Aristotle's "Topics," Book I, Chapter 2
waveletter
Aristotle has already said that it's about dialectical reasoning, so it
might seem that he's going to tell his students how to suppress
sophistical arguments. But, in fact, it's really a lot more than that.
Beginning at Stephanus page number (101a25): "After the above remarks
the next point is to explain for how many and for what purposes this
treatise is useful. They are three in number, mental training,
conversations and the philosophic sciences. That it is useful for
mental training is obvious on the face of it; for, if we have a method,
we shall be able more easily to argue about the subject proposed."
(Forster's translation, from the Loeb edn.)
Some things that I observe in the original Attic Greek are:
(1) Aristotle uses a potential optative in the first sentence, which
didn't make it through to Forster's English version. Transliterated:
"Hepomenon d' an eiE tois eirEmenois eipein pros posa te kai tina
chrEsimos hE pragmateia." If we include it, say by "After the above
remarks, the next point might be to explain...", then it conveys what
might well be an indication from Aristotle that the purposes of the
"Topics" are not going to be limited to the obvious ones, e.g., what's
wrong with sophist eristic.
(2) Actually Aristotle gives *four* purposes, three right here, and
then another one is tacked on down below at (101a37): "Further, it is
useful in connexion with the ultimate bases of each science; for it is
impossible to discuss them at all on the basis of the principles
peculiar to the science in question, since the principles are primary
in relation to everything else, and it is necessary to deal with them
through the generally accepted opinions on each point."
Yet the possible presence of a fourth use for the "Topics" does not
come forward in Forster's translation. The problem could be the nasty
Greek particle dE in the original: "esti dE pros tria...." (Here, even
if you don't know Greek, you can probably read the 3rd person singular
verb 'esti', like Spanish 'esta', and the number 'tria', like English
'trio'. A glitch in ancient Greek grammar is that the third person (he,
she, it) singular form of the verb is used with the plural of nouns of
neuter gender, as in this case.) Well, the particle 'dE' can mean
'then' or 'indeed' or 'clearly' or 'at least', and things like that,
but it does convey a bit of skepticism or sarcasm or caution. So
Aristotle may be saying "There are at least three...," or "Indeed three
are...", as if these were the obvious ones that we were thinking about
all along.
It does seem to me that the more important use is the fourth one. What
he's saying is that you have to have a standard of argument for
evaluating the foundational principles of every science. You can't
start the primary principles themselves, because these are what are in
question and subject to debate in a nascent scientific discipline. I
think that if we read the subtleties of the original Greek back into
the English, it makes plausible that Aristotle is preparing a little
surprise for his smug readers, like us, at the end of the second
chapter.
Thanks!
--Ron
Ron Allen
One correction: I meant "Bekker" numbers, not
"Stephanus" numbers. The Stephanus numbers apply to
Plato's works, of course.
A couple other thoughts on this second chapter of Book
I of the "Topics:"
(1) The third sentence is "That it [the treatise] is
useful for mental training is obvious on the face of
it...." (101a29-30). I'm not sure where the "on the
face of it" comes from. It seems like Forster is
turning "ex autOn" into some kind of intensive. But,
as the grammar books make clear, it would have to be
in the nominative for that. Neither is it in the
attributive position with the definite article. So it
must be simply a personal pronoun in the 3rd person
plural: it means "from them", probably referring, I
suggest, back to the "things said above".
(2) If you have Prof. Robin Smith's translation of
Books I and VIII of the "Topics" handy, you'll see
that he does account for the nuanced intro Aristotle
gives to this chapter with that optative of potential
I mentioned before: "Next in order after what we have
said would be to state the number and kinds of things
our study is useful for." (R. Smith, "Topics Books I &
VIII," Oxford: Oxford Univ Press, 1997).
(3) But, alas, Prof. Smith seems to follow Forster
with the "ex autOn" becoming "at once". Well, I'm not
the most learned translator, and I'll have to research
out whether there is colloquialism based on 'autos'
that means "on the face of it" or "at once".
--Ron
waveletter
When I was covering Book I, Chapter 1 of Aristotle's "Topics" I noted a
couple of points at which The Philosopher seemed to be pursuing a
different line of thought than his teacher, Plato, and Plato's teacher,
Socrates:
(1) Aristotle shows a concern for the majority opinion, or average
opinion. This is especially the case with the type of reasoning that is
the concern of the "Topics," dialectical reasoning (100a30).
(2) Aristotle does not propose to work with exact accounts, but will
simply outline his distinctions among types of reasoning (101a22).
But in the second chapter now, Aristotle identifies at least two points
that I think he has in common with Plato:
(3) That there are ultimate principles of the sciences (the Greek word
is 'archê', a principle or origin or leader). This Aristotle mentions
at (101a37-101b1), but he does not defend, let alone justify this
assertion--at least right here in the "Topics". Of course, Plato's
archê is the Form or Idea. His Theory of Forms is developed gradually
out of the earlier Socratic dialogues. In the "Phaedo," Plato develops
almost the full theory of Forms that we find in the "Republic," except
perhaps for the separation of forms from particular things. In the
"Republic," Plato lays out the Theory of Ideas fully, and includes as
well the Divided Line, which includes the higher Forms, such as
Triangularity, and the intermediate Forms, such as individual
mathematical objects, such as this particular 3-4-5 right triangle. Of
course Aristotle argues against Plato's Theory of Forms in the
"Metaphysics," among other places.
(4) Interestingly, Aristotle agrees with Plato that dialectic has a
role in elaborating the foundational principles of the sciences. This
is the fourth useful aspect of the treatise, which I called attention
to before. For Plato, the dialectic consists of a kind of rigorous
conversation, with short exchanges between participants, so that
gradually they are reminded of what their souls always knew.
For the next few posts, I'll compare how Plato and Aristotle see the
role of dialectic in helping us toward identifying foundational
principles in the sciences. In fact, I think we can open up some of the
other treatises within the "Organon" and even have a look at some the
scientific works of Aristotle as well.
Thanks!
--Ron Allen
waveletter
toward Plato in these early chapters of the "Topics." In the last post,
I listed two that stand out:
(1) Aristotle's confidence in a majority opinion. Perhaps it is a
majority or plurality of learned folk, but there is value, Aristotle
contends, as a basis for dialectical reasoning, to be found in widely
shared belief (100a30).
(2) Aristotle is content to furnish outlines of his distinctions among
types of reasoning (101a22), and he does not anticipate the need for
exact definitions.
On the first point, Plato was in his mid-20s in 399 BCE when he
witnessed the trial of Socrates and his friend's conviction of impiety
and corruption by the Athenian democracy. Plato's enmity toward
majority opinion might not date from exactly this moment. But it
certainly was set hard in place by that infamous majority vote, and how
much he detests popular rule can be seen in the dialogues.
For example, near the high point of the "Republic," in Book VI,
Socrates asks: "Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the
reality of the beautiful in itself (i.e. the Form of Beauty) as opposed
to the multiplicity of beautiful things (i.e. sensual particulars), or
can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the
many particulars?" Adeimantus answers: "Not in the least." Socrates
continues: "Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the
multitude." (494e3-494a1)
The phrase Plato uses for the "multitude" is 'ta polla', 'the many'.
This is the neuter nominative plural form. We have an expression in
English that came from the Greek, "the hoi polloi," which means "the
common" or "the base". It's the same word, 'polus', just that "hoi
polloi" is masculine nominative plural, "the base men". [An aside: It
is an odd quirk of popular usage, but sometimes people use "hoi polloi"
in the opposite sense: "the well-to-do, snobbish". This may stem from a
confusion between "hoi polloi" and the colloquial "hoity-toity", which
means "arrogant, conceited".]
Indeed, the "Republic" lays out an ideal city that is far from a
democracy. There is an elite circle of philosophers, the Guardians, who
are compelled by moral and intellectual duty to pilot the ship of
city-state on behalf of the vast majority of its citizens. The
multitude does not even have control over its own reproductive rights,
as the Guardians employ a phony lottery scheme to contrive marriages
among men and women of similar mental and physical qualities.
Next, consider the difference between Aristotle's positive view of
inexact definition and the views of Socrates and Plato. Aristotle tells
us in the "Metaphysics" that Socrates focused on definition, especially
with regard to moral questions: "After the systems we have named [the
Pythagoreans] came the philosophy of Plato, which in most respects
followed these thinkers, but had peculiarities that distinguished it
from the philosophy of the Italians [where the Pythagoreas were
particularly influential in the 5th century BCE]. For having in his
youth first become familiar with Cratylus and
with the Heraclitean doctrines (that all sensible things are ever in a
state of flux and there is no knowledge about them), these views he
held even in later years. Socrates, however, was busying himself about
ethical matters and negelecting the world of nature as a whole but
seeking the universal in these ethical matters, and fixed thought for
the first time on definitions." (987a29-987b4)
The account Aristotle gives accords with the portrayal of Socrates that
Plato constructs in his earlier dialogues, such as the "Meno." {I need
to break off here and walk the dogs!}
More in a moment...thanks! --Ron Allen
waveletter
Let's take a look at the "Meno" of Plato to see how Aristotle's
accomodation of inexact description differs from Plato and Socrates. Of
course, we have no writings by Socrates, and most of what we know about
him comes from Plato's dialogues and accounts in Xenophon. In the
earlier aporetic dialogues, Socrates is the main character, and the
account accords well with Aristotle's brief characterization from the
"Metaphysics" (987a29 ff.) In the earlier dialogues, it is unclear
where the historical Socrates stops talking where Plato begins putting
words into his mouth. But, in the middle dialogues, the character of
Socrates enunciates many of the philosophical themes that we associate
directly with Plato, and that we understand, from Aristotle's account,
did not come out of Socrates's forays in the agora. But in the middle
dialogues and on into the later works, where Socrates is a minor
figure--or even absent entirely--the concern for precision in
conceptual development remains central.
In Plato's dialogue, the "Meno," Socrates asks Meno for his account of
virtue: "ti fês aretên einai;" or "what do you say virtue to be?"
(71d6) [The Greek question mark is written as a semicolon. There is a
semicolon punctuation mark in Attic Greek--it's a raised dot above the
line.]
Well, this is a typical Socratic demand of "what is it?", the standard
Socratic request for an all-inclusive definition. Meno, though, goes
right ahead and gives Socrates a list of particular virtues--the virtue
of a man, the virtue of a woman, of a child, of elderly men, of
freemen, of slaves, and so on (71e1-72a5). But Socrates does not ask
for how these are all different, but for the quality that they all
share as virtues: "what do you call the quality by which they do not
differ, but are all alike?" (72c2-3) Socrates continues: "You
understand, of course, that his principle of mine applies to
everything...." (74b5-6) Finally, Socrates says that "Do you not
understand that I am looking for that which is the same common element
in all these things?" (75a4)
The same quest for an element that is in all things virtuous or
beautiful is clear in the passage from the "Republic" that I quoted
earlier: "Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality
of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful
things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as
opposed to the many particulars?" (494e3 ff.) In this passage, from
Plato's middle period, Socrates is invoking the Theory of Ideas, which
is Plato's own contribution to philosophy. Still, the concern for an
all-encompasing element is there, and, in fact, it is by
"participating" in the Form of Virtue or the Form of Beauty, for
example, that particular sensual things come to have the property that
we call "virtue" or "beauty".
As Aristotle continues to explain in the "Metaphysics": "...Plato
followed him [Socrates] and assumed that the problem of definition is
concerned not with any sensible thing but with entities of another
kind; for the reason that there can be no general definition of
sensible things which are always changing. These entities he called
'Ideas', and held that all sensible things are named after them and in
virtue of their relation to them; for the plurality of things which
bear the same name as the Forms exist by participation in them."
(987b4-987b11)
I think that this is a superb, succinct statement of the origin and
purpose of Plato's Theory of Forms. It solves a problem that Plato
perceived in Socrates's quest for exact definition--namely, that if the
definition is sought in something common to all particulars ["Meno"
(75a4)], then the quest necessarily fails, because, following along
with Cratylus, the particulars are always in flux.
Aristotle, in the "Topics," suggests that we can get by without exact
definition, and, at the same time, we can use this "dialectical
reasoning" that he's going to detail for us in elaborating the founding
principles of each and every science. It's really a pretty intriguing
point of view.
Thanks!
--RLA
waveletter
hemisphere--aristotle-logic group:
Let me address issues over which Aristotle seems to concur with Plato.
I've been blogging for a bit on points of view in which the two
differ--namely, (1) majority opinions or accepted beliefs or endoxa,
and (2) the necessity of precise definition. Now I want to pick up
again the apparent agreements that Aristotle and Plato enjoyed: (3)
scientific foundational principles and (4) dialectic as a means for
discovering and elaborating the foundational principles of science.
Here in Chapter 2 of Book I of the "Topics," Aristotle tells us that
his treatise "...is useful in connection with the first of the
starting-points about any individual science. For if we reason from the
starting-points appropriate to the science in question, it is
impossible to make any statement about these (since these
starting-points are the first of them all), and it is by means of what
is acceptable about each that it is necessary to discuss them."
(101a37-101b2) [Smith's translation, from "Aristotle's Topics: Books I
and VIII," Oxford: Clarendon, 1997, pp. 2-3]
And if we jump back to Chapter 1 of Book 1, we recall that "Those
things are true and primary which get their trustworthiness through
themselves rather than through other things (for when it comes to
starting-points, one should not search further for the reason why, but
instead each of the starting-points ought to be trustworthy in and of
itself)."
Aristotle is sketchy here in the "Topics," and I suggest his treatment
is cursory and dense. We can get some help from what is perhaps a later
work, the "Posterior Analytics." In Book 1, Chapter 2 of the "Posterior
Analytics," Aristotle explains that "demonstrative knowledge must
proceed from premisses which are true, primary, immediate, better known
than, prior to, and causative of the conclusion." Here, Aristotle is
talking about demonstrative knowledge, not dialectical reasoning, but
he still has in mind the kind of first principles ("true and primary")
that we are trying to identify. So it seems that either his more formal
syllogism developed later, or his dialectical reasoning, which he's
working out in the "Topics," must begin with these "archai" or original
principles at some point.
The foundational principles are those that give rise to belief through
themselves and not through anything else. If one begins to
dialectically reason from them, then that is OK. If one draws up a
formal syllogism from them, then that is OK. But the main thing is that
there are these true and primary principles. Where these are to be
found might best be determined by looking at some of Aristotle's
scientific works.
Thanks!
--RLA
waveletter
I want to highlight a few of the places where Aristotle talks about
things that are "true and primary, which command belief through
themselves and not through anything else...." ("Topics," Book I,
Chapter 1, (100b18-20). We have been reading through the second chapter
of Book 1 of the "Topics," and there Aristotle mentioned that his
treatise would be useful "...in connexion with the ultimate bases of
each science...." (101a37-38). So what are these ultimate bases
(archai, plural of archê, in the Greek) that are presumably true and
primary? [I'm quoting from the Loeb edn., trans. Forster.]
In the "Posterior Analytics," Aristotle wants to show how demonstrative
knowledge arises in Book I, Chapter 2: "Our contention now is that we
do at any rate obtain knowledge by demonstration." (71b15) and "Now if
knowledge is such as we have assumed, demonstrative knowledge must
proceed from premisses which are true, primary, immediate, better known
than, prior to, and causative of the conclusion. Of these conditions
only will the first principles be properly applicable to the fact which
is to be proved. Syllogism indeed will be possible without these
conditions, but not demonstration; for the result will not be
knowledge." (71b20-25).
Note that Aristotle says that a syllogism can work without the
conditions of "true, primary, immediate, ...."). So, as in modern
logic, we can have a valid inference without the premises being true at
all. "If all men are thoughtful, and if Nero is a man, then Nero is
thoughtful" is a valid syllogism, but it brings us no knowledge. This
is one of the main distinctions between the "Prior" and "Posterior
Analytics." In the former, Aristotle is concentrating on the mechanics
of syllogism, without worrying so much about how we extract the
premises of a syllogism. In the latter, The Philosopher is going to
ground syllogism in the discovery of valid first principles.
He homes in a little bit more on the priority and knowability: "There
are two senses in which things are prior and more knowable. That which
is prior in nature is not the same as that which is prior in relation
to us, and that which is (naturally) more knowable is not the same as
that which is more knowable by us. By 'prior' or 'more knowable' in
relation to us I mean that which is nearer to our perception, and by
'prior' and 'more knowable' in the absolute sense I mean that which is
further from it." (71b35-72a4) [from the Loeb volume II of Aristotle's
works, "Posterior Analytics," trans. H. Tredennick]
Aristotle goes on to endorse--what I read to be--a kind of causal
theory of knowledge at 72a26ff. In modern epistemology, the causal
theory of knowledge is that--basically--we know something when we
believe it and our belief was caused by the circumstance or fact that
is the object of our belief. The causal theory of knowledge addresses a
kind of epistemological paradox known as a Gettier example. The modern
causal theory of knowledge is due to Alvin Goldman, although he has
since backed away from the theory. Some references:
[1] E. Gettier, 'Is justified true belief knowledge,' in "Analysis,"
vol. 23, 1963, pp. 121-123.
Online: http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html
[2] A. Goldman, 'A causal theory of knowing,' in "Journal of
Philosophy," vol. 64, 1967, pp. 335-372.
At the end of the "Posterior Analytics," Aristotle picks up again the
question of the archê of knowledge, and I'll have a rip at that
tomorrow night. It continues to rain, a record 24th day in the month of
March, here in northern California.
Thanks!
--Ron Allen
"We, however, hold that not all knowledge is demonstrative; the
knowledge of immediate premisses is not by demonstration." [Aristotle,
"Posterior Analytics," Book I, Chapter 3, 72b19-20]
waveletter
The very end of the "Posterior Analytics" contains some of Aristotle's
most revealing points on the foundational principles, the archai, of a
science. We are actually reading the "Topics," which is about
dialectical reasoning, but there The Philosopher makes the striking
remark that dialectical reasoning is useful in connection with the
archê of each science.
This seems to be a contradiction. Here there is a 'men' and a 'de', as
the Greeks--and especially Aristotle--used to say. On the one hand
(men), he says that reasoning that proceeds from generally held
opinions is useful in finding the archê of each science. But one the
other hand (de), Aristotle says that the foundations of a science have
to be true and primary and command our belief by and for themselves and
not through anything else...in particular, not through some mushy
dialectical reasoning process! What's going on here?
Oh, I forgot to mention: It rained again today in the San Francisco Bay
area, breaking the record all to hell for number of rainy days in the
month of March. We are not anywhere close to the record by amount in
centimeters, however, just in terms of days it rained. Moss is growing
on just about everything in my yard, even my dogs. I looked at the
weather forecast, and it's supposed to rain every day next week. I
think I need to find some examples of first principles from
meteorology!
In "Posterior Analytics" Book II, Chapter 19, Aristotle says that "We
have now explained the nature of syllogism and demonstration--and also
of demonstrative science, which is the same as demonstration--and how
they are effected. We must next inquire how we obtain knowledge of
first principles, and what is the faculty that secures this knowledge."
(99b15-19)
What he means by this is fairly modern and sophisticated. Pure
logic--syllogism, which Aristotle invented, and which lasted
unchallenged for almost twenty-five centuries--tells us nothing. In the
later part of the "Analytics," the "Posterior Analytics," The
Philosopher is concerned with how certain first principles might enter
into the elaboration of a syllogism and how this leads to demonstrative
knowledge.
At this point, Aristotle seems very much like one of the Logical
Positivists of the early 20th century: Logic means nothing, and it is
analytic a priori, whereas when we add some synthetic a posteriori
facts to an agreed-upon analytic a priori definition, we get a kind of
new knowledge. Indeed, A.J. Ayer, in "Language, Truth and Logic," New
York: Dover, 1946, held that propositions can be connected to some
experience based on the senses or to the meanings (the analytical
logic, the syllogism, perhaps) of the terms inside the proposition.
Once again, as with the Causal Theory of Knowledge (Goldman), we have a
very modern philosophical theory that seems to be foreshadowed in
astonishing detail by the writings of a guy from the 4th century BCE.
Anyway, Aristotle goes on to describe how in some animals, which genus
includes human beings, a persistent perception can be retained in the
soul, and through this memory arises. (99b40-100a4)
Let's keep chipping away at this insight of Aristotle's.
Thanks!
--Ron Allen
waveletter
archai, in Greek. We recall that he said in "Topics" Book I, Chapter 2
that dialectical reasoning was useful in connection with the ultimate
bases of each science. So I want to elucidate what Aristotle means by
the "ultimate basis" or the "archê" of a science. We are getting some
ideas from what he writes at the end of the "Posterior Analytics."
Continuing a thought that he expressed at the beginning of the
"Posterior Analytics," Aristotle notes that "...it is impossible to
reach scientific knowledge through demonstration unless one apprehends
the immediate first principles." (99b20-22) What he says is that we
have some faculty, which is shared by all animals, an inborn power of
discrimination: sense-perception (aisthêsis). In some animals
sense-perceptions persist, and in others it does not. The animals with
persistent sense-perceptions have memory. (cf. 99b33-100a4)
"Thus sense-perception gives rise to memory, as we hold; and repeated
memories of the same thing give rise to experience; because the
memories, though numerically many, constitute a single experience. And
experience, that is the universal when established as a whole in the
soul--the One that corresponds to the Many, the unity that is
identically present in them all--provides the starting-point of art and
science: art in the world of process and science in the world of
facts." (100a5-a9)
So these sense-perceptions, crystallized in the soul into a single
experience, are the archai, the first principles, of art and science.
--Ron
"It is clear, then, that in all our inquiries we are trying to find a
middle term." ("Posterior Analytics," Book II, Chapter 3, 90a34-35)