PhilSoc Reminder (14/10)
Corey McCabe
Hi everyone,
The PhilSoc seminar next week (14/10) will be from Shimpei Endo (USyd)! Please find the title and abstract below. As always, the seminar will be held in room 6.71 on the top floor of the RSSS from 3-4:30, and the zoom link can be found below the title and abstract.
Also, we still have available slots towards the end of October (21st and 28th). Please let us know if you’re interested in presenting.
Kind Regards,
Matt and Corey
Vaguemaker
Vagueness has been bothering philosophers with its associated paradox of the sorites (a.k.a. the heap, the bald man). I have a suggestion: why do not we introduce truthmakers when we discuss vagueness?
This suggestion is built upon two observations.
The first observation is that truthmakers help us understand what truth is. When we talk about the nature of truth, there are several good reasons to think that truth is the totality of things (typically, propositions) being made true by something. We may call whatever these things that make propositions true truthmakers. This approach has two major advantages: explanation (as it clarifies what truth is) and flexibility (as it does not require adopting a particular view on semantics or metaphysics).
The second observation is that truth and vagueness have many things in common --- Truth and vagueness apply to the same kinds of things (their bearers, such as propositions); The debate about vagueness is a debate about semantics and, most notably, about truth; Truth also has its own associated paradox (the liar) and many philosophers suggested unified solutions toward both the liar and sorites.
This is where my suggestion comes in: What is vague is made vague by something. What makes it vague is a certain sort of truthmaker. We may even call them vaguemakers, if not afraid of a new notion.
What truth and vagueness have in common is that they both have entities responsible for their being so --- truth being true or vagueness being vague. What distinguishes them is that vagueness is the totality of wrecked truths --- truths that undergo some troubles in their truthmaking --- underspecifying, overspecifying, conflicting, interrupting, and fragmenting are just few examples of many ways of making vague. I show that importing the truthmaker framework into the vagueness debate offers the same two advantages --- explanation and flexibility --- by demonstrating how it can provide multiple solutions to the sorites paradox.
Zoom Link:
https://anu.zoom.us/j/82325020132?pwd=EQ32lxjAj5RPh6CkpxedvgTDpjaycJ.1
Upcoming PhilSoc:
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14/10/25 |
Shimpei Endo |
Open to all |
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21/10/25 |
Available |
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28/10/25 |
Available |