Windows 10 Pro 15063 Microsoft-ds Exploit

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Numbers Ventors

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Jul 15, 2024, 3:35:59 PM7/15/24
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\r\nThe new Petya-like ransomware just served a big blow to hundreds of banks, corporations, government organizations, post offices and shopping outlets around the world, spreading like fire, taking advantage of the EternalBlue exploit used by WannaCry ransomware only a few weeks before.

It is believed that the attack started by executing an infected software update for the M.E.Doc program (the e-document management tool widely used by accountants in Ukraine to submit tax reports). However, at the moment of writing, we cannot confirm this information.

windows 10 pro 15063 microsoft-ds exploit


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Once EternalPetya infects a computer within an organization, the ransomware can easily spread with EternalBlue/EternalRomance exploit and WMIC and PSExec tools. On the contrary to WannaCry, the propagation functionality is embedded to the ransomware main module represented as DLL.

Similar to WannaCry, it scans IP addresses on a local network, looking for open ports 139 and 445 of the NETBIOS Session Service (netbios-ssn) and Microsoft Directory Services (microsoft-ds) to run the EternalBlue and EternalRomance (for versions from Windows XP to Windows 2008) exploits respectively.\r\n

For the encryption, the cryptolocker utilizes Microsoft Cryptographic Provider. EternalPetya generates one AES-128 key for all files and export it using a hardcoded X509 certificate (public RSA-2048 key) imported having X509_ASN_ENCODING PKCS_7_ASN_ENCODING type.\r\n

The EternalPetya ransomware overwrites 22 sectors in the beginning of the primary hard disk \\Device\\Harddisk\\DR0 putting its boot loader and own kernel like all previous modifications of Petya to prevent Windows from starting up.\r\n

All Windows versions since Windows Vista (including server variants) have IPv6 enabled and prefer it over IPv4. By default, every Windows machine since Windows Vista will request this configuration regularly.

mitm6 will reply to those DHCPv6 requests, assigning the victim an IPv6 address within the link-local range. While in an actual IPv6 network these addresses are auto-assigned by the hosts themselves and do not need to be configured by a DHCP server, this gives us the opportunity to set the attackers IP as the default IPv6 DNS server for the victims.

On the victim machine we see that our server is configured as DNS server. Due to the preference of Windows regarding IP protocols, the IPv6 DNS server will be preferred over the IPv4 DNS server. The IPv6 DNS server will be used to query both for A (IPv4) and AAAA (IPv6) records.

Once the attacker has control of the DNS requests, they can utilize them to carry out a variety of attacks. For instance, they might divert traffic intended for a legitimate website to a phony version of the same site that is intended to steal sensitive data like login credentials.

Once, the IPv6 DNS has been taken over, if a user with sufficient privileges logs in, these scripts will attempt to add a new user within Active Directory. This user will have Enterprise Admins privileges, which can be used to perform DC Sync to the Domain Controller.

After authentication ntlmrelayx performs a ldap domain dump which provides us with quite a bit of information for us. These file can be found in lootme folder which we specified when we were setting up the relay.

6. Now if an administrator tries to login to a compromised machine and it succeeds, ntlmrelayx is going to create an access control list or ACL for us and is going to set us with a new user and password, with the DS-Replication-Get-Changes and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All privileges.

MITM6 attacks can be difficult to detect and prevent, as they often involve sophisticated techniques and tools. However, there are steps that organizations and individuals can take to protect against these types of attacks:

The Az PowerShell module is a set of cmdlets for managing Azure resources directly from PowerShell. PowerShell provides powerful features for automation that can be leveraged for managing your Azure resources, for example in the context of a CI/CD pipeline.

1. This cmdlet gets the Active Directory account, Active Directory tenant, Azure subscription, and the targeted Azure environment. Azure Resource Manager cmdlets use these settings by default when making Azure Resource Manager requests.

Use the Get-AzRoleAssignment command to list all role assignments that are effective on a scope. Without any parameters, this command returns all the role assignments made under the subscription. This list can be filtered using filtering parameters for principal, role and scope.

The Get-AzResourceGroup cmdlet gets Azure resource groups in the current subscription. You can get all resource groups, or specify a resource group by name or by other properties. By default, this cmdlet gets all resource groups in the current subscription. For more information about Azure resources and Azure resource groups, see the New-AzResourceGroup cmdlet.

Azure Active Directory PowerShell for Graph (Azure AD PowerShell) is a module IT Pros commonly use to manage their Azure Active Directory. The cmdlets in the Azure AD PowerShell module enable you to retrieve data from the directory, create new objects in the directory, update existing objects, remove objects, as well as configure the directory and its features.

ROADlib is a library that can be used to authenticate with Azure AD or to build tools that integrate with a database containing ROADrecon data. The database model in ROADlib is automatically generated based on the metadata definition of the Azure AD internal API. ROADlib lives in the ROADtools namespace, so to import it in your scripts use

Every commit to master is automatically built into a release version with Azure Pipelines. This ensures that you can install the latest version of the GUI without having to install npm and all it's dependencies. You can download the roadlib and roadrecon build files from the Azure Pipelines artifacts (click on the button "1 Published". The build output files are stored in ROADtools.zip. You can either install the .whl or .tar.gz files directly using pip or unzip both and install the folders in the correct order (roadlib first):

You can run the Angular frontend with npm start or ng serve using the Angular CLI from the roadrecon/frontend/ directory. To build the JavaScript files into ROADrecon's dist_gui directory, run npm build

A password spraying tool for Microsoft Online accounts (Azure/O365). The script logs if a user cred is valid, if MFA is enabled on the account, if a tenant doesn't exist, if a user doesn't exist, if the account is locked, or if the account is disabled.

This tool not only is looking for valid passwords, but also the extremely verbose information Azure AD error codes give you. These error codes provide information relating to if MFA is enabled on the account, if a tenant doesn't exist, if a user doesn't exist, if the account is locked, if the account is disabled, if the password is expired and much more.

So this doubles, as not only a password spraying tool but also a Microsoft Online recon tool that will provide account/domain enumeration. In limited testing it appears that on valid login to the Microsoft Online OAuth2 endpoint it isn't auto-triggering MFA texts/push notifications making this really useful for finding valid creds without alerting the target.

This module will perform password spraying against Microsoft Online accounts (Azure/O365). The script logs if a user cred is valid, if MFA is enabled on the account, if a tenant doesn't exist, if a user doesn't exist, if the account is locked, or if the account is disabled.

In this instance, the username is 'lightmand' and the domain is 'acmecomputercompany.com'. If a user has logged into OneDrive, this path will exist and return a 403 status code. If they have not, or the user is invalid, it will return a 404.

The results may vary depending on how widely used OneDrive is within an org. Currently it is the most reliable user-enumeration method that I'm aware of (office365userenum no longer works, and the others like UhOh365 are unreliable). Further, it does not attempt a login and is much more passive, and should be undetectable to the target org. Microsoft will see the hits, but the target org won't.

MailSniper is a penetration testing tool for searching through email in a Microsoft Exchange environment for specific terms (passwords, insider intel, network architecture information, etc.). It can be used as a non-administrative user to search their own email or by an Exchange administrator to search the mailboxes of every user in a domain.

MailSniper also includes additional modules for password spraying, enumerating users and domains, gathering the Global Address List (GAL) from OWA and EWS and checking mailbox permissions for every Exchange user at an organization.

it will attempt to connect to an Outlook Web Access (OWA) portal and utilize the "FindPeople" method (only available in Exchange2013 and up) of gathering email addresses from the GAL. If this does not succeed the script will attempt to connect to EWS and attempt to gather the GAL.

It will attempt to connect to an OWA portal and determine a valid domain name for logging into the portal from the WWW-Authenticate header returned in a web response from the server or based off of small timing differences in login attempts.

It will attempt to determine the Active Directory username for a single email address or a list of addresses. Use the Get-GlobalAddressList module to harvest a full list of email addresses to use with Get-ADUsernameFromEWS.

This is a simple Python script used to validate email accounts that belong to Office 365 tenants. This script takes either a single email address or a list of email addresses as input, sends a request to Office 365 without a password, and looksfor the the "IfExistsResult" parameter to be set to 0 for a valid account. Invalid accounts will return a 1.

In Linux, "capabilities" refer to the fine-grained access control mechanism that grants processes or programs specific privileges beyond those of a regular user. Traditionally, in Unix-like systems, privileges were managed through the setuid mechanism, where a program would temporarily assume the privileges of its owner when executed.

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