English 1119 Exam Paper

[Deandra Uleman]

Thelatest format is more comprehensive and covers all aspects of English Learning. The same weightage for each paper should be an advantage for students. If your command of the language is good, congratulations! For those who find themselves lacking in any of the components, your ability in others will compensate for that and you can still do well. You can get more marks for the papers you are good at and perform equally well compared with other students.

Getting used to this format also makes it easier for students once they embark on their higher education journey whether into a university, college or academy where they will still have to take English as a second language. The format for the English course will be the same as what you have learnt in school.

Preparation for a language examination is unlike that for other subjects where you can start brushing up in the last few weeks or days before the examination. Language skills are acquired over time with a lot of exposure and practice.

come across in a jotter/notebook. Go through them whenever you have time and try to use them in your writing whenever possible. Usage will make these new vocabularies stay with you forever. Learn the meanings of and how to use

Paper 2 is a writing paper where you will have to write three essays. The first and second essays are limited response essays whilst the third essay is an open response essay where you choose one title to write.

Paper 3 is a speaking test. You will take this test with another student. There are 3 parts to this question; the first and second parts need to be answered individually, whilst the last part you will need to make conversation with your partner.

We deal with embedding a large scale knowledge graph composed of entities and relations into a continuous vector space. TransE is a promising method proposed recently, which is very efficient while achieving state-of-the-art predictive performance. We discuss some mapping properties of relations which should be considered in embedding, such as reflexive, one-to-many, many-to-one, and many-to-many. We note that TransE does not do well in dealing with these properties. Some complex models are capable of preserving these mapping properties but sacrifice efficiency in the process. To make a good trade-off between model capacity and efficiency, in this paper we propose TransH which models a relation as a hyperplane together with a translation operation on it. In this way, we can well preserve the above mapping properties of relations with almost the same model complexity of TransE. Additionally, as a practical knowledge graph is often far from completed, how to construct negative examples to reduce false negative labels in training is very important. Utilizing the one-to-many/many-to-one mapping property of a relation, we propose a simple trick to reduce the possibility of false negative labeling. We conduct extensive experiments on link prediction, triplet classification and fact extraction on benchmark datasets like WordNet and Freebase. Experiments show TransH delivers significant improvements over TransE on predictive accuracy with comparable capability to scale up.

In his classic analysis, Gould (The mismeasure of man, WW Norton, New York, 1981) demolished the idea that intelligence was an inherent, genetic trait of different human groups by emphasizing, among other things, (a) its sensitivity to environmental input, (b) the incommensurate pre-test preparation of different human groups, and (c) the inadequacy of the testing contexts, in many cases. According to Gould, the root cause of these oversights was confirmation bias by psychometricians, an unwarranted commitment to the idea that intelligence was a fixed, immutable quality of people. By virtue of a similar, systemic interpretive bias, in the last two decades, numerous contemporary researchers in comparative psychology have claimed human superiority over apes in social intelligence, based on two-group comparisons between postindustrial, Western Europeans and captive apes, where the apes have been isolated from European styles of social interaction, and tested with radically different procedures. Moreover, direct comparisons of humans with apes suffer from pervasive lapses in argumentation: Research designs in wide contemporary use are inherently mute about the underlying psychological causes of overt behavior. Here we analyze these problems and offer a more fruitful approach to the comparative study of social intelligence, which focuses on specific individual learning histories in specific ecological circumstances.

In addition to the systematic methodological weaknesses that underlie reports of human superiority in the use and understanding of simple directional gestures, these claims rely on the core assumption that intentional and epistemic states cause overt behavior. This model of mental cause with behavioral effect is scientifically unfalsifiable whenever the putative cause is not empirically measurable.

apes do not produce, either for humans or for other apes, points that serve functions other than the imperative/requestive function. That is, they do not point declaratively to simply share interest and attention in something with another individual, and they do not point informatively to inform others of things they want or need to know (Tomasello et al. 2007, p 717).

Thus, in this strong version of the mental causality model, the alleged absence of declarative-expressive and declarative-informative gestures in great apes entails that apes lack these putative cognitive states, and the presence of declarative-expressive and declarative-informative gestures in our species entails that humans possess these mental states.

Moreover, there are many published examples of declarative-expressive and declarative-informative communicative acts performed by great apes (for reviews, e.g., Leavens and Bard 2011; Leavens et al. 2008; Leavens and Racine 2009):

At best, on purely logical grounds, researchers can deny that non-humans make choices in their environment informed by hypothetical mental state concepts but these studies cannot, in principle, demonstrate that these hypothetical concepts had any role, whatsoever, in the behavior of organisms, usually young humans, who do act in accordance with the theoretical stipulations that particular mental states cause particular response patterns.

Although often misunderstood, the scientific rationale for rearing an anthropoid ape in a human household is to find out just how far the ape can go in absorbing the civilizing influences of the environment. To what degree is it capable of responding like a child and to what degree will genetic factors limit its development? (p 426).

On logical grounds, the existence of hypothetical, causal mental states cannot be confirmed, with present technology. Hence, there is no evidence that the communicative signaling of humans, great apes or other animals, is predicated on substantially different cognitive bases. Current psychological process models that emphasize the allegedly causal nature of imaginary, invisible psychological processes like those listed in Table 1 are unfalsifiable, for several reasons, but primarily because no putative causal mental state, to date, is uniquely specified by any particular behavior pattern. By rudimentary logical principles, therefore the existence or effect of these imaginary, alleged psychological causal mental factors cannot be demonstrated by appeal to particular behavioral response patterns.

we attempted to teach children to point in the same manner as the chimpanzees, but most children were extremely reluctant or embarrassed to come forward and point at the experimenters. In addition, the points that they did produce were often so subdued that it was difficult to determine exactly to whom they were referring. In contrast, the children rapidly adapted to the procedure of extending their arm and placing it on the handprint in front of the target experimenter in order to obtain their rewards (stickers). (Povinelli and Eddy 1996, fn 6, p 109, emphasis added).

We thank the editors, Cat Hobaiter and Erica Cartmill, for organizing the symposium on which this special issue is based, as well as the other contributors to that symposium and to this special issue. We also thank the editors and two supportive anonymous reviewers for insightful critical remarks. David A. Leavens thanks Sally Boysen, Tim Racine, Ingar Brinck, Laura Desiree DiPaolo, Richard Moore, Dorit Bar-On, Alan Costall, Vasu Reddy, Hannah Clark, Mahmoud Elsherif, and the members of the Embodied Cognition Reading Group, University of Sussex, especially Nicola Yuill, Pamela Perniss, John Thornton, Simon McGregor, Zoe Flack, and Julie Coultas, for related discussion, and the School of Psychology, University of Sussex, for study leave during the drafting of this paper.

Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( ), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.

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