be investigated on a case by case basis, well
susally... Some beliefs are definitely irrational...
<snip>
<aside...>
> > Really? What miracles are "wide-spread"?
>
> The "sun moving one" (I think at Fatima?) seemed to have a wide
> range. Again, hard to photograph at the time.
This was debunked, and there were photographer at the times. Heck, we
have photograph of the crowds and, also, movie theatres already
existed...
You are going to have to try again if you really want to talk about
miracles that were observed and left unexplained.
<end of aside>
<snip>
> I agree that if you invent a belief out of whole cloth -- and YOU
> invent it -- then it is irrational. I also agree that it would be
> irrational if you didn't invent it but if you knew that it WAS
> invented, and so Russell's Teapot and the FSM fall out of the picture
And all known gods, except that the "inventor" of the beliefs are lost
in the the prehistoric times...
> (we know they were invented thought experiments). But the belief in
> God is not such a belief.
Really? How can you be so sure?
All theists have are books, much like any reader 500 years from now
will have regarding Russell's teapot...
> So, what basis do you have for the claim,
> then, that god beliefs are irrational on the basis of what's talked
Well, let me correct the this here. I might have given the impression
that I think that believing in god is irrational.
Not quite,. It depends on the circumstances.
What I did say is that god beliefs are special and not like other
beliefs upon which our daily experiences are built.
> about here? Beyond "You don't know that gods exist"? Because I
> return to the argument from design: The universe exists and shows some
> signs that things that are designed show. That fits your criteria.
No because every single so-called design argument has been refuted.
Show me one that cannot be expained away and we can talk.
> Note that I still do not AGREE with your criteria.
Which criteria?
>
>
> > > > > So why do you insist that we'd have to know that God
>
> > > > Not "God", but "gods."
>
> > > > > exists before we
> > > > > could believe that God exists? If God is the only God,
>
> > > > So?
> > > > is there some rule somewhere that states that there must be more than
> > > > one member of a class before the class can be said to be viable?
>
> > > Um, please read more carefully, and read entire arguments before
> > > replying. If there really was only one God, and I had to know that a
> > > god existed before BELIEVING that any other god existed, that's what
> > > your suggestion pragmatically boils down to. That's absurd, so that
> > > can't work.
>
> > Except that you do not kow that there exist just the one god, and you
> > have no logical reason to posit the existence of such a being.
>
> And if God only existed, your suggestion STILL pragmatically works out
> to "Prove that God exists before you can even believe that God
> exists". Yes, I don't know that that's true, but I don't know that
> that's false, either. And since that's a stupid way to proceed (you
> can't believe that ANY subatomic particles exist until you've proven
> that one does) it's right out as a rational way to know things. Thus,
> objections based on that are impractical and defeat the purpose of
> belief entirely. And thus should be ignored.
>
> Rebuttal?
We had very good empirical reasons to believe that sub-atomic
particles existed before they were demonstrated to exist
Heck, many types were predicted and then discovered based on those
predications.
Now, what are your equivalent reasons/predictions for god?
<snip>
> > All you need to do is give me one logical objective reason to even
> > suggest that a god is possible.
> > I am listening.
>
> You have to actually have an idea of what counts as "logical" and
> "objective" that's developed enough that I can understand it and that
> I agree with so that I WILL use it. You don't seem to have one.
Dodge ball much?
So, basically, you refuse to answer because in your assessment I am
too daft?
Just use any dictionary/resource you like and see what they mean by
objective and logical and then try me.
>
>
> > > > > and that doesn't make sense.
>
> > > > > [snip]
>
> > > > > > If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
> > > > > > on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
> > > > > > gods exist?
>
> > > > > This is you, as usual, imposing an unproven epistemology on me. I say
> > > > > that the evidence and justification is similar to that for other
> > > > > beliefs. You deny this because you claim god beliefs special, but
> > > > > have not been able to establish a rational argument showing that they
> > > > > are.
>
> > > > I have, but you refuse to acknowledge that I might have a point.
>
> > > No, you haven't. I haven't just dismissed your claims, but have
> > > argued against them. We've dropped your initial distinction because
> > > it ended up not being relevant, since things in your B category could
> > > be rational beliefs
>
> > Except that the original distinction was not based on segregating
> > beliefs in rational vs. irrational.
>
> But you were supposed to -- as I've said before -- segregate god
> beliefs from the other ones that _I_ consider equivalent and then show
> that because of their "specialness" they'd be irrational. You haven't
> really done either yet.
Nope, see the title of the thread YOU created.
All I claimed was that your god belief is special.
Later, I claimed that special and non-special beliefs can both be
rational or irrational. Rationality (or lack thereof) is not what
makes your god belief special. Rationality would be phase 2. We are
not there yet. Sorry for sometimes using those terms and seemingly
confusing the issues.
>
>
> > > and you accepted that it could be rational to just
> > > believe that something exists. Now we're arguing over other
> > > distinctions.
>
> > Nope.
>
> > The fact is you refused to acknowledge that my distinction had merit.
>
> I argued against it, in fact ...
>
>
>
> > Again, you can have beliefs about things that are known to exist and
> > you can have beliefs about things that are not factually known to
> > exist.
> > In the second case, because we are talking about beliefs about
> > beliefs, such beliefs are indeed special and cannot be compared to
> > basic first degree beliefs about actualities.
>
> I disagreed, pointing out that it seemed to reduce to "beliefs
> justified by beliefs" which is actually quite common ...
Except that I claimed that with "non-special" beliefs, so to speak, we
can trace the chain of beliefs back to a known fact or a logical proof
of some sort. Not so with your god belief. And THAT is precisely what
makes it special.
> > For those beliefs to be rational, you need some objective logical
> > arguments to support the belief.
>
> Which you also have not defined.
>
> > You have none for your god belief, but somehow it is my fault?
>
> > This is why it is special, you have beliefs about a belief which is
> > based on nothing but subjective reports.
>
> And this is explicitly about "beliefs about beliefs" and I do have
> these. When I bring them up, however, you drop the "existence" claim
> back in despite never having shown why that particularly matters.
It does matter.
See above.
<snip>
> > > If I am delusional, you should be able to demonstrate that I'm wrong.
>
> > What personal experience have you had that confirms that YOUR god is
> > real? And were you able to get corroboration from others?
>
> Why would it be "delusional" if I couldn't confirm it, but the
> experience was such that I wouldn't expect to?
You are not answering the question.
Did you or did you not have such an experience?
> Of course, again you forget that I never DID claim to base it on
> personal experiences.
So, you did not?
Then obviously we cannot talk about delusions in your case, at least,
not the normal run of the mill kind...
> Now, as to the specific example, the point of that was that I actually
> did, in fact, have EVIDENCE that I was wrong: the DVD release that had
> a different song (not the same song, but a different) than I
> remember. And I concluded that it was still rational of me to TRUST
> MY MEMORY and circumstantial data. So, why is it more rational to
> maintain belief in a proposition that I have DISCONFIRMING EVIDENCE
> for?
Utterly irrelevant.
All those facts are real (TV shows, songs, DVD, you, etc.).
Moreover, there are any number of circumstantial evidence that are all
possibly very real that can explain the discrepancy.
Again, give me just one fact for your god belief (equivalent to: TV
shows, songs, DVD, you, etc.) then we can equate it to this song
memory belief.
>
>
> > > You haven't. And this is consistent with you: instead of getting down
> > > and dirty and arguing for your position, you end up simply dismissing
> > > it and trying to bail on the discussion. If you can't prove your
> > > point, why should I or anyone else accept it? If you can't or won't
> > > argue for your position,
>
> > I did.
>
> > > why should anyone accept it?
>
> > Ask yourself.
>
> I'm asking you, since you're the one who has to prove your position.
>
>
>
> > > You and I disagree on this point. What you're doing here is rather
> > > sulkily suggesting a stance of "we agree to disagree" ... except that
> > > then you use YOUR view
>
> > So, when did it become MY view to insist that before one can call a
> > belief rational, said belief must be based on objective logical
> > observations/arguments?
>
> Except that the argument here is, in fact, about the "existence"
> portion. At any rate, my epistemology and yours do not align on this
> point, as you well know, and so in this debate it is, indeed, YOUR
> view that you are using to judge what evidence _I_ can present and
> what beliefs _I_ can have. Which is not a valid move in a debate.
Not quite.
I am pointing out that in YOUR world all your belief chains can be
traced back to observable facts or logical proofs, except your god
belief. Hence, it is a special kind of belief.
Nothing to do with me and my beliefs.
>
>
> > > to judge MY beliefs, which I of course won't
> > > accept. Which, then, is intellectually dishonest and dirty pool.
>
> > > > The fact is, you have not been able to give me another example of a
> > > > belief you have that rests wholly on something that cannot be
> > > > demonstrated to be real in any shape or form.
>
> > > Nice rant, but it is too vague to have any argumentative substance.
>
> > It does not make it false either.
>
> But that's not good enough; you need to prove it true if you want to
> use it as a criteria for the beliefs and discussions in this thread.
>
>
>
> > > I've argued that I have the same evidence as I have for other
> > > beliefs.
>
> > You have claimed it, but you have falied to demonstrate it with even
> > one single example.
>
> I feel I have provided plenty. You deny them all.
Yes, because in every single case, the chain of beliefs ended with
observable facts about the objective world.
> That's not an
> indication that I've failed,
Yes it is.
You have failed to provide me with one other example of a belief YOU
have that, like your god belief, cannot be traced back to observable
facts about the objective world.
> but an indication what we have completely
> different ideas about what counts as evidence and how it applies to
> other beliefs. This thread is supposed to be about settling this.
> And instead of engaging at that level, you retreat to "You can't
> provide an example of any other belief that you hold on that basis!"
> assertions and present that as if that's a failure of my position,
> when again all that is doing is indicating the area of disagreement
> between us.
>
> We're supposed to be settling the disagreement, so why are you
> insisting on presenting that disagreement as if it was evidence in
> favour of your position?
The very fact that, so far, only one of your belief is utterly
different from all your other belief does indicate that, as I
suggested, that one belief is indeed special.
<snip>
Treebeard
On May 26, 3:10 pm, Answer_42 <ipu.belie...@gmail.com> wrote:
> On May 13, 11:27 am, Treebeard <allan_c_cybuls...@yahoo.ca> wrote:
> <snip>
> <I have a feeling we are digressing to far afield here.. trying to
> refocus...>
>
> > So, I repeat, why can't I believe something that I find in a book and
> > can't corroborate with anything outside that book?
>
> You can, sure, but then it is a special belief.
> How many of those do you have?
You might be getting to a decent point, which is about beliefs that
simply can't be corroborated (at least practically) being special.
But then I'd argue that some of the ones that you've rejected --
Socrates, for example -- are that sort because they can only be
corroborated by the sources that propose it, some of which are known
to be actually fictional and inaccurate. But, at any rate, I still
see no problem with these sorts of beliefs, and so would see no reason
why I shouldn't hold them. Which, remember, is the key here. As long
as you seem to want to classify such beliefs as irrational, you have
to demonstrate how that specialness demonstrates that.
>
> > If I find a
> > journal of a young school girl in my attic but can't corroborate any
> > of the personal writings in it, why would it be a problem for me to
> > believe them?
>
> Except that you know for a fact that young girls exist, that young
> girls do often write journals, that young girls who write journals
> tend often exaggerate, etc.
>
> So, if all you have is the journal, and the you decide to believe it
> as it is written, the belief would be slightly irrational, but not
> special becasue of the aforementioned known facts about journals and
> young girls.
assign the CONFIDENCE of the belief based on what you mentioned ...
> Now apply the same to your god belief. What is it in that book you
> read that you know is real that points to your god also potentially
> being real? What are the "young girls" and the "journals" equivalent?
the places exist, some of the events happened, etc, etc. The problem
has always been that so many of the things that you claim that I know
exist that have a bearing on this aren't things that really relate to
the belief at all, nor are they any evidence that I should believe
that. They are trivial truths. I mean, that young girls exist and
write journals isn't really any indication that a young girl really
did write that journal. And, at that point, we can raise the same
objections against it that people raise against the Bible: maybe it
was a fake or invented or whatever.
So, how is it any different? If you had real things that did bear
directly on the proposition, you'd have a point. But that doesn't
seem to be the case.
>
>
>
> > > > > > > But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
>
> > > > > > Woudn't we have to define God and what would count as such an
> > > > > > observation first? After all, people
>
> > > > > <sigh>
> > > > > I was talking about YOU.
>
> > > > First, I think you already know the answer to that question.
>
> > > > Second, when you insist that you don't know what the definition of
> > > > "God" is, how could any of my observations count,
>
> > > A definition based on subjective observations is far from ideal, but
> > > if that is all you got, I guess we will have to make-do.
>
> > Except that if one of the major charges against subjective experiences
> > is "They don't indicate a god", that isn't what you're going to do,
> > now is it?
>
> > Unless we know what experiences would indicate "God" we cannot make
> > claims about what a particular experience means.
>
> And this is MY problem exactly how?
experience of God is, you have to also settle, at least, what you'd
accept as a reasonable -- not unequivocable -- experience that would
count as God.
>
> You are the god believer, so you are the one who should be able to
> define what constitute an objective "god" experience.
remember?
> The fact that you cannot indicates that I am on the right track here,
> not that I am at fault.
dismiss the more vague experiences of God as not really God
experiences because for some reason you don't think it could be such
an experience. You can refuse to believe it yourself, but if you are
going to tell others not to accept it either you need to outline and
have all parties agree on what an experience of God would be.
To return to the initial point, if you don't agree on or accept or
know a definition of God, you can't really say much about the
subjective experiences that you claim don't work to prove the
existence of God.
>
>
>
> > > > even if I had them?
> > > > Wouldn't you just deny that that was really an experience of God, like
> > > > you generally do, based on finding another way to explain it?
>
> > > Except that you cannot prove that other explanations are not valid...
>
> > If I could, I'd know it. So what? We're talking belief, not
> > knowledge. Remember, I ACCEPT that other explanations are valid, but
> > don't hold myself to the other answers just because someone else likes
> > them better.
>
> > > And you cannot prove that you had an experienced linked to what you
> > > call a supernatural being wh was somehow contacting you, here, in this
> > > natural world.
> > > Heck, you cannot even demonstrate in any shape or form that the
> > > supernatural is a real realm/dimension/something.
>
> > It is quite interesting that you have now retreated to the
> > "supernatural" distinction, despite the fact that it is well-known
> > that NEITHER of us accepts it or thinks it useful. Remember, I DON'T
> > call it a supernatural being, and have no idea how to define such a
> > thing, as I've said in the past. A position that you've agreed with.
> > Thus, you cannot use it or its "realm" as any sort of distinction
> > about the belief. And remember, that's what this thread is about:
> > showing why I should consider beliefs about God different than beliefs
> > about what time the restaurant opens.
>
> Simply because we know that restaurants are real, that restaurants do
> have opening hours (except for the 24/7 types, of course...).
restaurants about restaurants, they shouldn't believe that restaurants
exist? Or is that just a "special belief", which has no bearing on
what anyone should believe about those beliefs?
Neither outcome works well for your idea. Is there a third?
> Now, what facts do you know about gods that would make your god belief
> equivalent to that restaurant belief (or the aforementioned young girl
> journal belief for that matter)?
>
> > > So, between a non-existent being (as far a we can tell) and a natural
> > > explanation, in my book, in ALL cases, the natural explanation wins.
>
> > What's a "natural explanation"?
>
> One that rest on at least one known fact or one logical proof.
is heavily used in non-naturalistic philosophy, and is just you
essentially assuming your conclusion.
>
> > > If there is more than one possible natural explanation, more
> > > investigation is needed. "goddidit" never explained anything, and it
> > > never will, unless we can first establish that there are/is gods/a
> > > god.
>
> > And my question is this: if we have multiple theories or explanations
> > (again, dismissing the "natural" qualifier since it isn't relevant for
> > EITHER of us, despite your attempts to use it) what is it acceptable
> > to BELIEVE in the meantime? Anything? None?
>
> The one that expains the most using the least assumptions.
reasoning may not. It is highly controversial that "explaining the
most" matters (since it may explain across more fields but be an
inferior explanation in all of them), and we have to define what
assumptions are. I refuse to accept that I have to count the beliefs
in my Web of Belief and take the proposition that uses less of them,
and it's hard to see what other assumptions you could be referring to
here.
So, WHY should we only find acceptable things that fit this criteria?
I reply that it is acceptable to believe that which fits in best with
your Web of Belief. Why am I wrong?
>
> > > > > > DO claim to have observed/
> > > > > > experienced God and you and other atheists deny that they have.
>
> > > > > Wrong.
> > > > > We do not deny the feelings/experiences that they claim to have had.
> > > > > We just have a different explanation for such events.
>
> > > > And what can be settled then? There are always thousands of
> > > > alternative explanations for any experience or theory. Why do you
> > > > think it rational to say that if you can find an alternative theory --
> > > > no matter how improbable -- that should be believed over it being an
> > > > experience of God? Not just for yourself, but for them as well?
>
> > > > If you KNEW that it wasn't an experience of God and that the
> > > > alternative explanation was correct, that would be different. Do you
> > > > have that?
>
> > > See above.
>
> > The above doesn't address this at all: why should THEY deny that their
> > experiences reflect God just because YOU don't think -- and therefore
> > believe -- that they don't? Why should they accept the alternative
> > explanation that YOU prefer, or be called irrational?
>
> It is not about me wanting them to deny what their experiences tell
> them, it is about you considering for a moment that a belief that rest
> on no observable facts at all and on no logical proof/necessity of any
> kind is a special beleif. Period.
you meant "repeatable". And the vast majority of our every day
beliefs are, in fact, not repeatable in the right way, since we cannot
predict when -- or if -- they will occur again. And as I have said,
even science does not have logical proof or necessity (because it is
inductive) and the most it gets is repeatable experience. So, if not
having those things makes a belief special, then most beliefs are
special ... which kinda defeats the use of the word "special".
>
> Note that I am not talking about rational vs. irrational at this
> point. This has to be investigated on a case by case basis, well
> susally... Some beliefs are definitely irrational...
still say that they were irrational. If you now concede that there's
nothing about the specialness that makes it irrational per se,
specialness is irrelevant to whether or not someone should believe in
God, and so we wouldn't need to discuss it anymore and can move on to
how God beliefs are, in and of themselves, irrational.
>
> <snip>
>
> <aside...>
>
> > > Really? What miracles are "wide-spread"?
>
> > The "sun moving one" (I think at Fatima?) seemed to have a wide
> > range. Again, hard to photograph at the time.
>
> This was debunked,
be "The sun didn't move that way anywhere else, the sun doesn't move
that way, and they might have just had an illusion from looking at it
too much". Hardly a decent debunking.
> and there were photographer at the times. Heck, we
> have photograph of the crowds and, also, movie theatres already
> existed...
up that they could point AT THE SUN and photograph or film, in that
short period of time.
>
> You are going to have to try again if you really want to talk about
> miracles that were observed and left unexplained.
> <end of aside>
>
> <snip>
>
> > I agree that if you invent a belief out of whole cloth -- and YOU
> > invent it -- then it is irrational. I also agree that it would be
> > irrational if you didn't invent it but if you knew that it WAS
> > invented, and so Russell's Teapot and the FSM fall out of the picture
>
> And all known gods, except that the "inventor" of the beliefs are lost
> in the the prehistoric times...
have any evidence that it was, other than your own assumptions.
>
> > (we know they were invented thought experiments). But the belief in
> > God is not such a belief.
>
> Really? How can you be so sure?
saying that it was, unlike the other two. That's as far as my claim
goes, and I certainly do have that evidence. My claim is merely that
we don't know that gods were invented. That seems to be true.
> All theists have are books, much like any reader 500 years from now
> will have regarding Russell's teapot...
>
> > So, what basis do you have for the claim,
> > then, that god beliefs are irrational on the basis of what's talked
>
> Well, let me correct the this here. I might have given the impression
> that I think that believing in god is irrational.
> Not quite,. It depends on the circumstances.
from you challenging me to show that it wasn't irrational to believe
in God, and so if this isn't bearing on that we really need to settle
what would.
>
> What I did say is that god beliefs are special and not like other
> beliefs upon which our daily experiences are built.
have different epistemic positions here, which is causing the issue;
while I agree that there are differences, I don't think they are
enough to make them special.
>
> > about here? Beyond "You don't know that gods exist"? Because I
> > return to the argument from design: The universe exists and shows some
> > signs that things that are designed show. That fits your criteria.
>
> No because every single so-called design argument has been refuted.
still doesn't matter since the claim is that God created the universe,
which means that the existence of the universe is about as relevant as
the fact that restaurants -- or even a particular one -- exist to the
belief about what time the restaurant opens.
The argument from design only actually makes the existence of the
thing relevant to the beliefs.
> Show me one that cannot be expained away and we can talk.
>
> > Note that I still do not AGREE with your criteria.
>
> Which criteria?
that relates to the belief, however vaguely".
existed? Had we proven it? No. Therefore, your criteria is
irrational. Here, you are simply appealing to standards of evidence
and dropping the original contention entirely.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > All you need to do is give me one logical objective reason to even
> > > suggest that a god is possible.
> > > I am listening.
>
> > You have to actually have an idea of what counts as "logical" and
> > "objective" that's developed enough that I can understand it and that
> > I agree with so that I WILL use it. You don't seem to have one.
>
> Dodge ball much?
> So, basically, you refuse to answer because in your assessment I am
> too daft?
what that means, we won't get anywhere. I'll give you what I consider
such a reason, and you'll reject it, we'll rant and rave at each
other, but we won't settle it because our definitions don't match and
so both of us will think that we are talking about logical and
objective and properly using/defending it ... and we'll both be right,
by our own definitions.
I'd like to get that out of the way without all the ranting and
raving, please.
>
> Just use any dictionary/resource you like and see what they mean by
> objective and logical and then try me.
mean to you.
>
>
>
> > > > > > and that doesn't make sense.
>
> > > > > > [snip]
>
> > > > > > > If your belief is not based on faith alone, i.e. it is somehow based
> > > > > > > on reason, then what is that rational justification for believing that
> > > > > > > gods exist?
>
> > > > > > This is you, as usual, imposing an unproven epistemology on me. I say
> > > > > > that the evidence and justification is similar to that for other
> > > > > > beliefs. You deny this because you claim god beliefs special, but
> > > > > > have not been able to establish a rational argument showing that they
> > > > > > are.
>
> > > > > I have, but you refuse to acknowledge that I might have a point.
>
> > > > No, you haven't. I haven't just dismissed your claims, but have
> > > > argued against them. We've dropped your initial distinction because
> > > > it ended up not being relevant, since things in your B category could
> > > > be rational beliefs
>
> > > Except that the original distinction was not based on segregating
> > > beliefs in rational vs. irrational.
>
> > But you were supposed to -- as I've said before -- segregate god
> > beliefs from the other ones that _I_ consider equivalent and then show
> > that because of their "specialness" they'd be irrational. You haven't
> > really done either yet.
>
> Nope, see the title of the thread YOU created.
that got us here ... how, exactly?
>
> All I claimed was that your god belief is special.
> Later, I claimed that special and non-special beliefs can both be
> rational or irrational. Rationality (or lack thereof) is not what
> makes your god belief special. Rationality would be phase 2. We are
> not there yet. Sorry for sometimes using those terms and seemingly
> confusing the issues.
support of the irrationality. You did seem to divide based on
rationality -- as I pointed out -- and then after that retreated to
some of those special beliefs being rational. So I disagree with
special, but even if I did agree the onus would still be on you to
show that the beliefs are irrational.
>
>
>
> > > > and you accepted that it could be rational to just
> > > > believe that something exists. Now we're arguing over other
> > > > distinctions.
>
> > > Nope.
>
> > > The fact is you refused to acknowledge that my distinction had merit.
>
> > I argued against it, in fact ...
>
> > > Again, you can have beliefs about things that are known to exist and
> > > you can have beliefs about things that are not factually known to
> > > exist.
> > > In the second case, because we are talking about beliefs about
> > > beliefs, such beliefs are indeed special and cannot be compared to
> > > basic first degree beliefs about actualities.
>
> > I disagreed, pointing out that it seemed to reduce to "beliefs
> > justified by beliefs" which is actually quite common ...
>
> Except that I claimed that with "non-special" beliefs, so to speak, we
> can trace the chain of beliefs back to a known fact or a logical proof
> of some sort. Not so with your god belief. And THAT is precisely what
> makes it special.
not if we want a meaningful fact to ground it.
>
> > > For those beliefs to be rational, you need some objective logical
> > > arguments to support the belief.
>
> > Which you also have not defined.
>
> > > You have none for your god belief, but somehow it is my fault?
>
> > > This is why it is special, you have beliefs about a belief which is
> > > based on nothing but subjective reports.
>
> > And this is explicitly about "beliefs about beliefs" and I do have
> > these. When I bring them up, however, you drop the "existence" claim
> > back in despite never having shown why that particularly matters.
>
> It does matter.
> See above.
>
> <snip>
>
> > > > If I am delusional, you should be able to demonstrate that I'm wrong.
>
> > > What personal experience have you had that confirms that YOUR god is
> > > real? And were you able to get corroboration from others?
>
> > Why would it be "delusional" if I couldn't confirm it, but the
> > experience was such that I wouldn't expect to?
>
> You are not answering the question.
> Did you or did you not have such an experience?
>
> > Of course, again you forget that I never DID claim to base it on
> > personal experiences.
>
> So, you did not?
>
> Then obviously we cannot talk about delusions in your case, at least,
> not the normal run of the mill kind...
>
> > Now, as to the specific example, the point of that was that I actually
> > did, in fact, have EVIDENCE that I was wrong: the DVD release that had
> > a different song (not the same song, but a different) than I
> > remember. And I concluded that it was still rational of me to TRUST
> > MY MEMORY and circumstantial data. So, why is it more rational to
> > maintain belief in a proposition that I have DISCONFIRMING EVIDENCE
> > for?
>
> Utterly irrelevant.
whatever your existence claims are meant to show.
matter, and if that happens it just HAPPENS to happen. In short, I'm
not really saying whether or not it occurs for any other beliefs, but
denying that categorizing beliefs by that is in any way relevant,
important, or useful.
>
>
>
> > > > to judge MY beliefs, which I of course won't
> > > > accept. Which, then, is intellectually dishonest and dirty pool.
>
> > > > > The fact is, you have not been able to give me another example of a
> > > > > belief you have that rests wholly on something that cannot be
> > > > > demonstrated to be real in any shape or form.
>
> > > > Nice rant, but it is too vague to have any argumentative substance.
>
> > > It does not make it false either.
>
> > But that's not good enough; you need to prove it true if you want to
> > use it as a criteria for the beliefs and discussions in this thread.
>
> > > > I've argued that I have the same evidence as I have for other
> > > > beliefs.
>
> > > You have claimed it, but you have falied to demonstrate it with even
> > > one single example.
>
> > I feel I have provided plenty. You deny them all.
>
> Yes, because in every single case, the chain of beliefs ended with
> observable facts about the objective world.
>
> > That's not an
> > indication that I've failed,
>
> Yes it is.
> You have failed to provide me with one other example of a belief YOU
> have that, like your god belief, cannot be traced back to observable
> facts about the objective world.
beliefs. So, that can't be an indication of my failure that I cannot
produce a belief that matches the criteria that I don't hold.
>
> > but an indication what we have completely
> > different ideas about what counts as evidence and how it applies to
> > other beliefs. This thread is supposed to be about settling this.
> > And instead of engaging at that level, you retreat to "You can't
> > provide an example of any other belief that you hold on that basis!"
> > assertions and present that as if that's a failure of my position,
> > when again all that is doing is indicating the area of disagreement
> > between us.
>
> > We're supposed to be settling the disagreement, so why are you
> > insisting on presenting that disagreement as if it was evidence in
> > favour of your position?
>
> The very fact that, so far, only one of your belief is utterly
> different from all your other belief does indicate that, as I
> suggested, that one belief is indeed special.
YOUR CRITERIA. How, then, can we settle what criteria to use?
Answer_42
> > <I have a feeling we are digressing to far afield here.. trying to
> > refocus...>
>
> > > So, I repeat, why can't I believe something that I find in a book and
> > > can't corroborate with anything outside that book?
>
> > You can, sure, but then it is a special belief.
> > How many of those do you have?
>
> Why is that special?
>
> You might be getting to a decent point, which is about beliefs that
> simply can't be corroborated (at least practically) being special.
> But then I'd argue that some of the ones that you've rejected --
> Socrates, for example
men exist.
So believing that a specific man may have existed is not special.
While we would be arguing about the available evidence, none of us
would have to first make the assumption "men exist" in order to make
the inquiry even valid in the first place. It would be a fact known to
be true to both sides of those arguing whether Socrates existed or
not.
God belief is special because it is ultimately a belief based on
belief, not a belief based on facts, like other beliefs are.
> -- are that sort because they can only be
> corroborated by the sources that propose it, some of which are known
> to be actually fictional and inaccurate. But, at any rate, I still
> see no problem with these sorts of beliefs, and so would see no reason
> why I shouldn't hold them. Which, remember, is the key here. As long
> as you seem to want to classify such beliefs as irrational, you have
> to demonstrate how that specialness demonstrates that.
as a god exist, let alone that your specific god construct (which you
refuse to define, for obvious reasons) is existent, whether or not he
is the only member of the god class.
> > > If I find a
> > > journal of a young school girl in my attic but can't corroborate any
> > > of the personal writings in it, why would it be a problem for me to
> > > believe them?
>
> > Except that you know for a fact that young girls exist, that young
> > girls do often write journals, that young girls who write journals
> > tend often exaggerate, etc.
>
> > So, if all you have is the journal, and the you decide to believe it
> > as it is written, the belief would be slightly irrational, but not
> > special becasue of the aforementioned known facts about journals and
> > young girls.
>
> I'm not sure it would be irrational at all,
> especially since one would
> assign the CONFIDENCE of the belief based on what you mentioned ...
>
> > Now apply the same to your god belief. What is it in that book you
> > read that you know is real that points to your god also potentially
> > being real? What are the "young girls" and the "journals" equivalent?
>
> Books exist, people exist, the universe exists, animals exist, some of
> the places exist, some of the events happened, etc, etc.
people, in the universe, in animals, in places, in events, etc.
So this is all irrelevant, unless you can demonstrate how those
beliefs in things that are known to exist leads to your beliefs in
god, which is not known to exist.
> The problem
> has always been that so many of the things that you claim that I know
> exist that have a bearing on this aren't things that really relate to
> the belief at all, nor are they any evidence that I should believe
> that. They are trivial truths. I mean, that young girls exist and
> write journals isn't really any indication that a young girl really
> did write that journal.
the sense that it would be very well supported by reality and other
facts that are known to exist.
Nobody would ask (1) "Do young girls exist?", rather, they would ask
(2) "How do you know that it was indeed a young girl who wrote that
book?"
The reason why your god beleif is special is that you need to assume
(1) in order to hold all your (2) type of beliefs about that which you
assume in (1), such as he wants us to be moral agents, he has created
a three-state "universe" (or dimension) for the afterlife, he is
benevolent, etc.
> And, at that point, we can raise the same
> objections against it that people raise against the Bible: maybe it
> was a fake or invented or whatever.
>
> So, how is it any different?
We do not know that god(s) exist(s).
It IS a difference.
> If you had real things that did bear
> directly on the proposition, you'd have a point. But that doesn't
> seem to be the case.
>
>
>
> > > > > > > > But all that may be a moot point if you have observed god. Have you?
>
> > > > > > > Woudn't we have to define God and what would count as such an
> > > > > > > observation first? After all, people
>
> > > > > > <sigh>
> > > > > > I was talking about YOU.
>
> > > > > First, I think you already know the answer to that question.
>
> > > > > Second, when you insist that you don't know what the definition of
> > > > > "God" is, how could any of my observations count,
>
> > > > A definition based on subjective observations is far from ideal, but
> > > > if that is all you got, I guess we will have to make-do.
>
> > > Except that if one of the major charges against subjective experiences
> > > is "They don't indicate a god", that isn't what you're going to do,
> > > now is it?
>
> > > Unless we know what experiences would indicate "God" we cannot make
> > > claims about what a particular experience means.
>
> > And this is MY problem exactly how?
>
> If you are going to wade into the issue and try to judge what a real
> experience of God is, you have to also settle, at least, what you'd
> accept as a reasonable -- not unequivocable -- experience that would
> count as God.
Heck, you refuse to even provide a clear definition of what god is,
how can you expect me to acquiesce to the request you make here?
Define god, then, based on that definition, you tell me what a god
experience is. Then we can discuss whether it has merits.
>
>
> > You are the god believer, so you are the one who should be able to
> > define what constitute an objective "god" experience.
>
> Well, except that I don't think there is one. I'm an agnostic theist,
> remember?
> > The fact that you cannot indicates that I am on the right track here,
> > not that I am at fault.
>
> There's plenty of wrong track to be on, and one wrong track is to
> dismiss the more vague experiences of God as not really God
> experiences because for some reason you don't think it could be such
> an experience. You can refuse to believe it yourself, but if you are
> going to tell others not to accept it either you need to outline and
> have all parties agree on what an experience of God would be.
>
> To return to the initial point, if you don't agree on or accept or
> know a definition of God, you can't really say much about the
> subjective experiences that you claim don't work to prove the
> existence of God.
space that follows, do provide a clear and concise definition of god:
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will explain that they are buildings were people go to buy food and
eat it there or take it home.
None of that causes any problems: people exist, money exists, food
exists, homes exists, buildings exist and people are known for buying
things of all types.
So, again, your analogy fails.
> Neither outcome works well for your idea. Is there a third?
>
> > Now, what facts do you know about gods that would make your god belief
> > equivalent to that restaurant belief (or the aforementioned young girl
> > journal belief for that matter)?
belief?
should not have a particular belief in your web of beliefs.
However, since your (or my) web of beliefs is a system in which
beliefs support each other in various ways, what I am saying is that
your god belief is special because unlike your other beliefs in your
web, this god belief does not ultimately rest on factual knowledge of
any kind.
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[Now, I will snip a lot of stuff because a lot of the discussion has
become redundant and /or unnecessary. If you really want me to address
something I snip, let me know.]
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> > Except that I claimed that with "non-special" beliefs, so to speak, we
> > can trace the chain of beliefs back to a known fact or a logical proof
> > of some sort. Not so with your god belief. And THAT is precisely what
> > makes it special.
>
> And I pointed out that, no, we can't for a good number of beliefs ...
ALL your examples were ultimately based on stuff we know exist.
> not if we want a meaningful fact to ground it.
> > I am pointing out that in YOUR world all your belief chains can be
> > traced back to observable facts or logical proofs, except your god
> > belief. Hence, it is a special kind of belief.
> > Nothing to do with me and my beliefs.
>
> But the problem is this: my epistemology says that that doesn't
> matter, and if that happens it just HAPPENS to happen. In short, I'm
> not really saying whether or not it occurs for any other beliefs, but
> denying that categorizing beliefs by that is in any way relevant,
> important, or useful.
believing in anything one would want to.
Fine.
How can anyone argue with that?
Now, I might be wrong, but I thought epistemology was about knowledge
and how we acquire knowledge and about how we determine what
constitutes knowledge.
Since you have nothing at all that can link your god to any sort of
knowledge--Fact: You are agnostic--how does god fit in your
epistemology, exactly?
In other words, how can you use epistemology to defend something that
is not connected to knowledge at all?
<snip>
> > You have failed to provide me with one other example of a belief YOU
> > have that, like your god belief, cannot be traced back to observable
> > facts about the objective world.
>
> I repeat that I don't care; that's not, to me, how to classify
> beliefs. So, that can't be an indication of my failure that I cannot
> produce a belief that matches the criteria that I don't hold.
unique, you can still tell yourself that it is just a normal belief,
like any other belief... e.g. I believe it will be a hot summer...
Why don't you humour me and do try the exercise of seeing if you have
other similar beliefs or not?
It might be interesting, no?
> > > but an indication what we have completely
> > > different ideas about what counts as evidence and how it applies to
> > > other beliefs. This thread is supposed to be about settling this.
> > > And instead of engaging at that level, you retreat to "You can't
> > > provide an example of any other belief that you hold on that basis!"
> > > assertions and present that as if that's a failure of my position,
> > > when again all that is doing is indicating the area of disagreement
> > > between us.
>
> > > We're supposed to be settling the disagreement, so why are you
> > > insisting on presenting that disagreement as if it was evidence in
> > > favour of your position?
>
> > The very fact that, so far, only one of your belief is utterly
> > different from all your other belief does indicate that, as I
> > suggested, that one belief is indeed special.
>
> Except that, to me, it still ISN'T special or different because I DENY
> YOUR CRITERIA. How, then, can we settle what criteria to use?
epistemology allows and what it does not,. However your god belief
became part of your belief system long before you even knew what
epistemology means. So, in other words, you are using an a posteriori
rationalization to claim that believing in god is no different than
believing that your barber is closed on Mondays.
I maintain that before you can make that sort of claim, you have to
examine both how the belief came to be part of the system of belief--
whatever that system is and however you define that system--and how
the content of the belief connects to other beliefs in the system.
But you have claimed that belief origin and content are not important
in determining if a belief is special or not, if it is rational or
not, etc.
If you still maintain that, then, we are done.
I mean, how can I discuss beliefs with someone who claims that how
beliefs came to be and what they are made of is irrelevant?