ANU Thursday Seminar -- Oct 16

[Nuhu Osman Attah]

Hello Everyone, 

This week, the Thursday Seminar Series welcomes Heidi Hurd & Michael Moore, who will be presenting on October 16th, at 3:30pm, in the RSSS Auditorium (room 1.28). Title and abstract are below. Michael and Heidi have kindly included a draft of the book chapter they will be presenting, attached below.

Other events in the day include: 

- A grads-only pre-talk session with the speaker in room 6.68 at 2:00pm;

- Afternoon tea in the School of Philosophy tearoom at 3:00pm;

- Drinks at Badger & Co at 5:00pm;

- Dinner at Bistro Nguyen's at 6:30pm, half-subsidized for grad students (put your name down here if you would like to join).

Title: The Impropriety of Punishing Negligence in a Liberal State

Abstract: On the suppositions that criminal punishment requires blameworthiness and that blameworthiness requires culpability in addition to wrongdoing, the issue raised about punishment for negligently caused harm is whether and how inadvertent but unreasonable risk-taking (i.e., negligence) makes a wrongfully acting agent culpable. The concepts of negligence and of criminal negligence are initially examined, albeit very briefly, before the central problem is raised: how can inadvertent risk taking be culpable when by definition there is no choice (intent or belief) by the wrongdoer to take such a risk? H.L.A. Hart’s answer to this is then introduced, namely, that there is a culpability of unexercised capacity in addition to the culpability of choice and that negligent actors have the former kind of culpability even though they lack the latter. A more extensive analysis is then undertaken, first, of what it means to advert to a risk, and second, what it means to have the capacity to advert to a risk. A familiar counterfactual notion of capacity is defended, raising the question as to the proper antecedent of such a counterfactual in the case where the consequent is, “would have adverted.” We isolate a plausible antecedent to the relevant counterfactual in terms of four defects of the negligent actor: clumsiness, stupidity, selfishness, and weakness of will. We then examine the questions of whether all of these are moral defects, and whether, if they are, they are merely aretaic defects of character that are unlike the mental states of choice grounding deontic culpability. Finally, we defend the view that a properly liberal state should not punish merely aretaic defects and thus, not merely negligent actors. We close by showing why this moral thesis is not as revolutionary of current criminal law practice as it might seem.

[Note: All visitors (faculty, graduate students, undergraduates) are welcome to join for dinner. Faculty dine at a rate of ~$30.00 AUD, and graduate students and undergraduates at a rate of roughly $15.00 AUD.]

Best,

Osman.