ANU Thursday Seminar -- Today [Oct 23]

[n.osma...@gmail.com]

Hello Everyone, 

Later today, at 3.30pm, the Thursday Seminar Series welcomes David Plunkett (Dartmouth). The talk will be, as usual, in the RSSS Auditorium (room 1.28). Title and abstract are below. 

Other events in the day include: 

- A grads-only pre-talk session with the speaker in room 6.68 at 2:00pm;

- Afternoon tea in the School of Philosophy tearoom at 3:00pm;

- Drinks at Badger & Co at 5:00pm;

- Dinner at Blu Ginger at 6:30pm, half-subsidized for grad students (put your name down here if you would like to join).

Title: Topic Continuity, Realism, and The Objects of Philosophical Inquiry

Abstract: Some philosophical inquiry is directed at our thought and talk about a subject matter (e.g. how to understand the nature of moral thought, or our concept of consciousness), while other philosophical inquiry is directed towards understanding the “things themselves” (e.g. the nature of moral facts and properties, or of consciousness itself). This paper considers the methodology of the latter, “object-level” type of inquiry. We introduce a contrast between two ways of structuring this kind of inquiry. One alternative structures inquiry by focusing on those entities picked out by our existing concepts. For example, on this approach, moral inquiry would be inquiry into the parts of reality (if any) that are picked out by our actual moral concepts. We motivate an alternative approach, where object-level inquiry is directed at those explanatorily and/or normatively important kinds which are “in the topical vicinity” of our actual concepts. One way to see the usefulness of this approach is to contrast the differing significance of two “nihilist” hypotheses: nihilism about the stuff picked out by our actual moral concepts, vs. nihilism about explanatorily and/or normatively important kinds in the topical vicinity of “morality.” We then draw on the account of topic continuity we developed in our paper “Topic Continuity in Conceptual Engineering and Beyond,” to argue that whether a given kind counts as being in the “topical vicinity” of (e.g.) “morality” is a context-sensitive matter, which rests in large part on a certain set of priorities for inquiry of the conversational participants. We conclude by explaining how the methodology we develop here smoothly motivates a range of inquiries in conceptual ethics. [This is joint work with Tristram McPherson (Ohio State).]

[Note: All visitors (faculty, graduate students, undergraduates) are welcome to join for dinner. Faculty dine at a rate of ~$30.00 AUD, and graduate students and undergraduates at a rate of roughly $15.00 AUD.]

See you all there later today.

Best,

Osman.