Modern Warfare 3 On Mobile

[Aila Gilb]

Inthe new report, Enea gives a comprehensive overview of the various methods employed to gain military intelligence through the tracking of mobile devices on the battlefield. This is the first time a complete perspective, including military radio-centric and mobile network-centric methods, has been offered in a single report, providing individuals and organizations the guidance to understand the full scope of risks when using connected devices in conflict zones.

No previous research has comprehensively addressed all methods with side-by-side comparisons, as it requires distinct expertise in each field. This unique and ground-breaking research gives detailed outlines of the methods used, in addition to guidance and recommendations on the risks of mobile device tracking in war zones. Civilians and military personnel can evaluate the risks and benefits of bringing mobile devices into war zones and assess how to minimize risks if mobile device use is required.

Cathal McDaid, VP Technology at Enea and lead author of the report, commented, Our comprehensive analysis of the mobile battlefield reveals the complexities and evolving role of mobile networks in warfare. This report brings an important understanding of how phones are tracked on the battlefield, adding crucial insights for telecom, military and government policymakers to enhance security measures and effectively leverage technological advancements in the field. It builds and expands upon our previous research, which showed how important commercial telecom networks are for the security and resilience of a country facing hybrid threats, and the need for network security to help protect a country's networks."

About Enea

Enea is a world-leading specialist in software for telecom and cybersecurity. The company's cloud-native solutions connect, optimize, and secure services for fixed and mobile subscribers, enterprises, and the Internet of Things. More than 100 communication service providers and 4.5 billion people rely on Enea technologies every day.

The primary goal of the exercise was to assess performance and functionality within the context of the brigade headquarters. Additionally, this evaluation extended to understanding how these advanced components operate as part of the main command post and tactical command post. This comprehensive assessment will help inform how integrated platforms enhance on-the-move capabilities and align with operational requirements, including the imperative of modernization to support large-scale combat operations.

Command post modernization is not a one-time event, but a continuous process rooted in learning, adaptation, and enhancement. Lessons learned from real-world operations, emerging threats, and feedback from the troops provide the foundation for improvement. The recent LUT followed four separate Soldier Touchpoints with different units and formations conducted earlier in the development cycle.

The command post support vehicle is integrated with FM, high frequency and tactical satellite radios, which tie into the upper tactical internet and are used to set up communications and establish command and control quickly.

Modern warfare's reliance on electronic systems demands a dependable and efficient power supply to ensure operational success, and enhancing power supply capabilities is one of the strategic priorities that emerged from the LUT and Soldier Touchpoints, which will continue to be addressed in future iterations.

Maj. John Unrath, 1-2 Stryker Brigade intelligence officer addressed another strategic priority that came out of the LUT, which is the need to streamline complexity by providing Soldiers with robust and user-friendly systems and feels the CPI2 is headed in the right direction.

As the Army continues its journey of integrated network command post modernization, the test results and continued Soldier feedback will validate current CPI2 design, inform future design changes, and provide data required to move into a limited rate production decision for four brigade sets of platforms. Future CPI2 increments will improve on the current design and integrate additional vehicle variants.

Mobile WarfareMilitary advance of the Modern EraRequirementAutomobile

TacticsLeads toCombined Arms

RoboticsUnits enabledArmorObsoletesSun Tzu's War AcademyAI Value8'Civilized' Modifier-1 Back to the list of advances in Civ2

Mobile Warfare is an Advance in Civilization II. Discovering Mobile Warfare will make existing barracks obsolete. The game will automatically sell existing barracks, and the player can rebuild new Barracks. This also happens after the discovery of gunpowder.

The idea of using heavy weapons on the battlefield dates back to the 15th century when heavy cannons were mounted on wheels and towed into battle by horses. This first use of mobile artillery, devastatingly effective in its time, pales in comparison to the tactics used in 20th century armored warfare. Tanks were first used during World War I. A successful assault utilizing 400 tanks in November 1917, resulting in the capture of 8000 enemy troops and 100 guns near Cambrai, paved the way for a significant shift in battlefield tactics. During World War II, armored vehicles were used extensively throughout Europe and Africa by both Allied and Axis powers. The might and mobility of an armored assault was more than a match for countries who lacked proper defenses against such an attack. Armored warfare still plays an important role in battlefield tactics. This was proven in the Persian Gulf war, where the M1 Abrams tank proved to be vital a component of the ground assault force in Kuwait.

Land doctrine allows a nation to specialize the way its army conducts land warfare. Land doctrines can be reviewed and unlocked from the Officer Corps. There are four mutually exclusive doctrine trees each with one or two mutually exclusive branches.

This tree focuses on mobile mechanized and armored units and is the starting German doctrine tree. Armor and motorized/mechanized units will have the largest gains in this tree. It is the doctrine that increases army organization the most.It also reduces the time needed for planning bonuses to reach maximum. This tree is somewhat frontloaded with early bonuses. The first branching in this tree allows you to choose between Mobile Infantry or Armor as your main focus. While Mobile Infantry isn't as effective in combat, it is cheaper and can be used in greater numbers, so it could be an alternative strategy for Germany, or be used by a less industrially powerful nation. The second split offers a choice between switching over to a defensive posture, by maximizing Manpower gains and improving partisans, as Germany historically did, or continuing to develop offensive mobile doctrines.

The American and Yugoslav starting tree, this doctrine tree focuses on well-equipped divisions with a lot of support companies and (AirLand Battle) artillery which gain additional bonuses when fighting in areas with friendly air superiority. The first split offers a choice between improving support companies or focusing on line artillery. The second split will let you pick between Air-land battle for combined arms warfare, or Shock and Awe historically used by United States long after WW2 (particularly the Gulf War and Iraq War), which keeps the majority of your focus on ground-based firepower.

This could be thought of as the traditional doctrine tree, and is the starting tree for the British Commonwealth, France, Italy, Japan, and Poland. This doctrine tree gives divisions larger planning bonuses and boosts Infantry and Artillery. It is a bit weak on the offense to begin with, but has some defensive bonuses. The split offers a choice between increased offensive potential and steadily improving all unit types with the Assault path, or focusing heavily on Infantry with the more front-loaded Infiltration path (Note that the reduced supply consumption ). Grand Battleplan's strong point is its superior planning bonus, and using this advantage effectively takes patience and a compatible national strategic timetable, tempo of warfare, and style of command.

The Mass Mobilization branch is shorter than the others; this is because it's more of a series of stopgap measures for nations in dire straits than a real doctrine, and encourages nations to swap out of it when or if their military, technological and industrial situation improves. Mass Mobilization divisions often have more men than weapons to arm them, but this just means that the living will pick up the weapons of the dead and carry on the fight, an approach that tends to work better on defense than attack.

The following tables will compare the differences between every possible path of the selected land doctrines. The two tables separate army and overall bonuses from division unit bonuses. To calculate the overall bonus a unit type receives add the army bonus, the general support/frontline battalion bonus, the unit type bonus, and the equipment bonus.

It is increasingly evident that nuclear warfare is refocusing attention upon the need for a military force based on the high seas. Rather than diminishing the future value and need of a Navy, the advent of the atom, like that of the airplane, has reemphasized the importance of seapower.

Third: National security, unless one can be sure of striking first, lies in convincing an enemy that even if he strikes the first blow, he cannot prevent an overwhelming and possibly fatal counterattack against his air power and other nuclear weapons potentials.

The concentration of all the Services on increasing the range of our weapons steadily reduces our dependence on bases near the target. However, a corresponding increase in range of enemy weapons would also make even our immovable home bases vulnerable to sudden overwhelming attacks which could prevent our counterattack.

In a recent magazine article General Charles A. Lindbergh pointed to the vulnerability of air bases as a weak spot in our atomic deterrent potential. He emphasized the importance of decentralizing and scattering our bases to prevent their simultaneous destruction. He assumed quite logically that we cannot conceal the location of our land bases from enemy intelligence agents.

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