Hi,
Let me answer the points one by one.
I am not exactly hiding - if you'll read this discussion group, or some
other APRS related mailing list such as the APRSSIG, you'll find me
posting and answering questions here and there, with my name and email
visible. With the
aprs.fi web site, I'm pointing users to post questions
here, so that the answers will also be public (not private and hidden),
and that others could learn from them. They'll also be archived and
hopefully others might find the answers to their questions from the group
archive without asking the same question again
(
https://groups.google.com/g/aprsfi). Just take a quick look at the
archive, and then consider again if I am trying to hide. The group is
moderated so that off-topic posts don't get flooded here (there's a lot of
generic APRS questions coming in, and questions about APRS products from
vendors X and Y), but I do let critical posts through too, as long as
they're about
aprs.fi itself.
I am not aware of how aprs.direct does the process, could you please
explain carefully how the user's identity and ownership of a callsign is
validated in a strong manner? Please do so without being rude at anyone.
Google will never know if the position archive has one, two or three years
of data, it isn't quite smart enough to dig that deep in the pull-down
menus of time ranges in the map data. I bumped the archive time from one
to two years when people were complaining their precious tracks were
getting deleted too early. Some people still complained, so I added the
export feature to download it.
aprs.fi does not "scrape" DMR or D-Star - that is simply incorrect. APRS
came first (25 years ago!), then the APRS-IS network (in the 90's I guess,
many years before I started doing anything with APRS), and some other
websites (
findu.com,
aprsworld.net, others?). I started working on
aprs.fi
in 2006. Then, a few years ago, DMR came along, and some smart people
created gateways on the DMR network which push position data to the
APRS-IS. At this point I did nothing, the data just appeared on the
APRS-IS which
aprs.fi gets the data feed from. DMR gateways (brandmeister
et al) are the active part here, converting data from DMR to APRS, for
users who choose to use the feature. Similar story for D-Star, but
happened earlier.
I *do* agree that it would be good if people could ask nicely and have
their data deleted from
aprs.fi. I believe the GDPR requires this, and it
would also be really nice, correct and good. There are a few requirements
that would be necessary.
* People can't delete other people's data (just by saying "I am X, I want
to delete data of X"), as all sorts of abuse happens on a regular basis
and people would certainly delete data of others, and I don't want to
restore data from backups a lot.
* Ownership of callsign probably needs to be validated in a strong method.
Not just the fact that one is able to send some packets using callsign X
right now (easy to spoof), but the true identity of the visitor on the web
site (who the user is, as a person), and that the person is the rightful
owner of a callsign (or a representative of a club, or a custodian of a
repeater...).
* If this implies looking at documents such as photos of IDs, those are
actually very sensitive material, something that I wouldn't want to
request or handle at all. If they leaked accidentally, it'd be pretty bad.
The security requirements of such a system are quite different than of a
web site which by default publishes everything you send to it.
* One way to do slightly stronger authentication would be using ARRL LotW
certs, but it is a bit cumbersome and some people simply don't want to use
LotW for some reasons. I have suggested X.509 certificate use for APRS-IS
authentication and other amateur uses (TAPR Digital Communications
Conference 2013, Seattle WA, the video is on Youtube), but it hasn't
caught on and I haven't had time to push it forwards myself. It would
allow users to authenticate themselves *once* to some local authority
(ARRL or some other similar instance, or even a commercial entity) and
then
aprs.fi and others could just trust certificates given by those
authorities.
One way to avoid strong identification would be to do some sort of
soft/shadow deletion, where an user can request deletion of data, and it
would be immediately hidden from sight, and marked for actual deletion
later (2 months? 3 months?). If it was deleted by someone else, the
rightful owner of the callsign could request bringing it back and it would
be fairly to simple to do so, just by making it visible again. At this
point it'd probably be necessary to do the strong authentication again,
but maybe it'd have to be done less often.
Some folks would probably want to have actual immediate real deletion, but
the GDPR is alright with this as a concept - for example, it doesn't
require systems operators to immediately burn all their backup tapes if
one user requires deletion of his data. There are some gotchas in there,
one must not accidentally restore data from backups which was requested to
be deleted for example. :)
I naturally agree I am an expert programmer (thank you!) but many things
take a lot of time to implement, some require a lot of manual processing
after all and are difficult to automate, and some things might not be
practical at all. Some sort of reasonable solution needs to be figured
out, and I welcome ideas. Especially those which do not involve manual
deciphering of foreign identity documents or amateur radio licences in
foreign languages.
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https://groups.google.com/d/msgid/aprsfi/d25e80cf-9844-49d4-a557-43d25e74b224n%40googlegroups.com.
>
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- Hessu