Basic questions on the "Categories"
waveletter
Offlist, I've had the pleasure of corresponding with a psychology
graduate student, MJ, who is beginning to read Aristotle's "Organon"
for the first time--in particular the "Categories". In this thread,
I'll paraphrase some of the questions and recount my replies.
Hopefully, it will stimulate some others on this list, perhaps some
anonymous lurkers as well, to delve into this difficult early work of
Aristotle.
(Question 1) The translation of the "Categories" by Edghill seems to be
all over the internet. Is it the best one?
(Answer 1) I guess the ones other than Edghill are covered by
copyright. The "best" one in my opinion, however, is by Ackrill. It
includes "Categories" and "On Interpretation" as well as extensive
notes in the back.
(Q2) In the first chapter, "Homonyms, Synonyms, and Derivatives,"
Aristotle talks about "things" and not words by using the the term
'equivocally', etc. An example would be a writing pen and a chicken
pen. Is this right?
(A2) Yes, I think that in Aristotle a "homonym" is a thing. So, The
Philosopher is using the word 'homonym' in a technical sense that's
different from the way we use it today. This is
a major problem when you first read the "Categories."
(Q3) Modern usage would say the *word* is homonymous...not the items.
But Aristotle says it would be the chicken pen and the writing pen
together that are homonymous?
(A3) Yes, that's right. Mainly, Aristotle says that *things* are
homonymous, but, unfortunately, there are places where he (or at least
his text) says that words are homonymous. It may be a slip, it may be a
transcription error, or it may be that Aristotle is just using the term
in a different way than he did in the "Categories."
I'll continue the thread with more "Categories" Q&A tomorrow night.
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
(Question 4) I'm a little vague on what Aristotle means by the second
term 'univocal'. The definition seems to be whether they can be grouped
into the same class. So a turtle and a human are now univocal, since
they both can be labeled under animal?
(Answer 4) Things are synonymous when they are covered by the same
term, and the definition of their essence according to the term is the
same.
Things are homonymous when they are covered by the same term, and the
definition of their essence according to the term is different.
So, the chicken pen and the ballpoint pen are homonyms with respect to
the word 'pen', because for the chicken pen the definition of its
essence according the word 'pen' is "animal enclosure", whereas for the
ballpoint pen the definition of its essence is "writing instrument".
But, the chicken pen and the ballpoint pen are also synonyms with
respect to the word 'utensil', because they have the same definition of
essence with respect to this word: "made by a human being to serve a
particular purpose".
Well, something like that.
There are three things involved in deciding whether this or that thing
are synonyms or homonyms in A's technical sense: the thing, the word,
and the definition of the thing's essence according to the word.
(Q5) This seems strange...as everything is then univocal. For example,
a duck, a jacket, a computer and a car are all univocal as they can all
be 'things'.
(A5) Well, that's exactly right, and it's a good point. As the term
involved gets more and more general, the number of things that are
synonymous with respect to the term and the definition gets larger and
larger.
So more things are synonyms under the term 'animal' than under the term
'reptile'.
(Q6) The derivatives example seems OK. Is he talking about verbs and
their different form, as, for instance, a word like 'kicking' or
'kicked' derives from 'to kick'?
(A6) Aristotle calls these things "paronyms," when two things have
names that derive from one another. 'Football' and 'footballer' might
be good examples of paronymous things. The name 'footballer' comes from
'football', but in the one case, the thing is a round sport ball, and
in the other case, the thing is a human being. So the football and the
footballer are quite different in their essences, even though they have
names that derive one from the other.
--RLA
waveletter
(Question 7) Why, at least in Edghill's translation, is the title of
Chapter 1 "Homonyms, Synonyms, and Derivatives," yet when you start
reading that paragraph, Aristotle uses the words, 'equivocal',
'univocal', and 'derivative'? Is this inconsistent? A translation
problem?
(Answer 7) I think that Edghill realized that A. was using the words in
a different way than we do nowadays, and so she invoked the "equivocal"
and "univocal". But it does make the whole distinction seem to be one
of words, not things--at least to my eye.
Yes, it seems to be an inconsistent translation. It could be that
Edghill was hoping to give the English reader the flavor of the text
with the title and the clearer meaning with the internal translation.
Well, it didn't work for either of us! I prefer to translate it
directly and explain the technical use of the terms in footnotes. This
is better for the keen reader.
Edghill's translation is probably a lot easier to read than the others,
such as Ackrill's or Cooke's. But even the Greek in the "Categories" is
terse and hard to comprehend! So, why not make the English reader feel
that pain just like A's students did?
(Q8) At least the word 'derivative' is used both in the text and the
chapter title. Did Aristotle have a title in the original, or was this
just something that Edghill put in?
(A8) The translators put those in. Originally, the book was not even
divided up into chapters; it was just a papyrus roll, copied by a
scribe from notes probably taken by a peripatetic student. Or it might
even have been a digest of students' notes.
In ancient times, the papyri were written in all capital letters with
no spaces in between and no accent marks to help us distinguish
words,declined forms, and pronounce what was written. All of these
helpful graphological devices came later.
Thanks!
--Ron
P.S. The next Q&A session on the "Categories" picks up with Chapter 2.
I'll provide some references to the available translations of the
"Categories" in the next post.
waveletter
I thought I would list some reference notes for those of you on
aristotle-logic or just reading along on the outside.
[1] The Edghill translation that MJ is using in the course of our
off-list correspondence is widely available on the internet:
http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/categories.html
[2] The translation by Ackrill, though, is widely regarded as the best:
J. Ackrill, trans., "Aristotle's Categories and De Interpretatione,"
Oxford: Clarendon, 1963 (& many later editions). It's not available
online--as far as I know--unless you pay for it. Ackrill has extensive
notes in the back of the book. His translation is the most faithful to
the original Greek. My advice: Get it yesterday.
[3] A standard edition for American readers especially is the H.P.
Cooke translation in the Loeb edition of Aristotle's works:
H.P. Cooke and H. Tredennick, trans., "Aristotle: Categories, On
Interpretation, and Prior Analytics," vol. I (of XXIII) of the Loeb
Aristotle series, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1996.
This little green book has Greek text and Cooke's translation of the
"Categories" into English on facing pages. It contains an introduction,
outline, and fairly good footnotes. The translation maintains some
harmony with the original Attic Greek. If you're interested in learning
Greek, in critiques of the translations, or in the finer points of
understanding The Philosopher's thought, then this book is a must-have.
Better yet: Get the whole series.
[4] A good, complete set of translated Aristotle is J. Barnes, ed.,
"The Complete Works of Aristotle," Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, vols. I & II, 1984.
These volumes lead off with the "Categories" in vol. I. Nice hardbound
books, notes sparce, less commentary than that, small typeface, but
widely available new and used. Inexpensive, given the quality of the
books. For the "Categories," Prof. Jonathan Barnes chose the popular
translation by Prof. J.L. Ackrill.
Well, this should get you caught up with MJ's questions and my answers.
Thanks!
--Ron
waveletter
(Chapter 2, 1a16ff):
(Question 9) I'm afraid this next passage (Part two - forms of speech)
has completely left me in the dark. In a fuzzy weird sort of way, I
think I sort of get what he means.... But at the same time, I know I'm
way off. He mentions that forms of speech are either simple or
composite, but I'm not overly sure what he means by "forms of speech".
I'm assuming just sentences? He then goes to give some examples...using
"the man runs" as a composite form of speech, and 'man' as simple. I'm
not really sure how he is dividing this up.... I can't really see a
pattern, at first I was thinking he was just splitting them into nouns
and non-nouns, then nouns - verbs, then subject - predicate.
(Answer 9) The simple forms of speech are just terms--basically nouns
or adjectives, such as 'man', 'animal', 'pale', 'brave', 'grammatical
knowledge', and so on. The composite forms of speech combine two terms,
such as "man is brave", or combine a term and a verb, such as "man
runs".
(Q10) He then goes on to talk about "things" being predicable. A
predicate is basically, all of a sentence, after the subject yes? So in
the sentence, "The dog was running fast", "was running fast" is the
predicate? Having said that...I don't fully get what he means by
this...
(A10) Yes, that's basically it. To predicate for Aristotle right here
is to categorize. So "man is brave" has "man" for the subject and "is
brave" or just "brave" for the predicate or category.
(Q11) "Of things themselves some are predicable of a subject, and are
never present in a subject. Thus ?man? is predicable of the individual
man, and is never present in a subject." This part seems like a
nightmare! Its nothing like the first chapter!
(A11) The individual man is some specific person, such as Socrates or
Callias. So we can say "Socrates is a man", or we predicate 'man' of
the subject, the specific person Socrates.
But we don't find that 'man' is inside Socrates, like, say, the
knowledge of grammar. So here A. is arguing against Plato's theory of
Forms. Similarly, 'animal' is not inside Socrates.
A. is being careful to show that the form of the statements, "Socrates
is a man" and "Socrates is
knowledgeable about grammar" seem to have the same form, identifying
Socrates with some property. But, in fact, A. is arguing, that one
states that Socrates is an individual of the species 'man' while the
other statement is saying that there is something inside of Socrates.
The sophists used the form of sentences in order to derive their
so-called paradoxes--the elenchi. Hope this makes sense.
--Ron
waveletter
some terminology from philosophical logic.
(Question 12) I've got a few questions about propositional logic. I
have noticed on websites when I went looking that places use slightly
different words. For example, we got taught to use to the word
'statement', but other places use the word 'assertion'. From my
understanding, aren't a statement and an assertion the same thing? They
are basically just statements that can be true or false. So the
statement/assertion, "the moon is made of cheese" is one, even though
it's false.
(Answer 12) I think that a statement and an assertion are the basically
same thing. Sometimes, though, "statement" is a little broader than
"assertion". In Aristotelian logic, for example, a number of modern
commentators use assertion for a statement of fact. A statement,
though, could be something not intended to be factual; a statement
could, for instance, be one of possibility.
Thus, "It's possible that it will rain today" is a statement, but it's
not an assertion, because there is not factual intent. If I say "It is
raining", then that is an assertion (and a statement). So assertions,
in this usage do not involve "modal" qualifiers, such as "possibly",
and the like.
I could be wrong about this. But modern authors will talk about
"Aristotle's assertoric syllogisms" and they mean the ones that do not
involve modal qualifiers, such as 'necessarily', 'possibly', and so on.
You need to carefully check the examples that an author provides to see
exactly what is intended.
(Q13) Next word is 'premise'. From my understanding, a premise is a
statement/assertion that is used in an argument to support a
conclusion. So if it's not used in an argument, then it's just a
statement/assertion.
(A13) Right. A statement or assertion becomes a premise when it's used
to draw a conclusion. In the "Analytics," Aristotle considers
deductions (syllogisms) that have premises and conclusions. The
conclusion follows necessarily from the premises. A deduction where the
premise is a true statement is a demonstration--something that the
sciences are supposed to do. For example, a deduction that is not a
demonstration is one like this: If the moon is made of cheese, and if
all cheeses come from cows, then the moon comes from a cow. It's a
valid deduction, but it's not a demonstration. These are Aristotle's
technical terms, translated into English, and their technical usages.
(Q14) The very first premise of an argument is called an 'assumption',
right? So you could have a couple of assumptions, which then lead to an
intermediate conclusion. And then maybe you could introduce another
assumption, which may then lead to a final conclusion?
(A14) Assumption sounds weaker to me. An assumption could be something
hypothetical, whereas the first premise of an argument could have
factual content. For example, in Aristotle, there is the distinction
between deductions and demonstrations. Deductions are more
general. They can have false premises, like in (A13), and these are
mere assumptions. A demonstration is a deduction (a syllogism, in
Aristotle) where the premises are
factual (and true).
(Q15) Next I have 'proposition'. This to me sounds like the abstract
"underneath" part of a statement/assertion. So if I said, "My car broke
down" and also said "My car experienced a mechancial anomaly", both of
these statements are expressing the same proposition, right?
(A15) Yeah, but we're getting into muddy waters here. The proposition
is supposed to be the abstract form of the statement or assertion. Thus
if you say things in different ways, as you just did, you are providing
two different forms or concretizations of the same abstract
proposition. Similarly if I said the same thing in another language,
such as Spanish: "Mi coche rompio". I'd be expressing the same
proposition, except in another natural language.
This gets metaphysical really fast, and most philosophers nowadays do
not accept that there are
actually "propositions" apart from the utterances. Good questions!
Thanks!
--Ron