Aristotle's "Topics" Book I, Chapter 1
waveletter
Let's begin reading the first book of Aristotle's "Topics." So what is
the "Topics" about? From the title, it sounds like it's going to cover
just sundry philosophical ideas and arguments--nothing in particular
with any great emphasis. But that is not quite right.
Unlike with the "Categories" and "On Interpretation"--if you're
familiar with them--in the
"Topics" Aristotle tells us succinctly what he's going to accomplish:
"The purpose of the present treatise is to discover a method by which
we shall be able to reason from generally accepted opinions about any
problem set before us and shall ourselves, when sustaining an argument,
avoid saying anything self-contradictory." (100a18-21) [This is the
E.S. Forster translation, from the Loeb edition of Aristotle's works.
The numbers in parentheses, by the way, are Bekker numbers, which date
back to an edition of the works of Aristotle produced under August
Immanuel Bekker (1785-1871) for the Prussian Academy of Sciences.
[online ref. the Wikipedia article:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bekker_numbers
There is a corresponding set of numbers for the works of Plato called
the Stephanus numbers:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stephanus_pagination
The Bekker numbers are not inclusive, as there was one (disputed) work
of Aristotle, "The Athenian Constitution," which was discovered in
1890, after the publication of the Bekker edition. Bekker numbers are
handy. No matter what edition or translation of A's works one happens
to work from, it is always possible to locate a passage referred to by
someone else, as long as the Bekker number is given.]
So, in contrast to the "Categories" and "On Interpretation," the
"Topics" opens with a clear statement of its purposes. The other works
within the "Organon," the "Prior Analytics," the "Posterior Analytics,"
and "Sophistical Refutations" all start with this kind of clear
synopsis of what Aristotle is going to explain. From the first
sentence, which I quoted above, the goals of the work are:
1. To find a method to "reason from generally accepted opinions" and
2. To "avoid saying anything self-contradictory".
(a) So first off, A. is saying that he's not going to attempt to find
out what characterizes a true opinion or uncover any kind of foundation
for true opinions or explain what constitutes a justification for a
person's belief. At once, the purpose of the "Topics" seems to be
practical, just rhetorical guidelines, and neither epistemological nor
scientific. Exposing an opinion to be right or wrong is not the
purpose; it is sufficient that the opinion is generally accepted.
(b) Second, A. states that he's going to elaborate some methods of
"reason". Evidently, he's not going to be satisfied with just drawing a
debate opponent into a rhetorical trap. There are going to be some
principles of correct movement from one opinion to another opinion,
such that the validity of the derived belief is just as sound as the
validity of the source.
(c) Third, and related to the second point I made, is that A. insists
that we avoid self-contradiction. This seems like just a consequence of
making an argument by "reason", and that much is quite right. But his
point in fact goes beyond the simple remark that if we eventually reach
a contradiction, then we have not reasoned correctly. The purpose is to
find out how to "avoid" this circumstance. So it's the "how" of
avoiding self-contradiction, not just the "why" that Aristotle is going
to show us in the "Topics".
The Philosopher is going to be leaving a lot of stuff--indeed what we
typically deem to be the core of philosophical endeavor--out of the
discussion. But the fact that he defines the scope and conspicuously
omits concepts like precise definition, truth, and justification
incline us to think that A. has plans for elaborating these ideas
elsewhere.
Aristotle gets even more specific about the kind of reasoning that he
is interested in when he says in the second sentence:
"First, then, we must say what reasoning is and what different kinds of
it there are, in order that dialectical reasoning may be apprehended;
for it is the search for this that we are undertaking in the treatise
which lies before us." (100a22-24)
So now we are informed that:
(d) A. will tell us what "reasoning" is.
(e) There are different kinds of "reasoning".
(f) It is discovering one particular kind of reasoning, called
"dialectical reasoning," that is the purpose of the "Topics".
Thanks again!
--Ron
waveletter
Continuing with Aristotle's "Topics" Book I, Chapter 1.
In the second and third paragraphs of Book I of the "Topics," Aristotle
describes four kinds of reasoning:
(i) Demonstrative reasoning,
(ii) Dialectical reasoning,
(iii) Contentious reasoning,
(iv) And false reasoning.
He also says at (100a25-27) that "Reasoning is a discussion in which,
certain things having been laid down, something other than these things
necessarily results through them." (Forster's translation in the Loeb
edition)
So we have an explanation of reasoning and have been presented with
four types of reasoning. The fourth type of reasoning is special and
distinct from the first three. But, I'd like to suggest that the
definition--if you can call it that--of reasoning that A. offers has a
couple of gaps in it.
I think we can say that we know what a discussion is, so this isn't one
of the gaps that I'm gesturing at. A discussion might be a chat in the
agora, the Athenian marketplace, but it could be any type of
conversation. In particular it seems like A. means that it is more of a
formal discussion, where the things said are structured in some way and
preserved. I think we also know what "laid down" is, namely, some
statement that forms an element of the discussion.
But, second--and here's where I think I perceive the one of the gaps in
A's account--we don't really have an explanation of what constitutes
"something other than these". For what does it mean to be "something
other"? For example, suppose that I say that if a polygon has three
sides, then it has three interior angles. Is the statement that there
are three interior angles an "other". It seems conceptually equivalent;
mathematically it is equivalent. Although it does indeed talk about
different things: sides vs. interior angles. What if I say that for the
polygon with 3 sides, the interior angles add up to 180 degrees. This
too is a mathematical equivalent, but now it sounds even more like an
"other". Or is Aristotle only willing to say that what necessarily
follows needs to be non-equivalent (is implied by, but does not imply)
the assumed statement?
So A. does not unravel this for us, and it seems to be a hole in his
account.
Third, we don't know what "necessarily follows" means either. What A.
probably wants to supply is a definition of a proof, but the
development of logical reasoning may not have progressed to the point
that we need to have right here.
These are just immediate impressions, by the way. In fact, in the
fourth paragraph of Book I, Chapter 1 Aristotle confesses that he's not
going all the way for exact definitions (cf. 101a18-24).
The different kinds of reasoning are distinguished by their premises:
(a) Demonstrative reasoning proceeds from true or primary premises;
(b) Dialectical reasoning proceeds from generally accepted premises;
(c) Contentious reasoning proceeds from *apparently* generally accepted
premises, but that, in reality, are false;
(d) False reasoning proceeds premises that are not only false, but also
not generally accepted.
The second type of reasoning (b) is the one Aristotle is aiming at in
the "Topics".
It's too easy to overlook the importance of these distinctions. What's
especially interesting is the high level of argumentative methodology
that this schema reveals about life in Plato's Academy. Aristotle is
trying to group all of the arguments that come from say, mathematicians
(demonstrative reasoners), philosophers (dialectical reasoners),
sophists (contentious reasoners), and hucksters (false reasoners)
together into a common framework.
I think nowadays we would classify kinds of reasoning as to whether
they were deductive (proceeded from premises via accepted rules of
inference to derive a conclusion) or inductive (proceeded from numerous
instances of the same premise to a conclusion by way of a general
statement). So our classification would be founded on the derivation,
and it's probably indicative of a modern reflex. But Aristotle is so
different! His distinction is based on the kinds of premises that begin
the reasoned discourse.
There is another aspect to Aristotle's remarks that--I should
think--seems quite odd to today's thinker. It's that his dialectical
reasoning involves a kind of majority opinion or an average opinion or
even a minority opinion if it is accepted "by the most famous and
distinguished" (100b23). It is almost as if he has in mind the
"Aristotelian mean" of balanced, practical, common opinion that will
feature so prominently in the "Politics" and his attack on the utter
impracticability Plato's theory of the ideal city-state, its rulers in
the "Republic", and the "three waves" of fundamental change necessary
to achieve this idealized city.
Today, in contrast, we are much more individualistic, and this is
probably a gift of the Renaissance. Well, Aristotle comes from a
well-to-do Macedonian family and mixes it up with the ruling Athenian
elite in a society based on the conquest and enslavement of other
peoples. So this mutes his voice when it comes to the dignity of the
individual and the worth of minority opinions! Ha!
Next post, I'll raise some thoughts on the original Greek text, stuff
that might be glossed or lost by the translators.
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
Now I want to raise a few points that looking at the original Greek
text might help us illuminate. For the Greek text, you need the Loeb
edition of Aristotle's "Topics": H. Tredennick & E.S. Forster, trans.,
"Aristotle: Posterior Analytics, Topica," Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ.
Press, 1997. It costs about $20 new, but there are used copies to be
found here and there.
Let's not get too Greeked-out here; the discussion list is young and
small! I submit three points:
(1) If you examine carefully the first sentence of the "Topics," one
thing that you might notice is the method we are looking for is going
to enable us "to reason from generally accepted opinions about any
problem set before us" (100a19-20). [This is Forster's translation from
the Loeb ed.] This makes it sound like we could be confronted by any
problem, and we will reason about it from generally accepted opinions.
It other words, it appears that Aristotle is proposing that any time we
are faced with a problem, then we will invoke generally accepted
opinions in order to begin reasoning about it.
This doesn't sound very encouraging. It's almost as if Aristotle was
suggesting some kind of folk wisdom should be dug up to counter any
argument.
The original Attic Greek is:
"hE men prothesis tEs pragmateias methodon heurein, af' hEs dunEsometha
sullogizesthai peri pantos tou protethentos problematos ex endoxOn...."
The important thing to note regarding my (perhaps recherche!) question
above is that the "from generally accepted beliefs," or "ex endoxOn" in
Greek, comes last. It's associated with "peri pantos tou problematos"
not with "sullogizesthai", as the English translations suggest.
So I would translate the passage as follows:
"The purpose of the work is to discover a method from which we shall be
able to reason about any problem proposed from generally accepted
opinions."
Now, this is almost a literal translation of Aristotle; it leaves the
"endoxa" where they belong, at the end of the clause; and it no longer
seems like *we who reason* should invoke general opinions; rather, we
begin with problems coming out of general opinions, and we reason
forward from there. It sounds like The Philosopher's statement is a lot
more respectable!
Also, I would note that this first sentence shows that Aristotle
already has specified what the subject of his work will be, namely,
dialectical reasoning. The Philosopher begins with problems arising
from "generally accepted opinions" or "endoxa" and reasons from there.
Again, as I noted in the previous post, Aristotle defines dialectical
reasoning as having "endoxa" as its premises.
(2) The next thing that's worth noting is the Greek word that Forster
translates as "reason." I'm not saying that he's picked the wrong
English word. But I want to point out that the word itself has (or will
have!--if we put ourselves back in classical times when Aristotle, or
come of his students, wrote down the "Topics") a technical meaning in
Aristotle's Logic. The word is a verb: sullogizO, or "I syllogize".
It's a loaded verb.
Well now, does this mean that Aristotle has already conceived of the
central point of his whole Logic, the syllogism, at the time that the
"Topics" was written? Is it indeed one of his forms of the syllogism
(explicated in the "Prior Analytics") that he intends right here?
Let me leave these questions for a subsequent post.
(3) Oh, the third Greek language item I wanted to fuss about...it's the
title of the work: "Topics." It may seem strange that I would fuss
about this after having only read one chapter of the work (actually,
I've read more than the first chapter, but we've only reviewed only
this much in the new Google aristotle-logic group). But, I believe that
if you have some Greek background, and you've read the first paragraph,
you'll be rightly puzzled by the way we typically translate the title
of Aristotle's treatise into English.
I'll leave it at that. Just a teaser. My answer is forthcoming--and
soon, too--so if you don't find this worth mulling over, then just skip
to the next post.
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
I want to continue with the "original Greek" theme with which I colored
the previous post. The second point that I raised concerned the Greek
word 'sullogizesthai', which comes from the verb 'sullogizomai',
meaning "I reckon, consider, think, reflect, or conclude" according to
the the "Pocket Oxford Classical Greek Dictionary," Morwood & Taylor
eds., Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 2002.
Another translation is "I syllogize", as awkward as that sounds to
modern speakers.
The important point, thought, is that when Aristotle wrote the "Topics"
he did not already have in mind the rigorous conception of the
syllogism, such as is reflected in the "Prior Analytics". I think that
we shall be in a position to verify this point later on.
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
This post continues to discuss the term 'syllogism', as Aristotle uses
the it in the "Topics." I'm working through some of the fine points of
the first chapter of the first book of Aristotle's "Topics." And--just
a warning--some of the discussion involves the original Greek language.
The original meaning of 'sullogizomai' is to compute or reckon. Later,
it comes to mean "conclude from premises". Finally--and I think that in
the main, this is how we understand it today--it means, in the logic of
Aristotle, to infer through a 'syllogism'. I believe that today we
interpret a "syllogism" to be a specific form of deductive argument.
And the point is that if we think in our modern terms, we may
misunderstand how loosely Aristotle is using the expression in the
"Topics." It could be that he uses the term in the older, more informal
way, and that, therefore, the translation of 'sullogizesthai' as 'to
reason' rather than 'to deduce' just might be the right exegetical
move. Comparing the way Aristotle uses 'syllogism' in the "Topics" with
the way he uses it in the "Prior Analytics" provides a clue for
assigning historical precedence to the "Topics."
Well, I guess everyone thinks that a typical syllogism is as follows:
(1) All men are mortal;
(2) Socrates is a man;
(3) Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
So the "syllogism" has three parts. Indeed, in Book I, Chapter 4 of the
"Prior Analytics," Aristotle says:
"Whenever three terms are so related to one another that the last is in
the middle as in a whole, and the middle is either in, or not in, the
first as in a whole, the extremes must be related by a perfect
deduction (sullogismos)." [trans. A.J. Jenkinson, in Barnes, ed. "The
Complete Works of Aristotle" (25b32-35).
For the original Greek text, see Vol. I of the Loeb edition of
Aristotle's works, "Aristotle: Categories, On Interpretation, Prior
Analytics," Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1996.
The important points are the technical description of what constitutes
a syllogism: (i) three terms, (ii) the last term is in the middle as a
whole, and (iii) the middle is in or not in the first as a whole. This
will be our guideline for what Aristotle means formally by a syllogism.
Important to note is that we don't have a precise explanation of what
it means to be "in as a whole" yet, but this is something that may come
later in the "Prior Analytics" or may be developed in another work
within Aristotle's Logic. Indeed, how can one term contain another?
Does the term 'mortal' contain the term 'man'? Or is the containment of
terms related to their referents? Hmm...lots to think about!
Anyway, it's still early in our reading of the "Topics," and I just
want to point out the specific, technical definition of a syllogism
that is to be found in the "Prior Analytics" and invite the
correspondents on the aristotle-logic group to be on the alert for this
technical usage--or for the marked absence of it--within the "Topics."
If we indeed find that the "early", informal usage prevails in the
"Topics," whereas the "later", formal and technical usage prevails in
the "Prior Analytics," then this might be one piece of evidence by
which we could assign the "Topics" to an earlier historical period of
Aristotle's philosophical development than the "Prior Analytics."
Another way to establish historical precedence is check for cross
references between the two works. Interestingly, Aristotle mentions the
"Topics" explicitly early on in the "Prior Analytics," at 24b12-13: "en
tois Topikois eirEtai" or "said in the Topics." ["Topikois" is dative
plural, the Attic Greek nominal declension case, used in expression of
location or possession (and many other grammatical situations). In
English, there are only vestiges of nominal declension: SHE is there. I
see HER. WHO is there? WHOM do you see there? nominative vs. objective
only!]
By way of contrast, the "Analytics" is mentioned by Aristotle only in
the *eighth* and last book of the "Topics": "en tois Analutikois
eirEtai" or "said in the Analytics" at 162b32-33.
It's worth noting, if you read Forster's introduction to the "Topics"
in the Loeb edition (pp. 265-271), he summarizes the work of German
scholars in the late 19th and early 20th centuries toward fixing the
order of composition of Aristotle's "Organon." Forster there tells us
that Solmsen and Gohlke thought that Books I-VII of the "Topics" were
written first, and Book VIII came later. Maier thought that "Topics"
Book I was also late.
In relation to the "Analytics," Maier thought that the whole "Topics"
came before both the "Prior" and "Posterior Analytics." Solmsen thinks
that the "Topics" came before the "Prior Analytics." Gohlke, however,
says that the "Topics" came after both of the "Analytics."
Lots of detective work to engage in!
--Ron
waveletter
So we've been discussing some questions of translation from Greek to
English in the last couple of posts.
(1) What did the ancient Greeks mean by "syllogism," and
(2) Do the standard translations of the "Topics" have it right when
they say that
(a) we reason from generally accepted opinions about problems or
(b) whether (as I argued by looking at the original Greek word
order in "Topics" Book I, Chapter 1) Aristotle is saying that we reason
about problems that arise from from generally accepted opinions.
In other words, it's a question of whether our own reasoning derives
from folk wisdom or whether the problems themselves come from folk
wisdom, that is, generally accepted opinions (or endoxa, in the
original Greek), and then we apply reasoning to them.
In the earlier post, I also argued that my interpretation of this
passage is more consistent with what Aristotle defines as "dialectical
reasoning" anyway.
Another curious aspect of this text--to change the subject rather
abruptly! sorry--is the title of Aristotle's treatise: "Topics" or, in
Greek, "TopikOn". The Greek is the genitive plural, so the title there
means something like "Of Topics". But, suppose you were in a bookstore,
and you saw a book whose title was "Topics." Would you buy that book?
Sounds pretty innocuous, right? Right next to it might be a book titled
"Categories." Every book has a topic, and--what the heck--the guy that
wrote this one couldn't think of a more descriptive title? Unless you
knew the author, perhaps, or had heard of the book from a friend or a
review, you would most likely not stop. Get out of this aisle!
Indeed, right over in the adjoining section of the bookstore, there's a
slick volume by a kind of confident, smart looking blonde author.
Adorning it is the catchy title of "High Crimes and Misdemeanors," and
it looks a lot more intriguing. You'd buy that one, the one by the
blonde, not "Topics," right?
And you'd be making a big mistake.
Because Aristotle's book is not about various, banal topics; it's about
dialectical reasoning. And you are keen on dialectic, because you know
about Plato and the examples of dialectical reasoning that he provided
in his dialogs. So a fairly large treatise on this method of
dialectical reasoning by a prominent student out of Plato's Academy,
namely Aristotle, would be a lot more rewarding than Ann Coulter's
hash. Right?
So, go for it!
Only, what's the deal with the lame title, "Topics"?
In the next post, I hope to give you a better substitute title for
Aristotle's work on dialectical reasoning, as well as some defense for
why it's superior to the traditional one--the title that almost made
you buy one of Coulter's books.
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
Aristotle's treatise "Topics" or "TopikOn" (Greek: "Of Topics") has a
peculiarly bland title, although the introductory remarks in Book I,
Chapter 1 are fairly specific in that its subject matter is dialectical
reasoning. What is going on here?
The Greek root word from which "TopikOn" comes is 'topos', which means
"place," or "region," like a physical or geographical location.
Actually, if I'm not mistaken, 'TopikOn' is an adjectival form, from
the adjective 'topikos'. It is the genitive plural form, as I remarked
in the previous post in this thread. Now, "topikos" means "of, for,
applying to, or in respect to place". Hmm...in English I might give
this the brute-force translation "locational." So the word 'topikOn'
means something like "of locationals". My little "Pocket Oxford
Classical Dictionary" does not have an entry for the word 'topikos,'
but I found one in the decisive "A Greek-English Lexicon," by Liddell,
Scott, Jones, and McKenzie, Oxford: Clarendon, 1961. This is usually
called the "LSJ" for the three main author/editor's names. The LSJ
notes that Aristotle wrote a treatise entitled "ta topika," or "the
locationals." It may be that the Loeb edition has chosen, for some
reason, the genitive plural over the nominative plural.
A valid question is still: What is going on here? Let's turn to the
secondary literature for some help.
In the introduction to the "Topics" in the Loeb edition (pp. 268-269),
E.S. Forster says that "The term "topoi" is somewhat difficult to
define. They may be described as 'commonplaces' of argument...."
Also, the Kneales in their book "The Development of Logic," Oxford:
Clarendon, 1962, support this by saying that "The name 'Topics' is
derived from the Greek word which originally meant 'place' but later
came to signify a 'commonplace', i.e. a recurrent theme or pattern in
discourse...the _topoi_ are standard procedures or moves which can be
made in argument on any subject." (p. 34, of W. & M. Kneale, "The
Development of Logic")
These are somewhat illuminating remarks. I like the fact that these
interpretations include the physical location in the proposed English
translation: "commonplace." The problem I have with them is the choice
of the English word 'commonplace'--which means something more ordinary,
trite, or uninteresting. For example, "Neither a borrower nor a lender
be" is a _commonplace_ spoken to Hamlet by his father Polonius. It is
trite, impractical, and uninteresting. Except, no doubt, to the person
possessing immense inherited wealth, one who shares it with nobody--in
which case, it's an axiom.
What I would suggest is that we think of "topoi" as "situations". Then
the title of Aristotle's treatise on dialectical reasoning becomes "For
situationals" [from "TopikOn"] or "The situationals" [from "Ta
topika"]. It now sounds a lot more like a tactical manual for engaging
in argumentative discourse. And, it also has a physical location
flavor, since a thing will have a place or a situation. I would suggest
that, whenever you're reading the "Topics," if the English translation
"commonplace" seems a bit weird to you, you might try your own
substitution of 'situation' for 'commonplace'.
How does the proposed translation work? Let's see. We encounter
situations in debate where we are being led by our interlocutors into a
conundrum, and we want to extract ourselves from the position. We guide
the discussion to another more favorable situation. We avoid getting
ourselves into the situation of elenchus. It all sounds pretty good, I
suggest, and it makes Aristotle's "Topics" a lot more tantalizing.
I like to keep these posts short, so I'll end here.
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
Let's finish off Book I, Chapter 1 of Aristotle's "Topics." From the
Loeb edition (vol. II) of Aristotle's works, which contains the E.S.
Forster translation, we read
"Let the above then be a description in outline of the different kinds
of reasoning. [The Philosopher means the four kinds: demonstrative,
dialectical, contentious, and false reasoning.] In general, as regards
all those already mentioned and to be mentioned hereafer, let this much
distinction suffice for us, since we do not propose to give the exact
definition of any of them but merely wish to describe them in outline,
considering it quite enough, in accordance with the method which we
have set before us, to be able to recognize each of them in some way or
other." (101a18-24)
One thing that is striking about this passage is that Aristotle is
willing to be inexact in his formulation of types of reasoning. It is
in sharp contrast, in fact, to the Socratic tradition that we have
learned from the dialogues of Plato and from the historical notes that
Aristotle himself supplies to us about Socrates in the "Metaphysics,"
for example.
In Book I, Chapter 6 of the "Metaphysics," Aristotle tells us that
"After the systems we have named [the Pythagoreans] came the philosophy
of Plato, which in most respects followed these thinkers, but had
peculiarities that distinguished it from the philosophy of the Italians
[where the Pythagoreas were particularly influential in the 5th century
BCE]. For having in his youth first become familiar with Cratylus and
with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a
state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he
held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about
ethical matters and negelecting the world of nature as a whole but
seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for
the first time on definitions."
And Socrates must have been relentless in refining definitions, as we
see at the end of the "Euthyphro" of Plato for example:
"Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? That is an enquiry
which I shall never be weary of pursuing as far as in me lies; and I
entreat you not to scorn me, but to apply your mind to the utmost, and
tell me the truth." [from the Jowett translation, available online at
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/euthyfro.html]
But, quite off the Socratic track in this regard, Aristotle is willing
to give up the pursuit of precise definitions and distinctions in order
to cover "in outline" the points he wants to make about dialectical
reasoning. This is a typical Aristotelian standpoint: Philosophy need
not strive for precise definition of terms that are, by their very
nature, imprecise or--to use more modern parlance--fuzzy.
Aristotle is more famous for putting this view forward in the
"Nicomachean Ethics," by the way:
"Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much clearness as the
subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought for alike
in all discussions, any more than in all the products of the crafts."
(1094b12-14) [W.D. Ross trans., in J. Barnes, ed, "Complete Works of
Aristotle"]
And, in the 20th century, Ludwig Wittgenstein is strangely famous for
putting forward the very same idea that Aristotle did twenty-four
centuries earlier:
"If I tell someone "Stand roughly here"-- may not this explanation work
perfectly?" ["Philosophical Investigations, PI 88]
Just to wrap-up this thought: The main point I see is that in his Logic
as well as in his Ethics, Aristotle is ready to work from roughly
defined concepts, and he has just as decisively broken from his
Socratic heritage as Wittgenstein in the "Investigations" has broken
from the rigid formulations of the "Tractatus."
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
I think it's amusing that Aristotle's "Topics," the title of which
means "places" or as I suggested earlier "situations," has come to mean
in English "subjects" or "things under consideration or discussion."
Actually, according to the dictionary, the meaning of the word "topic"
in English came directly from Aristotle's treatise on dialectical
reasoning. The inner books, Books II-VII of the "Topics" consider a
variety of rhetorical "situations," and it is from this varied
selection of "situations," that we came to mean "subject of discourse"
by the word 'topic'. Aristotle's title meant something different, but
because of the content and the form in which he composed the content,
the meaning shifted to what we now have.
Another case that is similar is Herodotus's "Histories." In point of
fact, "history" as a discipline did not exist in the 5th century BCE,
when Herodotus of Halicarnassus (a city in Caria, a Greek-speaking
region on the west coast of what is now Turkey) was scratching out his
researches onto papyrus. What the Greek word historiA meant was
"inquiry," so that Herodotus was writing down the results of his
inquiries into the persons, events, and causes of the war between the
Persians and the Greeks. In the course of making and recording these
inquiries, he founded the scholarly pursuit we now know as history. So
it's another instance of the meaning of a modern word being taken from
the title of an ancient scholarly treatise, which, at the time of
composition, meant something quite different.
Thanks!
--Ron
Tonight's Aristotle quote: "For all is unclear when said according to
metaphor" ("Topics," Book VI, Chapter 2, 139b34-5)