Philsoc Next Week
Matthew Maguire
Hi everyone,
The PhilSoc seminar next week (04/11) will be from Krisztina Orbán (University of Tübingen)! Please find the title and abstract below. As always, the seminar will be held in room 6.71 on the top floor of the RSSS from 3-4:30, and the zoom link can be found below the title and abstract.
Kind Regards,
Matt and Corey
On Referring: The Beginning
When does referential behavior emerge in ontogeny and phylogeny? The standard answer is that referring requires language. A different answer is that referring already appears in non-human animal communication. I argue that referential behavior is uniquely human but that it emerges prior to the development of language, both in ontogeny and in phylogeny.
In this talk, I examine the strongest candidates for non-human referential behavior, drawing partly on existing literature and partly on novel cases. I discuss behaviors such as beckoning, honeyguide interactions, begging, and even pointing among non-human primates, in comparison with human pointing behavior. I compare human and non-human primate pointing and elaborate on the relevant differences (Leavens 2004). To clarify these differences, I propose to compare begging, showing, and pointing gestures. Non-human primates readily understand begging and showing gestures, such as lifting an object to display it (e.g., Grice’s example of presenting St. John’s head on a plate). However, pointing is cognitively and communicatively more complex. Research suggests that showing emerges earlier than pointing in human development (Ruether & Liszkowski 2024), reinforcing the idea that pointing requires distinct cognitive and social abilities that only develop later. I explain the advantages of pointing over showing or simply looking when used for referring—behaviors already displayed by chimpanzees and bonobos.
In this discussion, I use pointing to encompass not only Referential Pointing but also to other forms of non-referential pointing that serve different communicative or cognitive functions. When pointing is discussed in the philosophy of language (Kaplan 1978; Stojnić et al. 2013; Dickie 2015), it is usually restricted to pointing that fixes or shows the referent of a demonstrative expression such as this or that. I argue, however, that there are multiple forms of pointing, and this is only one among them. Most discussions—including those by Augustine, Wittgenstein, Kaplan, and Stojnić—focus only on a special use of pointing, such as pointing in language acquisition or for demonstratives, yet their general claims are often treated as if they are applicable to pointing in general.
I argue that infants between 9 and 15 months of age already demonstrate referential behavior through their use of referential pointing (Tomasello et al. 2007; Liszkowski & Tomasello 2011; Carpenter et al. 1998; Liszkowski et al. 2007; Tomasello 2010; Leavens et al. 1996; Shatz & O’Reilly 1990; Leavens et al. 2005; Shwe & Markman 1997; Orbán 2025). By this stage, infants are capable of employing pointing gestures to express themselves. In the literature, referential pointing is often treated merely as proto-referential behavior rather than as genuine referring, or else referring itself is treated as exclusively linguistic behavior (cf. Davidson 1977, 1979; Bates et al. 1975; Strawson 1959). Referential pointing, in particular, involves joint attention to indicate a referent, either declaratively (e.g., “This is interesting”) or imperatively (e.g., “Give me that”). An incorrect response typically prompts corrective behavior from the signaller until the intended action occurs. I employ several strategies to argue that referential pointing qualifies as genuine referring, including showing that it passes the standard tests for reference.
Zoom Link:
https://anu.zoom.us/j/82325020132?pwd=EQ32lxjAj5RPh6CkpxedvgTDpjaycJ.1
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Upcoming Philsoc:
04/11: Krisztina Orbán - open to all