FW: re: Line relief whilst under attack
Dan Powers
Subject: RE: Line relief whilst under attack
I chose this to respond to, shorter. My Caveat is that I just finished
re-reading ALL the ancient sources for Alexander.
So I must say this is very interesting. In the 'general universe' one could
get the impression that the late classical development (presumably pioneered
by Philip) and utilized by Alexander that the phalanx had developed a system
that in some ways created a 'modified' phalanx [or Macedonian] that was
employed at Gaugamela (331) as well as other battles circa Alexander's
Campaign that went into India proper (ended 325).
Now, here is what I think based on the sources available, about the general
state of Greek Warfare by 300.
Perhaps my deduction is not reasonable, but here it is. I firmly believe
that by Alexander's death the face of 'Greek Warfare' had changed into a
'combined arms' approach permanently. Xenophon wrote extensively about
Cyrus the Younger's (I Know he is Persian) use of varied unit types, but 'in
concert' on the battlefield, AND Iphicrates (famous Athenian Mercenary
General) and his 'Thracian Peltasts' is circa 388, nearly if not absolutely
a contemporary of Xenophon.
My point is that by Pyrrhus, if the details of the accounts say the troops
were stumbling over each other in the fight, I do not think it is because
they lacked the knowledge or practice to execute that on the battlefield.
It is only my opinion, BUT I think that the problems on the battlefield with
troops moving in concert are more likely the result of some variable present
at 'that specific' battle. To me there is just too much evidence that when
one Polis starts to employ a particular tactic, unit, or unit formation in
battles - the other Poleis very quickly adopt the same, when it indeed
proves to be effective and successful.
About Gaugamela, Alexander is very specifically recorded (in all the
sources) of issuing orders to the Macedonian Phalanx to spread out when the
Chariots approach - in order to let the chariots pass through. I will also
add, that the Scythed Chariot is recorded in Xenophon. I would presume that
Cyrus knew how to 'employ' chariots, and likely understood very well how to
face them. That is at the Battle of Cunaxa(401), and I think it is very
reasonable to make the case that units knew how to tactically retreat, even
while engaged. That is even recorded as one of the great successes at
Thermopylae (480) two hundred years and change before Pyrrhus.
If the Greeks were, less militarily inclined, I could agree that the
problems Pyrrhus' army faced were an indicator of their lack of ability to
execute the maneuver on the battlefield. But I am not convinced. Also it
is worth noting that Pyrrhus (through Olympias, Alexander's mother) is a
nephew of Alexander (Alex was his Great Uncle).
The reason Alex and Co achieved the success they did, as has long been
rightly argued, was the adaptations of Philip to transform the Macedonian
Army into a very mobile and adaptable force. By the 3rd Sacred War (c.
Philip II) Hoplite Armies in Greece proper, were in fact augmented by
Slingers, Peltasts, and Archers as standard fare.
The perpetual myth that a Greek Army was ONLY Hoplites on Greek battlefields
From 550-300 BC, is a product of some lazy modern historians. I won't
digress, since it is only a few, and we can largely thank the Hitler, I mean
History Channel for helping to propagate this very limited view of Greek
Warfare.
I apologize for using so much of the Macedonian experience, but I do think
it is relevant especially in providing the proper context of tactical and
operational development at the beginning and throughout the Hellenistic time
period.
Now having said all that some notes on the Greek sources for Pyrrhus. I do
not believe *(I may well be corrected here) any were military service in
major battles. Not with unit types contemporary to Pyrrhus invasion of
Italy. Most of our Latin sources (I believe and I have no authority beyond
cursory familiarity with them related to Pyrrhus) come significantly later
in their recounting of the conflict with Pyrrhus..? Am I on a twig on the
tree, or a pretty strong branch?
I do think it is possible that there are some possible explanations for this
difficulty. One I think it is possible the ancient sources we have, are
confused. It would not be the first time. Second, I suspect there may have
been conditions on that particular battlefield that caused a specific
problem. If I am not mistaken, this is the same battle that the phrase
"pyrrhic Victory" was coined from? Easy to see a battlefield SO littered
with dead bodies, that they created an unusual physical obstacle on the
ground, literally. Not unlike Cannae. So for me that is my underlying
suspicion.
It would not be the first time that I was wrong, but I think mostly greek
warfare had FAR advanced past the 'rookie' hoplite who could not move
around, even during a fight.
My two dollars.
Mark
Yes, I think what you are saying here has a lot of validity. There's a
good discussion of developments during the late hoplite era in
Wheeler's piece on "Battle" in the Cambridge History of Greek and
Roman Warfare (2007), vol. 1, at pp. 213-223, under the heading "The
Emergence of Generalship, 479-362 BC".
(... and Patrick, I'm still pondering Livy 8.8 and doing a bit of
reading as time permits - I will post more here in response to your
thoughts on the subject in due course, I hope!)
Best,
Mark
Patrician
perspectives and Mark's talent for hunting down source material to get
to the root of this one. Anyone else is welcome to add their
insights.
Just to recapitulate the essence of the Roman line relief problem:
Line A has to be replaced in an ongoing frontal combat (at least we
assume combat to be ongoing: anyone can replace troops during a lull)
by Line B. Somehow Line A's troops have to be subtracted from the
fighting and Line B's troops added without either suffering major loss
or disruption during the process. We may also be looking at two ways
of doing the same thing: one by files retiring through files; the
other by maniples retiring through gaps between maniples.
Dan's point that troops, especially good troops, can be trained in
various manoeuvres if a need is foreseen is well made.
Pyrrhus' difficulties over Heraclea seem largely to have been of his
own making, i.e. he won the battle but did not undertake a pursuit.
Had he pursued, the loss ratio would have been much more in his
favour.
Asculum was more of a problem battle: I believe accounts are best
reconciled by taking Dionysius' description (XX.1-3) as covering the
first day, and Plutarch's the second. The high Epirote losses that
turned Asculum into a 'Pyrrhic victory' are probably largely
ascribable to Pyrrhus' loss of his camp on the first day, with the
result that (battlefield medicine point here, Dan) "they spent the
following night under the open sky, without either baggage or
attendance and not well supplied with even the necessary food, so that
many wounded men actually perished, when they might still have been
saved had they received assistance and care" (Dionysius XX.3). In
addition to this amplified loss, Pyrrhus' habit of not pursuing (so
unlike Alexander) left him with many less Romans to his credit than he
deserved.
Mark, I look forward to whatever you can hunt down.
Patrick
pj
(at least we assume combat to be ongoing:'
I saw a Greek documentary around about the time of the Athens Olympics
(I think) over the internet.
The interviewer was asking a Greek martial artist about hoplite
warfare (this man claimed he was an expert, but I didn't know who he
is), he showed a few amazing moves but one he did show was how a
hoplite was replaced during combat.
Based on my memory ( I know not saving that link to that video was one
of my worst mistakes I have ever done ) in like a karate studio they
were using he had some help showing hoplites lined up. When the man
in the front got injured he called out to the hoplite behind him, (in
line B) this hoplite lifted his shield (using his left hand) over the
top of the hoplite in line A down past his helmet and as the shield
came down, the hoplite in line A lifted and turned to the right away
from the front and moved down the line between the hoplites and
continued to move away from the front and moved down to the back of
the phalanx. The hoplite that was in line B was now in line A, with
total cohesion.
I do remember while watching the move that the hoplite of the left of
the injured hoplite always was covered by the shield of the hoplite of
line A or B, he wasn't exposed in the maneuverer.
The martial artist did things with his shield that were amazing and as
soon as I saw it I knew the moves had merit. I can't remember the
guys name, I can't tell you how many times I have kicked myself for
not saving that link.
Incidently, he showed a few moves but the one that opened my eyes
straight away was he used his shield in such a way that when he made
contact with the enemies shield the contact knocked the shield a bit
that exposed the enemies throat, it somehow did it where the enemies
shield near the ground moved back and the part of the shield at the
top moved forward opening a pocket at the top where a dory thrusted
down from higher than eye sight came down hit the gap and stabbed the
throat.
Patrician
a veteran who knows exactly what he is doing in combat and a recently-
levied farmer or tradesman who is still working out how best to hold
his shield.
In this connection, I quote a description of Titus Manlius' duel with
a Gallic chieftain around 360 BC, as a result of which TM gained the
sobriquet 'Torquatus' from the trophy he took. This duel is best
known from Livy VII.10 but Livy's source appears to have been Aulus
Gellius, Attic Nights (Noctes Atticae) IX.43, quoting a passage from
Claudius Quadrigarius. Anyway, on with the action.
"In the meantime a Gaul came forward, who was naked except for a
shield and two swords and the ornament of a neck-chain and bracelets;
in strength and size, in youthful vigour and in courage as well, he
excelled all the rest. In the very height of the battle, when the two
armies were fighting with the utmost ardour, he began to make signs
with his hand to both sides, to cease fighting. The combat ceased.
As soon as silence was secured, he called out in a mighty voice that
if anyone wished to engage him in single combat, he should come
forward. This no one dared do, because of his huge size and savage
aspect. Then the Gaul began to laugh at them and to stick out his
tongue. This at once roused the great indignation of one Titus
Manlius, a youth of the highest birth, that such an insult should be
offered his country, and that no one from so great an army should
accept the challenge. He, as I say, stepped forth, and would not
suffer Roman valour to be shamefully tarnished by a Gaul. Armed with a
foot-soldier's shield and a Spanish sword, he confronted the Gaul.
Their meeting took place on the very bridge, in the presence of both
armies, amid great apprehension. Thus they confronted each other, as
I said before: the Gaul, according to his method of fighting, with
shield advanced and awaiting an attack; Manlius, relying on courage
rather than skill, struck shield against shield, and threw the Gaul
off his balance. While the Gaul was trying to regain the same
position, Manlius again struck shield against shield, and again forced
the man to change his ground. In this fashion he slipped in under the
Gaul's sword and stabbed him in the breast with his Spanish blade.
Then at once with the same mode of attack he struck his adversary's
right shoulder, and he did not give ground at all until he overthrew
him, without giving the Gaul a chance to strike a blow. After he had
overthrown him, he cut off his head, tore off his neck-chain, and put
it, covered with blood as it was, around his own neck. Because of
this act, he himself and his descendants had the surname Torquatus."
Livy dresses the Gaul in "multi-coloured clothing and painted armour
inlaid with gold," reflecting Livy's tendency to clothe Gauls wherever
possible (e.g. Polybius' naked Gauls at Cannae become 'nudi' only
'super umbilicum' (above the navel) in Livy's account). The
translator of Gellius has rendered 'torque' as 'neck-chain' for
reasons best known to himself, but torque it was.
The points to note here are: 1) the availability of a gladius
hispaniensis in a Roman army in c.360 BC, about a century before the
First Punic War, 2) Manlius' technique, in which he used shield-
against-shield impact to unbalance his opponent, slipped inside the
Gaul's sword-reach and then delivered a couple of debilitating stabs
which the off-balance Gaul was unable to parry or evade. This gives
us a hint about how Romans fought in close combat, with the shield and
personal impact being as important a weapon of offense as the sword
and the use of the two in combination providing an effect that neither
could achieve alone.
Patrick
ga...@berkeley.edu
>
> ... This duel is best
> known from Livy VII.10 but Livy's source appears to have been Aulus
> Gellius, Attic Nights (Noctes Atticae) IX.43, quoting a passage from
> Claudius Quadrigarius. Anyway, on with the action.
>
If I could clarify this for you a bit, Livy and Gellius both used Claudius
Quadrigarius and other sources. Polybius also appears to know the story
and refers to heroes who fight duels. Livy was born about a century
before Gellius.
Polybius says the Macedonians were horrified at the wounds these swords
inflicted in Roman hands (referring to 197 BC).
2) Manlius' technique, in which he used shield-
> against-shield impact to unbalance his opponent, slipped inside the
> Gaul's sword-reach and then delivered a couple of debilitating stabs
> which the off-balance Gaul was unable to parry or evade. This gives
> us a hint about how Romans fought in close combat, with the shield and
> personal impact being as important a weapon of offense as the sword
> and the use of the two in combination providing an effect that neither
> could achieve alone.
YES :)
gaius
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Patrician
Patrick
Mark
and vivid description of the technique, and it has the feel of an
account by someone with some practical experience of swordsmanship.
Indeed, Gellius says that when his pal Favorinus read this passage
from Quadrigarius "he used to say that his mind was stirred and
affected by no less emotion and excitement than if he were himself an
eye-witness of their contest". The connoisseur Gellius put this
excerpt forward as an example of the simple unaffected style he
prized
and sought to emulate (though Cicero likely would have seen it as a
negative example).
It is not entirely beyond dispute that Quadrigarius was Livy's
source,
particularly since Q says this episode happened in 367 while Livy
says
361 and expressly says that in doing so he is following the majority
of the sources (6.42.5-6). So it is possible that Livy used some
other
source, now lost. But there are many points of comparison between the
two (and indeed many studies comparing them) and it seems reasonable
to think that L used Q as at least a principal source for his
account.
It seems odd to me that Q makes a point of saying that Manlius was
displaying "courage rather than skill" ("animo magis quam arte")
[Gell. 9.13.16], since the details of the fight seem clearly to
demonstrate that the victory was the result of both courage and
skill.
Livy's account is artfully structured to set up the contrast between
futile Gaulish ferocity and Roman tenacity, discipline and training.
Livy, by the way, has Manlius stabbing the Gaul in the groin and
belly
rather than the breast, which seems more plausible. And while L's
dressing of the Gaul in splendid armour and clothing seems rather
less
plausible, it allows him another opportunity to illustrate Manlius'
restraint in despoiling his opponent only of his torque.
Nevertheless, I don't think that Quadrigarius fr.10b and Livy
6.9.10 demonstrate "the availability of a gladius hispaniensis in a
Roman army in c.360 BC". They just demonstrate the presence of the
words and concept in the minds and writings of an annalist of the 1st
century BC and an Augustan historian.
Regards,
Mark
On Oct 11, 3:46 am, Patrician <patrick.water...@mypostoffice.co.uk>
wrote:
>
> - Show quoted text -