¿Quién pagó a los chuponeadores?
Posted: 24 May 2011 10:58 PM PDT
En foto de abril de 2010, el actual ministro del Interior, Miguel Hidalgo; y el jefe de la Dirandro, general PNP Carlos Morán, señalan las contradicciones de las declaraciones de Giannotti en relación a su manifestación ante la Fiscalía (Foto: IDL-Reporteros). 
Giselle Giannotti a la salida de una diligencia judicial (Foto: La República). 
General Carlos Morán explica sobre USB de Giselle Giannotti, en entrevista a IDL-R en abril de 2010 (Foto: IDL-Reporteros).
No hay notas relacionadas.  |
Wikileaks. Cable 68387
Posted: 24 May 2011 02:08 PM PDT
| id: |
68387 |
| date: |
6/16/2006 16:39 |
| refid: |
06LIMA2415 |
| origin: |
Embassy Lima |
| classification: |
CONFIDENTIAL |
| destination: |
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| header: |
| |
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DE RUEHPE #2415/01 1671639
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RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6845
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4285
RUMIAAA/CDR USCINCSO MIAMI FL |
—————– header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 002415
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/15/2016
TAGS: PGOV, KCRM, PINR, PE
SUBJECT: FUJIMORISTAS LOOKING FORWARD TO COOPERATING WITH
GARCIA GOVERNMENT IN RETURN FOR “IMPARTIALITY”
Classified By: Polcouns Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(d).
1. (C) SUMMARY: Legislators-elect Keiko and Santiago
Fujimori, in a 6/12 meeting with Polcouns, said that their
13-member congressional bloc would be disciplined, and is
prepared to work constructively with the incoming Garcia
government in return for an end to “political persecution”
and “impartiality” in the legal treatment of ex-President
Alberto Fujimori. The Fujimoristas praised President-elect
Alan Garcia’s political acumen, thought that they could reach
an arrangement with him that would satisfy both parties, and
expected the Apristas would continue to detach legislators
elected on Ollanta Humala’s Union por el Peru (UPP) ticket.
They expressed concern, however, over the social situation in
isolated rural areas, particularly in the pro-Humala south,
which they thought could be incited to violence by Humala or
his followers. They doubted that the Garcia administration
would have the time or capability to adequately address these
demands in time to affect the November regional/municipal
elections. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Polcouns met for 90 minutes with legislators-elect
Keiko and Santiago Fujimori, who were accompanied by former
minister and President of Congress Jaime Yoshiyama, at
Santiago Fujimori’s office on 6/12. In a wide-ranging
discussion, the Fujimoristas addressed the following issues:
– RELATIONS WITH THE GARCIA GOVERNMENT: Keiko and Santiago
were confident that the 13-member Fujimorista legislative
bloc will remain loyal and disciplined, thereby providing
them with significant leverage in a divisive and
inexperienced Congress. They hope to have a “constructive”
relationship with the incoming Garcia Government, and will
support policies that promote fiscal responsibility,
increased foreign and domestic investment, free markets and
free trade (including implementation of the Free Trade
Agreement – Keiko said that she would ask her father to phone
current Fujimorista legislator Marta Moyano to ensure that
she backs the FTA), increased compensation for “losers” in
the FTA, particularly in the agricultural sector, and
augmented social spending, especially in rural areas. In
return, they expect an end to the “political persecution” of
Fujimoristas carried out under the current administration of
President Alejandro Toledo, as well as “impartial” treatment
for ex-President Alberto Fujimori in the extradition and
criminal cases against him. Santiago declared that an ideal
solution would be a deal under which Alberto could return to
Peru and help siphon off votes from Humala in the November
regional/municipal elections. Keiko commented that she
doubted Garcia’s ego would countenance her father’s presence
in Peru, but Santiago rejoined that he thought an arrangement
could be worked out.
– PRAISE FOR GARCIA: Yoshiyama was effuse with praise for
Garcia’s and the Apristas’ political acumen. He noted that
the President-elect is not/not one to bear grudges, and,
despite having been the focus of criminal proceedings by the
Fujimori Government, has let the Fujimoristas know that they
will not/not face similar treatment under his government
(NOTE: Keiko, Santiago and Yoshiyama have all faced criminal
processes since Alberto went into exile, and Santiago
currently is prohibited from leaving the country in
connection with criminal charges related to the purchase of
the presidential jet. END NOTE). Keiko and Santiago agreed
that Garcia and his followers are adept at negotiating with
other political forces, and put political expediency ahead of
ideological or moral purity. Keiko said that the
Fujimoristas are open to talks with the Apristas, while
Santiago and Yoshiyama indicated that such talks are already
underway, the latter naming several former Fujimori-era
officials who could serve as ministers under Garcia.
– BUT CONCERN ABOUT APRA’S CAPABILITIES: Santiago thought
that Garcia’s stated policies of political inclusion,
government austerity, openness to globalization and the world
economy, and increased social programs for marginalized areas
were the right way to go, but expressed doubts that the
President-elect has the time or human resources necessary to
make an impact in time to affect the regional/municipal
elections. The APRA leader needs to start to build a
supporting political coalition now, he commented, rather than
wait until his inauguration. If he does not, Santiago
warned, the earliest that Congress (which takes office on
July 28 and traditionally spends the first month of each
opening session bargaining over committee chairmanships)
could organize itself to act would be September-October. He
also doubted that APRA has the human resources necessary to
adequately staff the technocrat positions needed to
effectively implement the needed social policies, adding that
Garcia’s vow to halve GOP salaries at the upper and
managerial levels would have a negative impact on recruiting
talented professionals. If Garcia staffs these jobs with
APRA hacks, he warned, his presidency will be an even bigger
disaster than his first term.
– THE HUMALA FACTOR: Yoshiyama, referring to the
announcement earlier that day that three UPP
congressmen-elect had split from the Humalista bloc (Septel),
said that it was to be expected that Humala’s congressional
delegation would fracture given its impromtu formation and
the quality of its members. He explained that many of
Humala’s rural representatives at one time or another were in
the Fujimorista ranks, and characterized most of them as
unreliable “trash” who will graze where the grass is
greenest. Santiago agreed with this assessment, but worried
that Humala will always have the temptation to radicalize his
approach and incite his followers to demonstrations or acts
of violence, and that a shedding of congressional
representatives could spur him to adopt this course. He
characterized the south as a time bomb that could explode at
any time, while Keiko said that other isolated and
marginalized rural areas are just as discontented. She
expressed concern that Humalistas could win the regional
elections in the 15 departments taken by Humala in the
presidential second round, adding that the Fujimoristas would
present rival candidates in those regions and municipalities
where they could find nominees of unquestioned quality and
probity.
3. (C) COMMENT: The Fujimoristas know that their 13-member
congressional bloc gives them a strong card to play in
negotiations with the Garcia government, as they attempt to
parlay their support in return for an arrangement that
relaxes Alberto Fujimori’s legal situation. To what extent
those discussions prosper remains to be seen. Santiago’s and
Keiko’s worries about the Garcia administration’s time-frame
for action and capabilities to implement needed policies are
well taken, as are their concerns that Humala could exploit
frustrations in marginalized areas to threaten governability
and/or gain control over regional and municipal governments
there. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================ |
Notas relacionadas:
 |
Wikileaks. Cable 60170
Posted: 24 May 2011 01:50 PM PDT
| id: |
60170 |
| date: |
4/11/2006 19:34 |
| refid: |
06LIMA1406 |
| origin: |
Embassy Lima |
| classification: |
CONFIDENTIAL |
| destination: |
05LIMA5332 |
| header: |
| |
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHPE #1406 1011934
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111934Z APR 06
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9734
INFO RUEHBO/AMEMBASSY BOGOTA 3248
RUEHCV/AMEMBASSY CARACAS 9311
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ APR QUITO 0239
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0416
RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 6670
RUEHGL/AMCONSUL GUAYAQUIL 4213
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL |
—————– header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L LIMA 001406
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/11/2016
TAGS: PGOV, PINR, PE
SUBJECT: FUJIMORISTAS DELIGHTED WITH ELECTION RESULTS AND
LOOKING TO DEAL WITH APRA, BUT KEEPING THE DOOR OPEN TO
HUMALA
REF: 05 LIMA 5396
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(d)
.
1. (C) Jaime Yoshiyama, former Minister and President of
Congress under Alberto Fujimori and top advisor to Santiago
Fujimori, Alberto’s brother and the Fujimorista Alliance for
the Future (AF) party’s candidate for First Vice President
and Congress, was jubilant over the election results during a
4/11 breakfast with Polcouns. Yoshiyama said that the AF
expected to win at least 15 seats in the new legislature,
which would give it bargaining power with the two candidates
in the second-round run-off to exchange AF’s support in
return for “guarantees” that Fujimori and former officials of
his regime would receive “just treatment.”
2. (C) According to Yoshiyama:
– Alberto Fujimori has communicated from his detention in
Chile that he is “very pleased” with the election results.
– In addition to AF’s strong showing in the congressional
races, the Fujimoristas were delighted to see that their
principle political enemies, Fernando Olivera’s Independent
Moralizing Front (FIM) party and Valentin Paniagua’s Centrist
Front, did so poorly (the FIM does not look like it will
qualify for congressional representation, while Paniagua is
on track to receive less than six percent of the vote and the
Centrist Front legislative slate no more than a handful
seats).
– AF will also have a highly competent legislative bloc,
headed Keiko Fujimori (Alberto’s daughter and former First
Lady), with the brains supplied by Santiago Fujimori, former
Congress President Martha Hildebrandt, and Alberto Fujimori’s
lawyer, Rolando Sousa.
– Santiago Fujimori will request permission to depart the
country (he is being tried on corruption charges) to visit
his brother and seek specific guidance on how AF should
conduct its negotiations with the two candidates in the
second-round presidential run-off vote, whom the Fujimoristas
expect will be Union por el Peru’s Ollanta Humala and APRA’s
Alan Garcia.
– The Fujimoristas currently plan to negotiate principally
with APRA, whose leaders they view as capable and
responsible, as well as people with whom they feel they can
“do business.”
– The Fujimoristas will also keep the door open to Humala,
both as an incentive for APRA to negotiate in good faith, and
as an insurance policy. While the Fujimoristas question the
UPP candidate’s economic policies and ability to govern, they
do not/not demonize him.
3. (C) COMMENT: The election results to date are
everything the Fujimoristas hoped for (Reftel): a
significant congressional bloc (at least the fourth largest
in the next legislature), the most voted for congressional
candidate (Keiko Fujimori), affirmation of large popular
support for Alberto Fujimori, and the defeat of their most
inveterate political opponents. While Yoshiyama stated that
the Fujimoristas would prefer to swing a deal with Alan
Garcia for the second round, he was also clear that they are
prepared to talk turkey with Humala should the negotiations
with APRA prove unproductive. END COMMENT.
POWERS
=======================CABLE ENDS============================ |
Notas relacionadas:
 |
Wikileaks. Cable 48368
Posted: 24 May 2011 12:12 PM PDT
| id: |
48368 |
| date: |
12/21/2005 22:27 |
| refid: |
05LIMA5396 |
| origin: |
Embassy Lima |
| classification: |
CONFIDENTIAL |
| destination: |
05LIMA5332 |
| header: |
| |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available. |
—————– header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LIMA 005396
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, PREL, PE
SUBJECT: FUJIMORISTAS TRYING TO SELL THEIR MAN AS THE
MECHANISM TO STOP HUMALA
REF: LIMA 5332
Classified By: Political Counselor Alexander Margulies. Reason: 1.4(d)
.
1. (C) SUMMARY: Ex-President Alberto Fujimori’s brother
Santiago, along with three other members of the Fujimorista
brain-trust, in a 12/14 breakfast with Polcouns, described
their movement’s strategy for the upcoming elections;
inquired as to the USG’s position on the presidential
candidacy of ex-President Fujimori, suggesting that the
latter is the only one who can sidetrack ultra-nationalist
Ollanta Humala; and complained about alleged political
persecution and human rights abuses against them (all four
face criminal prosecutions for their actions during the
Fujimori regime). Polcouns replied that the USG views
Fujimori’s eligibility to run for the presidency as an issue
for the appropriate electoral/judicial authorities to
determine in accordance with the Peruvian Constitution and
laws. With respect to the accusations of political
persecution/human rights violations, Polcouns said that
Embassy’s Human Rights Officer was prepared to review any
specific charges, supported by evidence, that the
Fujimoristas submitted. END SUMMARY.
2. (C) Ex-Congressman Oswaldo Sandoval hosted a breakfast
for Polcouns on 12/14. The other invitees were Santiago
Fujimori, Jaime Yoshiyama (former President of Congress,
ex-President of the 1992-93 Constituent Assembly and
ex-Minister), and Augusto Bedoya (ex-Minister of Transport).
The four Fujimoristas characterized the meeting as an overdue
initiative by their movement to establish contact with the
Embassy so as to keep the USG appraised of the Fujimoristas’
objectives and strategy. Santiago Fujimori and Bedoya did
most of the substantive talking, with Yoshiyama interjecting
to correct misinformation or provide emphasis to specific
points. Sandoval appeared to be the liaison guy, with
minimal input on policy or organization issues. (NOTE:
There are media reports that Bedoya carried out the transfer
of funds for lease of the aircraft that took Alberto Fujimori
from Japan to Chile. END NOTE).
3. (C) According to the four Fujimoristas:
– Santiago Fujimori is the undisputed leader of the
movement in Peru and is in regular communication with his
brother in Chile.
– The four are part of the core Fujimorista brain-trust,
remaining in the background for two reasons: (1) politically
it is more advantageous to have populists like Martha Chavez,
who appeal to the poorest sectors of the population where
Fujimori’s support is strongest, out front; and (2) the four
are all involved in business dealings and face criminal
charges linked to their service with the Fujimori regime, and
are concerned that their commercial interests would suffer
and/or they would open themselves to “increased political
persecution” should they be seen as actively engaging in
politics.
– They are committed to bringing about Alberto Fujimori’s
re-election to the Presidency and inquired as to the USG’s
view on this (Polcouns replied that we consider Fujimori’s
eligibility to run for the presidency to be an issue for the
appropriate electoral and/or judicial authorities to
determine in accordance with the Peruvian Constitution and
laws).
– Fujimori’s detention in Chile was an unexpected blow and
damaged the movement politically, but they are hopeful that
he will be freed on bail in early January, once Peru files
its extradition request. Once freed from confinement,
Fujimori will be in a better position to rally the faithful.
– The movement’s original strategy was to combine the three
Fujimorista parties (Si Cumple, Nueva Mayoria, Cambio 90) in
one alliance. A 12/6 decision by the National Electoral
Board’s (JNE) Office of Party Organization Registration,
however, rejected the inscription of the proposed alliance on
the grounds that Alberto Fujimori, who was proposed as the
alliance’s titular head, was ineligible to occupy this post
as a result of a 2001 vote by Congress to disqualify him from
holding public office for 10 years. The Constitutional
Tribunal, in a case to which Fujimori was not/not a party,
subsequently stated that this disqualification also prohibits
those it covers from running for public office and restricts
their political rights.
– The Fujimoristas at first considered appealing this
decision to the JNE on the grounds that (1) the 2001 Congress
vote was insufficient (a simple majority of 37 legislators
present had voted for the disqualification, while a
subsequent Constitutional Tribunal decision provided that a
vote by two-thirds of the Congress — 80 legislators — is
required to remove a president), (2) the Constitutional
Tribunal ruling interpreting the effect of the 10-year
congressional prohibition is not/not in accordance with the
express wording of the Constitution (NOTE: Article 100 of
the Constitution empowers Congress to disqualify public
officials from holding office for up to 10 years, but does
not specifically state that they cannot run for office.
Article 10 of the Organic Law on Elections, however, does
provide that public functionaries disqualified from holding
office cannot vote or be elected. END NOTE); and (3) an
electoral alliance is a private political organization,
not/not a “public office,” and so falls outside the bounds of
the congressional prohibition.
– After due consideration, however, the decision was taken
not/not to appeal. This was based first on the brain-trust
concluding that the key JNE ruling will be on whether Alberto
Fujimori is eligible to run for office, and that they should
not expose their legal hand on less important issues.
Secondly, the Fujimorista leadership realized that splitting
the proposed alliance in two would enure to their benefit, as
they would then have a back-up electoral vehicle should the
JNE disqualify Fujimori.
– As a result, Si Cumple will go it alone, presenting a
presidential ticket with Alberto Fujimori at the top.
Meanwhile, Cambio 90 and Nueva Mayoria have formed the
Alliance for the Future (AF for short, Fujimori’s initials),
and will nominate an as-yet undecided ticket that does not
include the ex-President. If Fujimori is permitted to run,
then AF will withdraw its presidential slate from the race.
– The Fujimoristas have had discussion with JNE
magistrates, and believe that the JNE will permit Fujimori to
run, even though technically he cannot take office.
(COMMENT: Polcouns raised the issue of Fujimori’s
eligibility to run for the Presidency with JNE President
Enrique Mendoza at a 12/14 reception. Mendoza said that the
JNE will apply the constitution and law, adding that Article
10 of the Organic Law on Elections is dispositive. END
COMMENT.)
– If Fujimori runs and wins the election, they expect that
the sitting Congress will vote to lift the prohibition on his
taking office. If it does not, then the new Congress will do
so.
– If Fujimori is prevented from running, then the
Fujimoristas do not/not expect to win the presidency, but
they still hope to win a sizable legislative bloc, which will
pressure for the disqualification of Fujimori to be lifted.
(COMMENT: Keiko Fujimori, the highly popular daughter of
Alberto Fujimori and ex-Acting First Lady, has announced that
she will lead the Alliance for the Future. Presumably she
will also head its list of congressional nominees. END
COMMENT.)
4. (C) The four Fujimoristas claimed that, under their
leadership, a new Fujimori government would emulate the
positive actions of Fujimori’s first term, while avoiding the
massive corruption of its second term. They also emphasized
that Fujimori was the best bet to stop surging
ultra-nationalist presidential contender Ollanta Humala,
noting that many of those shifting to Humala are Fujimori
supporters disheartened by the ex-President’s captivity in
Chile.
5. (C) Polcouns acknowledged that Fujimorista followers
seem to be migrating to the Humala camp, but pointed out that
over the past year Humala’s candidacy has been highly
publicized, if not outright supported, by pro-Fujimori media
organs like daily “La Razon.” Santiago Fujimori admitted
that this was the case, indicating that in retrospect this
was unfortunate. He then declared that the USG should have
no/no political concerns over the election of a strong
Fujimorista legislative bloc, as this would ally itself with
center-right presidential candidate Lourdes Flores’ Unidad
Nacional alliance, “with whom we have excellent relations,”
in the next Congress.
6. (C) Santiago Fujimori took the lead in bringing up the
issue of human rights, arguing that there were “no
systematic” violations under the Fujimori regime. He
declared that the real human rights violations are occurring
today, with former Fujimori regime officials like those at
the table being the victims of political persecution. The
other three Fujimoristas present firmly assented, with each
complaining that “unfounded” criminal allegations against
them are being slowly processed by the criminal justice
system, negatively affecting their business activities and,
in some case, preventing them from traveling outside the
country. With breaking voice and tears welling in his eyes,
Santiago resumed his litany of complaints, embarking upon a
lengthy description of his mother’s hardships coping with a
judicial embargo on her bank accounts and properties. He
concluded by asking Polcouns for the USG to recognize these
alleged human rights abuses.
7. (C) Polcouns replied that he was unaware of the facts in
the criminal cases against his four interlocutors, but said
that the Embassy’s Human Rights Officer was prepared to
review any specific allegations and supporting evidence that
the Fujimoristas cared to put in writing. Polcouns
acknowledged that the Peruvian criminal justice system was
overloaded and inefficient, but observed that this is a
problem common to most defendants, not just the Fujimoristas,
noted that some American companies have had problems with
cases that move at the speed of continental drift, and
concluded that while this was regrettable, it did not by
itself constitute a violation of defendants’ human rights.
8. (C) COMMENT: This group of Fujimoristas claim to be the
real brains and brawn of the movement, but their leadership
is, in fact, in dispute. Alberto Fujimori’s imprisonment
clearly has deprived them of the direction they need, and
their confidence and courage have suffered accordingly. The
four looked less like political conspirators planning a
return to power and more like a group of retired business
executives sharing drinks at their country club while
reminiscing about their glory days in the corporate jungle.
Their presentation to Polcouns was unfocused, shifting from
topic to topic as the Fujimoristas sought to find an argument
that would spark a positive response. In the end, their main
pitch was that since much of Humala’s support seems to be
coming from voters who previously backed Alberto Fujimori,
the way to stop Humala is by letting Fujimori run. While it
does indeed appear to be the case that Humala has inherited a
substantial part of the Fujimori vote (Reftel), there are
other options to wean these voters away from the former
without promoting the latter. END COMMENT.
STRUBLE
=======================CABLE ENDS============================ |
Notas relacionadas:
 |
Wikileaks. Cable 38338
Posted: 24 May 2011 11:05 AM PDT
| id: |
38338 |
| date: |
8/10/2005 17:23 |
| refid: |
05LIMA3447 |
| origin: |
Embassy Lima |
| classification: |
CONFIDENTIAL |
| destination: |
|
| header: |
| |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available. |
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 003447
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/08/2015
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PINS, KCRM, PE
SUBJECT: PLOTTING ANOTHER COME-BACK: DOES FORMER PRESIDENT
FUJIMORI INTEND TO RETURN TO PERU?
Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. Former President Alberto Fujimori has done a
masterful job maintaining his standing as a major political
force in Peru, despite the fact that he remains exiled in
Japan, is prohibited from holding public office here, and is
the subject of extradition requests by the GOP. His
supporters’ claim that Fujimori will return to Lima in
December to kick off his campaign for the 2006 elections is
receiving a great deal of media attention, but has not
heightened political tensions. Fujimori faces arrest
warrants in some 22 criminal cases; we deem it highly
unlikely that he will return to Peru until he is assured that
he can avoid imprisonment. His strategy probably is to
create a sense of expectation and uncertainty about his
return as a way of drawing attention to himself and more
votes for his front parties. If, as is likely, his forces
win 10 percent or so of the seats in the next Congress,
Fujimori will be well positioned to trade his political
support to the post-Toledo government for an arrangement that
keeps him out of jail. (The next Congress is almost certain
to be much more factionalized than the present one, obliging
the incoming President to strike a lot of deals for support.)
Though the President,s intimates here have suggested he
might be able swing a deal with the courts by the end of this
year to avoid imprisonment while charges against him are
tried, any court order to that effect would be unlikely to
hold up under the Toledo government,s counterattack. That
said, Fujimori mastered Peruvian politics for 10 years by
catching everyone else completely off guard. His return
would throw the political scene into confusion and shake the
foundations of Peru,s institutionally-weak democracy. END
SUMMARY.
2. (C) Congresswoman Martha Moyano of the Si Cumple Party,
the new name for Fujimori’s main political party (loosely
translates as “He Keeps His Promises”), called on Polcouns
and Deputy on 8/5 to probe USG attitudes towards efforts to
effect Fujimori’s return and his 2006 presidential bid.
Moyano said that Fujimori’s attorneys are concentrating on
challenging the criminal charges against him (particularly
the La Cantuta and Barrios Altos cases involving
extra-judicial killings of suspected terrorists), and are
attempting to have the arrest orders against him changed to
summonses, indicating that once there are no arrest orders
outstanding he will return. Moyano added that Fujimori
intends to run for President despite the Congressional ban in
effect through 2011 against his serving, insisting that the
ban would only prevent him from taking office, not from being
elected. (COMMENT: The Constitutional Tribunal has declared
that Fujimori cannot be a candidate, but the final word seems
to lie with the independent National Electoral Board (JNE),
which has yet to issue a definitive pronouncement. END
COMMENT.) She implied that if Fujimori is elected, a
political means will be found to get around the ban. Moyano
claimed that Fujimori enjoys 68% support in the Peru’s jungle
region, and overwhelming support elsewhere in the interior
and in the poorer areas of Lima. Although she demurred on
endorsing the December return date proclaimed by Si Cumple
Secretary General Luis Delgado, she emphasized that Fujimori
SIPDIS
would be back before the elections.
3. (C) D/Polcouns recently discussed Fujimori’s intentions
with Fernan Altuve, a former Congressman of the Cambio 90
Party (Fujimori’s first electoral coalition). Altuve, a
Constitutional lawyer, said that he was in frequent contact
with the ex-President. He said Fujimori would head the
presidential ticket of his new party, and that Si Cumple
would field a full slate of Congressional candidates as well,
claiming that the party had the best grass-roots organization
of any political grouping in Peru. He endorsed the same
hypothesis as Moyano on Fujimori’s legal status as a
candidate: he was banned from taking office, but not from
running. Altuve contended that once Si Cumple’s Vice
Presidential candidate had taken office, the party’s
Congressmen (with the support of other parties looking to
their own future interests) would easily overcome the ban on
Fujimori taking office. Altuve also claimed that a new Si
Cumple administration would be the best ally imaginable for
the USG, taking a hard line against drug trafficking, and
opposing the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court.
4. (C) Assistant Anti-Corruption Prosecutor Walter Hoflich
told Poloff in July that his office has no specific
contingency plans for Fujimori’s arrival, other than to
proceed with pressing the charges already pending against the
former President. Should Fujimori arrive, Hoflich was sure
that he would be arrested by the National Police. He
doubted, however, that Fujimori would ever return until
charges against him are dropped. The fact that Fujimori
maintained several different identity documents indicated his
nervousness about being detained by Interpol. Hoflich
believed that Fujimori’s strategy was to keep in the
spotlight by talking about returning, and then hope that a
pro-Fujimori bloc in the next Congress would clear the path
for him legally.
5. (C) Polcouns raised Fujimori’s possible return with
Presidency Political Advisor Juan de la Puente and Labor
Minister Juan Sheput in separate meetings on 8/8. De la
Puente thought it unlikely that Fujimori would return, though
he did expect the former President to be nominated to head Si
Cumple’s ticket, as well as those of the other two
pro-Fujimori parties, Cambio 90 and Nueva Mayoria. He
predicted that the JNE would disqualify Fujimori, and that
the Vice Presidential candidate on the list, who he thought
would be Fujimori’s brother Santiago, would replace him.
While Fujimori’s supporters would seek to portray his
disqualification as a political move designed to frustrate
the electorate’s will, de la Puente thought that this would
not have much resonance and that the Fujimoristas will wind
up with a dozen-or-so seats in the next Congress.
6. (C) Sheput was not so sanguine. He expressed concern
that Fujimori’s attorneys could make headway in their legal
challenges to the criminal charges against the former
President, noting that rampant judicial corruption makes
anything possible. He was also worried that the JNE could be
subject to political pressure from the Fujimoristas, given
that the latter are expected to gain a strong foothold in the
next Congress.
7. (C) COMMENT: Toledo Administration contacts have told us
repeatedly that they want to put Fujimori on trial (although
their pursuit of the extradition case has been
lackadaisical), and that they will arrest him if he sets foot
in Peru. Fujimori is aware that he would face jail if he
comes back voluntarily before the April elections; even
though he is endeavoring to cast himself as a victim of
persecution, none of our contacts believe he is interested in
buffing his credentials by being imprisoned. It is also
telling that despite all the trial balloons that have been
floated about Fujimori’s return, his surrogates here have
been unable to energize mass public support like he enjoyed
in the past — even with some semi-clad female dancers as a
draw, a recent Si Cumple rally only drew a couple of thousand
people. Our assessment is that Fujimori is taking a prudent
approach — trying to rebuild his political base, painting
himself as a martyr, and allowing the criminal charges
against him to wither with the passage of time. The formula
of a patient exile while keeping a hand in the game worked
for Alan Garcia — in the late 90s; few predicted his return
as a viable presidential candidate in 2001. Alberto Fujimori
seems determined to make history repeat itself. END COMMENT.
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Wikileaks. Cable 44640
Posted: 24 May 2011 11:05 AM PDT
| id: |
44640 |
| date: |
11/7/2005 19:22 |
| refid: |
05LIMA4748 |
| origin: |
Embassy Lima |
| classification: |
CONFIDENTIAL |
| destination: |
05SANTIAGO2284 |
| header: |
| |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the
original cable is not available. |
—————– header ends —————-
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LIMA 004748
SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/07/2015
TAGS: PREL, KJUS, PE, CI, JA
SUBJECT: FORMER PRESIDENT FUJIMORI’S ARRIVAL, ARREST IN
SANTIAGO IS STUNNING NEWS IN PERU
REF: A. SANTIAGO 2284
B. LIMA 4733
Classified By: D/Polcouns Art Muirhead for Reason 1.4 (B, D)
1. (C) SUMMARY. Former President Fujimori’s surprise arrival
in Santiago over the weekend adds another complex issue to
the strained Peruvian-Chilean bilateral agenda. A Chilean
court quickly acted to detain Fujimori, and the GOP is
sending a high-level delegation to Santiago to argue for
Fujimori’s extradition. The Chilean Embassy Political
Officer (protect) told D/Polcouns that President Lagos,
irritated with the GOP over the maritime border issue, was
not taking calls from President Toledo. The GOC, he added,
was concerned about possible defects in the quality of the
extradition request that will be presented by Peru. END
SUMMARY.
2. (U) From the moment the story broke the afternoon of 11/6,
Peruvians have raptly followed the media reports about former
President Alberto Fujimori’s arrival and subsequent detention
in Santiago. Lima dailies on 11/7 stressed that Fujimori had
been arrested within 10 hours of his arrival in Chile, and
would be the subject of an extradition process. Press
reports noted Foreign Minister Oscar Maurtua’s statement that
the Appellate Court of Santiago had ordered Fujimori’s arrest
after Peru submitted a diplomatic note requesting the former
President’s preventive detention, and that Fujimori was
prohibited by the Court from leaving Chile. Maurtua also
said that a high-level delegation, including Interior
Minister Romulo Pizarro, Anti-Corruption State’s Attorney
Antonio Maldonado, Police Interpol Director Carlos Medel, and
special legal adviser Javier Ciurliza, was traveling to
Santiago to argue the GOP’s case.
3. (SBU) Initial reports held that Fujimori had traveled from
Japan to Chile in a private plane via a technical stop-over
in Mexico. Some press reporting on 11/7 (including that of
leading daily “El Comercio”) alleged that Fujimori’s routing
from Tokyo had been first to Atlanta on a Delta Airlines
flight, then on to Tijuana, Mexico and finally, Santiago.
Embassy DHS Attache has consulted with National
Transportation Center in the U.S. and is examining
immigration records for the period in question — up to now,
no/no information has been located which would substantiate
Fujimori’s having passed through the U.S. on his way to
Santiago.
4. (U) Immediately after the news of his arrival in Santiago,
several hundred Fujimori supporters, many wearing the t-shirt
of his “Si Cumple” (He Keeps His Promises) Party, rallied in
downtown Lima. An evening rally in front of the Chilean
Ambassador’s residence by anti-Fujimori protestors drew about
a hundred participants. Both demonstrations were orderly and
without incident.
5. (C) On 11/7, D/Polcouns discussed Fujimori’s arrival in
Santiago with Chilean Embassy Political Officer
XX. XX said that at least
initially, President Lagos was not taking calls from
President Toledo regarding Fujimori — Lagos was upset about
the GOP’s disregard over the past few weeks for Chilean
interests, especially on the issue of Peru’s unilateral
definition of the starting point for the two countries’
maritime border (Ref B). Lagos had, however, discussed
Fujimori’s arrival in Chile with FM Maurtua. Maurtua had
pushed for Fujimori to be immediately expelled to Peru by the
GOC. When Lagos made it clear this was not an option,
Maurtua had agreed to submit an extradition request.
XX’s opinion was that an extradition case against
Fujimori could spin out over a long period of time and had no
guarantee of success, especially when considering the poor
quality of submissions that Chile had received from Peru in
other extradition cases. (NOTE: Chilean courts rejected
Peruvian extradition requests for publicist Daniel Borobio in
2002, and for newspaper editor Eduardo Calmell del Solar in
2004. END NOTE.)
6. (C) XX said he had met the previous evening with
Fernan Altuve, a former Fujimorista Congressman and expert in
legal affairs who claimed to have been in regular contact
with the former President during his exile in Japan. XX
was impressed with the detailed information that Altuve had
about legal procedures in Chile, leading him to conclude that
Altuve had been involved in planning for Fujimori’s travel to
Chile for some time. XX said it was possible that
Fujimori had entered Chile on his Japanese passport (since no
visa would be required for Japanese citizens), raising
concerns about the possible involvement of the GOJ as an
advocate once extradition proceedings begin to move ahead.
7. (C) COMMENT: The quality of the GOP’s extradition request
to Japan for Fujimori has been repeatedly criticized in the
Peruvian media. The Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office has
been hard-pressed to come up with a “smoking gun” to prove
Fujimori’s involvement in charges of corruption and human
rights violations. Javier Ciurliza, a law professor at the
Catholic University and a member of Peru’s high-level
delegation to Santiago, told Poloff several months ago that
he had been hired by the Foreign Ministry to revise Peru’s
extradition requests to Japan for Fujimori, characterizing
those documents as “deeply flawed.”
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