How Canada Should Deal with Russia in the Arctic

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Adam G. Wynne

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Aug 30, 2021, 7:44:19 PM8/30/21
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How Canada Should Deal with Russia in the Arctic
Kari Roberts | iPolitics | 23 August 2021
https://ipolitics.ca/2021/08/23/how-canada-should-deal-with-russia-in-the-arctic/

'Canada and its allies need to find a way to normalize relations with Russia; this necessitates working with the Russia they have, rather than the Russia they want.'


The Arctic presents a host of challenges for Canada, and managing relations with an adversarial Russia requires a deft balancing of interests. Great power interest in the Arctic, and the West’s deteriorating relationship with Russia, raise the spectre of geopolitical competition on Canada’s doorstep. The melting ice has opened up shipping and tourism possibilities, which present environmental and socioeconomic challenges for Arctic nations. Regional surveillance, exploration, and security require collaborative solutions. 

Historically a region of co-operation and peace, the Arctic is a critical region for Canada, home to domestic priorities, such as support for Indigenous communities and addressing climate change. Canada can’t afford to allow geopolitical rivalry, or adversarial relations with Russia, to upend these priorities. Nevertheless, Canada faces a host of security interests, hard and soft, that must be protected. Addressing these priorities requires collaboration with all Arctic neighbours, including Russia. This necessitates a balanced appreciation for what Russia’s Arctic interests are, and the areas in which Russian and Canadian interests overlap. It would be too easy to let Russia’s activities elsewhere, and the prevalent mistrust of its motives in the West, narrowly shape our relations in the Arctic. The consequences of doing so could undermine Canada’s interests in the region. 

The solution: A balanced understanding of Russia’s interests

Russia’s Arctic interests should be understood in the context of its wider foreign policy goals. Russian President Vladimir Putin has made no secret of his intention to reassert Russian power on the world stage. This has taken a variety of forms over the past two decades, most recently, challenging American global hegemony by manifesting an emboldened and unapologetic assertion of Russian national interests globally, as seen in its activities in Crimea and Syria, and its support for political regimes unfriendly to Western interests. This includes a sustained antagonism toward the West (especially NATO), and a campaign of disinformation and election interference designed to disrupt liberal democracies, and cyberwarfare designed to undermine Atlanticism. These are both causes and symptoms of a growing rift between Russia and the West that threatens to obstruct the legacy of co-operation in the Arctic. Add to this Russia’s Arctic militarization (which NATO allies are also doing), and there’s a risk that growing animosities could reverse the progress that’s been made. Russia has the largest Arctic coastline and population, a stated interest in surveilling and protecting its sovereignty, a desire to mitigate the impact on its northern communities of increased navigation, and ensuring responsible environmental stewardship in the region.

The Arctic is a pillar of Russia’s resource economy, and is integral to its desire to dominate the global liquefied-natural-gas market by 2035. It therefore wants to preserve its national sovereignty and regional power status by modernizing its Arctic defences. There’s little evidence to suggest a Russian appetite for transforming the Arctic into a new Cold War battleground. Russian Arctic- and defence-policy documents transparently indicate that its military modernization there is for the purposes of defence and sovereignty, and to address the many challenges listed above, in possible collaboration with Arctic neighbours. 

Canada’s chief disagreement with Russia in the Arctic is overlapping claims to continental-shelf extensions in the Arctic Ocean. Each has made a claim through the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and both are committed to this process. Russia has taken no action to suggest that it will disregard its commitments; Russia has historically been a booster of institutional governance in the Arctic, as a signatory to the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, and, most recently, in its rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council.   

What Canada can do: 

  1. Lead a recommitment to Arctic principles.

Canada must avoid enabling a security dilemma in the region. Transparency and co-operation are essential, if we want to prevent militarization in the region from becoming weaponized. This pertains to Canada’s relations with Russia in the Arctic, but also to the U.S. and China. As a smaller but heavily invested presence in the region, Canada is in a unique position to take a leadership role in managing great power relations on its doorstep. As a first step, Canada should consider asking Arctic nations to go beyond the reaffirmation of principles that occurred in spring 2021 on the anniversary of the signing of the Ilulissat Declaration. This recommitment to peace and co-operation did not include non-Arctic nations (such as China), and did not venture into “hard” security or military collaboration. China will only become more active in the region, and a commitment to peace and military transparency among interested states would be an important start. The Arctic region, and, more generally, the principles of institutional governance and co-operation, are Canada’s brand. We can and should take the lead in encouraging this dialogue. 

  1. Support Russia’s Arctic Council agenda, 2021-23.

It’s high time for a new approach to Russia. Canada and its allies need to find a way to normalize relations with Russia; this necessitates working with the Russia they have, rather than the Russia they want. For decades, diplomacy was suspended when times were tough (i.e., the NATO-Russia Council). Arctic co-operation should not be contingent upon approval of Russia’s activities elsewhere. This is by no means to suggest that Russia’s aggression should be accepted, but the stakes are too high in the Arctic to allow conflict with Russia in other areas to derail Arctic priorities that would be much harder to achieve in a weaponized environment. Ostracizing Russia has gotten us nowhere. We need to accept that Russia’s interests won’t change because we want them to, certainly not under Putin, and that adversity may be the new normal. This can’t preclude co-operation in the Arctic. An easy, good-faith, and low-cost way to begin would be to support Russia’s Arctic Council agenda, which prioritizes supporting northern peoples, environmental protection, climate change, socioeconomic development, and strengthening regional governance — priorities Canada shares.    

Kari Roberts is a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and associate professor at Mount Royal University.


jdsharries jdsharries

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Aug 31, 2021, 2:06:37 PM8/31/21
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There are (at least) two issues here:

1. How Canada should "deal with Russia in the Arctic" (as per the Title of the article)

2. How Canada and ?with? its allies should "deal with Russia in the Arctic"

Canada, resource/presence/capability-wise, is an almost irresponsibly incapable bit-player, capable of only grand signaling.

Which party leader has made the well-being of the CANADIAN Arctic an election 'issue'? When was the last time Canadians heard from the Minister of Northern Affairs? 

DH

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Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon

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Aug 31, 2021, 2:55:27 PM8/31/21
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I read Kari’s paper (below) with interest. As someone who has studied the law of the sea for decades, I disagree strongly with the idea that "Canada’s chief disagreement with Russia in the Arctic is overlapping claims to continental-shelf extensions in the Arctic Ocean”.  It is important to recognize that in delineating its Arctic extended continental shelf, Russia is acting in accordance with international law and its behaviour is no different from that of its Arctic neighbours.   Seeing Russia’s delineation as aggression - which it is not - engenders fears and encourages resorts to military solutions.  

I am currently working on an article for the October edition of Peace Magazine that makes this point.

Elizabeth

Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon

Distinguished Senior Fellow 
Centre for Contemporary International History 
University of Toronto

Professor Emerita
Department of Political Science
Western University 

Senior Fellow
Massey College
University of Toronto




Franklyn Griffiths

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Sep 1, 2021, 11:24:43 AM9/1/21
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Dear Elizabeth, Right on!!  I skimmed the piece but maybe should have reacted.  Will look again.  All best, Franklyn

From: arctic-nuclea...@googlegroups.com <arctic-nuclea...@googlegroups.com> on behalf of Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon <eridde...@gmail.com>
Sent: Tuesday, August 31, 2021 3:55 PM
To: arctic-nuclea...@googlegroups.com <arctic-nuclea...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: Re: How Canada Should Deal with Russia in the Arctic
 
EXTERNAL EMAIL:

Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon

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Sep 1, 2021, 11:32:47 AM9/1/21
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Thanks Franklyn!  I appreciate the support!  best wishes, Elizabeth


Ernie Regehr

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Sep 1, 2021, 12:15:03 PM9/1/21
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Greetings,

 

Having just had a chance to read the Kari Roberts piece, I found it to be a refreshing and helpful take on relations with Russia in the Arctic. Elizabeth Riddell-Dixon’s subsequent comment is also very important, but I read Kari Roberts as being in essential agreement with Elizabeth’s point.   

 

Elizabeth noted that:  

“It is important to recognize that in delineating its Arctic extended continental shelf, Russia is acting in accordance with international law and its behaviour is no different from that of its Arctic neighbours. Seeing Russia’s delineation as aggression - which it is not - engenders fears and encourages resorts to military solutions.”  

 

Kari’s earlier statement was:

“Canada’s chief disagreement with Russia in the Arctic is overlapping claims to continental-shelf extensions in the Arctic Ocean.” She then went on to say: “Each has made a claim through the UN’s Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, and both are committed to this process. Russia has taken no action to suggest that it will disregard its commitments; Russia has historically been a booster of institutional governance in the Arctic, as a signatory to the 2008 Ilulissat Declaration, and, most recently, in its rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council” (emphasis added).  

 

I didn’t read Kari’s statement, namely, that overlapping claims represent disagreement, as suggesting in any way that she was characterizing Russia’s position as “aggression” – only that the disagreement would be managed through the established process. I read Kari as supporting Elizabeth’s point when she (Kari) says Russia’s has demonstrated commitment to following international law in settling continental shelf issues.

 

The overall thrust of the Kari Roberts piece is welcome – to pursue cooperation with Russia and avoid escalating militarization in the Arctic while remaining firm on calling Russia to account for violations of international norms elsewhere.

 

Cheers,

Ernie

EXTERNAL EMAIL:

1.     Lead a recommitment to Arctic principles.

Canada must avoid enabling a security dilemma in the region. Transparency and co-operation are essential, if we want to prevent militarization in the region from becoming weaponized. This pertains to Canada’s relations with Russia in the Arctic, but also to the U.S. and China. As a smaller but heavily invested presence in the region, Canada is in a unique position to take a leadership role in managing great power relations on its doorstep. As a first step, Canada should consider asking Arctic nations to go beyond the reaffirmation of principles that occurred in spring 2021 on the anniversary of the signing of the Ilulissat Declaration. This recommitment to peace and co-operation did not include non-Arctic nations (such as China), and did not venture into “hard” security or military collaboration. China will only become more active in the region, and a commitment to peace and military transparency among interested states would be an important start. The Arctic region, and, more generally, the principles of institutional governance and co-operation, are Canada’s brand. We can and should take the lead in encouraging this dialogue. 

2.     Support Russia’s Arctic Council agenda, 2021-23.

It’s high time for a new approach to Russia. Canada and its allies need to find a way to normalize relations with Russia; this necessitates working with the Russia they have, rather than the Russia they want. For decades, diplomacy was suspended when times were tough (i.e., the NATO-Russia Council). Arctic co-operation should not be contingent upon approval of Russia’s activities elsewhere. This is by no means to suggest that Russia’s aggression should be accepted, but the stakes are too high in the Arctic to allow conflict with Russia in other areas to derail Arctic priorities that would be much harder to achieve in a weaponized environment. Ostracizing Russia has gotten us nowhere. We need to accept that Russia’s interests won’t change because we want them to, certainly not under Putin, and that adversity may be the new normal. This can’t preclude co-operation in the Arctic. An easy, good-faith, and low-cost way to begin would be to support Russia’s Arctic Council agenda, which prioritizes supporting northern peoples, environmental protection, climate change, socioeconomic development, and strengthening regional governance — priorities Canada shares.    

Kari Roberts is a fellow at the Canadian Global Affairs Institute and associate professor at Mount Royal University.

 

 

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