United States Army Field Manuals are published by the United States Army's Army Publishing Directorate. They contain detailed information and how-tos for procedures important to soldiers serving in the field.
As of July 2007, some 542 field manuals were in use.[1][needs update] Starting in 2010, the U.S. Army began review and revision of all of its doctrinal publications, under the initiative "Doctrine 2015". Since then, the most important doctrine have been published in Army Doctrine Publications (ADP) and Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP), replacing the former key Field Manuals. Army Techniques Publications (ATP), Army Training Circulars (TC), and Army Technical Manuals (TM) round out the new suite of doctrinal publications. Not all FMs are being rescinded; 50 select Field Manuals will continue to be published, periodically reviewed and revised. They are usually available to the public at low cost or free electronically. Many websites have begun collecting PDF versions of Army Field Manuals, Technical Manuals, and Weapon Manuals.[2] The Library of Congress maintains a list of every Field Manual published between the 1940s to the 1970s.[3]
According to The New York Times, the Army has started to "wikify" certain field manuals, allowing any authorized user to update the manuals.[4] This process, specifically using the MediaWiki arm of the military's professional networking application, milSuite, was recognized by the White House as an Open Government Initiative in 2010.[5]
On 6 March 1989 General Alfred M. Gray Jr. published FMFM-1 (later, MCDP-1) Warfighting. This document would serve as a foundation to cement the Marine Corps' distinction as an independent force and demonstrate commitment to the doctrine of maneuver warfare. It was part of an increased commitment to military education as Marine Corps University was initiated to modernize the professional Marine.
Because this is a significant emphasis change for Army forces, the Combined Arms Center is using mobile training teams to educate the force about the implications of FM 3-0. To integrate this new doctrine, the Command and General Staff College has placed renewed emphasis on division operations in the context of large-scale ground combat against peer threats to ensure that our field grade officers enter the force prepared for the most demanding environments that their units will face.
FM 3-0 is the large-unit tactical doctrine that we use to fight a peer or near-peer threat today. Mastering it requires significant time and effort. But has this transition in focus been executed deliberately enough? Are we too obsessed with more flashy future concepts and modernization efforts that divert attention away from doctrine, which already incorporates not only multi-domain conceptual thinking but also the priorities of the National Security Strategy?2 This article addresses the sense of urgency and cultural transition required to incorporate FM 3-0 into the U.S. Army and to prepare to meet peer adversaries capable of placing our nation at risk. Our culture is not yet aligned with our latest doctrine, intended to address training and experience gaps resulting from fifteen years of prioritizing counterinsurgency and stability operations.
FM 3-0 candidly states that the Army no longer enjoys superiority across all the warfighting functions. Peer threats, particularly Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran, can contest both the Army and the joint force across all domains.3 Depending upon the regional context, we may be at a disadvantage in some warfighting functions and may only have relative parity in others. While this article does not address all of these challenges, it highlights some areas where we may experience overmatch from a threat in order to generate thought. Friendly intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, when faced with the contemporary integrated air defense capabilities of our adversaries, is one such area.
History has a way of repeating itself. Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, Combined Arms Center commanding general, directed the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate to execute a similar mission across the Army amongst a variety of audiences to explain the most recent FM 3-0. These efforts have not yet yielded the type of spirited professional discourse about our capstone operations doctrine of the 1970s and 1980s.
Changes to the global operating environment were not addressed until the publication of the Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World (AOC) in October 2014. The thirty-eighth Army chief of staff, Gen. Raymond Odierno, highlights this in his foreword to the AOC:
The AOC formally begins the process of addressing the conflict continuum and range of military operations that the Army should expect to support as part of the joint force. The AOC informs the realization that Army doctrine needs to change. In 2016, the Army chief of staff directed TRADOC to write a manual that provides the doctrinal basis for success against military adversaries whose capabilities were on par with ours.19 The release of FM 3-0 represents a yearlong effort to provide doctrine for large units that focus on large-scale ground combat operations against peer and near-peer threats (see figure 2).
Repetition and honest, continual assessment are essential to winning the force projection race required to achieve operational capability before our enemy. Our deployment readiness and projection abilities create conditions where quick transitions to large-scale combat operations are required. Generating this level of readiness and confidence is critical for future success on the battlefield.
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First: The Torture Convention prohibits in equal measure torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment (CIDT) as does international humanitarian law (IHL). Indeed, almost every codified prohibition of torture is accompanied by a bar on CIDT, although such acts are not criminalized as extensively as torture. Jurisprudence and United Nations experts have confirmed that this prohibition covers a broad continuum of mistreatment. In a 1986 report, for example, the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other CIDT identified the following acts as constituting torture: beatings; extraction of nails, teeth, etc.; burns; electric shocks; suspension; suffocation; exposure to excessive light or noise; sexual aggression; administration of drugs in detention or psychiatric institutions; prolonged denial of rest or sleep; prolonged denial of food; prolonged denial of sufficient hygiene; prolonged denial of medical assistance; total isolation and sensory deprivation; being kept in constant uncertainty in terms of space and time; threats to torture or kill relatives; total abandonment; and simulated executions. Acts of lesser severity are considered CIDT.
Even when Separation is utilized in strict conformity with the terms of the Field Manual, legal authorities might reach a conclusion that its use falls along this spectrum of prohibited acts. Amnesty International, for one, has determined that Appendix M runs afoul of the CAT as well as IHL. Human rights tribunals and expert bodies have consistently determined that incommunicado detention violates the prohibitions against torture and CIDT. Obviously, incommunicado detention is not equivalent to Physical Separation, but the element of prolonged isolation suggest that the former could easily devolve into, or be misinterpreted as, the latter. Likewise with respect to Field Expedient Separation and sensory deprivation.
observed tendency among interrogators who rely on force. If some force is good, these people come to believe, then the application of more force must be better. Thus, the level of force applied against an uncooperative witness tends to escalate such that, if left unchecked, force levels, to include torture, could be reached.
By isolating the detainee, Separation also increases the possibility that he or she will be subjected to other forms of prohibited abuse outside of the presence of potential witnesses. It has long been recognized that torture is routinely committed in connection with incommunicado detention.
Third: Although Separation is billed as an interrogation technique, it could easily be purposefully employed for punitive, intimidation, or social control purposes or on discriminatory grounds. Even though various levels of approval are required before Separation can be utilized, someone intent on punishing a subject for perceived misdeeds, or to threaten other detainees, could easily fashion a plausible rationale for its application.
Ill treatment during captivity, such as psychological manipulations, humiliating treatment, and forced stress positions, does not seem to be substantially different from physical torture in terms of the severity of mental suffering they cause, the underlying mechanism of traumatic stress, and their long-term psychological outcome. * * * These findings suggest that physical pain per se is not the most important determinant of traumatic stress in survivors of torture. * * * These findings [also] imply that various psychological manipulations, ill treatment, and torture during interrogation share the same psychological mechanism in exerting their traumatic impact. All three types of acts are geared toward creating anxiety or fear in the detainee while at the same time removing any form of control from the person to create a state of total helplessness.
Psychological manipulations do not produce their effects immediately; rather, they are cumulative in subtle and invisible ways. In a study of the effect of psychological torture, Physicians for Human Rights listed the following possible impacts of psychological torture:
Torture shall also be understood to be the use of methods upon a person intended to obliterate the personality of the victim or to diminish his physical or mental capacities, even if they do not cause physical pain or mental anguish.
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