Aristotle's "On Sophistical Refutations" Chapter 34 (Epilogue)
waveletter
states that he is concluding both the "Topics" and the present
treatise:
"Our purpose, then, was to discover a faculty which could reason on the
problem set before us from the most generally accepted premisses that
exist; for this is the function of dialectic in itself and of the art
of examination." [This is at Bekker numbers 183a37-39.]
Of course, reasoning from generally accepted opinions is dialectical
reasoning--the express purpose of the "Topics" (100a30-100b18). So this
is one indication that Aristotle viewed "Sophistical Refutations" and
"Topics" as parts of a single work on the science of argumentation.
The task of dialectical reasoning flows naturally into the discovery of
fake knowledge. The Philosopher continues in the Epilogue: "But, since
there is further added to it, on account of its close affinity with the
art of sophistry, that it can undertake an examination not only
dialectically but also with a pretense of knowledge, we therefore
proposed as the purpose of our treatise not only the above-mentioned
task of being able to conduct an argument but also the discovery how,
when supporting an argument, we are to defend our thesis by means of
the most generally accepted premisses in a consistent manner."
(183a39-183b7)
So as to not fall into sophistical traps, therefore, we want to build
the broadest acceptable defense of our arguments without contradicting
ourselves. As in the beginning paragraphs of the "Topics" (i.e. 100a21)
Aristotle is adamant about avoiding contradiction. Here, in the
conclusion of "On Sophistical Refutations," he proposes the goal of a
maximally consistent argument. It's hardly formal, but to me this is
reminiscent of the formal, modern concept from mathematical logic of a
complete, consistent theory. The Philosopher seems to be aware that the
more cases he covers in defense of an argument, the better advantage he
will have over his opponent. Ultimately, one could hope to either have
confirmed or refuted each and every possible aspect or subcase of the
problem in dispute, and this is very like the completeness of a logical
theory. At the same time, Aristotle shows awareness of the danger of
covering the cases too well and falling into a contradiction; we need
to maintain internal consistency as well as exhaust all subcases and
possibilities.
Just as an aside, propositional logic is complete, in the sense that
there is a proof for any tautology. And some cases of predicate logic
are complete, such as arithmetic with just a symbol for zero, the
successor function, and addition. However, as Kurt Gödel famously
showed in the early 1930s, when we add multiplication and the less than
relation and the induction axioms to arithmetic, we get a theory that
(if it is consistent) is incomplete: There is some statement about
numbers that we can neither prove nor disprove from these axioms. These
ideas are covered in books on mathematical logic:
(1) H. Enderton, "A Mathematical Introduction to Logic," New York:
Academic, 1972
and
(2) E. Mendelson, "Introduction to Mathematical Logic," New York: Van
Nostrand, 1964
are good places to start.
I want to draw attention to such insights by Aristotle, because there
has been a lot of recent scholarly debate on the nature and depth of
his system of syllogistic. In particular, it has been argued that The
Philosopher [are we justified to call him The Logician?] offered a
metalogical argument that his syllogistic was indeed complete. We'll
get to some of these very modern arguments, and all their twists and
turns, in a subsequent thread on syllogistic.
--Ron Allen
Ron Allen
One of the frustrations that I had with Plato's dialogues, especially
the ones that featured Socrates as the principal interlocutor, was that
Socrates posed many questions, but seemed to answer none. We read and
we are left wondering what is right, what is wrong, what is reasonable,
and what is nonsense. But Aristotle justifies our frustration at this
point in the "Sophistical Refutations" (183b7 ff.)
We are supposed to defend our thesis by means of the most generally
accepted premisses in a consistent manner, as I noted in (183a39 ff.)
the previous post (attached below). Aristotle continues in the last
chapter of "On Sophistical Refutations" as follows:
"...for this was why Socrates used to ask questions but never answered
them, because he confessed ignorance."
Actually, what Plato writes in the original Attic Greek is that
"...hômologei gar ouk eidenai" or "because he was confessing to be
without eidetic knowledge". It's not like Socrates was saying he knew
nothing, but that he lacked eidetic, or seeing knowledge, a kind of
final, unassailable knowledge in Greek philosophy. Eidetic knowledge
is distinguished from empirical or sensory knowledge, epistêmê, for
example. The verb, by the way, is 3rd person singular imperfective. It
indicates a regular, or unspecific, but not a one-time action. You
can't tell this from Forster's translation [in the Loeb edition, vol.
III of Aristotle], where he translates it as "confessed". In other
words, Socrates did this all the time.
In any case, what Aristotle is telling us here is that he (Aristotle,
son of the physician Nicomachus of Stagira) has discovered the logical
and dialectical strategy that underlies Socrates's exasperating method
of argument. It's not plain and simple ignorance that Socrates
confesses, but an incompleteness, and this bears on my earlier remarks
in the prior post (below). Socrates's questioning is an informal
attempt to achieve an exhaustive detail with respect to a philosophical
problem without falling off the precipice into contradiction. The
informal method of Socrates has been formalized and substantiated by
Aristotle--or at least this is what The Philosopher claims in this
passage.
Aristotle drives this point home a bit later. He mentions some of the
founders of rhetoric by name, but there is no comparable heritage of
dialectical theory. "Of our present inquiry, however, it is not true to
say that it had already been partly elaborated and partly not; nay, it
did not exist at all. For the training given by the paid teachers of
contentious argument resembled the system of Gorgias [the great
sophist]." (183b35-38)
Next time, I'll comment a little bit more on dialectic in Plato's
academy. Isn't it unexpected that Aristotle, of all Plato's students,
should be the one to write a treatise laying down for the first time
the principles of dialectical reasoning and pinpointing the sources and
forms of sophistical refutations?
Thanks!
--Ron Allen
Ron Allen
logue = upon + speech = speech upon), Chapter 34 of Aristotle's "On
Sophistical Refutations."
Beginning at Bekker number 183b39, Aristotle, after mentioning the
sophist Gorgias, says: "For some of them [paid teachers of contentious
argument, cf. Book I, Chapter 1 of the "Topics" (100b24 ff.)] gave
their pupils to learn by heart speeches which were either rhetorical or
consisted of questions and answers, in which both sides thought that
the rival arguments were for the most part included."
Aristotle's description appears to be accurate and reflected in Plato's
dialogues. For example, in Plato's "Gorgias," there is a cute and
illuminating exchange between Socrates and his student Chaerophon, on
the one hand, and Gorgias and his student Polus on the other. Socrates
and Chaerophon arrive at Callicles's house just as Gorgias has finished
a fine speech. Socrates induces Chaerophon, who is not the most gifted
of students of philosophy it appears, to ask the tired old Gorgias who
he is. It is indeed a quite pointed inquiry to someone who professes to
answer any questions put before him (Stephanus number 447d4-6). But
after Chaerophon poses the question, Gorgias hems and haws a bit,
saying that no one has asked him anything new in many years (448a ff.)
Chaerophon: "So I presume you will easily answer, Gorgias."
Gorgias: "You are free to make a trial of that, Chaerophon." [following
the W.R.M. Lamb translation of "Gorgias," in the Loeb edition of
Plato's works, Plato vol. III].
Which is, of course, no answer at all; it is vexing for the
relativistic sophist to answer the question: What do you do? [In fact,
in recent times, this might be something that Derrida's students never
dared to ask of their own master.] Well, back to the 4th century
B.C.E....
At which point Gorgias's pupil, Polus--who is quoted by Aristotle at
the beginning of the "Metaphysics", almost exactly as Plato has him say
in the "Gorgias" (448c6-7)--interrupts and engages Chaerophon. Polus
breaks off the question and answer with Chaerophon and offers a brief
encomium on Gorgias (448c4-10). And it appears that this kind of canned
speech out of Polus's mouth is what Aristotle is referring to in
Chapter 34 of the "Sophistical Refutations": The sophists "...gave
their pupils to learn by heart speeches...."
The standard pattern of dialectical conversations seems to have been a
two-man affair, with one posing the questions and making the
statements, and the other responding either yes or no to the leading
interlocutor. This kind of exchange appears in the "Gorgias", but it is
broken off by Polus so that he can make a speech of praise of his
teacher, Gorgias, in accord with sophistic practice. For a great survey
on how Plato's Academy engaged in dialectic, and how Aristotle
formalized its practices in the "Topics" and "On Sophistical
Refutations," see G. Ryle, 'Dialectic in the Academy,' in R. Bambrough,
ed., "New Essays on Plato and Aristotle," London: Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1965.
Lastly, Aristotle further confirms his own original contribution:
"Also, on the subject of rhetoric there already existed much material
enunciated in the past, whereas regarding reasoning we had absolutely
no earlier work to quote but were for a long time labouring at
tentative researches." ("On Sophistical Refutations," Chap. 34,
(184a10-b4), Forster trans., Loeb edition).
--Ron
"Experience seems to be be very similar to science and art, but
actually it is through experience that human beings acquire science and
art; for as Polus rightly says, 'experience produces art, but
inexperience luck.'" (Aristotle, "Metaphysics," I.1, 981a2-6)