Philsoc Next Week (18/11)

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Matthew Maguire

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Nov 14, 2025, 1:08:36 AM (8 days ago) Nov 14
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Hi everyone, 

The PhilSoc seminar next week (18/11) will be Jeremy Strasser’s presubmission talk! Please find the title and abstract below. As always, the seminar will be held in room 6.71 on the top floor of the RSSS from 3-4:30, and the zoom link can be found below the title and abstract. 

Kind Regards,

Matt and Corey

 

A Problem for Foundational Theories of Inductive Inference on Propositions 

Some kinds of claim cannot be supported without inductive inferences from empirical evidence—for instance, substantive predictions about the future, or substantive claims about the laws of nature. However, from some set of empirical evidence, inductive inferences can support those kinds of claims.

 I turn these plausible suggestions into desiderata for foundational theories of inductive inference. (Foundational theories are those where all assumptions and empirical evidence are stated explicitly.) For example, foundational theories should not recommend substantive predictions about the future without empirical evidence. But given some empirical evidence, they should recommend some substantive predictions about the future.

 Where the basic empirical evidence and hypotheses involved are propositions (sets of possibilities), I show that these desiderata are incompatible. I start with predictions about the future on the basis of empirical evidence about the past. (I draw on the spirit of Russell's (2023) account of what it takes for a proposition to be about the future or about the past.) Then I generalise to the case of any propositions that "go beyond" the evidence.

 There are some similar arguments in the literature (Titelbaum 2010; Norton 2019). I aim to improve upon them by making the argument clearer and more motivated. In particular, I display the connections to a certain kind of Empiricism.

 If the argument is right, then the basic empirical evidence and hypotheses cannot be propositions in any foundational theory of inductive inference.

 

 Zoom Link:

https://anu.zoom.us/j/82325020132?pwd=EQ32lxjAj5RPh6CkpxedvgTDpjaycJ.1





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Upcoming Philsoc:

18/11: Jeremy Strasser – Presubmission

25/11: Available

02/12: Ned Lis-Clarke – Presubmission

Matthew Maguire

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Nov 17, 2025, 7:15:37 PM (5 days ago) Nov 17
to anu-philosophy
Hi all, 

Just a reminder that this is on today!

All the best,

Matt

Corey McCabe

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Nov 17, 2025, 11:00:01 PM (4 days ago) Nov 17
to 1matthews...@gmail.com, anu-philosophy

Hi all,


Please find attached the handout for those on Zoom!

 

Kind regards,

Corey

 

From: anu-phi...@googlegroups.com <anu-phi...@googlegroups.com> On Behalf Of Matthew Maguire
Sent: Tuesday, 18 November 2025 11:16 AM
To: anu-philosophy <anu-phi...@googlegroups.com>
Subject: [ANU-philosophy] Re: Philsoc Next Week (18/11)

 

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Jeremy Strasser - A Problem for a Foundational Theory Inductive Inference v7.1 - Good to go!.pptx
A Problem for Foundational Theories of Inductive Inference on Propositions - Reference Handout.docx
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