Below is a structured philosophical analysis of the argument advanced by Richard H. Schwartz in his essay “Why Jews Should Be Vegans,” together with an expansion of how similar reasoning could be reformulated into deontological, consequentialist, and virtue-ethical arguments for universal veganism.
I. What Schwartz Is Arguing (Targeted to Religious Jews)
Schwartz’s primary audience is religiously committed Jews. His argumentative structure typically proceeds as follows:
Normative Premise (Internal to Judaism):
Judaism affirms values such as tza’ar ba’alei chayim (preventing animal suffering), stewardship of the Earth (bal tashchit), preservation of health, justice, and compassion.
Empirical Premise (Contemporary Reality):
Modern animal agriculture causes massive suffering, environmental degradation, climate destabilization, public health harm, and resource injustice.
Interpretive Claim:
Biblical concessions to meat consumption were historically contextual, not morally ideal. The Edenic diet was plant-based; prophetic visions anticipate peace and nonviolence.
Conclusion (Particular):
Faithful Jews, seeking consistency with core Jewish values under present conditions, ought to adopt veganism.
Logical Structure:
This is internally coherent. It is an argument from covenantal consistency: align conduct with professed values under present facts.
II. Is Schwartz Making a Virtue Ethics Case?
Yes, largely.
He frequently appeals to:
This is virtue-oriented reasoning:
A virtuous Jew seeks to cultivate compassion, humility, justice, and responsibility. Given present realities, consuming animal products conflicts with those virtues. Therefore, the virtuous response is veganism.
This is not purely rule-based (deontological) nor purely outcome-based (consequentialist). It is both (i) character-based and (ii) identity-based.
However, not all philosophers accept virtue ethics as foundational, and not all Jews accept that reinterpretive move. So broader arguments are possible.
III. Reconstructing Three (3) Distinct Ethical Cases for Universal Veganism
A. The Deontological Case (Duty-Based)
Structure:
This does not depend on Jewish identity. It rests on:
This is compatible with Kantian extensions, rights theory, and certain natural law views.
B. The Consequentialist Case (Outcome-Based)
Structure:
Actions should be evaluated by their consequences for (preserving and/or improving) well-being and (avoiding or reducing) harm.
Animal agriculture:
A global shift toward vegan diets would reduce these harms substantially.
Therefore, to minimize suffering and risk, people ought to adopt vegan diets.
Although NOT presented that way, this line of reasoning - argumentation - is independent of religious tradition.
It appeals to:
Interestingly, Schwartz often gestures toward these arguments in his environmental and public health writings.
C. The Virtue Ethics Case (Character-Based)
Structure:
This argument:
Schwartz’s distinctive move is to root this virtue case in Jewish covenantal identity.
IV. The Difference Between Particular and Universal Arguments
Schwartz’s argument is targeted:
“If you accept Judaism’s moral commitments, then consistency requires veganism.”
But that structure can be generalized:
If a tradition affirms:
And if contemporary animal agriculture violates those values,
Then adherents of that tradition ought to reject participation.
This reasoning could apply to:
The key move is the bridge principle:
Values + Current Facts → Moral Revision of Practice.
V. Intellectual Tension: Ritual, History, and Moral Development
Schwartz’s argument is correct to observe that change or alignment requires reinterpretation of:
He treats meat consumption as:
That move requires a theory of moral progress within tradition.
Philosophically, this resembles:
Not all religious philosophers accept that interpretive flexibility. That is where debate arises.
VI. Comparative Strengths of the Three Approaches
Deontological strength:
Consequentialist strength:
Virtue ethics strength:
Virtue ethics weakness:
VII. Toward a Unified Case
A powerful universal argument would integrate all three:
When all three converge, the case becomes philosophically robust.
VIII. Final Reflection
Schwartz’s project is not merely dietary reform. It is moral alignment under contemporary conditions.
His core claim can be abstracted as:
When inherited permissions conflict with present knowledge of harm, moral seriousness requires re-evaluation.
That principle extends far beyond (devoted, loyal, consistent) practitioners of) Judaism (although the Moral Law - construed as inward - the Moral Law within - or in the nature of things).
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When inherited permissions conflict with well-established knowledge about preventable harm, moral seriousness requires re-evaluation — not because a community revises its customs, but because the moral law, understood as intrinsic to reality, does not change.
In that formulation, the appeal is no longer exclusively to Judaism, nor even to religious identity. It becomes an argument about moral structure:
Under this view, tradition does not generate morality; it reflects it imperfectly. Customs may persist under historical constraints, but moral law remains constant. As knowledge expands — about sentience, ecological fragility, public health, and systemic violence — alignment with that law demands recalibration of practice.
Thus the case extends:
It becomes a claim about coherence between conscience and conduct.
The deeper philosophical claim is that moral development is not moral invention. It is moral recognition — the gradual uncovering of implications already embedded in the structure of reality.
If that is correct, then veganism is not merely a lifestyle preference, nor a sectarian discipline, nor a modern innovation. It is a response to the convergence of:
In that sense, the argument does not depend on one's being Jewish. It depends on being morally serious (and maybe 'rational' - or morally rational).
What IS "moral reasoning"??
Maynard